ONCA 2025

The appellant challenged property and costs aspects of a family law judgment after an 11-day trial.

The court found only a minor arithmetic error in deducting valuation-date debt, increasing the equalization payment by $4,250.

All remaining grounds, including tracing, exclusions, RESP treatment, post-separation adjustments, and costs, were rejected.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment granting enforcement rights to the respondent mortgagee.

The motion was denied on all four relevant considerations: no intention to appeal within the appeal period, unsatisfactory explanation for delay, prejudice to the responding party given the moving party's repeated violations of court orders and illegal repossession of the property, and lack of merit in the proposed grounds of appeal.

The applicant, convicted of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his adopted daughter and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, sought release pending appeal pursuant to s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous, as there was a serious issue regarding whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the relevance of the complainant's admitted fabrication of a prior criminal allegation against her mother.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and the length of the sentence, the reviewability interest outweighed the enforceability interest given the arguable ground of appeal challenged the credibility evaluation central to the conviction.

Public safety concerns were mitigated by the applicant's three-year compliance with his bail plan.

The motion was granted and the applicant was ordered released on conditions.

The applicant, convicted by a jury of historical sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would attend court but argued detention was necessary in the public interest given the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and outstanding breach charges.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding the trial judge's exercise of exclusionary discretion over relevant defence evidence, that the breach allegations had a problematic foundation reducing their weight, and that the applicant's age, health problems, and long history of compliance with release conditions favoured release.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The moving party sought a stay pending appeal of orders striking her trespass action as an abuse of process and granting the responding party vacant possession of a mortgaged property.

The moving party had previously been evicted following a default judgment but illegally re-entered the property.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found no serious issue to be tried, as the moving party's action was a clear collateral attack on the default judgment.

The balance of convenience favoured the responding party due to mounting arrears and the moving party's illegal occupation.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

Appeal from dismissal of breach of contract claim for attendant care services.

The appellant alleged an oral agreement modifying a fixed-rate compensation arrangement, claiming a balance owing of over $576,000.

The trial judge found no documentary evidence of the oral agreement, ruled certain evidence inadmissible, and found invoices and timesheets to be exaggerated or fabricated.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis or conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from an order setting aside a property transfer and granting a vesting order to the bankruptcy trustee.

The motion judge applied the interests-of-justice test, finding that while the moving party formed an intention to appeal within the appeal period and the initial delay was understandable, the four-month delay in bringing the motion was unexplained and prejudicial to the bankrupt estate.

The proposed grounds of appeal were found to be entirely lacking in merit, as the claims of unfair deprivation of a witness were unsupported and the evidence sought to be relied upon did not qualify as fresh evidence.

The extension of time was denied and costs were awarded to the responding party.

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay damages for sexually assaulting the respondent after administering the drug temazepam without her knowledge.

The appellant argued the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, provided insufficient reasons, and erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted a thorough credibility assessment, provided extensive reasons capable of appellate review, and properly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunne because the appellant failed to put his version of events to the respondent during cross-examination.

The moving party, a church, sought an injunction restraining the termination of its commercial lease by the landlord pending its appeal of a decision validating a 30-day notice of termination.

The Court of Appeal granted the injunction, finding that the interpretation of conflicting lease amendments raised a serious issue to be tried, the church would suffer irreparable harm due to its extensive charitable operations and the risk of the appeal becoming moot, and the balance of convenience favoured the church as it continued to pay rent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $520,096.35 under a mortgage loan.

He argued the mortgages were forged, the respondent failed to provide required statements, and the respondent lost the right to sue for the debt by selling the properties after commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and noting the appellant failed to provide trial transcripts.

The Court also clarified that exercising a power of sale, unlike foreclosure, does not preclude a mortgagee from suing for the debt.

The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in giving a restrictive corrective instruction.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could not find a key Crown witness fabricated her evidence about the appellant's confession because defence counsel did not explicitly put that suggestion to her in cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no breach of the rule occurred as the tenor of the cross-examination made the defence's position clear.

Furthermore, the corrective instruction erroneously usurped the jury's function by prohibiting them from considering whether the witness fabricated the confession.

The curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent in the underlying family law proceeding sought to have the appellant declared a vexatious litigant under r. 2.2.02(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court had already dismissed the appellant's motion for fresh evidence, review motion, and appeal with costs to the respondent.

The motion judge found that, with no ongoing proceeding remaining before the court, there was no jurisdiction to grant the vexatious litigant order, and dismissed the motion without prejudice to renewing it in the Superior Court or in respect of any future proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the time from when the second trial date was set until the first offered trial date available to defence counsel should have been apportioned rather than treated entirely as defence delay, but held that the time from the July 2022 proposed trial date to the second trial date was properly defence delay.

With the corrected apportionment, the net delay fell just under 30 months, below the presumptive ceiling, and no stay was warranted.

Appeal from convictions for dangerous driving causing death, five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failure to comply with a term of bail.

The appellant argued the trial judge's jury charge failed to distinguish between the actus reus and mens rea of the dangerous driving offences, risking conflation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the charge generally followed the model instruction in Watt's Manual, clearly instructed the jury on both the objective dangerousness of the driving and the marked departure standard, and when read as a whole equipped the jury to decide the case.

The jury question about the Highway Traffic Act definition of dangerous driving did not indicate confusion about the instructions.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his application for an extension of time to appeal a speeding conviction under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

He had been convicted in absentia after failing to attend his trial due to illness and his paralegal's failure to appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of an extension of time to appeal in proceedings under Parts I and II of the Act, as established by binding precedent.

Motion by the appellant for an extension of time to perfect an appeal from an order refusing to set aside the striking of the appellant's pleadings in family law proceedings.

The motion was dismissed as contrary to the interests of justice.

The moving party had a long-standing pattern of non-compliance with court orders, including failure to provide financial disclosure and failure to pay substantial costs orders.

The appeal lacked merit as the motion judge's findings were entitled to deference and the appellant's admitted failure to pay costs orders alone was fatal to the appeal.

Substantial indemnity costs awarded to the responding parties.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing its claim for insurance coverage under a Builder's Risk Policy.

The motion judge found the roof collapse was caused by frost heaving, an excluded peril under the policy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding summary judgment was appropriate where the respondent's expert evidence was uncontested, the frost or freezing exclusion applied, and the doctrine of nullification did not render the exclusion unenforceable because the policy still covered other perils.

The appellant, a 58-year-old family friend, was convicted of sexually assaulting the 17-year-old daughter of his close friend and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying the W.(D.) principles, and finding a lack of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the adolescent victim, and the severe impact of the offences.