ONCA 2025

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter after shooting two men outside a nightclub.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting evidence obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, misapprehending eyewitness testimony, improperly assessing the provocation defence, and refusing to grant a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 18-year parole ineligibility period as proportionate.

The moving party, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant and prohibited from filing further materials without leave, sought leave to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The underlying action involved allegations of improper disclosure of confidential youth records by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed notice of appeal contained the same fatal flaws as her previous pleadings and failed to raise tenable grounds.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal, finding that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the respondent would suffer prejudice.

The motion for leave to file a notice of appeal was dismissed.

The applicant pleaded guilty to exercising control over a person providing sexual services and was sentenced to time served plus probation.

More than three years later, he brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing his plea was involuntary due to harsh custodial conditions and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, provided no reasonable explanation for the delay, and raised grounds of appeal that lacked merit.

The moving party sought an extension of time in family support enforcement proceedings after repeated prior litigation.

Applying extension criteria, the court found no merit and characterized the proposed appeal as another collateral attack on long-settled support issues, amounting to abuse of process.

The moving party insurer sought an extension of time to file materials for leave to appeal and a stay of a Divisional Court order requiring it to pay $365,257 for home modifications under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The responding party, a 92-year-old woman with catastrophic injuries, required the funds to modify her daughter's home for her care.

The Court of Appeal granted the unopposed extension of time but dismissed the stay motion.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the insurer failed to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the responding party given her advanced age, poor health, and immediate need for the benefits.

The applicant sought release pending appeal from manslaughter conviction and sentence.

The court accepted the appeal was not frivolous, surrender and safety concerns were manageable, and public confidence favored review before immediate enforcement in the circumstances.

Release pending appeal was ordered on agreed terms.

After obtaining an order requiring security for costs, the moving party sought dismissal when the ordered deposit was not paid by the deadline.

The responding parties provided no substantive opposition and did not show a compelling reason to avoid dismissal.

The court dismissed the appeal and fixed costs.

The appellant challenged orders in bankruptcy proceedings including standing rulings, estate consolidation, and treatment of approved claims.

The court found no right of appeal under s. 193(a) or (c) of the BIA, declined leave under s. 193(e), and held the appellant had not timely invoked available statutory claim-challenge mechanisms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, FedEx, appealed an order certifying a class proceeding brought by the respondent, who alleged FedEx charged undisclosed and unsolicited customs brokerage fees in breach of the Consumer Protection Act.

FedEx argued the claim disclosed no cause of action, lacked common issues, and had an overly broad class definition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the systemic nature of the billing practices raised common issues, and the class definition appropriately included claims that might face limitation or jurisdictional defences, which are better addressed at trial.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The proposed intervener coalition sought leave to intervene in an employment-contract appeal concerning enforceability of termination provisions.

The court held the coalition would provide a distinct perspective on the effects of termination clauses on vulnerable and low-wage workers and granted leave on terms aligned with a prior intervener order.

The applicant sought release pending appeal from convictions and an eight-year sentence for sexual offences.

The court accepted that the appeal was not frivolous and that attendance and safety concerns were manageable, and then found the grounds clearly surpassed the non-frivolous threshold when balancing enforceability and reviewability in the public-interest analysis.

Release pending appeal was granted.

Two defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding substantial damages for breach of fuel-delivery contracts and for inducing breach.

The court upheld findings that Remote breached contract and good faith duties, that Wasaya induced the breach, and that mitigation findings were available on the record.

However, it held the trial judge erred by not applying the contractual limitation clause, reducing Remote’s liability to $50,000 while leaving Wasaya liable for $856,458.

The applicant sought bail pending conviction and sentence appeal.

Although the court accepted that the appeal was not frivolous and that surrender could be expected, it held detention remained necessary in the public interest.

Repeated breaches of release conditions, further offending while on bail, and the enforceability and public safety components of the test required continued detention.

The moving party sought panel review of two single-judge motion decisions: one requiring security for costs and payment of costs, and one refusing leave to obtain and file a transcript for the review.

The panel held that no error in principle, unreasonable result, legal error, or misapprehension of evidence was shown.

Both review motions were dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

The self-represented moving party sought leave to appeal the striking of his summary conviction appeals, which were dismissed for failing to acquire transcripts.

He brought a motion seeking a waiver of the transcript requirement, relying on pseudo-legal arguments regarding his status as a 'natural person' and international law.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the transcripts were necessary to adjudicate the appeals, the moving party failed to prove financial inability to acquire them, and his constitutional and international law arguments were without merit and not properly before a single judge.

The moving parties brought a motion to transfer part of an appeal to the Divisional Court, extend the time to perfect the appeal, and stay the trial judgment pending appeal.

The underlying dispute involved three brothers and a jointly owned residential investment property, resulting in a trial judgment that dismissed a breach of contract claim and ordered partition and sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to transfer, opting to combine the appeals under section 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to avoid inconsistent results.

The court granted the extension of time to perfect the appeal and granted a stay of the partition and sale order pending appeal, finding serious issues to be tried and a risk of irreparable harm.

The appellant real estate developers sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) regarding a cost-sharing dispute with an electricity distributor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding the OEB had merely provided an opinion and had not exercised a statutory power of decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the OEB's interpretation of the Distribution System Code to resolve the parties' complaint constituted a final, binding decision under its exclusive statutory jurisdiction.

As such, the decision was of a sufficiently public character to attract public law remedies, including certiorari, and constituted the exercise of a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and detained at CAMH, appealed a Review Board disposition continuing his detention despite being designated as alternate level of care.

The appellant proposed a conditional discharge with a Young clause and treatment compliance conditions, or alternatively, living with family due to a lack of community housing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board failed to properly consider the proposed safeguards, did not adequately inquire into family accommodation, and based its risk assessment on speculative concerns and unsupported assumptions.

The Court also overturned its previous decision in Negash regarding the enforceability of hospital readmission under section 672.93(2) of the Criminal Code.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.