Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-07-29
Docket: COA-25-CV-0014
Coram: L.B. Roberts, R. Pomerance, M. Rahman JJ.A.

Between

Paradigm Change Consulting Inc., Balwant Bhandal, Goginder Bhandal and Navneet Bhandal
Plaintiffs (Respondents)

and

Navdeep Singh Boparai, Lu Vesta Group of Companies Limited, Verance Development Corporation, Rhombi North Bay Development I LP, Rhombi North Bay Development II LP, Lotus North Bay General Partner I Inc., and Lotus North Bay General Partner II Inc.
Defendants (Appellants)

Appearances:
Navdeep Singh Boparai, acting in person
Sukhjinder Bhangu, for the appellants
Shayan Kamalie and Michael Campbell, for the respondents

Heard: 2025-06-10

On appeal from the judgment of Justice M. Claire Wilkinson of the Superior Court of Justice, dated December 16, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 7068.

Reasons for Decision

[1] The appellants appeal from the judgment granted to the respondents.[1] The appellants submit the motion judge made numerous reversible errors including that she did not properly analyze the evidence, misapprehended and disregarded the evidence, inappropriately made findings of credibility, and gave insufficient reasons. They argue that she erred in granting partial summary judgment because there were triable issues, including issues of credibility, that required a trial for their determination. Finally, they say she erred in continuing the Mareva injunction and failing to allow the sale of 744 Lakeshore Road (the “Lakeshore property”) to proceed.

[2] At the conclusion of oral submissions, we advised the parties that the appeal was dismissed with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.

[3] The appellant, Navdeep Singh Boparai, is a former mortgage broker whose licence was revoked in 2018 because of his fraudulent dealings with clients. Mr. Boparai is the sole owner and officer and/or director of the corporate appellants whose primary purpose was to purchase real estate holdings for Mr. Boparai.

[4] Mr. Boparai and the respondents, a married couple now in their late 70s (the “parents”) and their adult daughter, are related by marriage. He persuaded them to invest over $1 million in various investment schemes that he orchestrated through his corporations. The respondents’ investment funds included $600,000 obtained through a home equity loan on the parents’ home, as well as substantial funds that their daughter provided through her company, the corporate respondent, Paradigm Change Consulting Inc. When the respondents’ first investment in a private mortgage loan came due, the appellants convinced the respondents to reinvest in a condominium development in North Bay, Ontario, which included the Lakeshore property (“the North Bay project”). The respondents subsequently discovered that the development was owned by two of the corporate appellants. This development never came to fruition. The respondents also provided Mr. Boparai with another $400,000, which they understood was being placed in a family trust. Other than a payment of $95,200 to assist the parents with the interest on their home equity loan, the appellants returned no further funds to the respondents.

[5] The respondents commenced an action against the appellants to recover the funds owed to them by the appellants and obtained a Mareva injunction over and preventing the sale of all the appellants’ assets, including the North Bay project. They brought two motions: one for summary judgment, and one to amend their Statement of Claim. The appellants brought a cross-motion to dissolve the Mareva injunction entirely, or, in the alternative, permit the sale of the Lakeshore property only as an exception to the injunction.

[6] The motion judge granted the respondents’ motion to amend their Statement of Claim, partially granted the motion for summary judgment, and continued the Mareva injunction over the North Bay property, declining to allow the sale of the Lakeshore property. She found that the appellants, through Mr. Boparai, had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to take the respondents’ money. Her key conclusions appear at paras. 137-139 of her reasons:

[137] The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Boparai engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation in his dealings with [the respondents]. He admitted at his cross-examination that he did not have [the respondents’] original investment funds owed to them at the time that [the respondents] invested in the North Bay project. The exchange of funds that Mr. Boparai orchestrated made it appear that [the respondents] were receiving and then re-investing their funds in the North Bay project, when in fact they never actually received the funds.

[138] I find that Mr. Boparai knew that the representation to [the respondents] that he was returning $1,354,101 to them in June 2019 was false. He knew he did not have their funds available to return to them at that time. [The respondents] relied upon Mr. Boparai’s assurances that he was returning their investment funds to them when they made the decision to immediately re-invest the same funds with Mr. Boparai in the North Bay project.

[139] [The respondents] have suffered damages as a result of the false assurances and promises that Mr. Boparai made to defraud them. Balwant and Goginder Bhandal have not had their life savings returned to them, nor has Ms. Bhandal received any of her invested funds returned to her.

[7] The motion judge rescinded the North Bay investment agreement and required the appellants to repay the respondents the amount of $1,272,222 with respect to the North Bay project investment, as well as the $400,000 advanced to Mr. Boparai for the family trust, minus the $95,200 Mr. Boparai paid to the parents prior to the proceedings.

[8] The motion judge ordered the appellants to repay the amount of $1,617,679.53 to the respondents and directed that there be a trial of the issues of what further damages, including punitive damages, and prejudgment interest are owing to the respondents.

[9] With respect to costs, the motion judge found that Mr. Boparai’s “reprehensible, scandalous and outrageous conduct” warranted the award of substantial indemnity costs to the respondents up until the time that the motion materials and facta were exchanged. She awarded the respondents costs in the amount of $89,205.16, payable by the appellants within 30 days.

[10] We do not accept the appellants’ argument that the motion judge erred in granting partial summary judgment to the respondents. There were no triable issues or issues of credibility concerning the amounts that the appellants admitted owing to the respondents which required a trial. Nor is there any remote possibility that ordering a trial of the discrete remaining issues will result in inconsistent findings or any prejudice to the appellants.

[11] In determining whether there was a genuine issue requiring a trial, the motion judge did not exceed her powers under r. 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, which permitted her to: i) weigh the evidence; ii) evaluate the credibility of a deponent; and iii) draw any reasonable inference from the evidence. The motion judge determined that there was sufficient information before her “to make findings of fact and apply the law to the facts to reach a fair and just determination on the merits”. She found that Mr. Boparai “engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation in his dealings with [the respondents]” and that the respondents suffered damages as a result of his actions. Those findings were open to the motion judge on the record.

[12] We do not see any reversible error in the motion judge’s clear and cogent reasons, with which we agree. As demonstrated by her thorough and careful reasons, the motion judge’s findings and conclusions are rooted firmly in the record, including Mr. Boparai’s admission that he owed monies to the respondents. Her reasons more than adequately explain how and why she came to her decision based on the evidence that she was entitled to accept.

[13] We also reject the appellants’ contention that the motion judge erred in continuing the Mareva injunction and not permitting the sale of the Lakeshore property. There is no dispute that the motion judge applied the correct test. Her findings of Mr. Boparai’s past fraudulent conduct and the respondents’ lack of protection from further fraudulent conduct by Mr. Boparai and/or his corporations if the injunction were lifted and the property permitted to be sold, amply justified her decision that the Mareva injunction should remain in place.

[14] In sum, the appellants do not raise any errors in principle or in law. They allege that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in her findings of fact. The appellants’ complaint, at its core, is that the motion judge accepted the respondents’ evidence in preference to the appellants’ version of events. As such, their grounds of appeal amount to a request that this court reweigh the evidence and redo the motion judge’s findings. That is not our task. We see no basis to intervene.

[15] The appeal is dismissed.

[16] The respondents are entitled to substantial indemnity costs. This appeal had no merit. The appellants repeated the same arguments rejected by the motion judge and sought to retry the motion. The respondents should not have been put to the expense of responding to this appeal. They are therefore entitled to their substantial indemnity costs of the appeal from the appellants in the all-inclusive amount of $26,000.

“L.B. Roberts J.A.”
“R. Pomerance J.A.”
“M. Rahman J.A.”

Note

[1] At the commencement of the appeal, the appellants sought an adjournment of the appeal because they had discharged their counsel, which we denied. The appeal had been expedited and was peremptory on the appellants. The prejudice to the respondents (Balwant and Goginder Bhandal are elderly) from any further delay was palpable. The appellants had terminated their counsel’s retainer on the eve of the appeal. All appeal materials had already been filed. The appellants’ counsel attended at the hearing and with the appellants’ agreement, remained to assist the appellants as and if they required. There was no basis for the requested adjournment.