ONCA 2024

The moving party, Binance Holdings Limited, sought an order under ss. 6(2) and (3) of the Courts of Justice Act to join two appeals: one to the Divisional Court from an OSC decision and another to the Court of Appeal from a Divisional Court decision.

Binance argued the appeals were "in the same proceeding" and combining them would serve the administration of justice.

The Ontario Securities Commission opposed, arguing the appeals were distinct and combining them would cause delay and bypass appellate hierarchy.

The court granted the motion, finding the appeals were in the same proceeding due to identical parties, facts, legal issues, and legal origin (investigation order and summons).

The court also found that combining the appeals would allow for a full and final resolution of the jurisdictional issue, mitigate the risk of inconsistent findings, and secure a just, expeditious, and least expensive determination of the issues.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a release and minutes of settlement executed by an employee after termination.

The core issue was whether the settlement documents released the employee's claim for damages related to vested stock units.

The motion judge found the vested stock units were not released, concluding the settlement made little economic sense otherwise.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in law by allowing the factual matrix to overwhelm the clear and broad language of the settlement documents, misapplying the guidance on narrow construction of releases, and improperly evaluating the economic benefits of the settlement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgment for the employee and granting judgment in favour of the employer, finding the vested stock units claim was released.

This appeal concerned a request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) regarding LCBO theft/shoplifting incidents.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) had ordered the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) to disclose the records, but the Divisional Court set aside that order, finding the adjudicator's decision unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal, stepping into the Divisional Court's shoes, found the IPC adjudicator's decision to be reasonable.

The court affirmed that the adjudicator correctly applied the "reasonable expectation of probable harm" standard of proof for FIPPA exemptions and that her reasons were adequate, even with confidentiality constraints.

The Court also declined to consider new statutory arguments not raised before the adjudicator.

The appeal was allowed, restoring the IPC's original disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions: the appellant's request for an extension to perfect his appeal of a May 2024 judgment and leave to appeal a July 2020 order, and the respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance.

The Court granted the appellant an extension to perfect his appeal, citing his recent hospitalization and administrative delays in the Superior Court.

However, the appellant's motion for leave to appeal the 2020 order was dismissed due to significant delay, lack of coherent explanation, and low likelihood of success, as the order was made by consent.

The respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal was adjourned.

The appellant, J.E., appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three significant legal errors in assessing the evidence of a defence witness (the complainant's mother).

These errors included applying the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to individual items of evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof on the defence, and requiring independent corroboration for defence testimony.

The Court held that these errors were not inconsequential, as the defence witness's testimony, though peripheral, could have contributed to a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility or reliability.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

This is an appeal from a trial judge's finding of unlawful conversion and an award of punitive damages against the appellant, a lawyer, who intentionally deposited the respondent's insurance cheque into his personal bank account without authority.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence (bank statements) on appeal to challenge the trial judge's findings regarding mortgage payments, but the motion was dismissed as the evidence failed the reasonable diligence test and would not have been conclusive.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, dismissing the appeal and affirming the finding of unlawful conversion and the award of damages.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a trial judge's decision on fraudulent conveyance and oppression claims.

The trial judge had found oppression but did not rule on fraudulent conveyance, basing the oppression finding on a theory not pleaded or argued.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons legally insufficient, internally inconsistent, and procedurally unfair, as the decision was based on an unpleaded "reasonable expectation" of a reserve fund.

The court determined it could not conduct a de novo analysis or substitute findings due to credibility issues and the record not inevitably yielding a particular outcome.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the trial judgment set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants' appeal was allowed.

The Court of Appeal addressed the disposition of costs for a motion previously heard in the Superior Court.

The appellants sought $20,098.48 for the motion costs.

Applying s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed the motion costs at the requested amount and ordered them payable to the appellants by the respondents, conditional on the appellants' success in the ongoing main action.

The court noted the respondents' original motion had a low prospect of success.

The appellant was convicted of importing a controlled substance (cocaine) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude a prior exculpatory statement under the Edgar exception, the application of the W.(D.) analysis, or the treatment of circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the trial judge's imposition of a sentence at the low end of the established range for cocaine importation, and clarified the reconciliation of the Cunningham sentencing range with the proportionality principles emphasized in Parranto.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, willfully altering computer data, and making available intimate images without consent, stemming from a "revenge porn" incident.

He appealed his convictions on three grounds: that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in concluding guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principles of burden of proof, did not misapprehend the evidence given the strong circumstantial case, and was entitled to find the appellant's text messages constituted implied admissions.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition.

The appellant challenged the Board's decision to issue a detention order instead of a conditional discharge, and argued that two specific conditions of the detention order were overly restrictive.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it reasonable given the appellant's significant threat to public safety and the joint submission of the parties.

However, the court found two conditions to be unreasonably restrictive: the requirement for "supervised" accommodation and the need for hospital consent for communication with his mother in addition to her own consent.

The appeal was allowed in part, striking the word "supervised" from the accommodation condition and removing the hospital consent requirement from the communication condition.

This is a Crown appeal concerning a stay of proceedings entered by a summary conviction appeal judge due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The respondent's sexual assault conviction was quashed by the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in calculating the net delay by mischaracterizing certain periods.

Specifically, the Court determined that a significant period of delay, previously attributed to the trial judge's unavailability or defence delay, should be considered discrete exceptional circumstances arising from an unforeseen witness issue and the Crown's reasonable efforts to mitigate.

The Court concluded that the net delay, when properly calculated, fell below the Jordan ceiling of 18 months for matters in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, the conviction was reinstated, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination of other outstanding issues.

The appellant sought to overturn convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle, drugs for trafficking, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and challenged the total 10-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued misapprehension of evidence regarding the firearm's location.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the judge's reasoned assessment of witness credibility despite inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal contended errors in applying the totality principle and the correct sentencing range for recidivist firearms offenders.

The Court affirmed that sentencing ranges are flexible and that the imposed sentence was proportionate, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences involving guns and drugs, and the offender's extensive criminal record, while acknowledging mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for a resulting trust and the granting of the respondents’ claim for partition and sale of a property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the resulting trust claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act, lacked material corroboration under the Evidence Act, and would have been rebutted by evidence of a gift.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's claim for compensation for work done on the property and the order for partition and sale.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

This appeal addressed the correct analytical approach to interpreting a consent judgment, an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The case involved estate litigation concerning the sale of a farm, where the parties had signed Minutes of Settlement and a Consent Judgment.

The application judge had interpreted the Consent Judgment using a dictionary definition, concluding the farm sale provision was not included and that the appellants had repudiated the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal held that consent judgments should be interpreted using contractual principles, considering surrounding circumstances, but found the application judge's error immaterial as the Consent Judgment selectively incorporated terms from the Minutes of Settlement, excluding the farm sale.

The Court also upheld the finding that the respondents had accepted the appellants' repudiation of the Minutes of Settlement.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the determination of assets in a deceased's estate.

The Court of Appeal set aside the motion judge's order, finding several errors.

The motion judge erred by relying on trust principles without a determined estate representative, misapplying the "one economic unit" concept to presume equal sharing, making flawed credibility findings based on an uncross-examined witness, and making conflicting factual findings.

The appellate court emphasized that complex factual and credibility issues, especially with voluminous records, require oral evidence and that pending applications should be consolidated and heard together after the determination of a valid will or intestacy.

The appellant, Dailean John, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him an active participant rather than a mere bystander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude he played a culpable role given the evidence of the victim's confinement in his apartment and his awareness and control over her movements.

The appellant also sought to appeal his sentence, arguing it was unfit due to its impact on his Permanent Resident status and potential deportation.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, holding that reducing the sentence to avoid deportation would result in an unfit sentence given the seriousness and aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant, B.B., appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged error by the trial judge in finding a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and giving a prejudicial jury instruction, and an error in the jury instruction regarding the use of the complainant's prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the Browne v. Dunn rule, as there was no unfairness or prejudice to the witness or the trial process, and the resulting jury instruction was prejudicial to the appellant.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The second ground regarding prior consistent statements was not decided but the court reiterated important principles on their admissibility and proper jury instructions.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, assault, and assault by choking, along with breaches of court orders, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the high enforceability interest due to the seriousness of the crimes and the applicant's history of violating court orders designed to protect the complainant, which outweighed the reviewability interest, as the grounds of appeal were not strong.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possessing proceeds of crime after a trial judge admitted evidence despite a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The police delayed the appellant's access to counsel for nearly ten hours, based on an operational plan to secure search warrants first.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by underestimating the impact of the breach on the appellant's security of the person.

The Court concluded that the breach was serious and deliberate, outweighing society's interest in admitting the evidence, and ordered the exclusion of the gun and cash, leading to acquittals.