ONCA 2024

The appellant, Oleksandr Ostashkov, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to breaking and entering and possession of stolen property.

He sought to strike his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to parental pressure.

He also appealed his sentence, claiming it was unduly harsh, particularly the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's finding that the plea was voluntary, noting that while parental pressure was a factor, it did not negate his volitional decision, which was also influenced by new incriminating evidence.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed, determining it was neither demonstrably unfit nor based on an error in principle, and upheld the restitution order.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, Anjanette Passmore, appealed a Superior Court judgment granting summary judgment in favour of the City of Hamilton, dismissing her claim against the City.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the established principles for partial summary judgment, which is appropriate only in rare circumstances.

The court noted that granting partial summary judgment in this case did not result in efficiencies, as the issue was raised late in the proceedings and required adjudication of the same issues and evidence as would be required at trial against the remaining defendants.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court of Justice for trial.

This is an appeal from a trial decision concerning parenting time and decision-making responsibility.

The appellant father sought to change the shared parenting arrangement, alleging parental alienation, and requested a 90-day "protective separation" for the children to reside solely with him.

The trial judge dismissed this request, finding the existing arrangement to be in the children's best interests, and awarded costs to the mother.

The father appealed the trial decision and the costs award, also seeking to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upheld the trial judge's findings, declined to admit fresh evidence, and refused leave to appeal the costs award, emphasizing the narrow scope of appellate review in parenting disputes and the principle that post-trial events are typically addressed through variation procedures rather than appeal.

The appellant, found Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for manslaughter, appealed the Ontario Review Board's detention order for failing to include a community living term.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable because it did not adequately balance all factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, specifically the appellant's reintegration into society and mental condition, beyond public safety concerns.

The court emphasized the importance of including a community living term to address housing waitlists and facilitate long-term reintegration, even if not immediately exercisable, especially when there is no evidence of public safety risk.

The appeal was allowed, and the disposition order was amended to include a community living term with conditions.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment ordering payment on a promissory note.

The appellant had defaulted on the loan and filed no evidence on the motion for summary judgment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment and refused to stay execution pending a third-party claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision, as the respondent's evidence supported an independent contract and the appellant failed to provide contradictory evidence.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal where VAC Developments Limited's counterclaim against Mr. Williams was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed VAC's appeal from that judgment.

Mr. Williams sought full indemnity costs for the appeal and a fresh evidence motion, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding no grounds for a heightened award.

For the fresh evidence motion, which was occasioned by an unsupported allegation in Mr. Williams' factum, the court awarded reduced costs to Mr. Williams and also to Mr. Lakhani, a third party who intervened, acknowledging their partial responsibility for the motion's necessity.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The parties settled the costs of the appeal, agreeing that the respondent would pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $75,000.

This is an appeal from a family law judgment where the trial judge dismissed the appellant's claims for equalization of net family properties, a declaration of trust over the matrimonial home, and spousal support.

The trial judge granted the respondent exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, an unequal division of net family properties (resulting in no equalization payment), and $75,000 in damages for physical and psychological abuse, among other relief.

The appellant raised multiple issues on appeal, including alleged errors in financial findings, domestic abuse allegations, and the validity of a prenuptial declaration, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to admit the fresh evidence and finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings, particularly due to the appellant's failure to provide a trial transcript.

The appellant, Brian Kumar, brought a second appeal seeking to set aside a default order for support arrears, arguing that a Mareva injunction impacted his ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the lower courts' consideration of the Mareva injunction.

Both the original hearing judge and the first appeal judge had expressly considered its impact, and the appellant had failed to rebut the statutory presumption regarding his ability to pay.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Blake Robson, appealed a global sentence of five years' incarceration for drug trafficking and breach of a release order, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his Métis heritage (Gladue factors).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's analysis, noting that while the judge considered the principles from R. v. Kehoe and R. v. F.H.L. regarding the relevance of Indigenous heritage even if disconnected or not causally linked to the offence, there was no evidence on the record that systemic, background, or intergenerational factors related to the appellant's Indigenous heritage contributed to his involvement in the criminal justice system or impacted his moral blameworthiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the beneficial ownership of four residential properties and a costs award.

The trial judge had found that funds advanced by the respondents were investments, not loans, and made findings on beneficial ownership and renovation quality based on witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings due to the high deference owed to such findings and the appellants' failure to provide a complete trial record.

Leave to appeal the costs award was denied as it was out of time and did not meet the high threshold for granting leave.

The court also rejected a new argument raised on appeal concerning the Statute of Frauds, as it was not raised at trial and the necessary record was incomplete.

The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, alleging material non-disclosure.

The Crown had requested an adjournment of a Charter motion, citing a police officer's medical unavailability.

Fresh evidence revealed the officer was facing criminal charges, which were not disclosed to the defence.

The appellant asserted he would not have pleaded guilty if aware of these charges.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence's admissibility, the material non-disclosure, and that it likely influenced the plea.

The Court of Appeal accepted these concessions, allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial.

The plaintiff, Cary Beazley, brought a motion to review a single motion judge's order of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion for an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of his medical malpractice action.

Beazley alleged negligence by physicians for failing to timely diagnose and treat Lyme disease.

The Court of Appeal panel reviewed the motion judge's decision, applying a deferential standard of review, and found no legal error or misapprehension of material evidence.

The panel upheld the motion judge's finding that the proposed appeal lacked arguable grounds, as the expert evidence did not support Beazley's claims regarding Lyme disease testing accuracy or the standard of care.

The review motion was dismissed without costs.

This appeal concerned a defamation action where the motion judge struck out claims.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by taking an overly technical approach to pleadings, specifically regarding the pleading of special damages for one appellant and failing to grant leave to amend for the other appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order striking out claims was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to file a further amended statement of claim.

The respondent, a retired teacher, commenced a defamation action against the school board and its chair after the chair stopped her presentation at a public meeting and subsequently made media statements characterizing her comments as transphobic and questioning the right of trans people to exist.

The appellants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, allowing the defamation claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in his weighing analysis by failing to consider the public interest in the appellants' speech, a fresh weighing demonstrated that the harm suffered by the respondent outweighed the public interest in the chair's speech, which had mischaracterized her actual remarks.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Peter Wu, appealed the dismissal of his motion to add parties and amend his claim, and the dismissal of his action on summary judgment, with costs awarded against him.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered dismissing the appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it to be frivolous and vexatious.

The court determined that the appellant's lengthy and unarguable submissions, containing unparticularized allegations of conspiracy and fraud, had no chance of success.

Upholding the motion judge's finding that the appellant was a vexatious litigant, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Layla Hassan, appealed a judgment concerning Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, upon review of the materials and with the consent of both parties, dismissed the appeal without costs.

The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) appealed a lower court's interpretation of its standard-form "feed-in-tariff" (FIT 1) contracts with solar energy suppliers.

The dispute centered on whether suppliers breached contracts by "optimizing" their facilities (installing more efficient solar panels) without IESO's consent, specifically regarding changes to DC energy capacity and DC/AC ratio.

The application judge found that consent was only required for features outlined in the application or contract cover page, which did not include DC capacity or DC/AC ratio.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, dismissing IESO's appeal, finding no reversible error in the application judge's reasoning regarding contract interpretation or the impact of optimizations on metering plans.

This is an appeal from a family proceeding where the appellant sought to overturn the motion judge's decision to terminate spousal and child support obligations for the respondent due to his retirement, and to increase her spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the respondent's retirement was reasonable, that spousal support should be terminated due to material change in circumstances and the appellant's improvident financial decisions, and that child support for the youngest child should end by August 2023.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs award.

The appellant, Sergio Grillone, brought a motion to vary a previous decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any error of law or misapplication of discretion by the motion judge.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.