Court and Parties
Court: COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO Date: 20210728 Docket: C67378
Between: Her Majesty the Queen Respondent
And: Dwayne Brown Appellant
Before: Rouleau, Pepall and Roberts JJ.A.
Counsel: Paul Calarco, for the appellant Brendan Gluckman, for the respondent
Heard: March 16, 2021 by video conference
On appeal from the conviction entered on February 12, 2019, by Justice Dino DiGiuseppe of the Ontario Court of Justice.
Pepall J.A.:
A. Introduction
[1] The police obtained a general warrant to make covert entries into a storage locker used by the appellant and rented under a false name. The police discovered cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, alprazolam and Canadian currency in the locker. The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of the proceeds of crime, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.
[2] At trial, the appellant was convicted after unsuccessfully applying to quash the general warrant based on s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Before this court, the appellant argues that the reviewing judge applied the wrong standard in considering whether the warrant was valid and that the requirements of s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 were not met. Moreover, the test in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 favoured exclusion of the seized evidence. He asks that the warrant be quashed, the evidence obtained excluded, and an acquittal entered.
[3] For the following reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.
B. Facts
[4] The Thunder Bay Police Service received information from seven confidential informants (“CIs”) that the appellant and two associates were selling cocaine at the Royalton Hotel in Thunder Bay. Surveillance was conducted which confirmed the information provided by the CIs and which led to a storage locker where it was believed drugs and other evidence of trafficking would be located. The appellant and his associates were observed in vehicles rented by them going to and from the storage locker and entering and exiting the locker with various bags.
[5] The police applied for, among other things, a general warrant to covertly enter and search the storage locker. In the information to obtain (“ITO”), Detective Constable Bartol was the affiant. He set forth the basis for his belief that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant and his two associates had committed the subject offences.
[6] D.C. Bartol outlined information received on the appellant and his drug dealing activities since 2007, his arrests and charges for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking in 2008 and 2011, his guilty plea and conviction of the former and withdrawal of charges in the latter, and his continued active trafficking in cocaine assisted by Romariando Meggoe, whose street name was “Cash”, and another unidentified male known as “Money”.
[7] Police investigation revealed that the appellant had rented a grey Toyota vehicle and Mr. Meggoe a black Chevrolet Malibu and a green Volkswagon Jetta, and the police obtained other identification particulars associated with the vehicles.
[8] D.C. Bartol described in detail the information obtained from the seven CIs in the summer and autumn of 2017, four of whom had previously provided information to the police. In addition, much of the information provided was corroborated by independent investigation by the police.
[9] CI No. 1 advised that the appellant, who went by the name “Marshall”, was in town selling cocaine with a few other black males. They were driving a new grey or silver car. The appellant was using a cell phone and his number was provided. He recruited women to sell for him and was the main guy selling hard and soft cocaine. CI No. 2 said that the appellant was back in town and dealing cocaine out of the Royalton Hotel. CI No. 3 stated that the appellant was back in town, using the phone number identified by CI No. 1, his “boy” who was black, in his 20’s, and skinny with short hair, went by the street name “Cash”, and CI No. 3 saw “Cash” with coke a couple of days prior.
[10] CI No. 4 reported that the appellant was driving a rented silver Toyota Camry and was usually in the company of two other black males, one of whom was “Cash”. The appellant had two phones, moved around and used hotels and met people in parking lots. CI No. 5 reported that there were two black guys in town who were usually at the Royalton Hotel bar dealing three to four times a week. They supplied drugs to friends who lived there, and two named individuals dealt drugs for them. They were trying to get people to sell cocaine for them. The owner did not want them selling in the bar, so they went outside to deal and did all the drug dealing behind the bar. The black guys in the bar had a boss named “Marshall” who was not seen in the bar very often.
[11] CI No. 6 reported that there were black males selling crack cocaine at the Royalton and that the informant had bought drugs from them. CI No. 6 identified a photo of Mr. Meggoe as “Cash”. CI No. 7 stated that two black guys from Toronto were selling coke and crack at the Royalton almost every day, hanging around the bar. They went by the names “Cash” and “Money”. “Cash” was about 5’7”, black, and skinny with short hair and a nose piercing. They sold crack that was prepackaged, wrapped in a plastic bag. They always had lots of coke on them and kept it in their pockets. They met people behind the building in the back lane to make the deal.
[12] D.C. Bartol also reported on the surveillance conducted at the Royalton and other locations on August 23, September 7, 21, and 26, 2017. This revealed three black males engaging in apparent drug dealing activities and using the three vehicles noted. On September 21, 2017, following suspected drug transactions at the Royalton, a black male got into the Volkswagen Jetta vehicle believed to be rented by Mr. Meggoe, and drove in a manner consistent with attempting to lose anyone trying to follow to a residence at 25 Melon Street. The vehicle remained for about 20 minutes and then returned to the Royalton Hotel.
[13] On September 26, 2017, the police conducted surveillance at 25 Melon Street where the Volkswagen Jetta was parked outside. A black male carrying a white “Old Navy” bag, and identified as Mr. Meggoe, exited the building, got into the vehicle, and drove to Nor-Shore Storage where he went to storage locker number 316 and placed two bags inside. He then picked up a female at Confederation College, drove to the Thunder Bay airport, went into the terminal for a period of time, exited, dropped the female off at Confederation College, and returned to 25 Melon Street. Thirty minutes later he drove to the airport again, returned the Volkswagen Jetta, and entered the terminal where he checked a dark bag.
[14] On September 28, 2017, the police determined that storage locker 316 was rented to a male named Mark James who had paid cash and had produced a driver’s licence on July 31, 2017. However, on investigation, there was no person with that name and date of birth on the CPIC file or the MTO database.
[15] The storage facility surveillance system on July 31, 2017 showed a black male paying for the rental of the storage locker and exiting the passenger seat of the silver Toyota rented by the appellant, and on August 7, 2017, two men were seen exiting the same silver Toyota at storage locker 316 and placing a black pack sack inside.
[16] On October 3, 2017, the police installed a camera with a clear view of the front of storage locker 316.
[17] As the reviewing judge summarized:
On October 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 19, a silver vehicle was observed parking near the storage locker. Black males were observed on these dates, often more than once on the same date, removing bags from the vehicle and taking them to the storage locker, and removing bags from the storage locker and placing them in the vehicle. On three occasions, a male believed to be Mr. Brown is seen exiting the driver’s side of this vehicle. Each visit to the locker is brief, and the door to the locker is continually shut behind these individuals in an effort to conceal their actions.
[18] Armed with this information, D.C. Bartol outlined in the ITO why he had reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of drug trafficking, telecommunication devices, evidence of money laundering and proceeds of crime would be obtained from the storage locker while at the same time preserving the integrity of the investigation. He believed that the information provided by the CIs when taken in totality was compelling, credible and corroborated. Physical surveillance at the Royalton Hotel had provided observations consistent with hand to hand drug trafficking; physical and video surveillance of the storage locker had shown on numerous occasions that bags were placed inside and taken out of locker 316. Each stay at the locker was brief and the door continually pulled closed behind them.
[19] D.C. Bartol set out the objectives of the application, namely: to gather sufficient evidence of the full scope of the drug network, learn the stash locations, identify the persons assisting with drug transactions or exchanges, identify the couriers of drugs and money, and to seize evidence to support trafficking charges against the appellant, Mr. Meggoe and “Money” and any co-conspirators.
[20] He addressed the three components of s. 487.01(1), stating that he believed “that the covert interception of one or more of the drug shipments and currency shipments will provide police with evidence to further their investigation while at the same time preserving the integrity of the ongoing criminal investigation.” He expressed his belief that it was in the best interests of the administration of justice to issue the warrant. The investigation was ongoing and a conventional search warrant would by its nature likely terminate the investigation as the main targets would be immediately notified that they were the subject of a police investigation. He noted his belief that no other statutory provision would permit the technique contemplated by the general warrant.
[21] He believed that the appellant, Mr. Meggoe and “Money” were utilizing the storage locker to store the majority of the drugs and money and concluded by stating: “I believe that there will be further evidence collected from the storage locker that will further support the charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking.” He proposed 15 conditions and sought authorization to covertly enter and search the storage locker from November 9, 2017 to January 8, 2018.
[22] A general warrant was granted by the issuing judge on November 9, 2017, and on November 22, 2017, police covertly entered and searched the storage locker, finding cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, alprazolam and Canadian currency. This was the only entry made.
[23] The appellant was arrested on December 14, 2017. A search of his room revealed the key for storage locker 316. “Money”, who was identified as Novado Fraser, was arrested later that day at the airport. A search of his luggage revealed 11 ounces of cocaine. A search of a cell phone seized from the appellant on his arrest revealed text messages between the appellant and Mr. Fraser as Mr. Fraser was arriving in Thunder Bay.
[24] The appellant was charged and subsequently tried, and convicted. As mentioned, at trial, he unsuccessfully challenged the general warrant.
C. Reviewing Judge’s Reasons
[25] The reviewing judge found that the ITO, as amplified by the cross-examination of D.C. Bartol, was sufficient to afford the issuing judge reasonable grounds to issue the general warrant. In addressing the requirement for reasonable grounds to believe an offence has taken place and that evidence of a crime would be found in the storage locker, he stated that the standard was one of reasonable probability, and did not rise to the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As the reviewing judge, he was to inquire whether there was a basis upon which the issuing judge could be satisfied that the necessary preconditions to issue the warrant existed.
[26] After instructing himself on the law, he noted that the ITO depended on two planks: the information collected from CIs and the information generated directly by police surveillance and other investigative techniques. Neither plank was independently capable of justifying the grant of the warrant. The reliability of the police investigation, particularly with respect to the storage locker, was strong but the information provided by the CIs required scrutiny pursuant to R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140. Even if it were trustworthy, there remained the question of whether that information together with that collected by the police investigation objectively established the reasonable grounds to issue the warrant. He concluded that the CI information was compelling, credible and corroborated. The information was detailed in identifying the street names of the sellers, the location of the drug transactions, the vehicle descriptions, the cell phone number used by “Marshall”, that “Marshall” recruited women to sell the drugs, the drug packaging and pricing, and the frequency of the transactions. In addition, each CI provided information from August, September and October of 2017 and described the interactions and the individuals involved with similar particularity.
[27] The reviewing judge found that the issuing judge had ample information available to determine the credibility and reliability of each CI based on the information in the ITO. Finally, the CI accounts were corroborated by the police observations of suspected drug transactions behind the Royalton Hotel, the grey Toyota and the Volkswagen Jetta involved in the suspected transactions and found to be rented by the appellant and Mr. Meggoe respectively, and the cell phone number associated with the appellant. He noted that the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In this case, the information was compelling and corroborated in every material respect.
[28] He described how the surveillance video at the storage locker revealed that: the locker was rented by someone likely using a false name with false identification; the vehicles rented by the appellant and Mr. Meggoe were seen at the storage locker; significant activity was noted with each visit to the locker, particularly the movement of bags or packs between the vehicles and the storage locker; the appellant and Mr. Meggoe were present and accessing the storage locker; and the individuals observed appeared to be trying to conceal their actions.
[29] The reviewing judge stated that D.C. Bartol believed that the general warrant was needed to continue the investigation and ultimately uncover the full extent of the drug operation. He was cross-examined at length. The reviewing judge stated that the police believed that there were no other provisions in the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament that would provide for a warrant permitting the investigative techniques sought. The reviewing judge concluded that the ITO, as amplified by the cross-examination of D.C. Bartol was sufficient to afford the issuing judge reasonable grounds to issue the general warrant. He accordingly dismissed the appellant’s s. 8 Charter application.
D. Analysis
[30] Section 487.01(1) of the Criminal Code addresses the three requirements that need to be met to obtain a general warrant. That subsection provides:
487.01 (1) A provincial court judge, a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge as defined in section 552 may issue a warrant in writing authorizing a peace officer to, subject to this section, use any device or investigative technique or procedure or do any thing described in the warrant that would, if not authorized, constitute an unreasonable search or seizure in respect of a person or a person’s property if:
(a) the judge is satisfied by information on oath in writing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament has been or will be committed and that information concerning the offence will be obtained through the use of the technique, procedure or device or the doing of the thing;
(b) the judge is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the administration of justice to issue the warrant; and
(c) there is no other provision in this or any other Act of Parliament that would provide for a warrant, authorization or order permitting the technique, procedure or device to be used or the thing to be done.
[31] Boiled down to its basics, the issuing judge had to be satisfied that (i) there were reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had been or would be committed and that information concerning the offence would be obtained through the use of the general warrant, (ii) it was in the best interests of the administration of justice to issue the warrant, and (iii) there was no other federal statutory provision that would provide for a warrant permitting the technique or thing sought to be done.
[32] In R. v. Ha, 2009 ONCA 340, 96 O.R. (3d) 751, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 295, MacPherson J.A. discussed s. 487.01 in some detail noting, at para. 26, that it focuses not on authorizing specific techniques but rather on whether the public interest in authorizing the specific investigative technique in issue is sufficiently strong in the circumstances to overcome an individual’s constitutional right not to be subject to an unreasonable search or seizure.
[33] In Ha, this court held that a covert entry and search falls squarely within the meaning of an “investigative technique or procedure” under s. 487.01. The subsection (c) requirement was met in that case because no provision in any other federal statute would authorize an unlimited number of covert entries and searches on private property over a two-month period. This court, at para. 42, accepted the proposition put forward by Frankel J.A. in R. v. Brand, 2008 BCCA 94, 229 C.C.C. (3d) 443, at para. 51, that there was “nothing wrong in utilizing a general warrant to obtain information with a view to gathering additional and possibly better evidence than that which could be seized immediately through the execution of a search warrant.” Subsection (b) was met as the evidence obtained by the police in Ha strongly pointed to the accused having a major role in a drug laboratory and the warrant was not merely a “fishing expedition”. The authorization of multiple entries and the 59-day duration of the warrant, on the facts of that case, were considered to be reasonable. The court was also satisfied that the conditions attached to the general warrant were “explicit, clear and narrowly drawn” as described in R. v. Brooks (2003), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 361 (Ont. C.A.).
[34] In R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 56, in concurring reasons, Moldaver J. noted that subsection (c) is designed to ensure that the general warrant is used sparingly as a warrant of limited resort and, citing S.C. Hutchison et al., Search and Seizure Law in Canada (loose-leaf), at p. 16-40.3, to guard against it becoming “an easy back door for other techniques that have more demanding pre-authorization requirements”.
[35] At para. 77, he addressed the test under s. 487.01(1)(c), stating:
The test under s. 487.01(1)(c) must consider the investigative technique that the police seek to utilize with an eye to its actual substance and not merely its formal trappings. The provision must be interpreted so as to afford the police the flexibility Parliament contemplated in creating the general warrant, while safeguarding against its misuse. As the facts of this case illustrate, there is a need for heightened judicial scrutiny where Parliament has provided an authorization for an investigative technique that is substantively equivalent to what the police seek but requires more onerous preconditions.
[36] The appellant advances four arguments in support of his position that his s. 8 Charter rights were violated and also urges this court to conclude that under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Grant test favours exclusion of the evidence seized.
[37] First, he submits that the reviewing judge erred by applying the wrong standard for reasonable grounds and that there were insufficient grounds before the issuing judge to support a general warrant. In that regard, he argues that the ITO only disclosed possibilities, not a reasonable probability that the covert entry into the storage locker would reveal evidence of offences as required by s. 487.01(1)(a). The evidence before the issuing judge did not show that the use of a covert entry would produce evidence to support a charge. He asserts that the ITO contained conditional language such as “if controlled substances are located”, “should the police discover a large quantity of drugs”, and that the reviewing judge used phrases such as “[i]t was hoped” and “police hoped” which imply reservation, not likelihood.
[38] In addition, he argues that the timing of the ITO detracted from there being any reasonable probability of evidence being found. The CIs provided information in the August to October timeframe and camera surveillance of the locker ended on October 19, yet the warrant was issued on November 9, 2017.
[39] I do not agree with these submissions.
[40] The reviewing judge’s first task, which he recognized and applied, was to consider whether the issuing judge had a basis on which to issue the warrant: R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at p. 1452. He also correctly set out the standard for reasonable grounds as one of reasonable probability or credibly-based probability: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at pp. 167-68; Debot, at p. 1166. The reviewing judge’s use of the word “hope” in his reasons was in the context of summarizing some of D.C. Bartol’s evidence and the ITO, and it was not his articulation or application of the standard of reasonable probability.
[41] After a detailed review, the reviewing judge was satisfied that there was a basis upon which the issuing judge could be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to support the issuance of a general warrant. Although D.C. Bartol used some conditional terminology, he clearly set out in the ITO that the police believed that drugs and other evidence of trafficking would be located in the storage locker. He also testified that he believed the police had reasonable and probable grounds for a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 warrant and a conventional search warrant. The reasonable and probable grounds were supported by the information provided from the CIs and the police investigation. Reviewing the ITO and D.C. Bartol’s evidence in totality, it is hard to see how any other conclusion could be reached.
[42] As for timing, in this case, the appellant and Mr. Meggoe had been using the storage locker for months, since July 31, 2017. In October, the month preceding the ITO, they were observed accessing the storage locker at least 12 times. Although it was put to him multiple times in cross-examination, D.C. Bartol did not agree that it was “common” for drugs to be moved between stash locations to evade police or prevent seizure, only that it happened sometimes out of precaution. When the general warrant was issued on November 9, 2017, only a few weeks after the last observation, it was reasonable to believe that information concerning the offences would still be found there.
[43] I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
[44] Second, the appellant submits that the reviewing judge applied the wrong legal test under s. 487.01(1), treated the police request as being for a conventional warrant, and neglected to consider all of the components of s. 487.01(1). Counsel particularly emphasized the failure of the reviewing judge to address the best interests of the administration of justice element found in s. 487.01(1)(b).
[45] It is the case that, consistent with the submissions of counsel, the reviewing judge placed emphasis on the reasonable grounds requirement found in s. 487.01(1)(a) and did not explicitly use the term “best interests” in his reasons. However, he referred to s. 487.01(1) as a whole and dealt with the issue of best interests in the context of the argument made before him. In submissions before the reviewing judge, defence counsel had argued that it would only be in the interests of justice to permit entry to the storage locker if there were a reasonable basis to believe evidence would be located there and that it was not in the interests of justice to go on a fishing expedition. The reviewing judge clearly found that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that evidence would be located in the storage locker, thus implicitly negating any suggestion of a fishing expedition.
[46] Defence counsel also submitted that “the interests of justice and the no other provision authorizing” blurred together although he would try to keep them distinct.
[47] The reviewing judge expressly addressed the third element or “no other provision authorizing” element of s. 487.01(1) noting that D.C. Bartol had stated that “there were no other Acts of Parliament or provisions in the Criminal Code that would authorize a warrant permitting the techniques or procedures needed to conduct this particular investigation.” This lends further credence to the conclusion that the reviewing judge did not overlook the three elements of s. 487.01(1) including the best interests requirement. Although it would have been preferable if the reviewing judge had expressly referenced this element, reading his reasons as a whole, he implicitly considered the best interests of justice. As he stated at p. 23:
The CIs and the information they provided, were worthy of belief. The police investigation, from corroborating the CIs information to locating the storage locker, was unassailable. It followed a linear and logical path from one step to the next. While the focus of the investigation commenced at the Royalton Hotel, it inevitably shifted to the storage locker. The information in the ITO, as amplified by the cross-examination of Detective Constable Bartol, set out those investigatory steps taken, the objectives of the investigation and the need for a general warrant to surreptitiously enter the storage locker, obtain evidence and continue the investigation.
[48] D.C. Bartol had also explicitly addressed the best interests requirement in the ITO. He believed it would be in the best interests of the administration of justice to issue the proposed general warrant because the investigation was ongoing and the execution of a conventional warrant would likely terminate the investigation, as the main targets would be immediately notified that they were the subject of a police investigation. The reviewing judge referenced the need for surreptitious entry and concluded that “[n]othing in the ITO, nor in Detective Constable Bartol’s evidence in cross-examination, persuades me, as a reviewing justice, that seeking a general warrant in these circumstances, was inappropriate.”
[49] Turning to the appellant’s third argument, he submits that the warrant permitted potentially unlimited covert entries over a 60-day period and as such, could not meet the best interests of the administration of justice requirement under s. 487.01(1)(b). He argues that the conditions of the warrant should have been explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn. Section 487.01(3) of the Criminal Code provides that:
(3) A warrant issued under subsection (1) shall contain such terms and conditions as the judge considers advisable to ensure that any search or seizure authorized by the warrant is reasonable in the circumstances.
[50] This argument was not made by the appellant before the reviewing judge and is raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, although the facts of each case differ, there was judicial precedent for such a time period (see Ha, at para. 51; Brand, at para. 14; and R. v. Lucas, 2014 ONCA 561, 121 O.R. (3d) 303, at para. 186, leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 460, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 461). In addition, D.C. Bartol explained the need for 60 days to uncover the bulk amount of hidden controlled substances and the full drug operation, and to add to the success of the investigation while preserving its integrity. Here the targets had rented the storage locker for months and in October alone, had accessed it at least 12 times. As this court noted in both Ha and Lucas, an authorization under s. 186(4)(e) of the Criminal Code to intercept private communications similarly may be valid for up to 60 days. The time was reasonable in the circumstances, and the 15 conditions were clear and sufficiently narrow.
[51] Fourth, the appellant submits that the purpose of the covert entry, namely the collection of evidence, could have been accomplished by other means such as a production order for past text messages and numbers called and an authorization to intercept private communications under Part VI of the Criminal Code. He argues that in pursuing a general warrant, the police were attempting to make an end run around these more demanding and time-consuming provisions.
[52] I do not accept this submission.
[53] Even though the police might have gathered some evidence under a conventional search warrant, production order, or authorization to intercept communications, this does not preclude reliance on a general warrant: see e.g. Brand, at paras. 50-51; Ha, at paras. 42, 52. In Telus, Moldaver J. confirmed that his approach to s. 487.01(1)(c) has nothing to do with investigative necessity: at para. 100. In addition, at para. 102, he clarified that:
[U]nder the “no other provision” test, the police are not asked to show why an alternative authorization would not work on the facts of a particular case, but rather why it is substantively different from what Parliament has already provided. Though the fact that an alternative authorization will satisfy the investigative objective of the police may be helpful as a factor in demonstrating its substantive equivalence, the inquiry under the “no other provision” test remains focused on the latter point, not the former. If the police successfully make this showing, the inquiry under s. 487.01(1)(c) ends. [Emphasis in original.]
[54] MacPherson J.A. similarly stated in Ha, at para. 43:
The focus in the s. 487.01(1)(c) analysis is not on whether there are other investigative techniques that might accomplish the purported investigative purposes or goals of the police; rather, the focus is on the particular investigative technique or procedure that the police seek to utilize and whether it can properly be authorized by another provision in the Code or any other federal statute.
[55] As the appellant concedes, there is no other provision in the Criminal Code or other federal statute that would have authorized covert entries and searches at the storage locker. The other investigative techniques raised by the appellant are not, in substance, equivalent to unlimited covert entries and searches on private property. They would not allow the police to do what they sought to do in this case, namely, search the storage locker, where they believed evidence of the offences was located, without effectively terminating the ongoing investigation. The police in this case were not using the general warrant to circumvent more onerous requirements for other substantively equivalent investigative techniques.
[56] In light of my conclusion that none of the grounds of appeal relating to the alleged s. 8 breach can succeed, it is unnecessary to address the appellant’s ground relating to s. 24(2).
E. Disposition
[57] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.
Released: July 28, 2021 “S. E. Pepall J.A.” “I agree. Paul Rouleau J.A.” “I agree. L.B. Roberts J.A.”
