ONCA 2020

The appellant sued for wrongful dismissal and moved for summary judgment, arguing the termination clause in his employment contract was void for violating the Employment Standards Act.

The respondent conceded the 'Termination for Cause' provision was void but argued the 'Termination with Notice' provision was valid and severable.

The Court of Appeal held that employment agreements must be interpreted as a whole.

Because the 'for cause' provision violated the ESA, all termination provisions in the contract were rendered unenforceable, regardless of whether the employer relied on the illegal provision or if there was a severability clause.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that he owned a two-thirds share of a property.

The property was originally owned by his mother-in-law, who transferred it to herself and her daughter (the appellant's late wife) as joint tenants.

The appellant argued the property was a matrimonial home and the joint tenancy was severed upon his wife's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the transfer raised a presumption of resulting trust which was not rebutted.

Because the daughter held the property on resulting trust, she did not have an interest in the property under the Family Law Act, precluding it from being a matrimonial home.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for using a firearm while committing an offence under s. 85(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, as well as the imposition of a victim fine surcharge.

He had pled guilty to robbery with a firearm and other offences.

The Court of Appeal held that a conviction under s. 85(1)(a) is precluded when the underlying offence is robbery under s. 344, as the use of a firearm is already an essential element.

The conviction and its consecutive one-year sentence were quashed, reducing the global sentence to five years.

The victim fine surcharge was also struck down on consent pursuant to Boudreault.

The appellant pled guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession contrary to a prohibition order, obstruction of a police officer, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

At sentencing, the Crown requested a global sentence of 36 months.

The trial judge mistakenly believed the Crown sought 42 months and imposed a global sentence of 39 months.

The Court of Appeal found this misapprehension of the Crown's submissions to be an error in principle.

The appeal was allowed, and the global sentence was reduced to 33 months.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge requiring its principal to provide a personal undertaking to pay the costs of the action and appeal as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in misapprehending that the principal had agreed to provide such an undertaking.

Conducting a de novo review, the Court held that while the corporate appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario, an order for security for costs was not just in the circumstances due to the respondent's delay, the appeal not being devoid of merit, and the inappropriateness of requiring a personal undertaking from a non-party principal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against her.

She argued the motion judge erred in denying an adjournment, failing to find the mortgage charged a criminal rate of interest, and granting summary judgment despite her allegations of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the adjournment and fraud issues, and declined to hear the criminal interest rate argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

The appeal was allowed solely to correct calculation errors in the judgment amount related to an abandoned advance.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to defend the respondent kickboxing academy in an action commenced by a student.

The student alleged she was sexually assaulted by the respondent's co-owner on a return flight from a competition, and claimed the respondent was negligent in failing to supervise her.

The commercial general liability policy excluded claims arising directly or indirectly from abuse.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the only claim in the statement of claim arose from the sexual abuse incident, which was clearly excluded from coverage under the policy.

The insurer had no duty to defend.

The appellants, Ontario farmers, purchased agricultural machinery from the respondents, whose business is located in Quebec near the Ontario border.

The appellants sued the respondents in Ontario and served the statement of claim outside Ontario.

The motion judge set aside the service and stayed the proceeding, finding that the respondents did not carry on business in Ontario and therefore Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence showed the respondents solicited sales in Ontario, derived 40% of their sales revenue from Ontario, operated a mobile repair service in Ontario, and maintained a GPS system in Ontario to support the machinery sold there.

Therefore, the respondents carried on business in Ontario, establishing a real and substantial connection, and Ontario courts have jurisdiction.

The appellants and respondent entered into agreements of purchase and sale for a property to be severed.

The agreements required a second deposit upon the city's approval of the severance.

The appellants obtained approval but withheld this information from the respondent for over six months.

Upon finally informing the respondent, the appellants demanded immediate payment of the second deposit and subsequently terminated the agreements when the respondent, who was out of the country, requested an extension.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants acted unreasonably and breached the duty of good faith performance by imposing an arbitrary and impossible deadline.

The claimant, an Ontario resident, was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident in Nunavut while driving a Nunavut-plated vehicle insured by the appellant.

The respondent, the claimant's Ontario insurer, paid Ontario statutory accident benefits and sought reimbursement from the appellant under the priority provisions of the Ontario Insurance Act.

The arbitrator and appeal judge ruled in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was not an 'Ontario insurer' for the purposes of the priority dispute and that the Ontario Insurance Act could not be applied extraterritorially to a Nunavut policy for an accident occurring in Nunavut.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and theft over $5,000 for operating a large-scale Ponzi scheme that defrauded 41 victims of over $10 million.

He was sentenced to the maximum term of 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the appellant's lack of remorse and exercise of his right to trial as an aggravating factor to justify the maximum sentence.

The Court allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to 10 years' imprisonment, maintaining the restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture orders.

The appellant sought to recover costs awarded against a single-purpose corporation from its parent company, the respondent.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no basis to pierce the corporate veil or award costs against a non-party, but awarded the respondent $48,408.03 in costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, finding no abuse of process by the respondent.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, reducing it to $25,000 due to the trial judge's failure to adequately apply the principle of proportionality in a Simplified Procedure action.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and sexual assault of his then-wife, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's motive to fabricate, the meaning of a WhatsApp message, and prior disclosure to her family.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, concluding the trial judge's findings were supported by the record.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but the victim surcharge was set aside on consent.

The parties settled a wrongful dismissal action on the eve of trial for $75,000 plus costs.

When the defendants failed to pay, the plaintiff successfully moved for judgment under Rule 49.04.

The defendants appealed, arguing the settlement lacked essential terms regarding the allocation of damages and should be voided on public policy grounds due to the plaintiff's litigation tactics.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the settlement terms were clear and there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretion to enforce it.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal seeking substantial indemnity costs was also dismissed.

Following an appeal where success was divided, the parties made submissions on costs.

The appellant sought partial indemnity costs of $12,500, while the respondents sought $7,170 and no change to the motion judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs for the appeal due to the divided success, but reduced the costs awarded below from $6,000 to $3,000, payable only to the corporate respondent.

The Town of Grimsby appealed a decision declaring that a private works yard was a permitted use on the respondent's property, which was zoned as a 'Utility Zone'.

The Town argued the use must be related to a public or quasi-public utility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The zoning by-law unambiguously defined 'Works Yard' as a permitted use without restricting it to public or utility purposes, and the by-law's plain language governed.

The Ontario Plaintiff moved to quash the Quebec Plaintiff's appeal of an order dismissing a motion to stay the Ontario class action.

The Court of Appeal held that the refusal to stay the Ontario Action is an interlocutory order, not a final order, because it does not determine any substantive right to relief or substantive defence.

As the order is interlocutory, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court with leave, not to the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondents brought motions to quash the appellant's appeal of an order striking parts of her statement of claim and removing her lawyers of record.

The respondents argued both orders were interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash the appeal of the order striking the claim, finding it was final because it effectively foreclosed amendments.

However, the court quashed the appeal of the order removing counsel, confirming it was interlocutory and leave to appeal must be sought in the Divisional Court.

The appellant, a medical student, was convicted of internet child luring after initiating a sexually explicit conversation with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl in an adult chat room.

He appealed his conviction, arguing entrapment and a violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police did not provide an opportunity to commit the offence, as the appellant initiated the contact and escalated the sexual nature of the conversation despite being told the persona was underage.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's right to counsel was not infringed, as he understood his rights and consulted duty counsel.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion opposing the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's report regarding his former solicitor's accounts.

He argued the Assessment Officer lacked jurisdiction over a contingency fee agreement, the retainer violated the Solicitors Act, and the assessment should have awaited the outcome of his negligence action against the solicitor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly conducted his own analysis of the contingency fee agreement and confirmed the report, the statutory compliance argument was raised too late, and there was no basis to delay the assessment.