ONCA 2020

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their claim against their home insurer following a fire that destroyed their house and its contents.

The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the appellants failed to report a material change in risk (using space heaters instead of a wood stove) and made wilfully false statements in their Proof of Loss.

The Court of Appeal found errors in the trial judge's instructions regarding the material change in risk, but upheld the dismissal of the action because the jury's finding of 39 wilfully false statements vitiated the claim.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant relief from forfeiture due to the appellants' unreasonable conduct.

However, the court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the trial costs awarded to the insurer from $616,843.27 on a substantial indemnity basis to $430,000 on a partial indemnity basis, finding the appellants' conduct in pursuing bad faith claims was not reprehensible enough to warrant an elevated scale.

The respondent pension fund was defrauded of millions of dollars, with $3 million diverted into a company solely owned by the appellant.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for knowing assistance in a breach of trust based on wilful blindness, ordering her to pay $3 million.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by applying an objective constructive knowledge standard rather than the required subjective standard for wilful blindness.

The Court also found a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant continued to sign cheques without due inquiry, as there was no evidence linking her to cheques involving the diverted funds.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the issue of knowing receipt.

The respondent, a re-elected city councillor, filed a supplementary financial statement showing he exceeded the allowable campaign spending limit for expressions of appreciation.

Under s. 88.23(2) of the Municipal Elections Act, this triggered automatic forfeiture of his office.

The application judge granted relief from forfeiture, finding the error was inadvertent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act because s. 88.23(2) is a statutory penalty and the legislative scheme deliberately precludes such relief.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its action for delay.

The motion judge found the appellant's delay of over nine years was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the presumption of prejudice to the respondents was not rebutted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of legal principles and holding that her discretionary decision was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claims for trespass and intentional infliction of mental anguish against a security company and its principal.

The respondents had installed a security system at a home owned by the appellant, at the request of his estranged common-law partner who had exclusive possession of the home while the appellant was subject to bail conditions prohibiting his attendance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the estranged partner had the authority to permit access, precluding both the trespass and mental suffering claims.

The appellant commenced an action to recover a $50,000 deposit from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondents counterclaimed for breach of contract.

After years of delay, the motion judge dismissed the appellant's action for delay but did not address the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider that dismissing the claim left the mirror-image counterclaim alive, which was not in the interests of justice.

The dismissal was set aside and the matter remitted to the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed her conviction for breaking and entering and theft of a dog, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and based on misapprehended circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the complainant's testimony and corroborating evidence from neighbours.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his answer and amended answer in a family law proceeding due to his ongoing failure to comply with court orders regarding costs, household expenses, and financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the appellant's non-compliance to be wilful and egregious.

The court emphasized that striking pleadings is an exceptional remedy but was justified here given the appellant's repeated disregard for his fundamental obligations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, having successfully defended an appeal, sought costs of $17,818.44.

The appellant did not dispute the entitlement to costs but argued the quantum was excessive, noting he would have sought only $9,152.95 had he been successful.

The Court of Appeal agreed the requested amount was high given there was no oral hearing, and fixed the costs payable to the respondent at $9,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for damages arising from the respondent's refusal to honour the exercise of stock options.

The options were granted under a consulting agreement with a two-year term but specified a five-year exercise period.

The respondent argued the options expired six months after the consulting agreement ended, relying on an incorporated stock option plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in contractual interpretation.

The specific five-year exercise period in the grant took priority over the general termination provision in the incorporated plan.

Damages were awarded to the appellants in the amount of $2,820,000.

Following an appeal with divided success regarding an equalization payment and pension valuation, the parties could not agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the respondent was the more successful party.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's appeal costs fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The issue of trial costs was referred back to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash a municipal bylaw establishing an administrative penalty system for parking infractions.

He argued the bylaw was ultra vires, conflicted with provincial statutes, violated the Charter, and was enacted in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bylaw was explicitly authorized by statute, did not conflict with provincial legislation, and did not engage sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter as it involved no penal consequences.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment order granting specific performance to the respondent vendor after the appellant failed to close on a $3 million custom-built home.

The appellant argued the agreement was void due to misrepresentations and lack of solicitor review, and that specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement was valid and that the property's unique customizations and the flooded housing market justified specific performance rather than damages.

An application to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant mortgagor defaulted on a third mortgage.

The respondent mortgagee obtained summary judgment for the principal amount on consent, and the motion judge subsequently assessed and reduced the ancillary amounts claimed for fees, penalties, and costs.

The motion judge also granted possession to the mortgagee.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's assessment of the amounts owed or the granting of possession, and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff advanced significant sums to the defendant and his company over several years, documented by promissory notes.

The trial judge found the advances were demand loans, not investments, and held the defendant and his company liable for fraudulent activities, while dismissing the defendant's slander action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the limitation period, finding that the earliest loans from 2000 and 2001 were statute-barred under the former six-year limitation period and could not be revived by later partial payments.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the damage award accordingly, but dismissed on all other grounds, including the cross-appeal.

The appellant lawyer sought the proceeds of his client's after-the-event insurance policy to cover disbursements incurred in a motor vehicle action.

The client was a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the contingency fee agreement was unenforceable because it lacked court approval and was signed by the incapable client without the litigation guardian's involvement.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's motion for a charging order, finding the appellant merely acted as an insurance intermediary and did not recover or preserve property in the litigation.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision determining the parties' date of separation for the purpose of property equalization.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly assess credibility, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were clear, the alleged factual errors were minor and not overriding, and the bias allegation was completely unfounded.

The appellant appealed his conviction for invitation to sexual touching involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown alleged the appellant agreed to provide tattoos in exchange for sexual services.

The appellant denied the arrangement and claimed he believed the complainant was 16.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof by requiring the defence to 'convince' or 'persuade' him of exculpatory facts.

The Court also clarified the mens rea requirement for section 152 post-Morrison, holding that the Crown must prove the accused believed, was wilfully blind, or was reckless as to whether the complainant was under 16.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available, arguing that the search of his rooming house and electronic devices violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrant was not overbroad, was executed reasonably, and explicitly authorized the search of the seized electronic devices.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, incest, and sexual interference against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred by improperly relying on principles of delayed disclosure to excuse inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for his credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law, grappled with the inconsistencies, and provided reasons sufficient for appellate review.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial due to inadequate reasons.