ONCA 2020

The appellant, convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest criterion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and did not clearly surpass the not frivolous criterion.

Balancing the weak grounds, serious convictions, and lengthy sentence against the lack of flight risk and public safety concerns, the court concluded that the enforceability interest outweighed the reviewability interest, making detention necessary in the public interest.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and his sentence.

At trial, the judge rejected the testimony of a defence witness who claimed ownership of the firearm found in the car driven by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The sentencing judge erred by refusing to grant credit for harsh presentence custody conditions (lockdowns) despite agreement between the parties that such credit was warranted.

The Court granted 75 days of additional credit.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the complainant's lack of embellishment as a factor that enhanced her credibility, rather than merely noting it as an absence of a negative factor.

The Crown conceded the error but argued for the application of the curative proviso.

The Court declined to apply the proviso because credibility was the core issue at trial and the impact of the error could not be dismissed.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5000, fraud under $5000, and uttering a forged document after misappropriating over $350,000 from clients of her payroll services company.

She appealed her convictions and three-year custodial sentence, alleging errors in credibility findings, unauthorized changes to her mode of trial, unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, improper non-disclosure, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no merit in any of the grounds raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, save for setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, appealed his ten-year global sentence for multiple violent in-custody assaults, including an aggravated assault that left a victim severely brain-damaged.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, including a post-sentencing diagnosis of schizophrenia and a Gladue report that was waived at the original sentencing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the ten-year global sentence remained fit given the extreme violence, the custodial setting, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed, save for minor corrections to pre-sentence custody credit and the setting aside of victim fine surcharges.

The appellant appealed his sentence, specifically challenging a condition in a s. 161 prohibition order that prohibited contact with the adult complainant's parents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the parents did not fall within the definition of a victim under s. 161(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code.

The prohibition order was amended to remove the parents, while all other aspects of the sentence remained unchanged.

The appellant appealed his three-year global sentence for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation.

The appellant had sent hundreds of threatening messages of a sexually violent nature to his former domestic partner over two years, despite police warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the range for like offences and reflected the serious and aggravating features of the crimes.

The appellants brought a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion without costs, relying on the reasons given in a companion motion (M51732).

The Attorney General for Ontario moved to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a motion for an interim stay of the Chief Justice's order ending the COVID-19 eviction moratorium.

The appellants argued the order was final because it effectively determined their case was not justiciable and disposed of their substantive rights.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing a stay is interlocutory, as the merits of the underlying motion to set aside the Chief Justice's order remained to be determined.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against the respondents, which was deferred pending a civil action.

The civil action was settled, with the appellant agreeing not to pursue further claims.

The appellant subsequently filed a Superior Court application against the respondents and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, claiming damages for the respondents' failure to respond to the complaint.

The motion judge dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure without requesting submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to dismiss the claim without submissions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, as well as his global sentence of 660 days.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his testimony that the drugs were left by party attendees and that he received inadequate assistance as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the trial judge's conclusions well-supported by the evidence.

However, based on a Crown concession, the court allowed the appeal on one firearms count and entered an acquittal.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with several criminal offences.

The Ontario Securities Commission obtained a production order for the appellant's accounting and taxation files.

The appellant claimed solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the documents, which the application judge largely rejected.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the matter was criminal and no appeal route existed under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the production order was directed at the enforcement of a criminal order, and quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The applicant, charged with drug-impaired driving, sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued the appeal judge erred in calculating the delay by excluding the time taken by the Crown's certiorari application regarding the disclosure of drug recognition expert logs, and by selecting an incorrect end-date for the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no clear error of law or issue of significance beyond the case, as the appeal judge properly applied the Tsega framework to the certiorari delay and reasonably relied on the end-date accepted by the parties below.

The receiver brought a motion for directions to determine whether an appeal from a priority dispute order in a receivership lies to the Court of Appeal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or to the Divisional Court under the Construction Act.

The Court of Appeal held that because the motion judge's order was granted in reliance on jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, specifically a receiver's application for directions under s. 249, the appeal route is to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting the legally blind complainant's video recorded statement as her evidence-in-chief under s. 715.2 of the Criminal Code, and in excluding evidence of prior sexual history under s. 276.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or application of the W.(D.) principles, and upheld the sentence and mandatory sex offender registry order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching.

He argued the trial judge erred in evaluating credibility, treating the case as a credibility contest, finding a neighbour's evidence corroborative, and rendering inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on a second sexual touching count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The moving party sought to set aside the decision of a single judge of the Court of Appeal who dismissed his motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal.

The underlying action against the provincial and federal Crowns had been struck without leave to amend.

The panel accepted the moving party's explanation for delay but found no basis to interfere with the single judge's conclusion that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed.

The respondent insurer conducted an independent investigation into auto-collision industry fraud by intentionally damaging vehicles and submitting them to the appellants' body shops.

The respondent sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and other claims, alleging the appellants charged for unnecessary repairs and deliberately damaged vehicles further.

The appellants moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 21 based on the ex turpi causa doctrine and appealed the motion judge's refusal to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

However, the Court granted the appellants leave to amend their statement of defence to plead ex turpi causa rather than entrapment.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial dates were lost due to a lack of available judges, which the Crown argued was an 'exceptional circumstance' caused by two judges attending a compulsory education program and a third judge being unexpectedly ill.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that judicial education is a foreseeable systemic issue, not an exceptional circumstance.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the unexpected illness of one judge caused the delay in this specific case, as other priority matters were also not reached.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cannabis, arguing the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence only supported personal use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the wiretap evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion.

However, the Court noted that the appellant's criminal record incorrectly reflected a Schedule I offence instead of a Schedule II offence.

The Court ordered that the record be corrected as soon as possible.