ONCA 2020

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for breach of probation, appealed a Review Board decision continuing his conditional discharge and denying an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued there was no evidence he continued to pose a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence that the appellant lacked insight, was likely to discontinue medication, and would experience worsening persecutory delusions leading to a risk of criminal behaviour.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and attempting to distribute child pornography, and obstructing police.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on discreditable conduct evidence and by making personal observations of his hand movements to determine his physical ability to operate a cell phone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted to prove identity, and noting the appellant had expressly invited the trial judge to observe his hands during testimony.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful act manslaughter for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their 27-month-old daughter, who died of what trial experts concluded was a combination of asthma and malnutrition.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh expert evidence from a forensic pathologist and a pediatric bone disorder expert, challenging the trial evidence on the cause of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting it was highly cogent and undermined the Crown's theory of liability at trial.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the terms of an order setting aside a default judgment, which required him to pay $52,000 into court and pay costs.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the terms did not finally dispose of the dispute between the parties and were therefore interlocutory orders from which no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim to half the proceeds from the sale of a property and granting the respondent's counterclaim based on a resulting trust.

The parties were unmarried, and the trial judge found the appellant had financially exploited the respondent and contributed nothing to the property's purchase or upkeep.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption of resulting trust to the gratuitous transfer of the property interest, and affording deference to her credibility assessments and factual findings.

The appellant developer appealed the dismissal of its application to enforce a restrictive covenant limiting the size of ancillary buildings on a lot purchased by the respondents.

The covenant expired before the appeal was heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits as moot, finding no community interests or public importance to justify hearing it.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the application judge erred in awarding substantial indemnity costs to the respondents based on their offer to settle under Rule 49.10(7).

The costs award below was reduced to $20,000.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced an action against the respondent for damages for solicitor's negligence.

The motion judge struck out the claim for lack of legal capacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that under s. 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, a bankrupt's property, including causes of action, vests in the trustee in bankruptcy, depriving the bankrupt of the capacity to initiate the action.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal from a motion judge's order refusing to stay a court proceeding in favour of arbitration.

The moving party argued that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act barred the appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wellman to argue that the Huras line of cases should be overruled.

The Court of Appeal held that Wellman did not overrule Huras, affirmed that Huras was correctly decided, and found that because the motion judge had no statutory authority under section 7(5) to refuse to stay the arbitrable claims, his decision was not made under section 7.

Therefore, section 7(6) did not bar the appeal.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding the enforcement of letters of request, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondents sought costs, with one respondent relying on offers to settle the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered all parties to bear their own costs, noting that the underlying litigation in Florida was ongoing and that Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure generally does not apply to appeals.

The court found this was not a rare occasion where an offer to settle an appeal should be taken into account.

The appellant renewed his application for release pending appeal based on a material change in circumstances.

He raised a new ground of appeal arguing the trial judge erred in applying s. 276 of the Criminal Code to prevent cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior experience as a sex worker in a human trafficking prosecution.

The motion judge found this new ground had a realistic prospect of success, elevating the importance of reviewability.

The appellant was granted release on conditions including house arrest and electronic surveillance.

The appellants were convicted of traffic offences under the Highway Traffic Act after their applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter were dismissed.

The net delay in each case was under 14 months.

The summary conviction appeals judge upheld the dismissals, finding that the 18-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan applied to Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings, and that the appellants failed to show they took steps to expedite their cases or that the delay was markedly longer than reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, confirming that the 18-month Jordan ceiling applies uniformly to all provincial court proceedings, including regulatory offences, and found no error in the lower court's refusal to grant a stay.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for home invasion offences and attempting to obstruct justice.

The respondent had been sentenced to eight and one-half years for the home invasion and six months consecutive for attempting to obstruct justice by passing a note to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the home invasion sentence, finding it lenient but not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court found the six-month sentence for attempting to obstruct justice to be demonstrably unfit and increased it to two and one-half years consecutive, emphasizing that interfering with a witness normally warrants a penitentiary term.

The appellant City of Toronto appealed a trial judgment finding it liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for injuries sustained by the respondent when a glass door shattered at a community centre.

The trial judge found the City breached its duty of care because the door was made of annealed glass rather than the safety glass required by the Ontario Building Code.

On appeal, the City argued the trial judge improperly applied a strict liability standard rather than assessing whether the City took reasonable care to install the correct glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly decided the case based on the theories and issues expressly advanced by the parties at trial.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order pending his retrial for terrorist-related offences.

The bail judge had dismissed his application on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred by misapprehending a risk assessment, failing to address the applicant's present ideology, and considering irrelevant factors regarding the proposed sureties.

Fresh evidence regarding trial delay, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the applicant's rehabilitation was admitted.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on strict bail conditions including house arrest, electronic monitoring, and four sureties.

The applicant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking in 2008.

Over 11 years later, he was arrested in the United States for immigration violations and sought an extension of time to appeal his Canadian conviction, arguing his plea was uninformed regarding immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the 11-year delay excessive, the proposed ground of appeal weak, and that the applicant failed to establish that the justice of the case required granting the extension.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal support, child support, net family property, and costs.

He argued the trial judge erred in imputing income to him and under-attributing income to the respondent.

The respondent conceded minor calculation errors regarding her 2017 income and the equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal corrected the conceded errors but otherwise dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments, income imputations, and costs award were entitled to deference and revealed no errors in principle.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring a non-seasonally limited easement over their property in favour of the respondents' landlocked cottages and enjoining them from interfering with access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the deeds unambiguously granted unrestricted rights of way.

The court also rejected arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a civil context, the relocation of the easement, the test for a permanent injunction, the restriction to a single gate, and the absence of a respondent's factum at the application stage.

The judgment was varied on consent to remove the word 'prescriptive' as the easement was deeded.

The respondent, an inmate in protective custody, was severely assaulted by other inmates.

The trial judge found the Crown liable in negligence for failing to protect him, assessing damages at an agreed $1.5 million.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by finding institution-level liability rather than identifying specific negligent acts by individual employees, as required by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's reasons were conclusory, failed to properly articulate the legal test for Crown liability, and were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The respondents brought a motion to quash parts of the appeal and for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to quash parts of the appeal on a preliminary motion, leaving the issue for the panel hearing the appeal.

However, the court granted the motion for security for costs under Rule 61.06(1)(a), finding the appellant was impecunious and the appeal from an order allowing the respondents to discontinue their action appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant was ordered to post $15,000 in security.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident at a cottage where both parties were highly intoxicated.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent based on his failure to take reasonable steps and his self-induced intoxication.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant took no steps to ensure the complainant was awake and consenting, and that his belief was anchored in his own intoxication.

The appeal was dismissed.