ONCA 2020

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The court found that the applicant had at least one arguable ground of appeal regarding after-the-fact conduct instructions and lacked the ability to advance the complex appeal unrepresented.

The court also accepted that the applicant lacked sufficient financial means, finding his prior transfer of matrimonial home proceeds into trust for his children was reasonable.

The application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The appellant, convicted of criminal harassment, sought leave to appeal from a Superior Court of Justice decision dismissing his summary conviction appeal.

He also brought a fresh evidence application involving translated documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application and denied leave to appeal, finding no issue significant to the administration of justice and no merit to the proposed appeal.

The applicant sought an order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code directing a panel of the Court of Appeal to review a decision denying him bail pending trial on a charge of second-degree murder.

The bail judge had denied release primarily on the tertiary ground, finding the Crown's case strong based on video and eyewitness evidence.

The motion judge found it arguable that the bail judge committed a material error of law or fact in assessing the strength of the Crown's case without making specific findings of fact or identifying a specific basis for party liability.

The application was granted, and a review by a panel was ordered.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal a $40,000 costs order.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal properly belonged before the Divisional Court, either because the underlying order was interlocutory or because the costs order was for less than $50,000.

The single motion judge concluded that decisions on jurisdictional questions must generally be made by a panel of three judges and directed the motion to be placed before a panel.

The appellant, convicted of kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and assault causing bodily harm, brought an application for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The court found that the appellant advanced arguable grounds of appeal, lacked the capability to effectively argue them without assistance, and demonstrated a lack of financial means to retain counsel privately.

The application for government-funded counsel was granted.

The applicants, convicted of various firearms offences, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the applications based on the public interest criterion.

The motion judge found no public safety concerns, noting neither applicant had a criminal record and both had complied with previous bail conditions.

The judge also determined that the grounds of appeal were arguable and that the applicants might serve their sentences before the appeals could be heard.

The applications for bail pending appeal were granted.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought an order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code directing a panel of the Court of Appeal to review a single judge's decision denying him bail pending appeal.

The motion judge evaluated the public interest criterion under s. 679(3)(c), focusing on public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found no arguable material errors in the bail judge's conclusion that the applicant's involvement in high-level drug trafficking and access to a dangerous weapon posed significant public safety concerns.

Furthermore, the grounds of appeal, including challenges to eyewitness instructions and a Charter claim regarding a vehicle's infotainment system, were deemed relatively weak.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order giving effect to two Letters of Request from a Florida court in a defamation and conspiracy action regarding a hate mail campaign.

The appellant, an Ontario resident, argued his evidence was otherwise obtainable, the requests were unduly burdensome, lacked specificity, and resulted from a flawed foreign process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's application of the Friction Division factors and his conclusion that the evidence was relevant, necessary, and not otherwise obtainable.

The appellant appealed an order settling amounts owing pursuant to a previous family law judgment, arguing errors in the calculation of post-judgment interest on an equalization payment and seeking credit for spousal support paid.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by including spousal support in her income when calculating her retroactive child support obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no error in the interest calculation.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that under the Child Support Guidelines, spousal support received must be deducted when calculating a payor's income for child support purposes.

The appellant's motion for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence following guilty pleas to conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and committing an offence for a criminal organization.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing his pleas were uninformed because he did not instruct his counsel to agree to the joint sentencing submission.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant failed to prove his plea was uninformed, as circumstantial evidence and his own cross-examination contradicted his claims.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent solely to strike the victim fine surcharge.

The self-represented appellant appeared before the Court of Appeal and sought an adjournment to retain counsel.

The court denied the request, noting previous endorsements and communications over the summer.

The appellant then declined to make submissions.

Consequently, the appeal and all related motions, including a section 684 motion, were dismissed.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, sought a review of his detention order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

The detention order had been upheld by the trial judge under s. 523(2)(a) before a mistrial was declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown challenged the court's jurisdiction to hear the review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that s. 680(1) does not confer jurisdiction to review a bail decision made by a trial judge under s. 523(2)(a).

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash his committal for trial on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The charges arose from an undercover police operation where pre-marked buy money was used, and a subsequent search warrant executed at the appellant's residence yielded cocaine and drug paraphernalia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could return guilty verdicts based on the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a 2015 settlement agreement to be a binding separation agreement.

The appellant argued for the first time on appeal that a provision requiring expert review of the agreement's impact on their disabled child's ODSP eligibility created an implied right to terminate the agreement, and that the court should have exercised its discretion not to enforce it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to entertain novel arguments not raised before the motion judge and finding no basis to interfere with the enforcement of the agreement.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible (NCR) for offences committed in 2000 and 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his conditional discharge and reinstated a condition prohibiting cannabis use.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to conduct an even-handed analysis of the evidence, pathologized trivial conduct, and ignored significant evidence of the appellant's progress, medication compliance, and abstinence from other illicit drugs.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was ordered.

The Court of Appeal previously awarded Traders General Insurance Company its costs of a panel review motion and invited written submissions on quantum.

Traders sought partial indemnity costs of $24,158.71, while the responding parties argued for $7,500 due to duplication of work from the initial motion.

The Court agreed there was some duplication and fixed costs at $15,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed an order adjudging him bankrupt.

The respondent law firm, to whom the appellant owed debts from matrimonial litigation, had issued an application for a bankruptcy order after the appellant's consumer proposal was rejected.

The bankruptcy judge found the appellant owed debts exceeding one thousand dollars and had committed an act of bankruptcy by failing to meet his liabilities as they became due.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the bankruptcy judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant railway company appealed the dismissal of its claim for demurrage charges against the respondent shippers.

The appellant argued it was entitled to charge demurrage under its published tariffs pursuant to the Canada Transportation Act, even without a contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a contract, express or implied, is required to charge demurrage.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that no implied contract existed given the respondents' repeated refusals to pay, nor was there any unjust enrichment.

The appellant appealed a final order in matrimonial proceedings, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, misapprehending evidence regarding support, and failing to impute income to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the appellant had ample notice of the trial date.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on spousal and child support, including the imputation of income to the appellant and the refusal to impute income to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant developer contracted with an electrical contractor to construct two solar energy projects.

The contractor named the appellant as an additional insured under its commercial general liability policy for liability arising out of the contractor's operations.

After fires caused by transformers selected by the appellant, the appellant settled claims with the project purchaser and sought coverage from the insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's liability did not arise out of the contractor's operations, as the contractor merely installed the transformers chosen by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.