Howard et al. v. Attorney General of Canada
[Indexed as: Howard v. Canada (Attorney General)]
Ontario Reports
Court of Appeal for Ontario
Lauwers, Pardu and Nordheimer JJ.A.
May 1, 2019
146 O.R. (3d) 445 | 2019 ONCA 351
Case Summary
Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Fundamental justice — Applicants residing in Canada — Applicants claiming that they had right under s. 7 of Charter to choose their relationship with "Juristic Federal Unit Canada" and that they were not subject to federal or provincial laws without their consent — Application judge properly dismissing application — Applicants subject to federal and provincial laws that applied to residents while they continued to reside in Canada — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7.
Before the application judge, the applicants argued that even though they were born in Canada and continued to reside there, they had a right under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms "to choose their relationship with the Juristic Federal Unit Canada" and were not subject to federal or provincial laws without their consent. The application was dismissed. The applicants appealed.
Held, the appeal should be dismissed.
Every assertion made by the applicants was based on a selective reading of words and phrases in the Charter, international covenants, and Supreme Court of Canada decisions, none of which, properly interpreted, supported their radical position. As long as they continued to reside in Canada, they were subject to federal and provincial laws that apply to residents of Canada.
Statutes Referred To
- Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16
- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7
- Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
- Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 2(1)
Rules and Regulations Referred To
Treaties and Conventions Referred To
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1
APPEAL
From the judgment of Grace J., [2018] O.J. No. 526, 2018 ONSC 785 (S.C.J.).
Lance Howard and Catherine Bradbury, acting in person.
Nancy Arnold, for respondent.
Decision
[1] BY THE COURT: -- The appellants originally attempted to commence a proceeding by filing a notice of constitutional question, but this is not an originating process under the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. The appellants were eventually ordered to file a notice of application, which they did. However, the appellants did not file an affidavit in support of their notice of application. They were subsequently ordered to do that as well. In response, the appellants filed what they described as an "affidavit of claim". The matter came on before the application judge for hearing. He noted that the affidavit failed to set out any factual foundation for their claim.
[2] The appellants complain that they were not treated fairly, more specifically, that they were not given special consideration given that they are not represented. This complaint does not find any foundation in the record. The appellants were provided with ample opportunity to file proper material with a proper foundation and they failed to do so.
[3] We share the application judge's perplexity at the case put forward by the appellants. They were born in Canada, according to their factum, and, it seems, continue to reside here. No other facts are alleged or, it seems on reflection, are necessary to their core arguments.
[4] The appellants distinguish between the "geographic land mass" known as Canada, and something called the "Juristic Federal Unit Canada". It is not clear if the appellants consider themselves to be citizens of Canada, whatever their legal status might be under the laws of Canada.
[5] The appeal book and compendium contains a five-page statement setting out each of the propositions to which the appellants subscribe. Perhaps the best short description of their summative position is found in the following text:
There are different classes of persons in operation in federal and provincial law, each with their own set of rights, privileges, duties and obligations. Legislative statutes apply to designated classes of persons only, to extend statutory control without violating the Charter and international covenants. The government presumes that we are citizens (or other classes of persons), however, we get to choose. Under full legal capacity as guaranteed by the Constitution, we are not required to accept arbitrary designations and, therefore, are not bound by these provisions of statutory enactments which violate our fundamental rights.
[6] The appellants assert that as human beings, they have the right recognized in and guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms "to choose their relationship with the Juristic Federal Unit Canada". The result of such a choice is that "an individual is either inside or outside the jurisdiction of the Juristic Federal Unit Canada and the Appellants claim they have the liberty to choose".
[7] Drawing on some Supreme Court of Canada precedents, the appellants assert that "the liberty interest protected by s. 7 must be interpreted broadly and in accordance with the principles and values underlying the Charter as a whole and that it protects an individual's personal autonomy". This "[s]elf-determination is fundamental to personal autonomy". Accordingly, Canada and Ontario's laws of general application do not apply to them unless they so choose, or consent. They argue "that this s. 7 right to liberty included the right to choose their relationship with the State and to refuse arbitrary designation of their legal status in legislation". They are therefore free to pick and choose the laws to which they will be subject.
[8] The appellants assert that while they are entitled to live in the geographic landmass known as Canada, they are not subject to any of the laws enacted by the Juristic Federal Unit Canada, or presumably provinces or municipalities that also enact laws, unless they consent. Arguably arbitrary designations or distinctions drawn by statutes, such as "residency" or status as officers and directors of privately incorporated companies under provincial laws, do not apply to them without their consent. This, they say, flows from s. 7 of the Charter and also from their reading of art. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which binds the Juristic Federal Unit Canada. Consequently, they are not subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, or various other pieces of legislation such as Ontario's Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16.
[9] In essence, the appellants claim the right to live in Canada, but to be free from the obligations and language of any laws they do not choose to accept. This they say is an implication of "[t]he right to choose as guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter".
[10] Particularly irksome to the appellants is the lack of a prescribed definition of "resident" in the tax charging section of the Income Tax Act, s. 2(1):
2(1) An income tax shall be paid, as required by this Act, on the taxable income for each taxation year of every person resident in Canada at any time in the year.
[11] The appellants profess confusion. In oral argument, Mr. Howard asserted:
If the Income Tax Act said: "all human beings and legal persons living on the landmass Canada are required to pay an income tax," then we would not be here today. I wouldn't like it but we would not be here. But alas it does not say that, it says:
An income tax shall be paid as required by this Act, on the taxable income for each taxation year of every person resident in Canada at any time of the year.
[12] Mr. Howard added:
There is no definition of residency in the Income Tax Act . . . The judge concluded he had the liberty of judicial interpretation in defining a residence. This is an error. The responsibility and authority to establish to whom the law applies clearly falls to Parliament not the judiciary and Parliament has not done so. To do otherwise would be to usurp the role of the legislature.
[13] The appellants misunderstand the allocation of responsibilities between the judiciary and Parliament. In declining to define the phrase "every person resident in Canada" in the Income Tax Act, Parliament was leaving the interpretation of the Act to the courts, as it is entitled to do.
[14] To conclude, every assertion made by the appellants in their factum and in their summative statement is based on a selective reading of words and phrases in the Charter, several international covenants and several Supreme Court of Canada decisions, none of which, properly interpreted, support their radical positions. At least as long as they continue to live in Canada, to reside here, the appellants are subject to federal and provincial laws that apply to residents of Canada, including the Income Tax Act.
[15] The appeal is dismissed with costs payable by the appellants to the respondent in the amount of $5,000, all inclusive.
Appeal dismissed.
End of Document