COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: Teitel v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 893
DATE: 2014-12-24
DOCKET: C58778
Sharpe, van Rensburg and Pardu JJ.A.
IN THE MATTER of a complaint Made on October 22, 2014 by Murray Teitel against Case Management Master Ronald Dash
AND IN THE MATTER of the dismissal of that complaint on January 15, 2014 by Chief Justice Heather Smith
BETWEEN
Murray Teitel Appellant
and
Attorney General of Ontario and Master Ronald Dash Respondents
Counsel: Murray Teitel, in person Darrell Kloeze, for the Attorney General of Ontario Melvyn Solmon and Eric Borzi, for Master Ronald Dash
Heard: December 16, 2014
On appeal from the decision of Chief Justice Heather Smith of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 15, 2014.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] This is an appeal, with leave, from the decision of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court dismissing a complaint lodged against a Case Management Master (the "Master").
[2] The Courts of Justice Act, s. 86.2, sets out the procedure to be followed. Any person may make a complaint in writing to the Chief Justice alleging misconduct (s. 86.2(1)). The Chief Justice may dismiss the complaint pursuant to s. 86.2(2) which provides:
The Chief Justice shall review the complaint and may dismiss it without further investigation if, in his or her opinion, it is frivolous or an abuse of process, or concerns a minor matter to which an appropriate response has already been given.
[3] If the Chief Justice does not dismiss the complaint, she is directed to refer it to a committee of three, comprised of a judge of the Superior Court, a case management master and a lay member (s. 86.2(5)). The mandate of that committee is set out in s. 86.2(6):
The committee shall investigate the complaint in the manner it considers appropriate, and the complainant and the case management master shall be given an opportunity to make representations to the committee, in writing or, at the committee's option, orally.
[4] The committee makes a report and recommendation to the Chief Justice who may dismiss the complaint, or if she finds that there are grounds, impose a sanction from a range of options from reprimand to removal from office (s. 86.2(8)). The decision of the Chief Justice may be appealed to this court by the Master or, with leave, by the complainant (s. 86.2(9.1)).
[5] The appellant, a lawyer, made a complaint that the Master had acted with a lack of integrity and impartiality in relation to a costs decision in an attempt to cover up mistakes the Master had made. Of particular concern to the appellant, were statements made by the Master suggesting that the appellant had behaved in an unprofessional manner.
[6] The Chief Justice gave detailed written reasons for dismissing the complaint. In particular, the Chief Justice noted that the appellant had sought and obtained leave to appeal from the Master's decision and that one of the reasons for granting leave was the issue of whether it was open to the case management master to comment on the professional conduct of the appellant. In her reasons, she noted that she had given the Master a copy of the complaint and asked for his comments.
[7] The appellant submits that the Chief Justice failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the complaint. He also contends that the Chief Justice exceeded her jurisdiction by conducting an investigation by asking the Master for an explanation. The appellant submits that the statutory scheme precludes the Chief Justice from considering anything but the complaint, and requires her to refer the complaint requiring investigation to a committee pursuant to section 86.2(4), if anything other than the complaint needs to be considered. The appellant further contends that he was denied procedural fairness, as the Chief Justice failed to disclose to him the Master's response and give him an opportunity to respond. Finally, the appellant contends that the Chief Justice misconstrued the evidence in rejecting his contention that the case management master had attempted to cover his own error by alleging professional misconduct against the appellant.
[8] We see no merit in this appeal.
[9] The Chief Justice gave careful and comprehensive reasons which clearly explain why she dismissed this complaint. Although the Chief Justice did not use the precise words of the legislation, in our view it is unmistakable that she found that the complaint concerned "a minor matter to which an appropriate response has already been given". The appellant had obtained and sought leave to appeal from the decision which he complained about and, as the Chief Justice explained in her reasons, his concerns about the Master's findings of unprofessional conduct could be fully aired on appeal.
[10] We do not agree that the Chief Justice erred or exceeded her jurisdiction by asking the Master for his comments on the complaint. Section 86.2(2) permits the Chief Justice to dismiss the complaint "without further investigation". We do not agree that permission to dismiss without investigation means that the Chief Justice is precluded from asking the subject of the complaint to comment: see McDonald v. Ontario, (1999), 118 O.A.R. 1410, leave to appeal dismissed 1999 S.C.C.A. No. 309. Nor do we accept the submission that the Chief Justice was required to provide the appellant with an opportunity to comment on the Master's response.
[11] In our view, s. 86.2(2) gives the Chief Justice clear authority to dispose of groundless complaints in a summary manner without directing the complaint to a committee for further investigation. The powers conferred by s. 86.2(2) must be read in the light of the important role the Chief Justice plays in fostering the integrity and independence of her court, and the privilege attaching to judicial deliberations. It is entirely consistent with her role and the maintenance of that privilege, that the Chief Justice should be able to ask a judicial officer to comment on a complaint without requiring her to divulge the response to the complainant or triggering a full inquiry.
[12] We reject the submission that the Chief Justice misconstrued or misapprehended the evidence. Her reasons for dismissing the complaint and for finding that "a reasonably informed person would not be able to conclude an intention on the part of [the Master] to blame [the appellant] for a mistake made by [the Master]" are fully supported by the record. We reject the appellant's contention that there is anything in this record suggesting or indicating misconduct, or that the Master improperly misstated facts to cover up an error he had made.
[13] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The Master is entitled to an order that he be compensated for his costs pursuant to s. 86.2(12.2) in the amount of $15,000.
Released: "R.J.S." December 24, 2014
"Robert J. Sharpe J.A."
"K. van Rensburg J.A."
"G. Pardu J.A."

