COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Johnson, 2013 ONCA 73

DATE: 20130206

DOCKET: C53934

Goudge, Rouleau and Watt JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Michael Johnson

Appellant

Michael Dineen, for the appellant

Alison Wheeler, for the respondent

Heard: October 26, 2012

On appeal from the convictions entered on April 1, 2008 by Justice David J. Stinson of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

Rouleau J.A.:

[1] The appellant was convicted of armed robbery, unauthorized possession of a firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition, possession of a prohibited device, and occupying a motor vehicle with a firearm. On appeal, he argues that the trial judge committed several errors in his charge to the jury and that, as a result, the convictions should be set aside and a new trial ordered.

FACTS

[2] The appellant was alleged to have taken part in a group robbery of Clifford Campbell in the Driftwood Court area of Toronto. Campbell testified that, around 3:30 in the afternoon of April 18, 2005, he drove to Driftwood Court either to drop off or pick up a compact disc from a friend living there. When Campbell saw that his friend’s car was not there, he began to drive away. As he started to pull out of the parking lot, however, the driver of another vehicle gestured to him. As Campbell slowed down, his car was soon surrounded by six or seven men, three or four of whom were armed with black handguns. The assailants ordered him out of the car and he was forced to stand in a nearby field for a period of time. One of the assailants pointed a gun at his head and he was told not to return to the Driftwood area. After they left, Campbell discovered that they had stolen a number of items from his car, including a bag containing $10,000 in cash.

[3] Campbell attended at the police station the next day and told the police that he had recognized one of his assailants as someone he knew called “Jello”. Campbell was shown a photo line-up and selected the photo of the appellant as being a photo of “Jello”. The photo line-up and his statement to police were video-recorded.

[4] The following day, the police arrested the appellant while he was driving a car registered to his mother. The police searched the car pursuant to a search warrant issued later that day. They found a loaded handgun hidden in a secret compartment in the driver’s side door. The gun was a black coloured Bryco nine millimetre semi-automatic pistol. The compartment in which it was located was covered by a wood panel and could not be detected by simple observations. The panel, however, was loose when touched and could be lifted to reveal the handgun.

[5] Campbell testified at the preliminary inquiry and identified the appellant as one of the assailants who was armed with a black Glock handgun. Detective DiPassa later testified at trial that the Bryco nine millimetre semi-automatic pistol found in the secret compartment of the door is very similar in appearance to a Glock.

[6] Campbell was vague and evasive about the source of the $10,000 in cash that was stolen. During examination-in-chief he claimed that he intended to use much of it to pay outstanding taxes and the rest to buy some things for his car. He repeatedly refused to answer where he had acquired the money, beyond saying that he had borrowed half of it from the mother of one of his children.

[7] At trial, Campbell was again called as a Crown witness. He testified that although he had initially believed that he had recognized one of his assailants as Jello, he now believed this assertion to be a mistake. He explained that he came to realize his mistake because he had “seen a lot of people who look similar to him” and he had spoken to some of his friends who knew the appellant and those friends told him that the appellant was not one of the assailants. How these friends knew this, given that they were not present at the scene of the robbery, was not explained. According to Campbell these conversations with friends began before the preliminary inquiry and were “ongoing”.

[8] Because Campbell recanted his identification of the appellant, the Crown was permitted to cross-examine Campbell on his preliminary inquiry evidence pursuant to s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act. The trial judge also ruled that Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence could be adduced by the Crown for the truth of its contents pursuant to R. v. B.(K.G.), 1993 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740. As a result, Crown counsel read Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence into the record at the conclusion of Campbell’s trial testimony. The preliminary inquiry evidence was broadly consistent with Campbell’s account at trial with the important exceptions of familiarity with and identification of the appellant.

[9] The Crown presented Campbell with the pictures and instructions from the photo line-up. Campbell identified them and confirmed the undisputed fact that he had picked out the photo of the appellant and identified him as Jello. These documents were then marked as exhibits at trial.

[10] In his testimony, Campbell originally referred to Jello as a friend and as someone who grew up in the same neighbourhood as he did. Later, in cross-examination, Campbell denied that they were friends and stated that he had known him some 18 years earlier when he was a youth counsellor in the Driftwood Court area. Campbell testified that he did not even remember what the appellant looked like back then and did not recall ever speaking to him. There was, however, very little in Campbell’s trial testimony that might explain how he came to correctly identify Jello from the photo line-up he reviewed the day after the offence.

[11] During cross-examination at trial, the appellant’s counsel presented Campbell with a portion of his video statement to police. In the segment presented to Campbell, Campbell stated that he was unable to identify the assailant who entered the front passenger seat of his car. This version of events contradicted Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence in which he had stated that the person who entered the front passenger seat of his car was Jello. The appellant’s trial counsel suggested to Campbell that this inconsistency, and the fact that he would have been scared and intimidated as he was robbed by these armed assailants, suggested that Campbell mistakenly identified Jello. Campbell agreed and repeated that he had been mistaken when he told police that Jello was one of the assailants. When pressed further by the appellant’s trial counsel, Campbell stated that he lied at the preliminary inquiry when he identified the appellant as one of his assailants.

[12] The trial testimony stood in stark contrast to the preliminary inquiry evidence read in at trial. In that evidence Campbell left no doubt that had recognized one of the assailants as Jello and that Jello was one and the same as the appellant. There was no suggestion in that evidence that his knowledge of the appellant arose solely from dated interactions with the appellant when Campbell had been a youth counsellor in the Driftwood Court area. The cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry did not suggest that this was a case of mistaken identity.

[13] The Crown also called Officer Bragg as a witness at trial. He was the police officer who conducted the photo line-up with Campbell on the day following the robbery. Officer Bragg testified as to how the line-up was conducted and that Campbell had easily identified the photo of the appellant as being a photo of the person he knew as Jello. The portion of the video depicting the photo line-up was tendered as an exhibit at trial although the Crown made clear that it was not being tendered for its truth. The appellant’s trial counsel had objected to that portion of the video being entered at trial, but the trial judge ruled it admissible pursuant to this court’s decision in R. v. Tat and Long (1997), 1997 CanLII 2234 (ON CA), 35 OR (3d) 641.

[14] With respect to the firearm charges, the appellant’s mother was called as a witness by the Crown. She testified that the Mercedes in which the gun was found belonged to her. It was the third vehicle owned by her and her husband. They paid the insurance on it and both of them sometimes drove it. She had never noticed the hidden compartment in the driver’s side door. She testified that the appellant had located this car for her and had fixed it up in his auto shop. Although the appellant was the most frequent driver of the car, the car was also used by her younger son, Peter Johnson, and her step-son, Victor Kayode, who both lived with her at the time of the appellant’s arrest.

[15] In final submissions, the Crown relied on Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence, arguing that it was the most truthful and coherent version of events. The Crown went on to argue that Campbell’s explanations for recanting were not believable nor consistent. He initially stated that he had become unsure of his identification and then later claimed that he had lied at the preliminary inquiry. The Crown referred to the video of the line-up as clearly showing that Campbell quickly and easily identified Jello as the appellant. This made it abundantly clear that Campbell knew and could recognize the appellant.

[16] With respect to the firearm charges, the Crown relied on the circumstances of the arrest, the fact the panel was loose and that the appellant was the principal driver.

[17] The appellant’s trial counsel took a two-pronged approach in his submissions. First, he attacked Campbell’s credibility. Campbell had admitted to lying, and the jury was left with conflicting testimony: the exculpatory trial evidence and the inculpatory preliminary inquiry evidence. It would therefore be unsafe to convict on conflicting evidence given by an acknowledged liar.

[18] His second prong was to rely on Campbell’s testimony that, at the time of the robbery, he would not have had contact with the appellant for approximately 15 years and had only had the opportunity to glimpse at his assailants. This passage of time, combined with the contradiction between his video recorded statement and his preliminary hearing evidence as to whether he could identify the person who had entered the right front passenger seat of the car, supported the appellant’s submission that Campbell simply made an error when he identified the appellant.

[19] With respect to the gun offences, the appellant’s trial counsel relied on the fact that there were other drivers of the car and that two of these other drivers had unenviable records with respect to firearm offences.

ISSUES

[20] The appellant raises three issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial judge err by failing to instruct the jury that they could not use the video of the photo line-up for the truth of its contents?

2. Did the trial judge err by failing to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of the prior inconsistent statements put to the appellant’s mother in cross-examination?

3. Did the trial judge err in failing to give the jury a Vetrovec warning concerning Campbell’s evidence?

[21] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal on all grounds.

(1) Did the trial judge err by failing to instruct the jury that they could not use the video of the photo line-up for the truth of its contents?

(a) Position of the parties

[22] The appellant does not challenge the trial judge’s ruling that the video of the photo line-up was admissible in evidence. He argues, however, that the trial judge ought to have instructed the jury on the limits to its use.

[23] Specifically, the appellant argues that the trial judge improperly listed the video as an exhibit that constituted “evidence”. In addition, the trial judge ought to have specifically instructed the jury that it could not rely on the video of the photo line-up for the truth of its contents.

[24] In the appellant’s submission, there is a real possibility in the circumstances of this case that the jury could have rejected Campbell’s trial evidence as well as his preliminary inquiry evidence and then turned to the video of the photo line-up, finding it to be truthful and reliable independent evidence of Campbell’s identification of the appellant as one of the assailants.

[25] As the appellant explains, Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence, in many respects, defies belief. For example, his explanation of how he came to be in the Driftwood Court area with $10,000 in cash is highly improbable. It is quite possible therefore, that the jury would have rejected it and relied on the video of the photo line-up to convict. The jury would have found it more persuasive as it was made only a day after the robbery and before Campbell started to have “conversations” with various people as to whether the appellant had in fact been present at the time of the robbery.

[26] The Crown, however, submits that the jury’s determination of what weight to ascribe to Campbell’s identification of the appellant in his preliminary inquiry testimony and to his trial evidence to the effect that the appellant was not one of the robbers was likely to turn on an assessment of the cogency of his explanations for why he had changed his mind, as well as an assessment of Campbell’s demeanour and certainty at the time he made the initial identification to the police. That would have been a completely legitimate use of the evidence of prior identification – using it to assess the weight of subsequent evidence, rather than using it as stand-alone, independent evidence of identification.

[27] In the Crown’s view, the trial judge was not required to give the jury a complicated instruction on the law of evidence and on the differences between evidence admissible for the truth of its contents, evidence admissible to assess the weight of other evidence, independent evidence and original evidence. In the circumstances of this case, the correct instruction on how the jury could use the evidence of prior identification, coupled with the instruction that both Campbell’s trial testimony and his preliminary inquiry testimony could be used as evidence of what happened, were sufficient to guard against misuse of the evidence of prior identification. Trial counsel’s lack of objection tends to support this.

(b) Analysis

[28] In my view, the trial judge’s jury instructions were adequate in the circumstances of this case and there is little danger that the misuse raised by the appellant would occur. As I will explain, this was an unusual case in that the video of the photo line-up served dual purposes of credibility and reliability. Importantly, however, the video did not introduce new facts or provide the jury with a version of events concerning Campbell’s identification of the appellant that was not already properly in evidence at the trial. The trial judge’s instruction advised the jury of the proper use they could make of the evidence and, although it may have been preferable for the jury to also have been cautioned not to rely on the video of the photo line-up for the truth of the contents, such an instruction was unnecessary in this case, for the reasons that follow.

(i) Legal Principles

[29] This court’s judgment in R. v. Tat and Long provides that when a witness identifies the accused as the offender in court and testifies that he remembers identifying the same person in an out-of-court identification, the prior identification is admissible in support of the in-court identification made by that witness. (para. 35) In the present case, the trial judge admitted Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence for the truth of its contents pursuant to R. v. B.(K.G.). The parties agree that the admission of Campbell’s preliminary inquiry identification evidence stood at trial as the equivalent of an in-court identification. The photo line-up evidence was thus admissible to support Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence pursuant to Tat.

[30] When evidence of prior identification is admitted pursuant to the Tat principle, it is admitted as original evidence that assists the trier of fact in assessing the cogency of the witness’ in-court identification through a consideration of all of the process relating to that identification. In-court identification, standing alone, can have little probative value coming as it does in the structured setting of the court and often long after the alleged incident. Where the same identification had previously been made, soon after the alleged offence, that is relevant for the jury to consider in evaluating the in-court evidence. For this reason, Tat explains that “the probative force of identification evidence is best measured by a consideration of the entire identification process which culminates with an in-court identification”: para 36. This means that the trier of fact can use the evidence of prior identification to make an informed determination of the weight to be given to the testimony identifying the accused.

[31] In this case, the parties agree that the video of the photo line-up could not be used for the truth of its contents and could only be used to assess the strength of Campbell’s preliminary hearing identification evidence. I will proceed on that basis.

(ii) Application to the facts of this case

[32] The video of the photo line-up served two distinct purposes in this case:

(1) It gave probative force to Campbell’s preliminary inquiry identification of the appellant as one of his assailants; and

(2) It assisted the jury in determining which of Campbell’s two contradictory statements was reliable and truthful: the identification at the preliminary inquiry or the recantation at trial.

I will deal with each of these in turn.

(1) It gave probative force to Campbell’s identification evidence of the appellant as being one of the assailants

[33] Campbell’s trial testimony and preliminary hearing testimony was contradictory and left the trial record in a confused state. The evidence ranged from suggesting that the appellant was a friend that Campbell had immediately recognized at the time of the robbery to suggesting that the appellant was someone Campbell had never spoken to and had only seen, on occasion, in the neighbourhood Campbell lived in more than 15 years earlier.

[34] The appellant’s trial counsel argued in final submissions that, at the time of the robbery, Campbell was probably looking down and, out of a survival instinct, did not even get a good look at the assailant. This explained why it was entirely credible that, as Campbell testified at trial, he was mistaken when he testified at the preliminary inquiry that he had recognized Jello. Campbell’s error could be further explained by the fact that the appellant was someone he had not known for some 15 years.

[35] The Crown, for its part, relied on Campbell’s unqualified identification of the appellant in the preliminary inquiry evidence and the evidence to the effect that the appellant was someone Campbell knew.

[36] The video of the photo line-up was relevant and useful to the jury in assessing the cogency of the testimony and strength and accuracy of the identification evidence given by Campbell at the preliminary inquiry. The video gave the jury the opportunity to observe Campbell’s demeanour in making the contemporaneous identification.

[37] The trial judge’s instructions to the jury were quite proper in this regard. After pointing out that Campbell’s evidence of identification was critical in this case and that Campbell had recanted, the trial judge instructed the jury that they “may or may not” find support for one or other version “in the circumstances under which Mr. Campbell initially identified Mr. Johnson when he was interviewed by the police on April 19. In this regard, you may wish to consider Exhibit 1, the police photo line-up documentation, or Exhibit 17, the DVD of the line-up process.” The charge clearly emphasized that the jury should consider it as part of their evaluation of the contradictory versions given by Campbell in evidence.

[38] In these circumstances, there was simply no risk that the jury would have misused the video evidence when it considered it for this purpose. They would not have used it as stand-alone evidence of identification.

(2) It assisted the jury in determining which of Campbell’s two contradictory statements was reliable and truthful: the identification at the preliminary inquiry or the recantation at trial.

[39] The jury had to assess credibility and decide which version of Campbell’s testimony was true. On the one hand, his preliminary inquiry testimony was read into the record. In that testimony, Campbell identified the appellant as one of the assailants and explained that “I’ve grown up there, so over the years I’ve known him” and “I remember his face, I remember the events”. On the other hand, at trial Campbell testified that he lied at the preliminary inquiry and explained that he “didn’t really know [the appellant] 18 years ago”. Given Campbell’s contradictory evidence, the video of the photo line-up was relevant to the trier of fact’s assessment of his credibility. There were only two, mutually exclusive, propositions before the trier of fact: either Campbell was being truthful when he identified the appellant as his robber, or he was being truthful when he recanted at trial. The video of the photo line-up merely added probative force to the preliminary inquiry testimony. The video did not introduce any new facts. Rather, it was a visual reinforcement of the same identification of the appellant made by Campbell at the preliminary inquiry.

[40] The video shows Campbell identifying the photo of the appellant as Jello. The relevant contents of the video are as follows: after being told by the supervising officer, “If you recognize anybody from what happened, you can let us know”, and “the person or persons who committed the offence may or may not be in the photographs you are about to view”, Campbell flips through the line-up photos. After reviewing all of the photos, he points to photo number three and states, “This is the guy, this is Jello.” Although it is implicit from the photo line-up procedure that Campbell is identifying the perpetrator of the robbery, there is no explicit statement that Jello is the perpetrator, nor any description of the alleged crime. Other than showing Campbell’s demeanour, the video is unremarkable.

[41] The appellant argues that there is a danger that the jury relied on the videotape for the truth of its contents and used it as independent evidence of identity. He submits that an instruction was necessary to explain Campbell’s statement in the video line-up that the appellant was one of the perpetrators of the robbery could not be used for the truth of its contents. I disagree. The trial judge’s omission of such a direction did not give rise to the danger alleged by the appellant. I arrive at this conclusion for several reasons.

[42] First, there is very little content in the video of the photo line-up. It depicts nothing other than Campbell selecting the appellant’s photo and stating that he is Jello, something Campbell also confirmed at trial. Although, as I have noted, it is apparent from the context that he was identifying someone involved in the robbery, this identification would be of little or no value absent his testimony at the preliminary inquiry. Other than Campbell’s demeanour, which the jury could properly take into account, the video contains nothing that was not otherwise properly in evidence for the jury to consider.

[43] Second, the jury was instructed to consider and assess “all of the evidence given at trial” in reaching their decision. It would be illogical, therefore, for the jury to have considered and rejected Campbell’s identification of the appellant at the preliminary inquiry as supported by the video of the photo line-up only to then conclude that the video was sufficient on its own to support the conclusion that Campbell’s identification of the appellant as one of the perpetrator was truthful.

[44] Third, the trial judge correctly directed the jury that Campbell’s trial testimony and his preliminary inquiry testimony could both be used as “evidence of what happened”. By contrast, they were not told that the video of the photo line-up was evidence of what happened. Further, the instructions to the jury made it very clear that the circumstances of the initial photo line-up identification by Campbell could be used to see “how much and how little it supports or contradicts what Mr. Campbell said when he testified at the preliminary inquiry or in his evidence at trial”. The jury was left with a clear instruction that the circumstances of prior identification were simply a factor to be considered in assessing the identification evidence given at trial and at the preliminary inquiry. The jury would have understood that their task was to assess these two versions but that they could use the photo line-up video in doing so. In addition the jury was cautioned that they had to examine Campbell’s evidence “very carefully before accepting and relying on it to prove that Mr. Johnson was one of the participants in the incident of April 18, 2005.”

[45] Fourth, counsel’s closing submissions and the trial judge’s instructions focused the jury on their central task, assessing which of the two version of Campbell’s evidence concerning his identification of the appellant was true and whether the Crown met its evidentiary burden. If, as the appellant alleges, portions of the preliminary inquiry evidence, such as Campbell’s statements about the source of the $10,000, were so improbable as to be rejected by the jury, the jury could still reasonably and properly reject those improbable portions of Campbell’s preliminary inquiry evidence and nevertheless accept the portion of the evidence identifying the appellant. A jury can accept all, none or part of any witness’ testimony.

[46] Fifth, the case of R. v. Campbell, 2006 BCCA 109 relied on by the appellant, is of little assistance to him. In R. v. Campbell, the witness had given an earlier description of the robber to an attending police officer. That description was at odds with the description given by the witness in court. In effect, therefore, the out-of-court description offered a distinct version of the witness’ identification which in some ways conflicted with the in-court identification. The trial judge relied on the out-of-court description for its truth and as independent evidence proving the accused’s identity. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal explained that the trial judge could not reject the witness’ in-court description and choose to accept the different earlier out-of-court description as constituting substantive evidence of identity. That situation is quite different this case where the jury was presented with two statements, both of which were introduced in evidence for the truth of their contents: the preliminary inquiry identification of the appellant and the in-court recantation. The video of the photo line-up is simply a visual depiction of the identification Campbell made at the preliminary inquiry. It is not a third version of his story as to the identity of the perpetrator.

[47] Finally, there was no objection at trial to the portion of the judge’s charge dealing with the videotape of the photo line-up. Trial counsel’s failure to object is not determinative, but it suggests that counsel were not concerned with the risk now raised on appeal.

(2) Did the trial judge err by failing to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of the prior inconsistent statements put to the appellant’s mother in cross-examination?

[48] The appellant’s mother was cross-examined on statements she made to the police. In the appellant’s view, these statements were more advantageous to the Crown than her trial evidence. Specifically, in the statements put to her, it was suggested that the appellant had helped to pay for the car in which the gun was found and that she drove the car twice a month. The appellant’s mother did not adopt the statements and at trial testified that she drove the car twice a week. Because the statements were not adopted, they could not be used for the truth of their contents, but the trial judge did not instruct the jury about the limited permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

[49] I would not give effect to this ground of appeal. The trial judge’s failure to give a specific instruction did not, in my view, prejudice the appellant. The jury addresses and the charge to the jury correctly summarized Ms. Johnson’s actual evidence about her use of the car and made no reference to the unadopted prior inconsistent statements. The defence did not object to the charge.

[50] Ms. Johnson’s prior statements had little bearing on the firearm charges and had nothing to do with the robbery charges. The Crown’s case on the firearm’s charges turned on the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence. Whether the appellant helped to pay for the car and whether Ms. Johnson drove the car twice a month or twice a week made little difference to the case for the Crown. The trial evidence did establish that the appellant was the primary driver of the car. The thrust of Ms. Johnson’s evidence and the thrust of the submissions of the appellant’s trial counsel did not concern her use of the car but rather the suggestion that other people who used the car were more likely to possess illegal weapons. This suggestion is what, in the appellant’s submission at trial, should have given rise to a reasonable doubt. From the jury’s verdict it is apparent that this suggestion was rejected.

(3) Did the trial judge err in failing to give the jury a Vetrovec warning concerning Campbell’s evidence?

[51] At the pre-charge conference, the appellant’s trial counsel sought a Vetrovec warning concerning Campbell’s evidence. He argued that such an instruction was warranted not only because of Campbell’s criminal record, but because Campbell acknowledged having lied under oath at the preliminary inquiry. The trial judge considered this, but determined that a Vetrovec warning was not necessary. The trial judge preferred to highlight the fact that Campbell’s evidence on the crucial issue of identification had changed and to direct the jury to be very cautious before accepting and relying on that evidence to prove the appellant’s participation in the alleged robbery.

[52] The appellant argues that this warning was inadequate because, in cross-examination, Campbell clearly acknowledged that he had lied at the preliminary inquiry. It was apparent therefore that Campbell did not respect his oath and, in effect, was an admitted perjurer with a criminal record. This required a very clear warning.

[53] I would not give effect to this submission. The jury was strongly cautioned about the dangers of relying of Campbell’s evidence. The content of cautions about relying on a witness’ testimony is within the trial judge’s discretionary authority and is subject to deference on appellate review. Campbell was not a classic unsavoury witness. He was not an accomplice and there was no evidence that he had a motive to favour the Crown when he testified at the preliminary inquiry. The trial judge properly explained to the jury why Campbell’s evidence had to be approached with caution. The trial judge also pointed out to the jury that they did not have the opportunity to see Campbell’s behaviour when he testified at the preliminary inquiry. Further, he cautioned the jury that they should be “very cautious” before relying on eye-witness testimony. Taken together, these instructions were sufficient.

[54] Although Campbell’s recantation of his preliminary inquiry evidence logically leads to the conclusion that, at a minimum, he lied either at the preliminary inquiry or at the time of trial, this does not, in my view, require that a specific instruction on the seriousness of perjury be given. This was a somewhat unusual situation wherein Campbell gave evidence which at times incriminated, and at other times favoured, the accused. He was, as a result, a “mixed witness”. Taken in the context of the record, therefore, the trial judge’s warning that the jury should “examine his evidence very carefully” together with the other cautions was sufficient in the circumstances of this case.

CONCLUSION

[55] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.

“Paul Rouleau J.A.”

“I agree S.T. Goudge J.A.”

“I agree David Watt J.A.”

Released: February 6, 2013