Court File and Parties
CITATION: Blumas v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, 2011 ONCA 94
DATE: 20110203
DOCKET: C51638
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Blair, Rouleau and Epstein JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Ronald Blumas
Plaintiff/Appellant
and
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, Desmond Alexander Gibb and Grant Fraser Dickson
Defendants/Respondents
Ronald Blumas, in person
Robert Peck, for the respondents
Heard & released orally: January 31, 2011
On appeal from the judgment of Justice John A. Desotti of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 14, 2009.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The appellant appeals from the dismissal of his action for abuse of statutory authority and defamation. The appellant’s principal submission is that the e-mail in issue was not protected by qualified privilege because it was made maliciously, in the sense that it was dishonest or reckless. The trial judge found that the statement was inaccurate and the appellant argues that the use of such inaccurate “hyperbole” has no place in a regulatory process like the one at issue and amounts to dishonesty or recklessness. In the appellant’s view, Mr. Dickson’s e-mail served no legitimate purpose in carrying out his duties as the Director of Practice Inspection or Mr. Wilson’s duties as Chief Executive Officer. The defamatory statements were outside the scope of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario’s (ICAO) duties as a regulatory authority and the trial judge ought therefore to have found that they were not protected by qualified privilege because they were made with malice
[2] We disagree. We see no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s finding that Mr. Dickson’s e-mail was sent on an occasion of qualified privilege and that the privilege was not lost in the circumstances.
[3] The ICAO’s officials were acting in the public interest, within the context of a confidential regulatory process. It is important in such circumstances that the officials involved be free to speak candidly. As found by the trial judge, the narrowly-focussed comment was neither malicious nor used to cause the appellant embarrassment. Malice was not a motive, let alone the dominant motive. There was an ample basis for this finding on the record in this case. The information communicated was reasonably within the scope of the regulatory process in the circumstances at the point when the information was given.
[4] In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to deal with the issue of damages. Given the outcome, we see no basis to interfere with the costs award made at trial.
[5] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. Costs of the appeal to the respondents fixed in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.
“R.A. Blair J.A.”
“Paul Rouleau J.A.”
“G.J. Epstein J.A.”

