R. v. Chevers, 2011 ONCA 570

CITATION: R. v. Chevers, 2011 ONCA 570

DATE: 20110901

DOCKET: C50777

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Rosenberg, Sharpe and LaForme JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Christopher Chevers

Appellant

Christopher Chevers, in person

Louis P. Strezos, acting as duty counsel

Susan Ficek, for the respondent

Heard: August 17, 2011

On appeal from the judgment of Justice R. Scott, of the Superior Court of Justice, dated February 6, 2009.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] After a trial by judge alone, on February 6, 2009 the appellant was convicted of attempted murder and two other firearms offences. The main issue at trial was identity, which turned on credibility and in particular that of the victim who identified the appellant as his assailant. He appeals his convictions.

[2] The appellant argues that the trial judge failed to give himself a Vetrovec[^1] warning regarding the evidence of the victim as an alleged unsavoury witness. He contends that the trial judge was mandated to give himself a Vetrovec warning of the danger of acting on the victim’s evidence without other evidence of confirmation.

[3] Assuming that a Vetrovec warning applies to a victim and that in some cases it may be mandatory; the trial judge’s failure to do so in this case does not constitute an error in law.

[4] A Vetrovec warning is intended to alert juries to the danger of relying on the evidence of certain witnesses. Judges know the risks in relying on the testimony of witnesses like this victim; thus there is no requirement that a judge sitting alone recite a Vetrovec caution in his or her reasons for judgment: R. v. Snyder, 2011 ONCA 445, at para. 24.

[5] This was a case of identity wherein the Crown’s case depended largely on the victim’s testimony. The trial judge was acutely aware of this and that the credibility of the victim was open to question. Indeed, the trial judge specifically notes that: “Defence submits that because [the victim] lied about so many things, even under oath, he should not be believed as it would be dangerous to convict [the appellant] on such evidence”.

[6] The trial judge, therefore, had regard for the dangers of relying on the victim’s evidence. Nevertheless, after properly considering all the evidence, and after specifically scrutinizing the evidence of the victim, the trial judge, for the reasons he gave, believed the victim’s identification of the appellant as his assailant.

[7] In the result, there was no error in the trial judge’s analysis and the appeal against conviction must be dismissed.

“M. Rosenberg J.A.”

“Robert Sharpe J.A.”

“H.S. LaForme J.A.”

[^1]: R. v. Vetrovec (1982), 1982 20 (SCC), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.).