Court File and Parties

CITATION: Langlois v. Grenier, 2008 ONCA 802

DATE: 20081128

DOCKET: C49043

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Lang, Juriansz and Epstein JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Sabrina Langlois

Applicant (Respondent/ Appellant by way of cross-appeal)

and

Gerald Grenier

Respondent (Appellant/ Respondent by way of cross-appeal)

Gene C. Coleman, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal

Sabrina Langlois, acting in person

Heard and released orally: November 25, 2008

On appeal and cross-appeal from the order of Justice Robert J. Abbey of the Superior Court of Justice dated June 13, 2008.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This is an appeal from the order of the motion judge that enforced the minutes of settlement entered into between the parties respecting the payment by the appellant of lump sum support to the respondent. The minutes of settlement, which were reflected in a court order, provided that the respondent would be entitled to have a particular property vested in her if the appellant defaulted in payment of the agreed-upon support.

[2] The appellant raises three grounds of appeal.

[3] First, the appellant argues that the motion judge should have extended the time for the appellant to make the support payment so that he could sell the property for this purpose. However, the motion judge rejected this request because the agreement to purchase the property put forward by the appellant was conditional and entered into only after the appellant had been in default for six months and after the respondent had commenced her application for the vesting order. Moreover, the motion judge observed that the agreement of purchase and sale was subject to three important conditions, an environmental inspection condition, a zoning condition and a broad financing condition. Any of these conditions could be exercised at the discretion of the proposed purchaser. Thus, the motion judge concluded that the offer was uncertain. In those circumstances, we see no error on the part of the motion judge in rejecting the appellant’s request for an extension of time.

[4] Second, the appellant argues that the respondent had no standing to move for a vesting order because only the Director of the Family Responsibility Office has jurisdiction to enforce a support order. We observe that the minutes of settlement specifically provided that the respondent would be at liberty to apply for the vesting order on an ex parte basis. Moreover, in the absence of any notice to the Family Responsibility Office in regard to this issue, we would not give effect to this ground, which was raised for the first time on appeal.

[5] We also reject the appellant’s final argument concerning the motion judge’s reference to the continuing record in his reasons. In our view, the motion judge’s decision was based not on the continuing record but on the record before him, particularly the indefinite nature of the conditional agreement of purchase and sale.

[6] The respondent’s cross-appeal deals with matters that were not before Abbey J. and are apparently now scheduled to be heard in the Superior Court. The cross-appeal is dismissed.

[7] The respondent is entitled to costs. We reduce the costs award in view of the dismissal of the cross-appeal and the result on the motion before Gillese J.A. In the result, the respondent is awarded costs of $3,500, inclusive of disbursements and Goods and Services Tax, to be paid out of the monies already paid into court.

“S.E. Lang J.A.”

“R.G. Juriansz J.A.”

“Gloria Epstein J.A.”