Amjay Ropes and Twines Limited v. Cordex NorthAmerica, Inc., 2008 ONCA 247

DATE: 20080404

DOCKET: C47800

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

BLAIR, ROULEAU and EPSTEIN JJ.A.

BETWEEN:

AMJAY ROPES AND TWINES LIMITED

Plaintiff/Appellant

and

CORDEX NORTH AMERICA, INC., CORDEX-COMPANHIA INDUSTRIAL TÊXTIL, S.A., CORDENET, S.A., CORDEBRAS LTDA and RONALD EASTMAN

Defendants/Respondents

Barry Bresner and Brendan Y.B. Wong for the plaintiff/Appellant

Jonathan F. Lancaster and Alex Van Kralingen for the defendants/respondents

Heard: April 3, 2008

On appeal from the order of Justice Harvey Spiegel of the Superior Court of Justice dated September 4, 2007.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1] Amjay seeks to set aside the order of H. Spiegel J. striking various paragraphs in the statement of claim which pleaded three statements alleged to be defamatory (The Website Statement, the Faxed Statement and the Oral Statement). In our view, the motion judge was correct in striking the portions of the pleading as he did, however, and we would dismiss the appeal for the reasons he gave with one caveat. While it would have been preferable had the motion judge considered the Website Statement and the Faxed Statement together, we are not persuaded that an amendment to the pleading to allege that the “existing and potential customs” to whom the statements were communicated – and a consideration of the plaintiff’s position from that perspective – would make any difference to the analysis.

[2] Even if the website statement could be taken to be a statement “of and concerning” Amjay – which we doubt – neither the impugned remarks in the Website Statement or the Faxed Statement or the Oral Statement, taken in context and individually or together, are capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged in the statement of claim. As Lane J. said, in Hodgson v. Canadian Newspapers Co. (1998), 1998 CanLII 14820 (ON SC), 39 OR (3d) 235 at 252-53, aff’d (2000), 40 P.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) – adapted by this court in Mantini v. Smith Lyons LLP (No. 2) (2003), 2003 CanLII 22736 (ON CA), 64 O.R. (3d) 516:

In deciding whether the words are capable of a defamatory meaning, the trial judge will construe the words according to the meaning they would be given by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence, and will not consider what persons setting themselves to work to deduce some unusual meaning might succeed in extracting from them.

[3] That sentiment applies to this case in our view. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

[4] The respondent is entitled to its costs of the appeal fixed at $7,500 all inclusive.