Court of Appeal for Ontario

Citation: R. v. Sinobert, 2007 ONCA 807

Date: 2007-11-26

Docket: C45878

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen Respondent

and

Charles Sinobert Appellant

Before: Cronk, Juriansz and Watt JJ.A.

Counsel: Vincenzo Rondinelli, for the appellant Megan Stephens, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: November 16, 2007

On appeal from the conviction entered on February 2, 2006 and the sentence imposed on February 9, 2006 by Justice G.E. Michel of the Ontario Court of Justice.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The appellant appeals from his conviction for the aggravated assault of his domestic partner. He also seeks leave to appeal and, if leave be granted, appeals from his sentence of four years imprisonment, in addition to one year credit for pre-sentence custody, together with a lifetime weapons prohibition.

A. Conviction Appeal

[2] The appellant raises two grounds of appeal in support of his conviction appeal. He argues first, that the verdict is not supported by the evidence and, hence, that it is unreasonable. He also submits that the trial judge erred in law by reversing the burden of proof. We disagree for several reasons.

[3] First, the challenged evidence of Ms. Lauzon and Mr. Majewski was not identification evidence. Neither of these witnesses, nor any other witness, purported to identify the appellant as the victim’s assailant. This was not an identification case.

[4] Second, the trial judge’s reasons indicate that he was clearly alive to the frailties in the evidence of Ms. Lauzon and Mr. Majewski concerning their observations on the night in question. He expressly referred to some of these frailties in his reasons. Based on a reading of his reasons as a whole, it is our opinion that the trial judge understood that the evidence of these witnesses was but one piece of circumstantial evidence to be considered together with the other evidence, including the physical evidence, that was capable of implicating the appellant in determining whether the Crown had met its burden of establishing the guilt of the appellant on the criminal standard.

[5] Third, we are satisfied that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction. This included evidence of: (1) a trail of blood leading to the appellant’s front door from the chair in the brewery where the victim sat while she was bleeding; (2) blood on the door sill of the appellant’s apartment; (3) a blood droplet on an article of the appellant’s clothing and a blood smear on his wrist that, upon testing, were found to match the victim’s blood; (4) neighbours of the appellant and the victim, who testified that they heard loud shouting and the voice of a female emanating from the appellant’s apartment within the time frame of the assault; and (5) Ms. Lauzon and Mr. Majewski that they observed two persons arguing outside the appellant’s apartment at a location where a significant collection of blood was later detected.

[6] Although the Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial, this evidence, taken as a whole, was more than sufficient to ground the verdict against the appellant. The conviction was not unreasonable.

[7] Finally, in our view, the trial judge’s reasons reveal no misapplication of the burden of proof in this case.

B. Sentence Appeal

[8] The appellant also submits that his sentence was unfit and that the trial judge erred by overemphasizing the seriousness of the victim’s injuries and by failing to give adequate weight to the victim’s wish that the appellant not go to jail. The appellant argues that his sentence was simply too long. We do not agree.

[9] The trial judge accurately described the victim’s injuries. This assault took place in a domestic relationship and the appellant had a long, continuous criminal record for offences of serious violence and had violated parole several times. The trial judge was aware and took proper account of the victim’s expressed desire that the appellant not be sent to jail. The sentence imposed was well within the appropriate range for the offence and this particular offender.

[10] We note that the appellant abandoned his proposed ground of appeal based on R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.

[11] Accordingly, for the reasons given, the conviction appeal is dismissed, leave to appeal sentence is granted and the sentence appeal is dismissed.

“E.A. Cronk J.A.”

“R. Juriansz J.A.”

“David Watt J.A.”