CITATION: York (Regional Municipality) v. Tassone, 2007 ONCA 215

DATE: 20070327

DOCKET: C45066

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

SHARPE, SIMMONS and CRONK JJ.A.

B E T W E E N :

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Ex Rel. THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF YORK

Appellant

• and -

MAURIZIO TASSONE

Defendant

(Respondent)

Hans J. Saamen for the appellant

Michael J. Rombis for the respondent

Grace Choi for the intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario

Heard: March 22, 2007

On appeal from the judgment of Justice William W. Bradley of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated November 3, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

[1] This appeal involves the interpretation of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.H.8, s. 106(3), (since amended) which, at the relevant time, provided that “every person who drives on a highway a motor vehicle in which a seat belt assembly is provided for the driver shall wear the complete seat belt assembly in a properly adjusted and securely fastened manner.”

[2] A police officer observed the respondent in the driver’s seat of his car approaching a red light. The officer illuminated the vehicle and confirmed that the driver was not wearing his seat belt. The driver then pulled the seat belt across his body.

[3] The respondent was charged with failing to wear a seat belt contrary to s. 106(3). At trial, the respondent testified that when he got to the red light he put his car in park to check for his wallet, unfastening his seat belt in the process. When he found his wallet, he refastened the seat belt and proceeded through the intersection. The respondent admitted that he had been operating the vehicle on the highway before he reached the red light and that the motor was still running while the car was in park. He also admitted that his seat belt was unfastened for some fifteen to twenty seconds.

[4] The Justice of the Peace who tried the case implicitly accepted the respondent’s evidence but concluded that his explanation did not constitute a defence to the charge. He held that the purpose of the mandatory seat belt provision was road safety and that although the respondent had stopped at the light and put the vehicle in park, he was still operating and driving a motor vehicle on the highway. He therefore convicted the respondent.

[5] On appeal, the provincial offences appeal judge held that once the vehicle was in park, the respondent was no longer driving on a highway. The provincial offences appeal judge considered a dictionary definition of the word “drive” and found that the term implies movement of the car at the time of driving. He concluded that while the respondent had care or control of the car, he was not driving the car. He quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial

[6] The Regional Municipality of York was granted leave to appeal to this court.

[7] In our view, the provincial offences appeal judge erred in his interpretation of s. 106(3). When interpreting the words “drives on a highway” in that section, it is important to take the broad purposive approach adopted by several recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada from Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at p. 87:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

[8] Read in light of the important statutory purpose of minimizing driver and passenger injuries resulting from car collisions, the words “drives on a highway”, in our view, do not render the seat belt requirement inapplicable to the situation of drivers waiting at red traffic lights. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the purpose of this statutory provision. Accidents occur even when vehicles are stopped at traffic lights. In our view, s. 106(3) must be interpreted as requiring the driver to wear a seat belt continuously from the time he or she puts the vehicle in motion on the highway to the time the driver leaves the highway, parks the vehicle in a position in which the vehicle can be left unattended, or gets out of the vehicle.

[9] For these reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the provincial offences appeal judge and restore the conviction and fine at trial.

“Robert J. Sharpe J.A.”

“J. Simmons J.A.”

“E.A. Cronk J.A.”

RELEASED: March 27, 2007