The Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Transport v. Ryder Truck Rental Canada Limited [Indexed as: Ontario (Minister of Transport) v. Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd.]

47 O.R. (3d) 171

[2000] O.J. No. 297

No. C32343

Court of Appeal for Ontario

Laskin, Feldman and Sharpe JJ.A.

February 9, 2000

Criminal law -- Provincial offences -- Highway traffic offences -- Section 84.1 of Highway Traffic Act providing for absolute liability offence where wheel becomes detached from commercial motor vehicle on highway -- Defendant charged under s. 84.1 of Act when dual wheels, hub and axle on one side of truck separated as unit from truck while it was being driven on highway -- Section 84.1 applying only where wheel itself separates from vehicle -- Defendant properly acquitted -- Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 84.1.

Section 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, which was enacted in 1997 in the wake of several serious incidents of "flying truck wheels", provides for an absolute liability offence where a wheel becomes detached from a commercial motor vehicle while the vehicle is on a highway. The respondent was charged under s. 84.1 when the dual wheels, hub and axle on one side of one of its trucks separated as a unit from the truck while it was being driven on a highway. The wheels themselves did not separate from their fasteners. The respondent was acquitted at trial and the Crown's appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed. The Crown appealed.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

A "wheel becomes detached" under s. 84.1 of the Act only when the wheel itself separates from the vehicle. A wheel does not become detached when an assembly of which the wheel is a part separates from the vehicle. Section 84.1 was passed to address one concern: the threat to public safety from "flying wheels", that is, from wheels coming off of commercial motor vehicles. In this case, the wheel fastening mechanism, which was the concern of the legislature in enacting s. 84.1, did not fail. Had the legislature meant to impose absolute liability when another component that includes a wheel becomes detached from a vehicle, it could have said so.

APPEAL by the Crown from a judgment dismissing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal of the defendant on a charge under s. 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.

Cases referred to R. v. Gladue, 1999 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 238 N.R. 1, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 23 C.R. (5th) 197 Statutes referred to Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, ss. 84, 84.1 (en. S.O. 1997, c. 12, s. 12) Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 131 Rules and regulations referred to Commercial Motor Vehicle Inspections Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 575 (Highway Traffic Act), ss. 2(1), 3, Schedules 1, 2, 3 Authorities referred to Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994), p. 131

Murray G. Forbes and H. Sandra Bang, for appellant. Robert S. Russell and Adam F. Fanaki, for respondent.

The judgment of the court was delivered by

[1] LASKIN J.A.: -- In July 1997, in the wake of several serious incidents of "flying truck wheels", the Ontario legislature enacted s. 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, as amended by S.O. 1997, c. 12, s. 12. Section 84.1 provides for an absolute liability offence where a wheel becomes detached from a commercial motor vehicle while the vehicle is on a highway. A vehicle owner or operator convicted under this section may be fined to a maximum of $50,000.

[2] Shortly after s. 84.1 came into force, the respondent Ryder Truck Rental Canada Limited was charged under the section when the dual wheels, hub and axle on one side of one of its large moving trucks "separated as a unit" from the truck, while it was being driven on a highway near Peterborough.

[3] Ryder was acquitted at trial by Justice of the Peace O'Toole and the Crown's appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed by Justice Whetung. The Crown appeals to this court, with leave, on a question of law, under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33. The question of law is whether on the agreed facts of this case a wheel became detached from Ryder's truck under s. 84.1 of the Act.

Background

[4] The parties filed an agreed statement of facts. Ryder was the operator of the commercial motor vehicle in question, a 1993 international truck. About a week before the incident, Ministry of Transportation inspectors had inspected the truck, and the Ministry had issued an annual inspection certificate. [See Note 1 at end of document]

[5] On the day of the incident, July 30, 1997, the truck was being driven eastbound on Highway 115 "when the dual wheels, hub and axle on the second axle left side separated as a unit" from the truck. In other words, the dual wheels themselves did not separate from their fasteners. Instead, the entire assembly, of which the dual wheels were a part, detached in one piece from the truck. The parties agreed that "[t]he axle and the dual wheels are attached to the wheel hub at the wheel end, and the axle is not attached but interacts with a series of gears to rotate, at the differential. When a hub separates the two wheels and axle attached to it will separate with the hub." The parties also agreed that "the cause of wheel separation is not a necessary element of proving the offence."

[6] In acquitting Ryder the justice of the peace concluded:

The section is very specific. The definition, in my opinion, is quite specific. There is no mention at any place of the axle, and in my opinion they do not apply in this case. From the Agreed Facts, the axle separated, and that was the cause of everything attaching to the axle coming off with it.

[7] Justice Whetung decided that the justice of the peace's conclusion was "reasonably reached" and therefore dismissed the Crown's appeal. Goudge J.A. granted leave to appeal to this court on June 16, 1999.

Discussion

[8] Section 84.1 of the Act was part of Bill 138, "An Act to promote road safety by . . . creating an absolute liability offence for wheel separations . . .". Subsection (1), which imposes liability, provides:

84.1(1) Where a wheel becomes detached from a commercial motor vehicle, or from a vehicle being drawn by a commercial motor vehicle, while the commercial motor vehicle is on a highway, the operator of the commercial motor vehicle and the owner of the vehicle from which the wheel became detached are guilty of an offence.

[9] Subsection (3) provides that on a conviction the owner or operator is liable to a fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $50,000. Subsection (5) makes the offence one of absolute liability by providing that the exercise of due diligence to avoid or prevent the detaching of the wheel is not a defence to a charge under s-s. (1).

[10] The dispute between Ryder and the Crown centres on whether, under s. 84.1(1), "a wheel becomes detached" only when the wheel itself separates from the vehicle, or whether a wheel also "becomes detached" when an assembly of which the wheel is a part separates from the vehicle. Ryder argues for the former meaning; the Crown for the latter. This is a question of statutory interpretation.

[11] The modern approach to statutory interpretation calls on the court to interpret a legislative provision in its total context. The court should consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. The court's interpretation should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflect the legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and just meaning. [See Note 2 at end of document] The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this approach to statutory interpretation, most recently in R. v. Gladue, 1999 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at p. 704, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385, where Cory and Iacobucci JJ. wrote:

As this Court has frequently stated, the proper construction of a statutory provision flows from reading the words of the provision in their grammatical and ordinary sense and in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute as a whole, the purpose of the statute, and the intention of Parliament. The purpose of the statute and the intention of Parliament, in particular, are to be determined on the basis of intrinsic and admissible extrinsic sources regarding the Act's legislative history and the context of its enactment . . .

[12] The relevant indicators of the legislative meaning of s. 84.1(1) all support Ryder's interpretation. Four indicators of the section's meaning are especially important: the legislative history, the text of the section, the related regulatory provisions, and the effect of the Crown's proposed interpretation.

[13] First, the legislative history of s. 84.1 supports Ryder's interpretation of the section. The legislative debates on this issue from February 1997 until Bill 138 was passed in July 1997 focus on one concern: the threat to public safety from "flying wheels", that is, from wheels coming off trucks and other commercial motor vehicles because, for example, the wheel was not fastened tightly enough.

[14] Section 84.1 was enacted to address that specific concern. Both Justice of the Peace O'Toole and Justice Whetung recognized this purpose of s. 84.1. Justice of the Peace O'Toole said:

The intention of course, given all of the publicity in the last couple of years, was for road safety and the protection of the public in my opinion. We are all aware of the numerous situations, accidents, and deaths that have resulted, as a result of the term flying wheels.

Justice Whetung adopted this view:

I do not consider the present appeal to be trivial at all. It involves legislation that deals directly with the issue of public safety on the highway. It involves legislation meant to address a situation that is clearly within the forefront of public concern and involves serious matters of public safety and involves situations on our highways that have resulted in fatalities.

[Justice of the Peace O'Toole] directs his mind to the issue I alluded to earlier of road safety and refers to the issue of the term "flying wheels". He acknowledges the drafting of the legislation as creating an absolute liability offence and acknowledges that was the intention of the legislature. Obviously, the legislature drafted it, so that must be their intention.

[15] In the case before us, for whatever reason, the axle, hub, wheel and tire assembly came off in one piece. But the wheel fastening mechanism -- which was the concern of the legislature in enacting s. 84.1 -- did not fail.

[16] The second indicator of the meaning of s. 84.1 is the text of the section. The words used in s. 84.1 show that the section means to impose liability when a wheel separates from a commercial motor vehicle, not when another component or assembly of the vehicle -- such as an axle and hub -- separates, even if that other assembly or component includes a wheel. Under s. 84.1(1) an offence occurs only "where a wheel becomes detached". Had the legislature meant to impose absolute liability when another component that includes a wheel detached from a vehicle, it could have said so.

[17] The Crown submits, however, that s. 84.1(1) imposes liability in the present case for two reasons. The Crown draws a distinction between the phrase used in s. 84.1(1) "where a wheel becomes detached", and the phrase "where a wheel detaches". The Crown submits that the actual wording of s. 84.1(1) is broader and that Ryder's interpretation would be supportable only if the legislature had used the words "where a wheel detaches". In my view, the Crown has drawn a distinction without a difference. The section focuses on the separation of a wheel from a vehicle, not on the separation of another component of the vehicle, which happens to include a wheel. As the justice of the peace said in acquitting Ryder "the axle separated, and that was the cause of everything attaching to the axle coming off with it."

[18] The Crown also submits that on Ryder's interpretation, an owner or operator of a commercial motor vehicle could be convicted only if the wheel alone separates. That interpretation, the Crown argues, would make the section ineffective because a wheel is defined not to include a tire or large piece of a tire, [See Note 3 at end of document] yet when a wheel becomes detached from a vehicle, invariably it becomes detached with a tire. I do not agree with this submission by the Crown. To obtain a conviction under s. 84.1, the Crown need not prove that the wheel without the tire separated from the vehicle. The tire can be attached to the wheel. But if the tire alone separates, that is not an offence under s. 84.1.

[19] The third indicator of the meaning of s. 84.1 is found in related provisions of the regulatory scheme under the Highway Traffic Act. Ryder's interpretation of s. 84.1 is consistent with the duties imposed by regulation on a driver to inspect the wheels on a commercial motor vehicle. Section 2(1) of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Inspections Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 575 provides that "[e]very driver of a commercial motor vehicle shall inspect or cause to be inspected the commercial motor vehicle before the vehicle's first trip of the day." Section 3 provides that the inspection must include the list of items in Schedule 1 (outside inspection) and Schedule 2 (inside inspection). Among the items to be inspected under Schedule 1 are "wheels and fasteners (for wheel or rim cracks, defective lock rings, loose or missing fasteners). "Requiring the wheels and fasteners to be inspected is meant to ensure that the wheels themselves do not separate from the vehicle. A driver has no similar obligation under the Regulation to inspect hubs and axles to ensure they do not become detached from a vehicle. Moreover, as with the inspection requirements in Schedule 1, the maintenance standards for "wheels" in Schedule 3 relate only to wheel fasteners and the wheel surface. Thus, both s. 84.1 of the Act and the inspection requirements under the regulation reflect the legislature's concern about "flying wheels".

[20] Finally, the Crown's proposed interpretation of s. 84.1 would produce unreasonable results. Suppose a tractor trailer rig lost the trailer it was hauling. Although the trailer would have separated as a unit, because it included wheels the owner of the rig could be convicted under s. 84.1. Such a result seems unreasonable and contrary to the purpose of the section.

[21] Giving effect to Ryder's interpretation of s. 84.1 does not mean the Crown is powerless in a case like the one under appeal. The Crown could have resorted to the general offence provision, s. 84(1), which provides:

84(1) No person shall drive or operate or permit the driving or operation upon a highway of a vehicle, a street car or vehicles that in combination are in such a dangerous or unsafe condition as to endanger any person.

[22] I would dismiss the Crown's appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Notes

Note 1: Because s. 84.1 is an absolute liability offence and, therefore, Ryder cannot rely on a defence of due diligence, the inspection has little relevance on this appeal.

Note 2: Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994), at p. 131.

Note 3: Section 84.1(7): "'wheel' includes a major component of a wheel, such as a wheel rim or wheel assembly, and a large piece of a wheel or of a major component of a wheel, but does not include a tire or large piece of a tire."