COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

DATE: 20000711

DOCKET: C33370

RE:

NINO CAMPITELLI (Plaintiff (Appellant)) and THE
CORPORATION OF THE TOWN OF AJAX, RUNNYMEDE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND RUNNYMEDE
SOMERSET LTD. (Defendants (Respondents))

BEFORE: CARTHY, AUSTIN AND MOLDAVER JJ.A.

COUNSEL:

Jeffrey E. Streisfield
For the appellant

N. Cameron Murkar
For the respondent
Corporation of the Town of Ajax

Raymond M. Slattery
For the respondent
Runnymede Development Corporation and
Runnymede Somerset Ltd.

HEARD: June 12, 2000

On appeal from the order of Somers J. dated December 8, 1999.

E N D O R S E M E N T

[1] We agree with the conclusion reached by the motions judge
that summary judgment should issue to the extent indicated in his
reasons. The plaintiff raises a myriad of issues spawned by his
concern that the municipality and his neighbour are acting male
fides. However, he presents no real evidence to give reality to
his suspicions.

[2] While we substantially agree with the reasons of Somers J.,
we must add our comments concerning two issues that he did not
refer to.

[3] A road allowance ran between the properties of the plaintiff
and Runnymede, and thence south to the shore of Lake Ontario.
Instead of passing one by-law to close the road, the Town passed
five by-laws, each applying to a segment of the entire allowance
and one of which applied to the land between the plaintiff’s
property and that of Runnymede.

[4] The appellant argues that this was a ruse to avoid the
approval of the Ministry of the closing of a road leading to a
lake as required by s.297(3) of the Municipal Act (since
repealed). The purpose of this section was, no doubt, to secure
access points to lakes and waterways and we see no detriment to
that purpose in treating the closing opposite the plaintiff’s
property as not being contemplated by s.297(3). There is an east-
west access road south of the plaintiff’s property and the
Minister’s approval, when it was required, can properly be
considered as required for closings between that road and the
lake. In any event, were we to hold otherwise, it would only
require the Town to pass a new by-law and would not justify a
trial.

[5] A legitimate purpose for segregating the closing by-law
adjacent to the Runnymede property may relate to the second
subject of these reasons. The Town sold the westerly half of the
former road allowance abutting Runnymede’s property to Runnymede
and also granted a perpetual easement for “grading purposes” over
the easterly portion. The closing by-law identified the north and
south limits of that segment and thus permitted it to be easily
dealt with apart from the portions to the south. The plaintiff
submits that the permanent easement is, in effect, a sale of the
eastern segment and, pursuant to s.215(2) of the Municipal Act
must be offered to him as the abutting owner. We disagree. The
municipality is entitled to treat this property as its own, in
this case as a bike path subject to a grading easement, and the
plaintiff’s rights do not arise until there is a determination by
the municipality to effect a true sale.

[6] For these reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs.

“J.J. Carthy J.A.”
“Austin J.A.”
“M. Moldaver J.A.”