The applicant, Valentina Ortega Alvarez, brought an urgent motion without notice seeking a no-contact order and related relief against the respondent, William H. Duong, due to concerns for the safety of herself and their children following an escalation in the respondent's abusive and volatile behaviour.

The court granted a temporary no-contact order under section 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act, finding immediate danger to the children but declined to issue a restraining order, holding that less restrictive measures were appropriate at this stage.

The paternal grandmother (applicant) sought a contact order with her 6-year-old grand-daughter.

The mother (respondent N.J.) opposed this and sought a restraining order against the paternal grandmother.

The father (respondent T.S.) was in default.

The court applied the two-part test for grandparent contact, determining that a positive relationship did not exist at the time contact was terminated, and the mother's decision to deny contact was not arbitrary.

This was based on significant safety concerns in the paternal grandmother's home and community, her problematic parenting history, and a clear power imbalance and lack of trust between the parties.

The court dismissed both the paternal grandmother's claim for contact and the mother's claim for a restraining order, finding no sufficient grounds for the latter.

In an uncontested trial, the court addressed parenting, child support, and a restraining order.

The applicant father's claims were struck due to non-compliance.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and permission to travel with the child and obtain government documentation without the father's consent.

Parenting exchanges were ordered to take place at a police station due to high conflict.

The father was ordered to pay child support arrears and prospective child support based on an imputed income.

The mother's request for supervised parenting time and a permanent restraining order was denied, but communication and non-harassment orders were issued.

Costs were awarded to the mother due to the father's bad faith and willful non-compliance.

This trial addressed whether a temporary restraining order against the respondent, Mr. Visinoiu, should be made permanent under the Family Law Act and Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant, Ms. Grosu, alleged a history of physical and verbal abuse and expressed fear for her safety.

The respondent acknowledged one incident of assault but denied others and highlighted his compliance with previous court orders (bail, peace bond, temporary restraining order) and continued unsupervised parenting time with their daughter.

The court applied the objective and subjective test for restraining orders, balancing the applicant's fear against the respondent's compliance and the passage of time since the last incident.

The court found the respondent less credible but ultimately dismissed the application for a permanent restraining order, vacating the temporary order.

The court also declined to vary a previous parenting order.

The trial addressed parenting and child support arrangements for the parties' six-year-old son.

The mother sought recognition of a Syrian custody order, or alternatively, primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility, supervised parenting time for the father, and child support.

The father sought primary residence and decision-making in Germany, or joint decision-making, and opposed retroactive child support.

The court dismissed the father's claims for primary residence and joint decision-making, refused to recognize the Syrian order due to lack of notice and opportunity to be heard, and granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence.

The court ordered supervised in-person and virtual parenting time for the father, and ordered him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, including a share of special expenses, based on his actual income, dismissing his undue hardship claim.

A no-contact and communication order was issued against the father.

The applicant sought a restraining order under section 46 of the Family Law Act or, alternatively, orders restricting the respondent's contact and communication with her and their children under section 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondent sought dismissal of the claims.

The court found that the respondent had perpetrated family violence against the applicant and that the applicant had a reasonable fear.

However, the court dismissed the request for a restraining order, finding that suitable protection could be achieved through orders under section 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act, which were granted.

These orders restrict the respondent's contact with the applicant and children to specific terms.