COURT FILE NO.: CR-17-0000737-0000 DATE: 20191204 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – SINBAD MARSHALL
Counsel: Craig Coughlan and David Steinberg, for the Crown Mitchell Huberman and Christopher Hicks, for the Defendant, Sinbad Marshall
HEARD: November 19, 2019
R.F. GOLDSTEIN J.
Ruling on Corbett application
BACKGROUND
[1] On November 11, 2015 Stella Tetsos was found dead in her home. She was 82 years old. At some point between November 9 and November 11, 2015, Sinbad Marshall broke into the house. He broke a basement window and entered. There was some kind of violent encounter between Ms. Tetsos and Mr. Marshall somewhere in the house. Ms. Tetsos died as a result. The cause of death was blunt force trauma to her torso.
[2] The police arrested Mr. Marshall the next day, November 12, 2015. Mr. Marshall was in possession of several items of Ms. Tetsos’s jewellery. Mr. Marshall’s DNA was found on a pop can in the kitchen of Ms. Tetsos’s home. Foot impressions made by a shoe that could have come from Mr. Marshall were found on the floor of Ms. Tetsos’s home.
[3] Mr. Marshall is charged with first degree murder in death of Ms. Tetsos. The Crown theory is that Mr. Marshall killed Ms. Tetsos while forcibly confining her. It is an agreed fact that Mr. Marshall was the sole perpetrator of her death. After the Crown closed its case, the defence brought two applications: First, an application for a directed verdict. I granted that application and reduced the charge faced by Mr. Marshall to second-degree murder. The second application is this Corbett application. A Corbett Application is an application to exclude all or part of an accused person’s criminal record. It is brought prior to the accused testifying.
[4] Prior to Mr. Marshall’s testimony I indicated that I was permitting cross-examination on an edited version of the record. I gave copies of that version to counsel. I indicated that my reasons would follow.
[5] What follows are my reasons.
ISSUES
[6] Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act permits a witness – including an accused person – to be cross-examined on his or her criminal record. A judge has discretion to permit cross-examination on some or all of an accused person’s convictions.
[7] R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R 670, is the leading case (and the case for which this application is named). LaForest J. analyzed the manner in which a judge should exercise his or her discretion to exclude convictions. He set out a non-exhaustive list of four factors that a judge should consider. They are: first, the nature of the previous convictions; second, the similarity of the previous convictions; third, the remoteness of the previous convictions; and fourth, the need to prevent an unbalanced picture being presented to the jury. The factors set by LaForest J. are really just an aid to achieving that result. Nonetheless, those factors are recognized as a helpful framework for the analysis.
[8] Although LaForest J. dissented on the application of the factors, the majority agreed with his framework for analysis: R. v. Batte, 2000 CarswellOnt 2114, 145 C.C.C. (3d) 498 (C.A.) at para. 48.
[9] In the same case, Chief Justice Dickson also stated:
Clearly section 12 creates no presumption of guilt nor does it deprive the accused of the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty”. The effect of the section is merely to permit the Crown to adduce evidence of prior convictions as they relate to credibility. The burden of proof remains upon the Crown and the introduction of prior convictions creates no presumption of guilt nor does it create a presumption that the accused should not be believed. The prior convictions are simply evidence for the jury to consider, along with everything else, in assessing the credibility of the accused.
[10] The trial judge’s role is always to ensure a fair trial. In the context of a Corbett application that means balancing probative value and prejudicial effect. There is no science to ensuring a fair trial. Every trial develops its own dynamic based on the issues. Ultimately balancing probative value and prejudicial effect is a matter of judgment in the context of that particular dynamic.
[11] In my view, after considering the charges faced by Mr. Marshall and the dynamics of the trial, the issues that I believe I must consider to ensure a fair trial are these:
(a) What is the nature of the previous convictions? (b) Are the previous convictions similar to the current charge? (c) How remote are the previous convictions? (d) Is there need to prevent an unbalanced picture being presented to the jury? (e) What balance of factors achieves a fair trial?
ANALYSIS
[12] Mr. Marshall’s record consists of the following list of 21 youth entries and 7 adult entries (I have not set out the sentences that were imposed):
DATE LOCATION OFFENCE
Apr 21, 2010 Toronto (Youth) Sexual Assault Fail To Comply With Recognizance x 2 Possession Of A Schedule II Substance x 2
Nov 10, 2010 Toronto (Youth) Possession Of Property Obtained By Crime Under $5000 Theft over $5000 Break And Enter And Theft
Nov 10, 2011 Toronto (Youth) Fail To Comply With Recognizance x 2 Possession Of Property Obtained By Crime Under $5000 Assault Peace Officer Escape Lawful Custody Break And Enter And Commit
Mar 9, 2012 Brampton (Youth) Break And Enter And Commit x 2 Mischief Over $5000 Fail To Comply With Recognizance Fail To Comply With Disposition
Jul 11, 2012 Brampton (Youth) Possession Of A Firearm Knowing Its Possession Is Unauthorized Fail To Comply With Disposition
Sep 22, 2013 Brampton (Adult) Assault
Sep 27, 2013 Brampton (Adult) Assault Peace Officer
Jan 30, 2014 Toronto (Adult) Aggravated Assault Fail To Comply With Probation Order
Dec 1, 2015 Toronto (Adult) Assault
Jul 16, 2018 Toronto (Adult) Assault Peace Officer Sexual Assault
[13] Mr. Huberman, for Mr. Marshall, argues that the prejudicial effect of the record outweighs the probative value. He argues that all, or almost all, of the record should be excluded. Otherwise the jury is likely to engage in “propensity reasoning” and determine that Mr. Marshall is the sort of person who is likely to kill an elderly woman in her home. The defence has not generally attacked the credibility of the Crown witnesses. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether the jury would be presented with an unbalanced picture. If required, all convictions but the breach of probation could be excluded. Such editing, he argues, would show the jury that Mr. Marshall is not blemish-free without at the same time exposing the jury to the risk of propensity reasoning that goes with a long criminal record. He relies on Doherty J.A.’s statement in R. v. Talbot, 2007 ONCA 81 at para. 34:
I see no error in the trial judge's identification of potential prejudice. Nor do I regard her frank acknowledgement of that potential prejudice as inconsistent with a recognition of the ability of juries to follow instructions. Acknowledging the risk of prejudice is not tantamount to suggesting that juries will ignore what they are told by trial judges. Rather, acknowledging the prejudice recognizes that despite proper instructions and the best of intentions by juries, faulty propensity based reasoning can infect a jury's deliberations. This is particularly so where an accused's criminal record lends considerable credence to propensity based reasoning.
[14] Crown counsel, Mr. Coughlan, does not disagree with the framework as set out by Mr. Huberman. He argues, however, that there should be a different outcome. He says that the Crown ought to be permitted to cross-examine Mr. Marshall with regard to all of his convictions, with the exception of the two drug convictions in 2010. Those convictions are irrelevant. Mr. Coughlan says that to do otherwise would deprive the jury of the full picture. He, in turn, relies on Dickson J.’s statement at para. 41 of Corbett:
In my view, it would be quite wrong to make too much of the risk that the jury might use the evidence for an improper purpose. This line of thinking could seriously undermine the entire jury system. The very strength of the jury is that the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence is determined by a group of ordinary citizens who are not legal specialists and who bring to the legal process a healthy measure of common sense. The jury is, of course, bound to follow the law as it is explained by the trial judge. Jury directions are often long and difficult, but the experience of trial judges is that juries do perform their duty according to the law. We should regard with grave suspicion arguments which assert that depriving the jury of all relevant information is preferable to giving them everything, with a careful explanation as to any limitations on the use to which they may put that information. So long as the jury is given a clear instruction as to how it may and how it may not use evidence of prior convictions put to an accused on cross-examination, it can be argued that the risk of improper use is outweighed by the much more serious risk of error should the jury be forced to decide the issue in the dark.
[15] Mr. Coughlin also argues that it is a mistake to find that the jury cannot assess Mr. Marshall’s character. They jury can. It is open to them to determine that he is a career criminal. They may use that determination to assess his credibility. What they may not do is use that determination to engage in the prohibited moral reasoning – and find that he is more likely to have committed murder.
[16] Mr. Coughlan argues that there are four categories of Mr. Marshall’s convictions: first, crimes of dishonesty such as theft or possession of property; crimes involving lack of concern for court orders, such as fail to comply with recognizance; crimes indicating antipathy to the justice system, such as escape lawful custody; and crimes of violence such as assault. I think that this classification is useful for analytical purposes. The danger of doing so, of course, is that one may take a very granular approach that loses the larger picture of prejudicial effect and probative value. With that caution in mind, I will apply the suggested classification and turn to each of the questions:
(a) What is the nature of the previous convictions?
[17] Mr. Huberman argues that the nature of the previous convictions is the most important factor. He argues that the crimes of violence in Mr. Marshall’s past have no probative value. Crimes of violence have little bearing on the honesty of a witness: Corbett, at para. 161 quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (1967, U.S.C.A., DC Circ.). He also argues that the sexual assault conditions in the context of a break-in at an elderly woman’s home might invite speculation from the jury. The assault convictions, and especially the aggravated assault conviction, are invitations to propensity reasoning. The potential prejudice, therefore, outweighs the probative value of these convictions.
[18] Mr. Coughlan argues to the contrary that a jury could find that a person who has been convicted of a string of serious violent offences disregards the norms and rules of society. Such a person may not think lying in court is particularly serious: R. v. Charland, [1996] A.J. No. 819 (C.A.); appeal dismissed: , [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1006.
[19] Mr. Huberman further argues that the convictions involving theft and breaches of court orders are not classic crimes of dishonesty. They are not perjury, or fraud convictions. These convictions therefore have very little probative value because they will not add to the jury’s evaluation of Mr. Marshall’s propensity to lie or tell the truth. Since Mr. Marshall has only one conviction for a breach of recognizance as an adult, remoteness and youth mean that these convictions should be excluded. He also argues that there is no danger of presenting an imbalanced picture to the jury. There has been no attack on either the credibility or the character of the Crown witnesses, with the exception of PC Pece (about which more later in these reasons).
[20] Mr. Huberman also argues that cases involving theft and break and enter have no probative value because they will cause the jury to think that Mr. Marshall is involved in a criminal lifestyle. They will engage in the prohibited reasoning that because he is a criminal he is more likely to have murdered Ms. Tetsos in the course of committing another crime. For that reason, he argues that these convictions should be excluded.
[21] I disagree with Mr. Huberman’s argument. Mr. Marshall, as I understand it, will admit to breaking into Ms. Tetsos’s house and assaulting her. There is no danger of propensity reasoning. The jury will find him guilty of manslaughter at a minimum. They already know he committed a violent act. The record will only go to his credibility.
(b) Are the previous convictions similar to the current charge?
[22] Mr. Huberman argues, correctly, that several of the previous convictions are similar to the current offence, notably the break and enter and the assault convictions. He urges me to adopt the notion that I should be “chary” of including such convictions.
[23] There is no blanket rule against the admission of similar offences. Admission obviously depends on prejudicial effect and probative value. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Clarke, 2014 ONCA 777 considered this issue and determined that the trial judge in that case was correct to permit cross-examination on the whole record. The accused was charged with manslaughter, robbery, and other offences. The deceased suffocated while tied up with duct tape during the course of a robbery. The accused’s record included robberies. His co-perpetrator testified for the Crown. He attacked the character and credibility of the co-perpetrator. The Court stated:
The trial judge was troubled about admitting evidence of the appellant's past robbery convictions, echoing the Supreme Court in Corbett by observing that: "I am naturally most chary of admitting evidence of similar crimes." He considered editing the robbery convictions out of the record, but concluded that "doing so would significantly minimize both the seriousness and the persistence of the record, important considerations when assessing credibility." He added: "to omit the robberies in this case would overwhelmingly reduce the seriousness of the record, and create an artificial gap in it, from 1992 to 1999, followed by a few minor convictions." The remaining record, after omitting the robberies, would have had the effect of deleting any indication of crimes of violence apart from the appellant's youthful assault conviction in 1991.
The trial judge's overriding consideration was that, without the inclusion of evidence of the appellant's prior robberies and associated convictions, "the jury would have a false basis to consider the competing versions of the events [in] issue if they are left to believe that the accused, unlike Mr. Joseph, had an unblemished past." He pointed out that: "without involvement in the robbery, there is no basis to conclude that the accused was involved in the murder." This favoured the introduction of the appellant's whole record.
[24] Mr. Marshall’s counsel did not conduct an attack on the credibility of the witnesses in the same way. There was an attack on the credibility of PC Pece. That attack had to do with the forcible confinement aspect of the Crown’s case, which in turn is only relevant to the issue of first degree murder, not intent. As I have already stated, I see little danger of propensity reasoning because it is conceded that Mr. Marshall committed the offences of break and enter and assault. With a proper instruction the jury will be able to use the record properly.
(c) How remote are the previous convictions?
[25] Mr. Huberman argues that the remoteness of Mr. Marshall’s earlier youth convictions militates against introduction. Again, he argues that the jury may get the impression that Mr. Marshall is a hardened criminal. As a hardened criminal, Mr. Marshall would be more likely to murder Ms. Tetsos, the jury may reason.
[26] Mr. Coughlan, in contrast, argues that the remoteness argument carries less force. He argues that the convictions are probative because there is an unbroken record of them.
[27] In this case, the most remote convictions are from Mr. Marshall’s youth. Some of the more remote and less serious convictions will be edited out. The jury will be instructed that older, more youthful convictions should carry less force.
(d) Is there a need to prevent an unbalanced picture being presented to the jury?
[28] Mr. Marshall has, in fact, carried on a criminal lifestyle. That does not seem to be a secret. As Mr. Coughlan pointed out, he has had more-or-less continual brushes with law enforcement. It would be unbalanced if I were to edit the record and Mr. Marshall could present himself as someone whose first brush with criminality occurred when he broke Ms. Tetsos’s basement window. That is not realistic. It is also not likely to fool the jury. Juries are a cross-section of the community. They are realistic. They likely understand that a person does not simply break into a home, cutting a window screen and carrying a mag light, without any prior brushes with crime. In a way, presenting an edited record will prevent inevitable speculation if Mr. Marshall is presented as a first offender.
(e) What balance of factors achieves a fair trial?
[29] Ultimately the purpose of the balancing exercise is to ensure that Mr. Marshall receives a fair trial. It is not obvious how to best achieve that balance. He is a young Aboriginal man who has accumulated a long and unfortunate criminal record. I know little of Mr. Marshall’s antecedents but it is obvious he has had a troubled past. He is accused of a heinous crime, the random killing of a harmless elderly woman in her own home.
[30] I am not entirely convinced that the jury will look at Mr. Marshall’s record and find that he is a hardened criminal who lives a criminal lifestyle and is therefore more likely to have the intent to commit murder. It is also possible that the members of the jury, being a cross-section of major urban population, are well acquainted with the systemic racism and difficulties faced by Aboriginal youth. The jury are aware that Mr. Marshall is Aboriginal. There was a challenge for cause based on his Aboriginal status. It is possible that rather than assuming that Mr. Marshall is a hardened criminal, they will use a very different kind of reasoning. The jury may well look at Mr. Marshall’s record and assume that it is the product of a troubled and difficult upbringing. Unfortunately, the difficulties faced by Aboriginal youth are not unknown in this country: R. v. Williams at para. 58; R. v. Gladue at paras. 67-69. In Gladue at para. 67 the Court described these difficulties as “well known.”
[31] Williams was 21 years ago. Gladue was 20 years ago. It is just as possible that Mr. Marshall’s record will engender some sympathy. Mr. Marshall’s counsel has taken the traditional view that there is more danger of propensity reasoning than of sympathy. His view is not unreasonable, of course, and is backed up by case law. It may be time to revisit that traditional view.
[32] Whether and how a jury might use propensity reasoning to determine guilt has been the subject of much judicial comment. The leading case in the area is R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56. In that case the issue was whether the Crown could introduce similar fact evidence in order to show that the accused had a propensity to inflict painful sex. Unlike conviction evidence, similar fact evidence is prima facie inadmissible: Handy at para. 31. A trial judge must, however, apply a similar analysis: whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. Binnie J. described the twin dangers of “moral prejudice” and “reasoning prejudice” at paras. 139-147. In essence, moral prejudice describes a forbidden chain of reasoning: that a jury will infer guilt in a specific case because of an accused person’s general disposition to commit crimes. Binnie J. referenced Corbett in this regard. Binnie J. also described reasoning prejudice. Reasoning prejudice describes the risk that the jury might be distracted from its main task by the presence of disposition evidence.
[33] I recognize that the case law has long considered the danger that propensity reasoning will guide a jury, and that a clear instruction is required. For example, in R. v. Poitras, 2002 CarswellOnt 26 (C.A.), Doherty J.A. noted at para. 31 that juries are expected to follow instructions:
I cannot accept the argument advanced at trial. It rests on the assumption that the jury would apply propensity reasoning, albeit propensity reasoning favouring the accused, when considering the evidence of the accused's criminal record. A criminal record is admitted because it is assumed that juries will follow the instruction given by the trial judge and use the record only in assessing credibility and not for any other purpose. The argument advanced by the Crown at trial assumes that the jury will misuse the evidence.
[34] Sometimes courts have noted that propensity reasoning is unlikely to be used by the jury where the connection is tenuous. In R. v. Romain, 2017 ONCA 519, the accused were charged with fraud and fraud-related offences. They were running what is commonly known as a “boiler room”. The police arrested Ms. Romain at a suspected boiler room location. She testified that she was only going there to smoke marijuana in the basement. The trial judge did not give a warning to the jury about bad character evidence. The Court of Appeal made this comment at paras. 72-73:
The suggestion that the jury might infer that because Ms. Romain used marihuana, she had a propensity to commit all crimes, including telemarketing fraud, is to say the least farfetched. The argument becomes even less tenable in light of the nature of the cross-examination. Crown counsel's questions did not target Ms. Romain's marihuana use as demonstrating a propensity to commit crimes, but rather the cross-examination sought to highlight what the Crown argued was a patently unbelievable explanation offered by Ms. Romain for her conduct at Whites Road.
Like counsel at trial and the trial judge, we see no risk that the jury improperly used propensity reasoning to infer that because Ms. Romain used marihuana, she was a telemarketing fraudster.
[35] Other courts have emphasized the prejudicial effect of previous convictions. In Batte, Rosenberg J.A. extensively analyzed the issues where the defence has attacked the credibility of the Crown witnesses. At para. 45 he distinguished between an attack on the credibility of the Crown witnesses in the context of the particular case, and an attack on the character of the Crown witnesses generally. The attack on character raises the issue of balance; the attack on credibility usually does not. Importantly for this discussion, he noted that there is a greater risk of prejudice to a fair trial where the previous conviction was for a similar offence: see para. 48-49 (something noted as well by LaForest J. in Corbett).
[36] Watt J.A., in the context of an alternative suspect argument, commented on the difficulty of the balancing exercise when weighing probative value and prejudicial effect. See R. v. Spackman, 2012 ONCA 905 at para. 118:
Where the basis on which the exclusionary discretion is invoked is a claim that the prejudicial effect of the evidence exceeds its probative value, the balancing exercise brushes up uncomfortably close to the jury's function of weighing the evidence. A trial judge, invited to exercise his or her exclusionary discretion on this basis, must be careful not to invade the jury's territory. In a similar way, in assessing the potential prejudicial effect of evidence, a trial judge must take into account and not underestimate the jury's ability to understand and follow limiting instructions R. v. Corbett …
[37] At the end of the day, I think that the remedy is not to sanitize the trial but to have faith that the jury will follow instructions. I refer to Chief Justice Dickson’s original observation. My view, therefore, is to give the jury information so that they can make an informed evaluation of Mr. Marshall’s credibility. That information is to be tempered by careful editing and strong mid-trial and final instructions.
DISPOSITION
[38] Mr. Marshall’s record is admissible but will be edited to remove the most egregious offences. My goals are that the jury should have the appropriate information, that an unbalanced picture is not presented, but that the evidence is not so prejudicial that the fairness of the trial is impaired. The editing should also achieve the goal of providing information while not distracting the jury from their task. Although I do believe the jury will follow my instructions, some convictions are probably too prejudicial and may resonate with some jurors despite their best efforts. This is, after all, a very human process.
[39] I will deal with the offences using the classification suggested by Mr. Coughlan. Both counsel take the position that the youthful Schedule II drug offences can be excluded. I agree with counsel. The drug convictions will be edited out.
Crimes Of Dishonesty
[40] Although the term “crimes of dishonesty” has been used, these convictions are not classic crimes of dishonesty, such as fraud or perjury. The classification I am adopting is for convenience only. Mr. Marshall has been convicted of four of these offences: two for possession of property obtained by crime under $5000; one for theft over $5000; and one for mischief over $5000.
[41] There is certainly probative value to these convictions. They may not be classic crimes of dishonesty, but they often involve dishonest behaviour, or an association or benefit from dishonest behaviour. I think that the risk that the jury will engage in prohibited moral prejudice reasoning is low. None of these offences involve violence. It is not logical to think that a person is more likely to commit murder because he has been convicted of theft, for example. The prejudicial effect of these convictions is generally low.
[42] Thus, the probative value of these convictions outweighs the prejudicial effect. That said, the mischief over $5000 offence may be distracting. A jury may well spend time wondering how someone could cause mischief over $5000. At the same time the conviction has little probative value regarding credibility. It will be edited out.
Crimes Involving Lack Of Concern For Court Orders
[43] Mr. Marshall has been convicted of eight of these offences: five for failure to comply with recognizance; two for failure to comply with a disposition; and one for failure to comply with probation.
[44] In my view, it is fair to suggest that there is a link between disrespect for court orders and disrespect for the oath or affirmation. A jury could make an informed decision about Mr. Marshall’s credibility using these convictions. There is also little danger of propensity reasoning associated with them, as I have already canvassed. It is not logical to think that a person who has breached court orders is also more likely to commit murder.
[45] I find that the probative value of these offences is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect. There may, however, be a prejudicial effect from so many convictions so early in his life. I therefore find that the earliest two fail to comply with recognizances should be excised, the ones from April 21, 2010. There is some resonance to the remoteness argument in this respect. The rest of these convictions should not be excluded.
Crimes Indicating Antipathy To The Justice System
[46] Mr. Marshall has been convicted of four of these offences: three convictions for assaulting a police officer, and one conviction for escape lawful custody.
[47] I have concerns that these offences are highly distracting and therefore prejudicial. I am concerned that the jury may spend too much time speculating about whether Mr. Marshall has an antipathy to the police rather than about the evidence. They may speculate that he is an angry young man, which could lead to propensity reasoning. On the other hand, I see little probative value in these convictions. They likely to speak more about anger than credibility. These convictions should be excluded.
Crimes Of Violence
[48] Mr. Marshall has been convicted of ten of these offences: four convictions for break and enter; two convictions for sexual assault; one conviction for possession of a firearm; two convictions for assault; one conviction for aggravated assault.
[49] I am not sure that “break and enter” can be considered a classic crime of violence, but, again, I am adopting this classification only for convenience, not as a hard and fast rule. As I have already stated, I do not believe that the break and enter offences carry a serious danger of propensity reasoning. After much consideration, I believe that the jury may consider these offences. For the same reasons, I find that the jury can consider the assault convictions.
[50] The sexual assault, possession of a firearm, and aggravated assault convictions raise the potential prejudice levels. I think that prejudicial effect of the firearm conviction is a real concern and outweighs the probative value, even though no firearm was used in this crime. It will be excluded.
[51] The sexual assault offences are also problematic. There is no evidence or suggestion of any sexual contact between Mr. Marshall and Ms. Tetsos. Nonetheless, I agree that there is considerable potential for distraction. It is certainly conceivable that some jurors may be troubled that this crime involved an assault on an elderly woman at night and see a link, or at least may speculate about it. The sexual assaults will be edited out. Remoteness also plays a role in the first sexual assault conviction.
[52] I agree with Mr. Huberman that an aggravated assault charge tips the balance slightly towards an elevated prejudicial effect. It will be edited so as to simply indicate an assault.
[53] Ultimately, after editing there will be 17 entries on Mr. Marshall’s record. I reproduce the list of entries as edited:
DATE LOCATION OFFENCE
Nov 10, 2010 Toronto (Youth) Possession Of Property Obtained By Crime Under $5000 Theft Over $5000 Break And Enter And Theft
Nov 10, 2011 Toronto (Youth) Fail To Comply With Recognizance x 2 Possession Of Property Obtained By Crime Under $5000 Break And Enter And Commit
Mar 9, 2012 Brampton (Youth) Break And Enter And Commit x 2 Mischief Over $5000 Fail To Comply With Recognizance Fail to Comply With Disposition
Jul 11, 2012 Brampton (Youth) Fail To Comply With Disposition
Sep 22, 2013 Brampton (Adult) Assault
Jan 30, 2014 Toronto (Adult) Assault Fail To Comply With Probation Order
Dec 1, 2015 Toronto (Adult) Assault