Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 50/19 Date: 2019-06-19 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Her Majesty The Queen And: Derek Denesevich

Counsel: James Spangenberg, for the Crown Aaron Prevost, for the defendant

Heard: May 27, 2019

Before: Grace J. (Orally)

A. Introduction

[1] Derek Denesevich is charged with various offences arising from alleged attempts to import firearm components into Canada. On October 29, 2018, Justice of the Peace P.A. Hodgins ordered his detention following a show cause hearing.

[2] Time passed, necessitating an application by the custodial institution housing Mr. Denesevich pursuant to s. 525(1) of the Criminal Code . For good reasons, the defendant asked the court to adjourn the matter pending completion of his preliminary hearing in the Ontario Court of Justice.

[3] With the decision to commit him on four of the five charges in hand, the accused exercised his right to request that the court schedule a hearing to determine whether or not detention should continue.

[4] Soon after a date was set, counsel for Mr. Denesevich filed an application record. It included a notice of application seeking a bail review pursuant to s. 520 of the Criminal Code. A blended hearing under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code was conducted on May 27, 2019. Decision was reserved until today.

B. Background

[5] The defendant is 31 years old. He has dual Canadian and American citizenship. He has been a Florida resident for much of his life. Mr. Denesevich appears to have taken up residence in Canada about two years ago.

[6] The defendant acknowledges that he has a youth and adult criminal record in the United States. It is alleged that his presence in Canada violates a term of an order made there as evidenced by a Warrant for Arrest of Supervised Releasee issued by the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida on September 8, 2016.

[7] The charges laid in this jurisdiction arise in the following circumstances. Two incoming packages from the United States were identified when x-rayed by a member of the Canadian Border Services Agency. Both were opened and found to contain handgun components. London, Ontario addresses were listed on both parcels. One was to be delivered to Deren Alexander, E21, 1173 Dundas Street (“Unit E21”) and the other to Derek Denesevich, 42-786 Shelborne Street (the “residence”).

[8] A controlled delivery of the second package was effected on October 24, 2018 at the stated address. A police officer played the role of courier. He had brief interactions with the accused. The package was left with him. Soon afterward, Mr. Denesevich was arrested and the Shelborne Street residence searched. A number of items were seized.

[9] The business premises of Price Self Storage are located at the 1173 Dundas Street address. Unit E21 is a storage locker there. It is alleged that Mr. Denesevich rented the unit. More firearm parts were found when it was searched.

[10] Five charges were laid. On October 29, 2018 Mr. Denesevich was taken before a justice as required by s. 503 of the Criminal Code and a show cause hearing was conducted. The parties agreed that the defendant had the onus of showing why detention was not justified.

[11] A plan of release was formulated. It involved two sureties: family friend Derrick Salter and the defendant’s father George Denesevich. The former was prepared to allow the accused to live in his residence. The proposed sureties expressed their willingness to supervise the accused.

[12] Mr. Salter testified. So did the defendant’s father. In ordering detention, the Justice of the peace told the accused:

So, on the secondary ground concerns [ sic ] and on the tertiary ground concern, I am not satisfied that the plan that has been presented today with the two sureties is suffice [ sic ]. You have not shown cause for your release today, and you will be detained in custody.

C. The Proposed Release Plan

[13] In this court, counsel for the defendant requests the release of Mr. Denesevich once he enters into a recognizance with the same two sureties supported by a pledge in the aggregate amount of $17,500 but without deposit of money or other valuable security.

[14] Conditions are proposed. They include a requirement that the accused reside with Derrick Salter at all times subject to specified exceptions, obey a curfew, surrender travel documents and comply with a weapons prohibition.

[15] The Crown asks the court to order the continued detention of Mr. Denesevich.

D. The Evidence

[16] Affidavits of George Denesevich, Derrick Salter and the accused were sworn and filed.

[17] The proposed sureties had testified during the bail hearing. The transcript was available for and excerpts relied upon by the parties’ counsel during this proceeding.

[18] The Crown declined the opportunity to cross-examine the proposed sureties on the affidavits filed with this court. The defendant did not testify at the bail hearing and was not cross-examined on the affidavit filed for the purposes of this review.

[19] However, the Crown relies on a number of documents. They include an agreed statement of facts filed at the preliminary hearing, an online copy of a newspaper article published October 25, 2014 concerning the sentence Mr. Denesevich received in a Florida court following a conviction for aggravated identity theft and a record of the defendant’s criminal history in the United States.

[20] The Crown relies on two documents authored by members of the London Police Service dated July 5, 2017 and February 27, 2018. They concern the teenage son of Derrick Salter. The first document outlined events that resulted in a charge of breaching a recognizance. The other set forth circumstances that ended with the young person’s release into the care of his father. No charges were laid on that occasion.

[21] D-C Jamie Porter testified. D-C Porter told the court that Derrick Salter had been acting as surety at the time of the July 5, 2017 incident. D-C Porter was unable to determine the disposition of the resulting charge. However, it did not show up as an outstanding matter or as a conviction in the records he reviewed.

[22] According to the officer, Mr. Salter’s son is currently on probation. The address on the probation order provided by the Canadian Police Information Centre corresponds with the proposed surety’s address.

[23] D-C Porter had also recently spoken to officials in the United States about the defendant. He said he had been told that an extradition order was issued in December, 2018. He said a “hold” had been placed on the accused by the London Police Service. In cross-examination, the witness conceded that he is not familiar with the process involved in extraditing a person from Canada to the United States.

E. The General Legal Principles

[24] The right of an accused to a review of their detention under s. 525(1) of the Criminal Code arises automatically upon passage of the statutory time period: R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18, [2019] S.C.J. No. 18 at paras. 35, 39 and 44 (“Myers”).

[25] The purpose of the subsection is “to prevent an accused person from languishing in pre-trial custody and to ensure a prompt trial by subjecting lengthy detentions to judicial oversight.” [1]

[26] Section 520(1) of the Criminal Code allows an accused person to apply to a judge to review a detention order made in the Ontario Court of Justice. I need not dwell on the threshold issue often in play on the return of such an application because the Crown agrees that the dismissal of one of the original charges in the provincial court constitutes a material change in circumstances.

[27] Proceedings under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code are not identical. As was explained in Myers at para. 47:

The question in the s. 525 review – whether the continued detention of the accused is justified – is somewhat different in nature than the question at the initial bail hearing or in a review under s. 520 or 521. While ss. 520 and 521 exist for the purpose of reviewing a prior order, a review under s. 525 is more properly characterized as a review of the detention itself.

[28] On both applications the presiding judge must bear in mind the considerations that arise whenever judicial interim release is sought.

[29] Bail is an important and fundamental right entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”). Section 11(e) provides:

Any person charged with an offence has the right

(e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause…

[30] In R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328 (“St-Cloud”), Wagner J. (as he then was) explained why detention is not the usual or preferred course. At para. 70, he wrote:

…it is important not to overlook the fact that, in Canadian law, the release of accused persons is the cardinal rule and detention, the exception…This entitlement rests…on the cornerstone of Canadian criminal law, namely the presumption of innocence that is guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter … These fundamental rights require the justice to ensure that interim detention is truly justified having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. [Citations omitted]

[31] Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada said that “pre-trial detention is a measure of last resort.” [2]

[32] Pre-trial custody takes a toll on any accused person. Once again writing for the court in R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 509, Wagner J. (as he then was) explained at para. 66:

Pre-trial custody “affects the mental, social and physical life of the accused and his family” and may also have a “substantial impact on the result of the trial itself” [Citations omitted]

[33] Pre-trial detention is sometimes necessary and appropriate. Entitlement to interim release is not absolute. If just cause exists, reasonable bail may be denied. However, the concept of just cause has been narrowly circumscribed. Detention is only justified in three circumstances.

[34] The first – or primary ground justifying detention – is found in s. 515(10)(a) of the Criminal Code. It is engaged if:

…detention is necessary to ensure [the accused’s] attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law…

[35] For detention to be justified on the second – or secondary – ground under s. 515(10)(b), it must be:

…necessary for the protection or safety of the public…having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice…

[36] The third – or tertiary – basis for requiring pre-trial custody is set forth in s. 515(10)(c). That subsection is engaged:

…if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including

(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case,

(ii) the gravity of the offence,

(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and

(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment…

[37] Sometimes concerns that arise under s. 515(10) can be adequately mitigated by terms or conditions.

[38] As stated in The Law of Bail in Canada:

The bail decision does not present the judge with a stark choice between detention on the one hand, and absolute freedom on the other. Bail judges have a number of options at their disposal. [3]

[39] The Supreme Court of Canada has directed courts to strictly adhere to the principle that early release is to be favoured and on the least onerous form of release that is reasonable in the circumstances. [4]

F. The Parties’ Positions

[40] Counsel for the defendant acknowledged that the release plan presented in this court is similar to the one that failed to find favour in the Ontario Court of Justice. Nonetheless, based on the legal principles I will come to and the evidence, Mr. Prevost submitted Mr. Denesevich should be released on the terms proposed. He made these points:

a. First, the Crown conceded at the preliminary hearing that there was insufficient evidence for committal in relation to the allegation Mr. Denesevich was a party to a conspiracy to import a prohibited or restricted weapon into Canada. Consequently, the charge under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code was dismissed;

b. Second, any concerns under the primary, secondary or tertiary grounds specified in s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code are not overwhelming and are adequately mitigated by the release plan. In that regard, the defence submits that the Crown’s case is not strong, the extent and seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history in the United States unclear and that the court should take into account the fact there is no suggestion Mr. Denesevich has been involved in criminal activity in Canada, aside from the pending charges.

[41] The Crown maintains that all three subsections of s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code are engaged.

[42] With respect to the primary ground, the prosecution notes that the Warrant for Arrest of Supervised Releasee was issued because Mr. Denesevich fled from the United States during a period of probation. The second subsection is engaged, he argued, because of a criminal record that includes a plethora of charges and convictions while a youth and as an adult. Robbery, drug and firearms offences appear as well as a crime of dishonesty.

[43] Mr. Spangenberg submits the tertiary ground is applicable as well. The Crown disagrees with the defence’s estimate of the strength of its case. It maintains that the circumstances outlined in the agreed statement of facts prove the elements of possession and knowledge: R. v. Rahmani, 2013 ONCA 130 at paras. 15-18. The outstanding charges arise from the attempted importation of parts of two handguns. Components were found in packages bearing innocuous but misleading labels. One of the items was addressed to and readily accepted by Mr. Denesevich at his residence. Sights for a Glock handgun were uncovered during the subsequent search of the storage locker. The remaining counts are very serious. If convicted, a penitentiary sentence of at least three years is likely.

[44] The attention of the Crown then turns to the adequacy of the release plan. Mr. Spangenberg made these points. Mr. Salter has served as surety for his son. The adequacy of supervision is in issue given the incidents that are described in the July 5, 2017 prosecution summary and February 27, 2018 police witness statement. The involvement of George Denesevich adds little. He has two young children to raise. His income is modest, his health poor and his residential situation less than ideal. Most of the time he resides in a hotel in London, Ontario. The ability of the defendant’s father to fulfill a stated willingness to relocate to Glencoe where Mr. Salter resides is unknown.

G. The s. 525(1) review: Is continued detention warranted under s. 515(10)?

i. The question to be answered

[45] The fundamental question to be determined on a review under s. 525(1) of the Criminal Code is this:

Is the continued detention of the accused justified within the meaning of s. 515(10)? [5]

ii. The burden of proof

[46] Before turning to the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds, I should address the burden of proof. Who bears the onus? Prior to the release of Myers uncertainty reigned. In The Law of Bail in Canada, Trotter J.A. said:

There is considerable debate in the case law over who bears the onus of a hearing under s. 525. Indeed, as Hill J. said in R. v. Gill …”neither the rules of court nor the text of s. 525 provide any real assistance on issues such as burdens of production or persuasion, the appropriate record or the precise span of remedies.” Therefore, it is not surprising that the cases conflict on this issue. [6]

[47] In some cases the court has concluded that the Crown is required to justify further detention once the statutory period expires. In others, the presiding justice has held that the onus lies as it did in the Ontario Court of Justice.

[48] The Crown submitted that the burden of proof lies with Mr. Denesevich because that was where the onus lay when the show cause hearing was conducted. The defence disagrees. Mr. Prevost argues that a review of paras. 4, 32 and 46 of Myers leads to the conclusion that the Crown must demonstrate that detention is still required on one or more of the statutorily mandated grounds.

[49] While the issue of the onus of proof was not expressly addressed in Myers, the Supreme Court of Canada provided some helpful commentary concerning the nature of a s. 525(1) detention review:

a. Such a review is a “safeguard” that is triggered simply by the passage of time; [7]

b. It is to be provided to all accused persons to whom the section applies whether there has been an initial bail hearing or not; [8]

c. The detention review is to be initiated by the person having custody of the accused, not the prosecution or the defence, although a defendant who is fully informed of their rights and the purpose of the provision may waive what is intended to be an automatic hearing; [9]

d. If a bail hearing was not conducted in the Ontario Court of Justice, it must be conducted “from the ground up” by the judge presiding on the s. 525 review, taking into account the time already spent in custody; [10]

e. If, however, such a hearing was conducted, s. 525 does not require the presiding judge to conduct it anew; [11]

f. In that regard, the presiding judge may rely upon the transcript, exhibits and reasons from any initial judicial interim release hearing and any subsequent review and any additional credible and trustworthy information which is relevant or material to the question the court is instructed to answer; [12]

g. While prior decisions are not to receive a “rubber stamp”, the s. 525 judge should show respect for findings of fact made by a previous decision maker absent cause to interfere with them; [13]

h. However, any previously conducted balancing exercise or weighing of factors must be reviewed in light of the time that has already passed. In that regard, the period of pre-trial custody may have afforded the accused person time to take steps that would negate the initial basis for detention. [14]

[50] Again, the fundamental question is whether the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified within the meaning of s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code. In light of the foregoing I suggest that the onus depends on what, if anything, has happened before. If, for example, a bail hearing was not conducted, the Crown should bear the onus as s. 515(5) mandates, unless shifted to the defendant by virtue of s. 515(6).

[51] In this case, a detention order was made at first instance because Mr. Denesevich was not able to adequately mitigate secondary and tertiary ground concerns. Absent cause to interfere with the earlier findings, I am of the view the accused must demonstrate that continued detention on those grounds is no longer justified based on new evidence, a material change of circumstances, the elapsed and anticipated passage of time and/or unreasonable delay for which the Crown bears responsibility. [15]

[52] Another scenario also arises in this case. The Crown argues that continued detention is justified on the primary ground. However, detention was not ordered on that basis in the provincial court. Absent a demonstrated error, I am of the view the Crown must satisfy the court that continued detention is warranted on the basis of a ground that did not find favour in the bail hearing based on new evidence, a material change of circumstances and/or unreasonable delay for which the defence bears responsibility. [16]

iii. Analysis and conclusion – s. 525 review

[53] I will now deal with the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds in turn.

[54] At the bail hearing the Crown argued that detention was necessary to ensure Mr. Denesevich attended court in order to be dealt with according to law. The prosecution relied on the Warrant for the Arrest of a Supervised Releasee and newspaper article to which I have referred. The former suggested Mr. Denesevich’s most recent move to Canada violated the terms governing his release from a Florida jail. According to the latter item Mr. Denesevich fled to Canada on an earlier occasion.

[55] The justice of the peace held that any primary ground concern “could most likely be alleviated by having your passport seized.” Detention was not ordered on that basis.

[56] The Crown has not alleged that the justice erred. The only further piece of information presented to the court on this review came from D-C Porter. Extradition proceedings may be underway. However, that is a consequence of events that predated the bail hearing. Nothing has happened since then that causes additional concern. The new evidence does not support the conclusion the Crown advocates.

[57] Further, the release plan proposed in this court requires that Mr. Denesevich deposit any passports or travel documents with the police. During argument, Mr. Prevost said the defendant would consent to an additional provision that required the defendant to regularly check in with the police. Any concern under s. 515(10)(a) is adequately mitigated by those terms.

[58] As mentioned, detention on the secondary ground is authorized:

…where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public…having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice…

[59] The justice of the peace was of the view the subsection applied because:

a. While not familiar with the printout of the criminal record of Mr. Denesevich in the United States, it revealed a number of convictions including weapons and drug offences;

b. The Crown had compiled a “significant case” against the defendant that suggests he was smuggling firearm components into Canada on an ongoing basis; and

c. The release plan was insufficient.

[60] The tertiary ground is engaged where consideration of all of the circumstances, including those specifically listed, leads to the conclusion detention is necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The court below considered the factors enumerated in s. 515(10)(c). The apparent force of the Crown’s case was found to be “relatively strong”, the gravity of the alleged offences “significant”, the circumstances surrounding their alleged commission “negative” and the potential term of imprisonment “lengthy”.

[61] As noted, the justice of the peace was of the view that the release plan did not adequately mitigate the concern arising on the tertiary ground either.

[62] With that summary I return to the question posed a short while ago. Is the detention of the accused still justified under ss. 515(10)(b) or (c)?

[63] I start with the secondary ground.

[64] The record of Mr. Denesevich in the United States was filed in this court too. It is, indeed, difficult to follow because its form is not similar to that in use here. The accused may have been able to shed light on its contents but was not cross-examined.

[65] The record appears to contain a total of fifteen groups of entries, called cycles. The printout contains a combination of youth and adult records. Each cycle commences with a specific date. Most, but not all, list at least one charge that was laid against Mr. Denesevich.

[66] The youth entries commence on September 25, 2001 and end on September 2, 2005. In that time frame, Mr. Denesevich ranged in age from 13 to 17. The last of those entries indicated that the accused was treated as an adult despite his young age. On that occasion, he faced a charge of robbery “no firearm or weapon”. He was convicted [17] and on November 16, 2007 sentenced to a custodial term followed by probation.

[67] It appears that the record contains three convictions post-dating the defendant’s eighteenth birthday. The first was recorded on November 16, 2007 (possession of a concealed weapon), the second on December 20, 2011 (selling cocaine) and the third the aggravated identity theft conviction mentioned previously (dated October 24, 2014).

[68] In summary, it appears that Mr. Denesevich has a youth and adult criminal record in the United States. However, from this vantage point the concern arising from its length diminishes significantly after consideration of its content. The number and nature of the offences listed thereon does not justify alarm. The charges he faces here appear to be among, if not the most serious. Nothing more than a preliminary assessment of the Crown’s case is possible at this stage. In any event, Mr. Denesevich is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence, no matter how strong it may be perceived to be. Having regard to all the circumstances, the justice of the peace’s conclusion that detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public is a tenuous one. In any event, the identified risk can be managed within the statutory scheme. I will return to that aspect of the matter at the conclusion of these reasons.

[69] I turn to the tertiary ground. Save for one item, counsel for Mr. Denesevich did not quarrel with the bail court’s comments concerning the factors specifically listed in s. 515(10)(c). The defendant submits the assessment of the prosecution’s case as “relatively strong” is overly generous. His counsel argues that the Crown faces a challenging path and notes that an application for certiorari is pending.

[70] The court’s task in assessing the tertiary ground is to determine whether detention is “necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.” As the Supreme Court of Canada said in St-Cloud at para. 74

…the “public” in question consists of reasonable members of the community who are properly informed about the “philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case”… [Citation omitted]

[71] Such persons know that the fundamental rights the Charter enshrines “require the justice to ensure that interim detention is truly justified having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case.” [18]

[72] Unfortunately, the justice of the peace did not address that issue at any point in time. That gap in the analysis is an important one. As the court said in St-Cloud at para. 69:

…this is the ultimate question the justice must answer, and it must therefore guide him or her in making a determination. The argument that detention must automatically be ordered if the review of the four circumstances favours that result is incompatible with the balancing exercise required by s. 515(10)(c) and with the purpose of that exercise.

[73] In my view, the relevant circumstances include the personal history of Mr. Denesevich to which I have referred. [19] A comprehensive release plan is an item that is specifically mentioned in Myers as something that may “impact on the question whether [the defendant’s] continued detention in custody is justified”.

[74] So, too, is the passage of time. Mr. Denesevich has been detained for almost eight months. That is a significant period. At para. 53 of Myers, the court explained why elapsed time may be an important consideration when conducting a s. 525 review:

In St-Cloud, the Court indicated that a lengthy delay between the hearing and the eventual trial may be considered in determining whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, which is the tertiary ground…In this sense, the analysis is not only retrospective, but also forward-looking. For example, let us consider a scenario in which an individual is detained on the basis of s. 515(10)(c), and at the time of the first detention order his trial is only two months away. If the trial date is then rescheduled for a date two years later and remains many months away at the time of [the] s. 525 hearing, the continued detention of the accused may no longer be proportionate, or necessary, for the purposes of this third ground…

[75] In my view, continued detention of Mr. Denesevich is not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to and after balancing all of the circumstances. A reasonable, properly informed member of the public would not have their faith in the legal system shaken by the release of Mr. Denesevich on the terms I contemplate imposing. To the contrary. Subject to the terms that follow, Mr. Denesevich shall be released upon entering into a recognizance with two sureties, Derrick Salter and George Denesevich without deposit or other valuable security. Those terms are:

a. Derrick Salter shall pledge the sum of $2,500 and George Denesevich shall pledge the sum of $15,000;

b. These terms shall apply: 1. Mr. Denesevich shall, at all times, reside at 179 McKellar Street, Glencoe, Ontario (the “residence”) and shall be amenable to the routine and discipline of that residence; 2. Mr. Denesevich shall be confined to the residence except for his: (i) scheduled court appearances; (ii) scheduled appointments with legal counsel of record; (iii) scheduled medical or dental appointments; (iv) medical or dental emergencies; (v) obligation to check in with the Ontario Provincial Police, Middlesex Detachment, Glencoe, Ontario office in person during daytime hours on or before Monday, June 24, 2019 and thereafter once per week on such day and at such time as shall be arranged with that office; and (vi) four consecutive hours of personal time on either Saturday or Sunday of each week provided he is accompanied by at least one surety; 3. Save only for his own medical or dental emergencies, Mr. Denesevich shall be subject, at all times, to a curfew from 9:30 p.m. to 8 a.m. There shall be no other exceptions; 4. If requested by a peace officer during the curfew period, Mr. Denesevich will immediately present himself at the front door of the residence; 5. Mr. Denesevich shall not have in his possession, at any time or for any purpose, any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive device, or things intended for use as a weapon as defined in the Criminal Code of Canada; 6. Mr. Denesevich shall not apply for and shall immediately surrender any and all passports or travel documents in his name, wherever issued, to the London Police Service.

H. The s. 520 review

[76] Given the outcome of the s. 525 review, it is not necessary to deal with the application Mr. Denesevich filed under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

“Justice A.D. Grace”

Grace J.

Delivered orally: June 19, 2019

COURT FILE NO.: 50/19 DATE: 2019-06-19 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – DEREK DENESEVICH REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Justice A.D. Grace

Released: June 19, 2019 (Orally)

[1] R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18 at para. 41. (“Myers”) [2] Myers, para. 67. [3] Trotter, G., The Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2010 (loose-leaf, updated 2019, release 1) at p. 3-11. [4] R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 509 at para. 67. [5] R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18 at para. 46. [6] At p. 8-54. [7] Myers, para. 43. [8] Myers, paras. 43 and 56. [9] Myers, paras. 44 and 61. [10] Myers, paras. 56, 62 and 63. [11] Myers, para. 47. [12] Myers, paras. 48, 49 and 63. [13] Myers, paras. 47 and 55. [14] Myers, para. 49. [15] Myers, paras. 49, 53 and 54. A myriad of examples could be given. Arrangements for a suitable surety and a comprehensive release plan were ones provided by the Supreme Court of Canada: para. 49. Others were the postponement of a trial date (para. 53) and unreasonable delay falling at the feet of the Crown (para. 54). Also mentioned were “other steps that would negate the initial basis for…detention”. That could include, for example, counselling or treatment. This principle would also apply if there was a prior review under ss. 520 or 521. [16] The same principle would apply to a ss. 520 or 521 review. [17] It appears he was convicted on December 8, 2005 and sentenced on November 16, 2007. [18] St-Cloud. at para. 70. [19] Ibid. at para. 71.