Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-18-00607488-0000 Date: 2019/06/20 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Mohamed Abdullahi, self-represented as BARUUTMAN and on behalf of PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM), and FAIZA ALI Plaintiffs

• and - CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF TORONTO, ALBERTA DANSO and MENA GILL, TORONTO POLICE SERVICE BOARD, CHIEF MARK SAUNDERS, ELIZABETH BYRNES, JAMES CASE, KRYSTAL MACLEOD, JASON MAUNDER, PAUL WALKER, MICHAEL HENRY, TODD BELZA and JAMES MUIRHEAD, THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, JENNIFER GIBSON, REBECCA LAW and JOANNE BRUNO Defendants

Counsel: Mohamed Abdullahi, self-represented Brennagh Smith for the Defendants Toronto Police Service Board, Chief Mark Saunders, Elizabeth Byrnes, James Casey, Krystal MacLeod, Jason Maunder, Paul Walker, Michael Henry, Todd Belza, and James Muirhead Heather Burnett for the Defendants Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Jennifer Gibson, Rebecca Law, and Joanne Bruno

Heard: May 31, 2019

Perell, J.

Reasons for Decision

A. Background to the Motions to Strike

[1] After an investigation by the Defendant Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (in this action misnamed the Children Aid Society of Toronto), the Plaintiff Mohamed Abdullahi was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference with respect to an incident with a nine-year-old female child.

[2] The Toronto Police Service issued a press release announcing the criminal charges. Mr. Abdullahi’s employer saw the announcement and fired him. The subsequent prosecution of the criminal charges cost Mr. Abdullahi his marriage because his wife divorced him. His work as a community worker for the Somali community in Toronto was destroyed.

[3] From the outset, Mr. Abdullahi proclaimed his innocence. He asserted that he had been set up by the mother of the child, who was a jealous and bitter woman. He asserted that the Islamophobic and racist Children’s Aid Society staff and the Islamophobic and racist Toronto Police Service had, along with the mother, fabricated the case against him. He said that the Toronto Police Service encouraged a known-to-be meritless prosecution in order to injure Mr. Abdullahi and to destroy the valuable community work he was doing for the Somali community in downtown Toronto. He says that the Crown Prosecutors were also out to get him and that they relentlessly and negligently pursued the prosecution of the meritless charges.

[4] Mr. Abdullahi was tried. The mother and the child testified. He testified. He was acquitted.

[5] After his acquittal, Mr. Abdullahi sued: (a) the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto and two of its employees, Albert Danso and Mena Gill, hereinafter referred to as “the Society Defendants”; (b) the Toronto Police Service Board, and ten police officers: Chief Mark Saunders, Elizabeth Byrnes, James Casey, Krystal MacLeod, Jason Maunder, Paul Walker, Michael Henry, Todd Belza, and James Muirhead, hereinafter referred to as “the Police Defendants”; and (c) the Ministry of Attorney General, and three Crown attorneys: Jennifer Gibson, Rebecca Law, and Joanne Bruno, hereinafter referred to as “the Attorney General Defendants”.

[6] The Amended Statement of Claim reads like a novella. With a very small font, it is over 80 pages in length. There are over 200 paragraphs. The pleading is divided into multiple parts, only some of which contain material facts relevant to Mr. Abdullahi’s causes of action. Part I and Part II provide background information on Mr. Abdullahi’s life in Africa before he immigrated to Canada and before the events giving rise to the action. There is a lengthy history of his community service work and about his education and his career aspirations in information technology. There is a history of his aspirations to marry and have a family in Canada. Numerous parts of the claim contain information that should not form part of a pleading. Among the improperly pleaded materials are news reports, transcriptions of police interview, excerpts from the transcript of his trial, screenshots of Facebook posts and webpages in which people discuss the charges against Mr. Abdullahi.

[7] In his Amended Statement of Claim, Mr. Abdullahi advances numerous causes of action, including: negligence, defamation, wilful misconduct, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, unlawful conduct conspiracy, abuse of process, and breach of the sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He seeks damages on his own behalf and on behalf of "YOUNG GE", an organization he founded, his brother, his family in Africa, his ex-wife (Faiza Ali), his ex-wife’s family, and on behalf of Prophet Muhammad.

[8] Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two motions before the court:

[9] In the first motion, the Police Defendants seek an order that Mr. Abdullahi’s libel action be struck out and that all references to it should be struck from his Amended Statement of Claim on the ground that Mr. Abdullahi failed to provide the notice required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

[10] In the second motion, the Attorney General Defendants seek an order, among other things, that Mr. Abdullahi’s action against the Attorney General Defendants be struck out in its entirety without leave to amend and that the action be dismissed on the grounds that: (a) Mr. Abdullahi failed to provide the notice required by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, and (b) he failed to plead a reasonable cause of action as against the Attorney General. In the second motion, in the alternative, the Attorney General Defendants also seek an order that Mr. Abdullahi’s Amended Statement of Claim be struck because it is not a concise statement of the material facts as required by Rule 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[11] It required two attendances for the argument of the motions. The evidence and argument presented at the first attendance was based on both the Police Defendants and also the Attorney General Defendants deposing that they had diligently searched their records to determine whether Mr. Abdullahi had sent the notices required by the Libel and Slander Act and the Proceedings Against the Crown Act. Their witnesses deposed that they could find no record of having received the notices. They deposed that Mr. Abdullahi had not responded to their requests to prove that he had given notice.

[12] In his responding factum and at the argument of the first attendance, the self-represented Mr. Abdullahi, who ought to have produced the evidence to the contrary before the hearing said that he had proof that the requisite notices had been given and received. He produced some of the evidence at the hearing, but the evidence with respect to the Attorney General Defendants was on a USB key that he said he had left at home.

[13] I recessed the two motions, and I directed Mr. Abdullahi to email his evidence to the defendants and to the court. The Attorney General’s counsel did the honourable thing and did not protest my giving Mr. Abdullahi another opportunity to provide evidence.

[14] Mr. Abdullahi provided the evidence of the requisite notices having been given, received, and acknowledged, with the result that on the second attendance, the Police Defendants’ argument became that the notice under the Libel and Slander Act was untimely and that Mr. Abdullahi’s libel action was, in any event, statute-barred under that Act.

[15] For her part, on the second attendance, the Attorney General’s counsel withdrew her argument based on the Proceedings Against the Crown Act but continued the arguments that Mr. Abdullahi had not pled a reasonable cause of action against the Attorney General Defendants and that Mr. Abdullahi’s Amended Statement of Claim should be struck out for non-compliance with Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. Amendments to the Style of Cause

[16] Before turning to these arguments, it is necessary to discuss several amendments to Mr. Abdullahi’s style of cause. There are several patent problems with the style of cause in Mr. Abdullahi’s Amended Statement of Claim that require attention.

[17] In the style of cause, the plaintiffs are referred to as: “Mohamed Abdullahi, self-rep as Baruutman and on behalf of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) and Faiza Ali. It is not necessary or proper for a self-represented plaintiff to sue other than in his or her own proper name, and thus “self-rep as Baruutman” should be struck from the style of cause. It is obvious that “Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him)” cannot be a party or be represented by a party and thus “on behalf of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him)” should be struck from the style of cause. While Faiza Ali, who is Mr. Abdullahi ex-wife, is a proper plaintiff, she must sue on her own behalf, and, thus, Mr. Abdullahi cannot sue on behalf of Ms. Ali. Thus, the identification of the plaintiffs in the immediate case, should be just: “Mohamed Abdullahi and Faiza Ali.”

[18] Turning to the identification of the defendants in the style of cause, the misnaming of the Society Defendants needs to be corrected. Further, Mr. Abdullahi has joined a government ministry; i.e. the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario as a defendant, and he has joined Jennifer Gibson, Rebecca Law, and Joanne Bruno, all Crown Attorneys or assistant Crown Attorneys who were involved in the prosecution of Mr. Abdullahi. The defendant Ministry of the Attorney General is not a proper defendant because, as a ministry, it is not a suable entity. The Proceedings Against the Crown Act, does not allow for lawsuits against a ministry of the Crown. The Crown Attorney defendants are not proper defendants because the Ministry of the Attorney General Act, precludes prosecutors from being personally named as defendants in lawsuits arising from a prosecution, and instead allows such lawsuits to be brought directly against the Attorney General of Ontario, who is the properly named defendant for Mr. Abdullahi’s action. Thus, the identification of the defendants in the style of cause should be just the Attorney General of Ontario and the references to the Ministry of the Attorney General, Jennifer Gibson, Rebecca Law, and Joanne Bruno should be struck from the style of cause.

C. The Motion to Strike the Libel Claim

[19] Turning to the motion brought by the Police Defendants, Mr. Abdullahi’s various causes of action against the Police Defendants are proceeding, and these Defendants seek only to have his libel claim stuck out on two grounds.

[20] The first grounds is that Mr. Abdullahi’s action is for libel in a newspaper or in a broadcast, but he did not within six weeks after the libel came to his knowledge give the Police Defendants notice in writing as required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act, which states:

Notice of action

5 (1) No action for libel in a newspaper or in a broadcast lies unless the plaintiff has, within six weeks after the alleged libel has come to the plaintiff’s knowledge, given to the defendant notice in writing, specifying the matter complained of, which shall be served in the same manner as a statement of claim or by delivering it to a grownup person at the chief office of the defendant.

[21] The second grounds is that pursuant to s. 6 of the Libel and Slander Act, Mr. Abdullahi’s action for libel in a newspaper or in a broadcast must be commenced within three months after the libel came to his knowledge but he failed to commence his action within time. Section 6 of the Act states:

Limitation of action

6. An action for a libel in a newspaper or in a broadcast shall be commenced within three months after the libel has come to the knowledge of the person defamed, but, where such an action is brought within that period, the action may include a claim for any other libel against the plaintiff by the defendant in the same newspaper or the same broadcasting station within a period of one year before the commencement of the action.

[22] For the purposes of deciding whether the libel claim should be stuck, it is not necessary to say much about the factual background. For the purposes of the Police Defendants motion, all that needs to be said about the factual background is the following.

[23] On August 29, 2015, Mr. Abdullahi was arrested and charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

[24] On September 14, 2015, the Toronto Police Service issued a press release about the charges that had been laid against Mr. Abdullahi. The press release stated:

In August 2015, members of the Child and Youth Advocacy Centre conducted an investigation into the sexual assault of a child.

It is alleged that:

• the man sexually assaulted the 9-year-old child at a home
• the man was known to the child and family.

On Saturday, August 29, 2015, officers arrested Mohamed Abdullahi, 34, of Toronto, he is charged with:

• Sexual Assault
• Sexual Interference

The investigation has revealed that Mohamed Abdullahi is a leader in the Somalian community in the Regent Park area. He has run numerous youth organizations within the community and has had access to other children in the past.

Police believe there may be other victims.

He is due to appear at Old City Hall courts on Thursday, October 1, 2015, in J Court at 10 a.m.

The Child and Youth Advocacy Centre was opened in October 2013 and is comprised of specialized child abuse investigators from the Toronto Police Service, in collaboration with members of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society, the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, the Hospital for Sick Children’s Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect Program (SCAN), Safe-T Program, Halton Trauma Center, and Boost Child Abuse Prevention and Intervention.

A sexual assault is any form of unwanted sexual contact. It includes, but is not limited to, kissing, grabbing, oral sex and penetration. To learn more about sexual assault, including how to report a sexual assault, please visit our Sex Crimes Unit web site.

Anyone with information is asked to contact police at 416-808-2922, Crime Stoppers anonymously at 416-222-TIPS (8477), online at www.222tips.com, text TOR and your message to CRIMES (274637). Download the free Crime Stoppers Mobile App on iTunes, Google Play or Blackberry App World. […]

[25] The press release became a news article that was published in the Toronto Star, the Toronto Sun, and broadcast on Channel CP24. (Mr. Abdullahi’s Amended Statement of Claim pleads and actually sets out a screen capture of a Toronto Star article along with reader’s comments, many of them racist and offensive.)

[26] After his employer viewed a television broadcast about the Police Services notice on Channel CP24, Mr. Abdullahi was fired from his job.

[27] It took about a year for the criminal proceedings to come to trial and on October 25, 2016, Mr. Abdullahi was acquitted.

[28] Another year passed, and on October 5, 2017, Mr. Abdullahi wrote a demand letter to Toronto Police Services. He delivered a notice of claim package to the Toronto Police Service.

[29] Another year passed, and on October 23, 2018, Mr. Abdullahi had his Statement of Claim issued, which he had amended on December 19, 2018.

[30] While no media parties are joined as defendants, in his Amended Statement of Claim, Mr. Abdullahi pleads that defamatory words were published in a newspaper and broadcast and that as a result he suffered damages.

[31] On December 21, 2018, the Statement of Claim was served on the Police Defendants.

[32] Although the Police Defendants are not a newspaper or a broadcaster, section 5(1) applies to the press release. See Watson v. Southam Inc., 2000 ONCA 5758; Janssen-Ortho Inc. v. Amgen Canada Inc., 2005 ONCA 19660.

[33] Subsection 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act includes an element of discoverability. The knowledge element includes an objective component such that the six-week period for giving notice commences as soon as the alleged libel has come to a plaintiff’s knowledge or at the point the plaintiff could reasonably have known of the libel. See Bhaduria v Persaud, 1998 ONSC 14846.

[34] In the immediate case by at least September 17, 2015, if not earlier, Mr. Abdullahi’s libel claim was either known to him or the claim was discoverable and ought to have been known to him. Thus, his notice that came years’ later was not timely.

[35] Further, Mr. Abdullahi’s libel claim is statute-barred pursuant to s. 6 of the Libel and Slander Act. The same test for discoverability applies to s. 6 of the Act as under s. 5(1); a plaintiff does not have to have actual knowledge of each and every aspect of the libel for the limitation period to begin to run; it is sufficient if he or she knew or ought to have known of the alleged libel. In the case at bar, Mr. Abdullahi’s action was not commenced until over three years later after he knowledge of having been libelled. Thus, Mr. Abdullahi’s libel claim is statute-barred and I so declare.

[36] The Police Defendants also asked that the paragraphs that refer to the libel be struck from the Amended Statement of Claim. I, however, shall not do so.

[37] I am not striking any paragraphs because, although Mr. Abdullahi cannot proceed with the libel claim, his other claims against the Police Defendants (and his claims against the Society Defendants) are proceeding. Because these claims are proceeding and because the facts associated with the libel claim are part of the factual narrative for the other claims and are relevant facts for the calculation of Mr. Abdullahi’s damages, therefore, I have decided not to strike any paragraphs in the Amended Statement of Claim that refer to the libel.

D. The Claim against the Attorney General

[38] Turning now to the motion to strike brought by the Attorney General Defendants, Mr. Abdullahi pleads that the Crown Attorney at the bail hearing submitted that Mr. Abdullahi was an influential member of the Muslim community and that he was a danger to the public particularly children. Mr. Abdullahi was granted bail but under his bail conditions, he was banned from downtown Toronto, given a curfew, restricted from living with relatives who had children living with them, and banned from working with children.

[39] Mr. Abdullahi pleads that Deputy Crown Attorney Jennifer Gibson assigned Mr. Abdullahi’s case to assistant Crown Attorney Rebecca Law, a new member of the specialized Child Abuse Team. Mr. Abdullahi pleads that Ms. Law was inexperienced.

[40] Ms. Law screened the case and decided to pursue a prosecution. Mr. Abdullahi requested that his bail conditions be altered, but Ms. Law refused to agree to this request. Mr. Abdullahi pleads that knowing that Mr. Abdullahi was innocent, Ms. Law used fabricated evidence to continue and cover up a malicious prosecution initiated by the Society Defendants and the Police Defendants.

[41] Mr. Abdullahi pleads that Ms. Gibson and Ms. Law required the Toronto Police to video record a statement from the child, taken at the mother's home. He alleges that the video provided incriminating evidence but also exonerating evidence and exposed the falsity of the charges. Ms. Law, however, did not withdraw the charges against the plaintiff, but rather defended the mother.

[42] Mr. Abdullahi pleads that the Crown attorney delayed the trial date in order to apply psychological pressure to force him to accept a plea bargain and to secure their quota of convictions.

[43] When Ms. Law went on maternity leave, Ms. Gibson assigned the case to Ms. Bruno, a senior Crown Prosecutor, with over 10 years of experience. Ms. Bruno reviewed the case and continued the prosecution. Mr. Abdullahi pleads that Ms. Bruno and Ms. Gibson proceeded in order to get a conviction to win.

[44] On the first day of trial, neither the mother nor the child appeared to testify, and Ms. Bruno dispatched police officers to bring them to court.

[45] Mr. Abdullahi pleads that the prosecutors played the videotaped statement for the court, but only played the beginning of the video, even though the remainder of the video contained exonerating evidence. He says that the prosecutors also called the mother to testify, and she lied during her testimony.

[46] At the trial, there were two defence witnesses who testified that the mother was lying and trying to set up Mr. Abdullahi. At the trial, Mr. Abdullahi testified on his own behalf. He pleads that Ms. Bruno's cross-examination was an attempt to trick, deceive and convict him. He pleads that Ms. Bruno was influenced by Detective James Casey who was covering up a wrongful prosecution by the Toronto Police and the Children's Aid Society of Toronto and who was using the Ministry of the Attorney General to get a conviction.

[47] The overall tenure of Mr. Abdullahi’s Amended Statement of Claim is that the Crown attorneys were negligent in their handling of the prosecution and motivated to coerce a confession or a conviction notwithstanding their awareness that the case against Mr. Abdullahi was based on fabricated evidence and the racist and Islamophobic motivations of the Society Defendants and the Police Defendants.

[48] The overall tenure of the Attorney General Defendant’s motion to strike Mr. Abdullahi’s Amended Statement of Claim is that crown prosecutors are immune from an action for negligence and that Mr. Abdullahi has otherwise failed to plead a reasonable cause of action.

[49] The Attorney General Defendants submit that for a malicious prosecution claim or for the other possible claims against them including the claims based on alleged violations of the Charter, Mr. Abdullahi must plead material facts that demonstrate malice or a malign intent and that he has not done so notwithstanding a massive recitation of the facts that goes far beyond what is normally permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure. They submit that Mr. Abdullahi’s bald allegations of malice or malign intent without material facts to support the allegations are insufficient and his action as against the Attorney General Defendants should be dismissed.

[50] Where a defendant submits that the plaintiff’s pleading does not disclose a reasonable cause or action, to succeed in having the action dismissed, the defendant must show that it is plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot succeed in the claim. See Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc. (1998), 1998 ONCA 4831; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc. (1990), 1990 SCC 90. Matters of law that are not fully settled should not be disposed of on a motion to strike, and the court's power to strike a claim is exercised only in the clearest cases. See Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc. (1998), 1998 ONCA 4831; Temelini v. Ontario Provincial Police (Commissioner) (1990), 1990 ONCA 7000.

[51] In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 at paras. 17-25, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that although the tool of a motion to strike for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action must be used with considerable care, it is a valuable tool because it promotes judicial efficiency by removing claims that have no reasonable prospect of success and it promotes correct results by allowing judges to focus their attention on claims with a reasonable chance of success.

[52] On motions brought under the procedure to strike a claim or defence as untenable in law, leave to amend the pleading may and usually will be given, and leave to amend will only be denied in the clearest cases when it is plain and obvious that no tenable cause of action is possible on the facts as alleged and there is no reason to suppose that the party could improve his or her case by any amendment. See Mitchell v. Lewis, 2016 ONCA 903 at para. 21; Conway v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 72 at para. 16; Holdings Ltd. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank (c.o.b. TD Canada Trust), 2007 ONCA 456 at para. 6; Miguna v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2005 ONCA 46385.

[53] With respect to the Statement of Claim, the court accepts the pleaded allegations of fact as proven, unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof. See Folland v. Ontario (2003), 2003 ONCA 52139; Nash v. Ontario (1995), 1995 ONCA 2934; Canada v. Operation Dismantle Inc., 1985 SCC 74; A-G. Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1980 SCC 21. Bare allegations and conclusory legal statements based on assumption or speculation are not material facts; they are incapable of proof and, therefore, they are not assumed to be true for the purposes of a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Das v. George Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 4129, aff’d 2018 ONCA 1053; Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Ltd., 2009 ONSC 43651 at paras. 39-40, aff’d 2010 ONCA 613, leave to appeal ref’d 2010 SCCA 438; Merchant Law Group v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2010 FCA 184 at para. 34.

[54] For the purposes of a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is not obliged to accept as a proven material fact the conclusion that there is a cause of action or a duty of care; rather, the court must examine whether the genuine material facts, which are not argument or conclusory statements, disclose a reasonable cause of action. See Das v. George Weston Limited, 2017 ONSC 4129 at paras 17 and 21, aff’d 2018 ONCA 1053.

[55] In the case at bar, I agree with the Attorney General Defendants’ submission that Mr. Abdullahi has not and would not be able to plead a reasonable cause of action as against these defendants and, therefore, the claims against them should be dismissed.

[56] The Amended Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action in negligence against the Crown Attorney defendants because the common law provides them with immunity from claims of negligence. See Smith v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 993 (Div. Ct.).

[57] All of Mr. Abdullahi’s other pleaded causes of action against the Attorney General Defendants, of which some are simply differently named versions of the same torts (i.e. malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, abuse of process, unlawful conduct, conspiracy, willful misconduct, breach of the Charter), require material facts that support a threshold of malicious intentional misconduct above negligence. See Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 24; BK v. Chatham-Kent Children’s Services, 2016 ONSC 1921; Gravelle v. Ontario, 2012 ONSC 5149.

[58] As drafted, the Amended Statement of Claim, however, fails to provide material facts to support any claim of intentional misconduct above negligence. Although the Amended Statement of Claim repeatedly asserts that the Attorney General Defendants wanted to harm the plaintiff, the assertions are bald and conclusory. The Claim does not plead facts or circumstances that, if proven, would allow a judge to infer that any of the Crown Attorney defendants acted with intent to harm Mr. Abdullahi.

[59] In short, notwithstanding an effusively pleaded Amended Statement of Claim, Mr. Abdullahi has not pleaded a reasonable cause of action against the Attorney General Defendants and his action against them should be dismissed.

E. Procedural Order

[60] At an attendance in Civil Practice Court with respect to Mr. Abdullahi’s action, Justice Firestone scheduled these two motions and he also scheduled a summary judgment motion for July 16, 2019 subject to the direction of the court hearing the two motions to strike.

[61] In the process of hearing and deciding the two pleadings motions, I did a deep dive into the pleadings and the evidentiary record, and it became obvious to me that a summary judgment motion is inappropriate. There are numerous genuine issues that require a trial, and it is inconceivable that an appellate court would uphold any judgment in this case arrived at summarily. The case requires a trial.

[62] I, accordingly, cancel the summary judgment motion, and I direct that this action proceed in the normal course through documentary disclosure and examinations for discovery.

F. Conclusion

[63] For the above reasons, the libel action is dismissed and the action against the Attorney General Defendants (properly named as the Attorney General for Ontario) is dismissed.

[64] If the parties cannot agree about the matter of costs, they may make submissions in writing beginning with the Police Defendants’ and the Attorney General Defendants’ submissions within twenty days of the release of these Reasons for Decision followed by Mr. Abdullahi’s submissions within a further twenty days.

[65] If the parties cannot agree about the form of the order for these motions, they may send me their drafts and I will settle the form of the order.

Perell, J. Released: June 20, 2019