Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FS-18-92010 DATE: 20190308

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

Laura Lynn Beasley Robert M. Halpern, for the Applicant Applicant

• and -

William (Bill) Christopher Beasley David K. Sherr, for the Respondent Respondent

HEARD: December 11, 2018

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Fowler Byrne J.

[1] Two motions were brought before me. The Applicant Laura Lynn Beasley has sought the following orders:

a) An order that the Respondent William Christopher Beasley make full financial disclosure within 30 days, as well as disclosure of certain documentation she has requested;

b) An order that William retain an expert valuator for the purpose of valuing his trust, business interests and his income for support purposes;

c) An order that William pay Laura an advance on her equalization payment in the sum of $100,000, in order to retain professionals; and

d) Pending receipt of the income reports and financial disclosure, an interim interim order for spousal support, whereby William be required to (retroactively) pay Laura the monthly sum of $7,767.58 for 2018 and thereafter the monthly sum of $13,953.

[2] William has sought the following:

a) That he pay spousal support in the sum determined by the court based on his imputed income of $250,000 and Laura’s imputed income of $60,000;

b) An order for the equal division of household contents and the return of his personal effects;

c) An order for the partition and sale of the parties’ cottage at 6221 Sixth Street, Belwood, Ontario; and

d) That the divorce be severed from the corollary relief proceedings, and that the divorce proceed on an uncontested basis.

[3] Both parties seek their costs.

[4] On the day the motion was argued, the parties were able to resolve some of these issues themselves, and an order was issued in accordance with the consent filed.

[5] Accordingly, the sole issues to be decided in this motion are as follows:

a) Interim interim retroactive spousal support for 2018;

b) Ongoing interim interim spousal support;

c) An advance payment to Laura in the sum of $100,000 for her legal fees; and

d) Severing the divorce.

[6] The court was advised during the argument of this motion that the Respondent’s complete 2017 tax return, with all schedules and attachments, was not attached to the materials through inadvertence. Accordingly, the Respondent was given until December 13, 2018, to file that tax return and the Applicant was given an opportunity to make written submissions with respect to it.

[7] With respect to the divorce, the Applicant did not have a chance to respond to that request, given the late service of the Respondent’s materials. Accordingly, the parties were given an opportunity to serve and file written responding and reply submissions on that issue.

Background

[8] The parties were married on October 15, 1988. They separated on October 22, 2016, making this a 28-year marriage.

[9] There are three children of the marriage: Lisa Danielle Beasley, born February 5, 1991; William Alexander Beasley, born March 19, 1992; and Samuel Collins Beasley, born April 10, 1998. Lisa and Alex are self-sufficient and are no longer children of the marriage. As of the date of separation, Sam had commenced his post-secondary education, though he ceased his studies in January 2018. Sam currently lives with his father, and William claims that Sam is still financially dependent on him.

[10] Laura finished high school and attended one year of university at the University of Western Ontario in the late 1970s. She did not graduate from this institution. She eventually received a Bachelor of Arts in hospitality and tourism from Ryerson University in 1985.

[11] Since 1988, Laura has held various positions within William Beasley Enterprise Ltd. (“WBEL”), a company run by William’s family. From 1988 to 1997, she worked as an office manager for WBEL’s interests at the Canadian National Exhibition (“CNE”) each August. From 1988 until 2013, she also worked part time for special events at Toronto Island.

[12] In 1990, she was offered a full time position as a food and beverage manager with WBEL, which was operating the Centerville Amusement Park at the time. This position did not last long. In February 1991, after the parties’ first child was born, she stayed at home full time to raise the family and would assist her husband with seasonal events, such as the CNE, as well as special events and projects at Toronto Island, as described above.

[13] Accordingly, since their marriage, the Applicant has worked for no other employer other than WBEL. With the exception of one year, she has only worked part time or seasonally.

[14] Throughout the course of the marriage, Laura was not aware of how much she was paid. It was Williams’ practice to randomly deposit money into their joint account, to which she had access. Their income was split for tax purposes. It was not until the fall of 2016, around the time of separation, that she received a pay cheque from the company in her name, in an amount determined by William.

[15] Following separation in October 2016, William continued to issue a regular pay cheque to Laura. From May 2017 to December 2017, the money Laura received from the company started to fluctuate, and all payments stopped as of January 2018.

[16] Laura has provided her income tax information, showing that her line 150 income in 2016 was $79,614 per annum, and it was $75,597 in 2017. Her only source of income for these years was income from WBEL, as determined by William and/or his family.

[17] When the regular pay cheques stopped, Laura received the following amounts from William in 2018, for a total of $52,220:

a) January 2018: $2,650;

b) February 2018: $11,800;

c) March 2018: $1,370;

d) April 2018: $5,300;

e) May 2018: $5,300;

f) June 2018: $4,300;

g) July 2018: $2,150;

h) August 2018: $6,450;

i) September 2018: $2,150;

j) October 2018: $6,450; and

k) November 2018: $4,300.

[18] William maintains that he has also paid other benefits to Laura, such as maintaining the expenses on jointly held properties and paying her car insurance and licensing fees.

[19] William is the president of WBEL. This is a family-owned company named after his grandfather. William’s father, Warren Beasley, is the majority shareholder, and William claims to own only a fractional ownership interest, which was gifted to him by his father. His siblings are in the same situation.

[20] His income tax return for 2016 shows his line 150 income to be $180,021. His income tax return for 2017 shows his line 150 income to be $334,919.56. Of this amount, approximately $159,000 is a result of a capital gain he earned when he sold his investment properties held by his investment business SplinterCell. He claims the capital gains, or even the full proceeds derived from the sale of SplinterCell, represent an asset that is subject to equalization. He argues that to include that capital gain in his income for spousal support purposes would amount to double dipping.

[21] Given William’s corporate and trust interests, his income is not straightforward. He has agreed to hire a professional to provide an opinion on his income for support purposes. Until that time, he is content that his income be imputed as $250,000, and that his support obligations should be calculated accordingly.

[22] William, though, argues that income should be imputed to Laura. He contends that she is not actively seeking employment and does not intend to make such efforts. He claims that she has the ability to plan, sell and manage corporate events; oversee operations and restaurants; and manage people and money. He believes her skills are highly transferable, and that she could earn about $60,000 per year. In fact, he has tried to find a job for her through one of his colleagues.

[23] The Beasleys enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle during the course of their marriage. They were part of athletic clubs and contributed the maximum to their RRSPs and RESPs each year. They went on family vacations to Europe and throughout the United States. The children attended private schools, and their extracurricular activities included skiing, snowboarding, competitive dance, rep soccer, Outward Bound Summer trips, CISV international trips, and involvement in multiple team sports with private lessons. The parties owned luxury vehicles and wore high-end clothes. They renovated their home and purchased their cottage with cash.

[24] Both parties have filed up-to-date financial statements. Bearing in mind that financial disclosure is not yet complete, the Respondent has indicated a net family property value of $2,096,906.93. By contrast, the Applicant has indicated a net family property value of $456,137.62.

[25] William has provided a draft net family property statement in his materials. His statement predicts that an equalization payment will be made to Laura of approximately $225,000. William has also provided evidence that he has already advanced the sum of approximately $415,000 to Laura. He is concerned that he has already overpaid for the purposes of equalization.

[26] The Applicant has provided no evidence in support of her request for an advance on her equalization payment, other than her statement that she is in need and the Respondent is able to pay.

Issues

[27] The issues to be decided on this motion are as follows:

a) What amount of retroactive spousal support should be paid to Laura for 2018?

b) What amount of ongoing spousal support should be paid to Laura?

c) Should an advance payment be made to Laura in the sum of $100,000?

d) Should the divorce be severed from the corollary issues, allowing William to obtain a divorce on an uncontested basis?

Spousal Support

[28] To their credit, both parties agree that spousal support is payable to Laura. They unfortunately disagree on what income should be imputed to the other in order to calculate the amount payable on a monthly basis.

[29] In order to determine what amount of support should be paid to Laura, there are three things to be decided:

a) What factors should be considered in making an interim order?

b) What is each party’s income for the purposes of support at this juncture?

c) Where in the range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines should Laura be paid?

A. Interim Spousal Support Orders

[30] The Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 15.2(2), sets forth the authority under which an interim order for spousal support may be awarded. When making any award, I am to take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including the length of the relationship, the functions performed by each in the marriage, and any agreement or order relating to the support of either spouse: s. 15.2(4). My objective, in making the interim order, is to (a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time: s.15.2(6).

[31] When considering an interim order, complete income information is not always available. Indeed, in this case, Laura is only seeking an interim interim order, in recognition of the income disclosure that is still expected from William, following which the interim order may be varied. When the parties proceed to trial, interim orders may be varied back to the commencement of the interim order: Ponkin v. Werden, 2015 ONSC 791, at para. 18, citing Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, 88 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 76.

[32] The principles governing interim spousal support orders have been outlined by the court on a number of occasions: Driscoll v. Driscoll, 2998 CarswellOnt 7393 (S.C.), at para. 14; Joyce v. Joyce, 2015 ONSC 4311, at para. 34; and Samis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Samis, 2011 ONCJ 273, 2 R.F.L. (7th) 476, at paras. 43-44. In essence, the Ontario Superior Court has adopted, almost completely, the factors outlined by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Robles v. Kuhn, 2009 BCSC 1163, at para. 12, and the decision of the Manitoba Queen’s Bench in Kowalski v. Grant, 2007 MBQB 235, 219 Man. R. (2d) 260, at paras. 15-18.

[33] The principles relating to interim spousal support orders can be summarized as follows:

a) They should only be ordered where it can be said that a prima facie case for entitlement has been made out. Where there is a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support;

b) The applicant's needs and the respondent's ability to pay assume greater significance;

c) The need to achieve self-sufficiency is of less importance;

d) The interim support order should be sufficient to allow the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor's ability to pay warrants it. In Kowalski, the interim order was referred to as a “holding order”, allowing the applicant to maintain the accustomed lifestyle pending final disposition, if possible and as long as the claimant is able to present a triable case for economic disadvantage;

e) The court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties' circumstances, or whether either party suffered an economic advantage or disadvantage as a result of the relationship. That is better left to trial. In the words of Master Keighley in Robles, at para. 12, the court achieves “rough justice at best”;

f) The court should not overly emphasize any one of the factors set forth in the Divorce Act;

g) Robles states that interim support should be ordered within the range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, by Carole Rogerson & Rollie Thompson (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, July 2008) (“SSAG”), unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise: at para. 12. Ricchetti J. in Joyce, at paras. 35-38, notably refused to adopt this factor. He believed this would have the effect of giving the SSAG a much greater importance in the determination of an award of interim spousal support than in determining a final spousal support order. In determining a final spousal support award, the SSAG calculations are a useful tool as a “check” of the court’s conclusion arrived at after the application of the factors set out in the Divorce Act. Ricchetti J. relied on the Ontario Court of Appeal in Racco v. Racco, 2014 ONCA 33, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 240, at para. 25, which stated:

The application of these principles makes the determination of spousal support highly individual and discretionary. As Professors Rogerson and Thompson state in their introduction to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2008) (SSAG):

Bracklow emphasized the highly discretionary, individualized nature of spousal support decisions. The Court was clear that the Divorce Act endorses no single theory of spousal support and must retain flexibility to allow judges to respond appropriately to the diverse forms that marital relationships can take. The Court presented spousal support determinations as first and foremost exercises of discretion by trial judges who were required to “balance” the multiple support objectives and factors under the Divorce Act and apply them in the context of the facts of particular cases.

[34] I concur with the comments of Ricchetti J. in this regard.

B. The Parties’ Income

[35] Income for the purposes of support is to be determined under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (the “Guidelines”). The starting point is the party’s income as set forth on line 150, or “total income”, from their tax return: s. 16. The Guidelines then set forth a number of ways that this number can be adjusted. For example, if a party’s income fluctuates, a court can average the three most recent years: s. 17(1). If a party is a shareholder, director or officer in a company, and the court believes that the amount identified as “total income” does not accurately reflect all the money available to that party, the court can add pre-tax income of the corporation to the party’s income or impute an income that more accurately reflects the services provided: s. 18.

[36] Schedule III of the Guidelines provides for adjustments to income. Section 6 of this schedule allows the court to replace a capital gain realized in a particular year with the actual amount of capital gains realized. That would mean that a party’s income would be greater for the purposes of calculating support.

[37] William argues that his capital gain should not be reflected in his income. His investment in SplinterCell is identified in his financial statement as a real estate venture with two other partners. It appears from his tax return that in 2017, two of these properties were sold and the appropriate capital gain was declared. He characterizes the income derived from this sale as the “proceeds of a sale of an asset” and not “income” that should be calculated for the purposes of support.

[38] The SSAG state at s. 12.6.3 that the SSAG on amount and duration do not change the law from Boston v. Boston, 2001 SCC 43, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 413, governing double-dipping, mostly from pensions. “That law remains in place, as a possible constraint upon the amount of support, determining if some portion of income should be excluded from the formula because it has been previously shared under property division.”

[39] At this early stage of the proceedings, there is not enough evidence to determine if it would appropriate to attribute the capital gain or even the full proceeds of the sale to William for the purposes of calculating income. There is no evidence on the income that can be earned on the proceeds of the sale. Accordingly, these are issues best left to the motion for interim support or for trial.

[40] With respect to Laura, we know she had no income in 2017 and 2018. The various amounts she received from William during those years are to be considered as advances towards William’s support obligations for that year.

[41] William has provided no independent evidence that Laura is capable of earning $60,000 per year. The evidence of William’s colleague, who would offer her a job at $60,000 per year is not sufficient. Her employment throughout her marriage is confined to her work with the CNE in August and Toronto Island in the summer. It was only part time. Given the seasonal or part-time nature of this employment, it is unknown if her yearly salary (which was only paid to her recently) is reflective of what someone working on a seasonal basis at this job would earn. This is especially the case as she was being paid by family. Perhaps she is being underpaid or overpaid – it is unclear at this juncture. There is also no evidence that the skills Laura obtained would be transferrable to a third-party employer at a rate anywhere near what she was earning in the last few years. Prior to 2016, we have no information of what her job was worth, given that neither William nor WBEL ever paid her.

[42] It appeared the parties engaged in income splitting. Reasonable income splitting can be good tax planning. Implicit in income splitting though, is the understanding that one party earned less than the other, and the income of the lower earner is elevated. In this situation, it is Laura’s income that was elevated. Accordingly, Laura’s income is artificial, and it would be improper for William to rely on it in support of an argument in favour of imputing income anywhere near it, without independent evidence of what she could possibly earn at this time.

[43] Accordingly, for the purposes of determining support, the Respondent’s income shall be imputed at $250,000, as conceded by William, as a reasonable amount on an interim interim basis, and no income shall be attributed to Laura.

C. Range of Spousal Support

[44] While I am not obligated to order spousal support with the range of the SSAG’s, in these circumstances, a reasonable amount of support to be paid to Laura falls within the mid to high range of the SSAG. I come to this conclusion for the following reasons:

a) Laura has a strong compensatory claim. She has not worked full time as a result of the family decision for her to stay at home to raise the children. Her work was only part time or seasonal, for which she was for the most part not paid. It will take her some time to get back into the work force and earn a level of income similar to what she enjoyed during the marriage;

b) Her need is now great, and William has the ability to pay;

c) By William’s own evidence, the parties enjoyed a joint income of approximately $234,000 in 2017; given that he stopped paying Laura from the company in 2018, it can be assumed he enjoys this joint income himself;

d) Laura is been unable to maintain a lifestyle similar to what was enjoyed during marriage;

e) As stated, in his financial statement sworn December 6, 2018, William discloses 2017 income attributable to both himself and Laura in the sum of $234,000, which greatly exceeds his expenses. This does not take into consideration any corporate income that may be attributed to him. So it appears that despite Laura’s income of 2017 being stated as $75,597, I can infer from William’s financial statement that the income paid to Laura or paid on her behalf in 2017 was actually closer one-half of the total amount claimed by him, which is $115,000.

Conclusion

[45] For the reasons set forth herein, Laura is entitled to interim interim spousal support on a needs basis and in order to maintain her in a lifestyle as similar as possible to what was enjoyed during the marriage. Her life – personally, professionally and financially – has been tied to William’s family, and now she has been cut off. Her need for support is obvious.

[46] While the child Sam is living with William, he is over 18, not disabled and not enrolled in full-time education. No child support is payable for Sam, and accordingly, the “without child support” calculations should be used.

[47] Accordingly, based on immediate need and Laura’s compensatory claim, pending full financial disclosure it is appropriate to grant support to Laura in the mid to high range, in the sum of $9,500 per month, commencing January 1, 2018 until further order of this court.

[48] I have heard evidence that Laura has already received the sum of $52,220 throughout 2018. Accordingly, William’s interim interim obligations for 2018 are set at $9,500 per month, less this amount already received. The arrears should be paid forthwith, without prejudice to both parties to seek a readjustment if further evidence is obtained about the amounts paid to or on behalf of Laura.

Advance Payment of Costs

[49] Pursuant to r. 24(18) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, the court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on a case, including a lawyer’s fees.

[50] The Supreme Court of Canada in the decision of British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, [2003] S.C.R. 371, at para. 36, stated that there are three requirements that must be present for court to award interim disbursements:

a) The party seeking the order must be impecunious to the extent that, without such an order, that party will be deprived of the opportunity to proceed with the case;

b) The claimant must establish a prima facie case of sufficient merit to warrant pursuit; and

c) There must be special circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that the case is within the narrow class of cases where this extraordinary exercise of its power is appropriate.

[51] These requirements might be modified if the legislature were to set out the conditions on which interim costs are to be granted or where the courts develop criteria applicable to a particular situation in which interim costs are authorized by statute: at para. 36.

[52] In the case of Rea v Rea, 2016 ONSC 382, 75 R.F.L. (7th) 105, at para, 13, Douglas J. found that r. 24(18) (which was r. 24(12), at the time) was such a statute and accordingly governs. Douglas J., at para. 14, then relied on the general principles regarding interim disbursements set forth in the case of Stuart v. Stuart (2001), 24 R.F.L. (5th) 188 (S.C.).

[53] In Stuart, at para. 3, Rogers J. stated that to interpret the meaning of the r. 24(18), the court must look at the primary objective of the Rules of Civil Procedure as found in r. 2(2), (3), (4) and (5). Among the several obligations of the court in carrying out its mandate to actively manage cases is the responsibility to ensure that the procedures are fair to all parties, to identify the issues and to set timetables to control the progress of the case.

[54] Rogers J. continued, at paras. 5-6, that it is the court’s duty to ensure a fair procedure, which means that both parties should be able to request and get disclosure and to tackle valuation issues equally. One party should not be disadvantaged in the litigation by being unable to test the evidence of the other party. As well, both parties should be equally wary about the potential of a costs order against them.

[55] The court then set out a number of factors to be considered when determining whether to make an order for interim disbursements. The factors come from both the law and r. 24(18). These factors under r. 24(18), listed at para. 8 of Stuart, are:

a) The court must consider which of these principles adhere to the primary objective of the Family Law Rules.

b) The court interprets the new Family Law Rules to require the exercise of the discretion in r. 24(18) on a less stringent basis than the cases that call for such discretion only in exceptional cases. The discretion should be exercised to ensure all parties can equally provide or test disclosure, make or consider offers or possibly go to trial. Simply described, the award should be made to level the playing field.

c) An order under r. 24(18) should not immunize a party from costs awards. The order is to allow the case to proceed fairly and should not be such that a party feels a license to litigate.

d) Certainly the proof of the necessity of interim disbursements would be critical to the successful claim. The claimant must clearly demonstrate that the disbursements are necessary and reasonable given the needs of the case and the funds available. In particular, if an expert is the subject of a requested disbursement, the claimant must demonstrate there is a clear need for the services of said expert.

e) The claimant must demonstrate that he or she is incapable of funding the requested amounts.

f) The claim or claims being advanced in the case must be meritorious as far as can be determined on the balance of probabilities at the time of the request for disbursements.

g) The order for interim disbursements should not be limited to cases where it would be taken out of an equalization payment. There are cases where there will not be an equalization payment. The litigants could be a child suing a parent, an elderly parent suing an adult child or a family that has not acquired assets. It may be that a party with a minimal income stream and no liquid assets needs disbursements to test evidence that might lead to him or her resisting an equalization order. The levelling of the playing field should not be limited to those with an expected equalization payment.

[56] In the case at hand, I have been given very little evidence to substantiate the sum of $100,000. There is no evidence of experts that need to be paid or quotations for services to be rendered. While the net worth of William is clearly in excess to that of Laura, Laura is far from impecunious.

[57] Again, the purpose of this rule is to give Laura the opportunity to hire the professionals she requires in order to test the evidence and ensure that she is satisfied with his stated net worth and his income. At this juncture, the Respondent has not even provided his position on his income or his assets, which was one of the reasons that this motion was brought. While the Applicant may know of her legal fees to date, there is no evidence of funds required to hire her own accountant or valuator.

[58] We have also received evidence of advances Laura has already received, totalling over $400,000, which have already been expended. Laura, according to her last financial statement, claims to have had approximately $150,000 she has just received from an inheritance. She has other RRSP investments totalling approximately over $400,000, though it is not required that Laura cash her RRSPs to fund the litigation.

[59] It is acknowledged that the payment of an equalization payment has not been settled, and the court should not restrict the exercise of its discretion to those cases in which an equalization payment shall be made. I am concerned, though, that at this early stage, that evidence suggests that William may have already overpaid Laura through these advances.

[60] Accordingly, at this juncture, in the absence of any evidence of the upcoming costs that Laura faces, no monies will be advanced, but this can be reviewed again upon full financial disclosure and reports being provided and when Laura is aware of the costs required to respond.

Severing of Divorce

[61] The court may on motion make an order splitting a divorce from the other issues if (a) neither spouse will be disadvantaged by the order and (b) reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of any children of the marriage: Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 12(6).

[62] In the case before me, there are no children for which such arrangements must be made. Accordingly, I must only determine whether either party will be disadvantaged by an order severing the divorce.

[63] As stated by Gray J. in the decision Al-Saati v. Fahmi, 2015 ONSC 1114, 59 R.F.L. (7th) 219, at para. 22, requests to sever a divorce from corollary relief issues are almost granted routinely, provided adequate arrangements are made for the support of the children of the marriage. If there are no children of the marriage, an order severing a divorce from the other issues may be made if neither spouse will be disadvantaged. Gray J. interpreted the word “disadvantaged” to mean a legal disadvantage that the responding party may suffer if a severance is granted. It has to be more than simply allowing the divorce to be withheld or delayed as a form of leverage for other issues that can be pursued separately: at para. 27.

[64] In the case before me, Laura claims that she will be disadvantaged if William dies intestate and she is no longer a spouse for the purposes of s. 44 of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26. In support of that position, she relies on the endorsement of Emery J. in the case of Mullin v. Sherlock (Sept. 1, 2015), Brampton (S.C.), leave to appeal to the Divisional Court refused, 2015 ONSC 7587, 73 R.F.L. (7th) 373.

[65] In the case of Mullins, the court refused to sever the claim for divorce as the husband had not complied with orders for financial disclosure and his claim for divorce could potentially prejudice her claim against her husband’s estate in the event of an intestacy. Little other facts are provided in the endorsement.

[66] In the motion record before me, I find there is little evidence about what legal disadvantage Laura would face if this divorce was permitted to proceed. In her application, Laura has sought in her application an order that William obtain and maintain life insurance policies sufficient to secure any support obligations. This has already been partially dealt with by way of a consent order at the case conference in this matter on July 17, 2018. At that time, the parties consented to an order that stated: “the respondent shall not change or cause to be changed the beneficiary designation in terms of the two existing life insurance policies held by 1840469 Ontario Inc., currently each in the amount of $250,000, both with Manulife, pending further agreement or court order.” William’s financial statement shows that the same company is the beneficiary of the policy. I also note from Laura’s financial statement that she claims an interest in this company.

[67] In the event that the Respondent dies intestate, there is a chance that Laura would lose out on her preferential share as a spouse, which is currently valued to be $200,000: O. Reg. 54/95, s. 1. We have no evidence however, that such an intestacy is likely to occur.

[68] Laura’s interest in William’s estate is otherwise preserved by s. 5(2) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, which expressly contemplates an equalization payment triggered upon the death of one of the parties.

[69] In addition, Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act permits a dependent to make a claim for support, if the deceased was under an obligation to provide support at the time or his or her death. A dependent is defined in s. 57(1) to include a spouse whose marriage is terminated by divorce. William’s obligation to support Laura is established with the support order made herein.

[70] Accordingly, in the case before me, I have received no evidence that either party will be disadvantaged by the severing of the divorce, and accordingly that order shall be granted.

Conclusion

[71] Accordingly, I make the following orders:

a) On an interim interim basis, the Respondent William Christopher Beasley shall pay spousal support to the Applicant Laura Lynn Beasley in the sum of $9,500 per month, retroactively, from January 1, 2018, and continuing on the first day of each month that follows until a court orders otherwise;

b) On an interim interim basis, the Respondent William Christopher Beasley shall continue to pay all expenses on jointly owned properties, and pay for the Applicant Laura Lynn Beasley’s car insurance and licensing fees;

c) The Respondent William Christopher Beasley shall be given credit for the sum of $52,220 already paid to the Applicant Laura Lynn Beasley in 2018. Any further adjustments are reserved for a motion for interim support or for trial;

d) Arrears in spousal support for 2018 shall be paid forthwith;

e) No advance on equalization or costs shall be made at this time, without prejudice to the Applicant to seek that advance again when financial disclosure has been provided as ordered on December 11, 2018, and as ordered on the motion in writing brought before me in February 2019;

f) The divorce shall be severed from the corollary issues. The Respondent William Christopher Beasley may proceed to obtain a divorce on an uncontested basis, without costs;

g) A support deduction order will be issued;

h) The parties are encouraged to settle the issue of costs. If they are unable to do so, and given that there was mixed success on this motion, each party may serve and file their costs submissions, limited to two pages, single sided, double spaced, exclusive of costs outline and case law, no later than 4:30 p.m. on March 22, 2019. Any responding submissions, with the same size restrictions, must be served and filed no later than 4:30 p.m. on April 5, 2019. If neither party files submissions by 4:30 pm. on March 22, 2019, there shall be no costs on this motion.

Fowler Byrne J.

Released: March 8, 2019