COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-603054-00CL DATE: 20181121 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO (COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.c-36, AS AMENDED

RE: IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC., Applicants

BEFORE: S.F. Dunphy J.

COUNSEL: Maria Konyukhova and Kathryn Esaw for Applicants Jeffrey Levine, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors David Bish, for Richter Advisory Group, Monitor Danish Afroz, for Deerfield Management Company, L.P.

HEARD at Toronto: November 16, 2018

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] This case raises for determination the always-troubling question of Key Employee Retention Plans (or “KERPs”) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (or “KEIPs”). At the conclusion of the hearing. I indicated that I would be approving the proposed KERP involving three employees with reasons to follow and would take under reserve the matter of the proposed KEIP.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I have determined to approve the KEIP as well. My reasons that follow apply to both programs.

Background facts

[3] The applicants Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. brought this application under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1990, c. C.-36 and an initial order was granted by me on August 10, 2018 with Richter Advisory Group Inc. appointed as Monitor. A number of affiliated entities in the same corporate group sought relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on the same day. The Chapter 11 case is being managed by Justice Glenn in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Both courts have adopted a cross-border protocol.

[4] As their names suggest, the Aralez group of companies are in the pharmaceutical industry. The debtor companies have operated in an integrated manner and have 41 employees at the Canadian entities and 23 in the Chapter 11 entities.

[5] In addition to being operationally integrated, Aralez has an integrated capital structure as well. The secured credit facility is secured by substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies on both sides of the border. The secured creditors – Deerfield Partners L.P. and Deerfield Private Design Fund III, L.P. – possess security on substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies on both sides of the border. The security in Canada has been subjected to independent review by the Monitor and its counsel and no issues have arisen nor have any creditors objected to their claims.

[6] These cases have been targeting a managed liquidation from the start. On September 18, 2018, the Canadian and US entities entered into three stalking horse agreements and, pursuant to a court-ordered sales process order, are in the process of completing a bid process in the coming days. The three stalking horse bids place a “floor” under sale proceeds of approximately $240 million subject to possible adjustments. This compares to the secured claim of Deerfield that is approximately $275 million.

[7] I understand that a motion may be brought in the United States to challenge some aspects of Deerfield’s security in that jurisdiction (no such motion has been suggested in Canada to date). However, as things currently stand, the bid process underway would have to yield a fairly significant improvement from the existing stalking horse offers in order to result in surplus being available for junior creditor groups. The point of this analysis is merely to establish that Deerfield’s input into the process of design of the KEIP and KERP programs before me is a material factor. Any funds diverted to KEIP or KERP programs have a substantial likelihood of coming out of Deerfield’s pocket in the final analysis and any improvements or de-risking to either cash flow or sales proceeds will enure very substantially to Deerfield’s benefit.

[8] Stated differently – Deerfield has significant “skin in the game” when it comes to a KERP or KEIP.

[9] Deerfield’s interest acquires somewhat greater weight when one considers that one of the stalking horse bids (in the United States) is a credit bid whereas the Canadian stalking horse bid involves a sale of the assets of Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc., resulting in the unsecured creditors of subsidiary Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. being granted effective priority over Deerfield despite Deerfield’s secured claims. Deerfield is thus very likely to be one of the only Canadian creditors substantially impacted by the KEIP or KERP.

[10] This does not imply that the Court is a rubber stamp as to whatever Deerfield may have approved nor does it imply that other voices have no weight. It does imply that some comfort can be taken that this process has been subject to arm’s length market discipline. Deerfield has an interest in getting as much as possible in the way of value-added effort out of the employee group and they have an interest in getting that effort at as low a cost as they can bargain for.

[11] The KERP program involved only three employees, was reported upon extensively by the Monitor and was not opposed by any stakeholder. I approved it at the hearing with reasons to follow (these are those reasons). The KEIP program affects nine senior management employees whose services are provided to both the Canadian and United States debtors and was accordingly presented to both courts for approval. I am advised that Justice Glenn approved the KEIP program for purposes of the United States debtors on November 19, 2018.

[12] While the KERP and KEIP programs were presented to me separately, they have many features in common. Were this not a transnational proceeding, it is quite likely that I should have had but a single combined KERP-KEIP program before me since these are not commonly differentiated in this jurisdiction. Different considerations obtain in the United States where KERP programs for some categories of employees are not allowed and KEIP programs are subject to specific rules one of which is that the predominant purpose of a KEIP must be incentive and not retention. Both are appropriate criteria in our process. In approving the KEIP program for the United States debtors, Justice Glenn indicated that he was satisfied that the KEIP program was designed primarily to incent the beneficiaries of the program.

[13] The Canadian KERP impacts three employee of Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. The KERP would provide these three with a retention bonuses of between 25% and 50% of salary. The total amount payable under the proposed program would be $256,710 and payment is to be made on the earlier of termination without cause, death or permanent disability and the closing of a sale of the Canadian assets.

[14] The KEIP impacts nine senior management employees of the Canadian debtors who provide services (in all but one case) that benefit both estates. None of the KEIP participants are expected to have on-going roles once the bankruptcy sales process is completed. The program is designed to incent participants to assist in achieving the highest possible cash flow during the bankruptcy process (thereby reducing the need to rely upon DIP financing) and to achieve the highest level of sales proceeds. Cash flow is measured relative to the DIP budget and nothing is payable until sales are completed.

[15] The affected individuals are members of the senior management team that can be expected to be in a position to achieve a positive impact upon both criteria (cash flow and sales proceeds), but their roles are such that the level and value of the contributions of each towards those targets are difficult to measure with precision. Total payouts under the “super-stretch” targets could rise to as much as $4,058,360. This figure may be compared to the stalking horse bids that establish a floor price of $240 million.

[16] Since all but one of the participants in the KEIP program are providing services for the benefit of both United States and Canadian debtors, the KEIP program has been designed such that costs will be shared by the two estates regardless of residence.

[17] The design of the two programs was supervised by Alvarez & Marsal Inc, the financial advisor to the United States and Canadian debtors. The Compensation Committee of the parent company’s Board was involved as was the debtor’s counsel. The Monitor was consulted at every step in the process and provided significant input that was taken into account. The Board of Directors of each affected entity has approved the plans.

[18] The programs were disclosed to the proposed beneficiaries at or near the outset of the bankruptcy process. At the request of the DIP Lender, court approval of these programs was not sought at that time as is relatively common. The stalking horse bids were several weeks away from being finalized and significant effort from the affected employees would be needed to but those transactions to bed. The sales process that followed also needed to be put on the rails and the all hands were needed to ensure that the business passed through the initial stages of the bankruptcy filing without undue adversity. In short, the affected employees were asked to acquiesce in the deferral of approval of these programs with the understanding that the employer would pursue their approval in good faith.

[19] With only a few weeks remaining until the expected end of the sales process, it is fair to observe the employees have more than delivered on their end of the bargain. Cash flow has held up very well and the stalking horse bids have been firmed up at a favourable level.

[20] The motion for approval of the KEIP (not the KERP) was opposed by the Official Committee of the Unsecured Creditors appointed pursuant to the United States Chapter 11 process. I shall not review here the nature of their standing claim – and the dispute of that claim. Their intervention has been focused, their arguments precise and the prospect of harm in the form of unnecessary delay or expense is minimal. Without prejudice to the position of everyone on the status of this committee in other contexts, I agreed to hear them and receive their written arguments. The cross-border protocol that both courts have approved affords me discretion to allow the Official Committee standing on a case-specific or ad hoc basis.

[21] In the view of the Official Committee, the KEIP program bonuses are too high and too easily earned. I shall address both of these arguments below.

Issues to be determined

[22] Ought this court to exercise its discretion to approve the KERP or KEIP programs as proposed by the applicants?

Analysis and discussion

[23] KERP/KEIP programs throw up a number of thorny issues that must be grappled with because there are a number of potentially conflicting policy considerations to balance.

[24] The early stages of an insolvency filing are chaotic enough without having added pressures of trying stem the hemorrhage of key employees. “Key” is of course an elastic concept. Everyone is key to someone. Employees are not hired to amuse management but to perform necessary functions. Sorting out “key” in the context of the organized chaos that is the early days of an insolvency filing requires a weathered eye to be cast in multiple directions at once:

• restructuring businesses often have inefficiencies that need identifying and resolving that may impact some otherwise “key” employees;
• with the levers of traditional shareholder oversight blunted in insolvency, the risks of management resolving conflicts in favour of self-interest are acute;
• it is easy to overstate the risk of loss of key employees if a “bunker mentality” causes management to take counsel of their fears rather than objective evidence, such evidence to be informed by a recognition that some degree of instability is inevitable; and
• “business as usual” is a goal, but never a perfectly achievable one and small amounts of stability acquired at high cost may be a bad investment.

[25] While the risks of abuse or wasted effort are easily conjured, the legitimate use of an appropriately-calibrated incentive plan are equally obvious:

• Employees in newly-insecure positions are easy prey to competitors able to offer the prospect of more stable employment, sometimes even at lower salary levels, to people whose natural first priority is looking after their families;
• There is a risk that the most employable and valuable employees will be cherry-picked while the debtor company may find itself substantially handicapped in trying to compete for replacement employees;
• Whether by reason of internal restructuring or a court-supervised sales process, employees may often find themselves being asked to bring all of their skills and devotion to the task of putting themselves out of work; and
• Since many employers use a mix of base salary and profit-based incentives, employees of an insolvent business in restructuring may find themselves being asked to do more – sometimes covering for colleagues who have being laid off or who have left for greener pastures - while earning a fraction of their former income.

[26] What is wanting to sort out these competing interests is one thing that the court – on its own at least – is singularly ill-equipped to provide. It is here that the essential role of the Monitor as the proverbial “eyes and ears of the court” comes to the fore. The court cannot shed its robe and wade into the debate in a substantive way. The Monitor on the other hand can shape the manner in which the debate is conducted and in which the decisions presented to the court for approval are made.

[27] What the court is unable to supply on its own can be summed up in the phrase “business judgment”. Outside of bankruptcy, the debtor company is entitled to exercise its own business judgment in designing such programs subject to the oversight of shareholders and the directors they appoint. Inside bankruptcy, the oversight of the court is required to assess the reasonableness of the exercise of the debtor company’s business judgment. In my view, the court’s role in assessing a request to approve a KERP or KEIP program is to assess the totality of circumstances to determine whether the process has provided a reasonable means for objective business judgment to be brought to bear and whether the end result is objectively reasonable.

[28] Perfect objectivity, like the Holy Grail, is unattainable. However, where business judgment is applied in a process that has taken appropriate account of as many of the opposing interests as can reasonably be brought into the equation, the result will adhere most closely to that unattainable ideal.

[29] My review of the limited case law on the subject of KERP (or KEIP) approvals suggests that there are no hard and fast rules that can be applied in undertaking this task. However the principles to be applied do emerge. Morawetz J. suggested a number of considerations in Cinram International Inc. (Re), 2012 ONSC 3767, relying on the earlier decision of Newbould J. in Grant Forest Products Inc. (Re) [1]. I reproduce here the synthesis of Morawetz J. ( Cinram, para. 91):

a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed); b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge; c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process; d. the employees’ history with and knowledge of the debtor; e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies; f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored; g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

[30] I have conducted my examination of the facts of this case having regard to the following three criteria which I think sweep in all of the considerations underlying Grant and Cinram and which provide a framework to consider the degree to which appropriately objective business judgment underlies the proposal:

(a) Arm’s length safeguards: The court can justifiably repose significant confidence in the objectivity of the business judgment of parties with a legitimate interest in the matter who are independent of or at arm’s length from the beneficiaries of the program. The greater the arm’s length input to the design, scope and implementation, the better. Given the obvious conflicts management find themselves in, it is important that the Monitor be actively involved in all phases of the process – from assessing the need and scope to designing the targets and metrics and the rewards. Creditors who may fairly be considered to be the ones indirectly benefitting from the proposed program and indirectly paying for it also provide valuable arm’s length vetting input. (b) Necessity: Incentive programs, be they in the form of KERP or KEIP or some variant are by no means an automatic or matter of course evolution in an insolvency file. They need to be justified on a case-by-case basis on the basis of necessity. Necessity itself must be examined critically. Employees working to help protect their own long-term job security are already well-aligned with creditor interests and might generally be considered as being near one end of the necessity spectrum while those upon whom great responsibility lies but with little realistic chance of having an on-going role in the business are the least aligned with stakeholder interests and thus may generally be viewed as being near the other end of the necessity spectrum when it comes to incentive programs. Employees in a sector that is in demand pose a greater retention risk while employees with relatively easily replaced skills in a well-supplied market pose a lesser degree of risk and thus necessity. Overbroad programs are prone to the criticism of overreaching. (c) Reasonableness of Design: Incentive programs are meant to align the interests of the beneficiaries with those of the stakeholders and not to reward counter-productive behavior nor provide an incentive to insiders to disrupt the process at the least opportune moment. The targets and incentives created must be reasonably related to the goals pursued and those goals must be of demonstrable benefit to the objects of the restructuring process. Payments made before the desired results are achieved are generally less defensible.

(a) Arm’s length safeguards

[31] In my view, there is substantial evidence that the process of negotiating and designing both programs has benefitted from significant arm’s length and objective oversight in the negotiation, design and implementation phases of these two programs.

[32] The process leading to both programs began prior to the insolvency filings on August 10, 2018. Aralez had engaged A&M as its financial advisor for the restructuring process and asked A&M to help formulate both the key employee incentive and retention programs. A&M worked on program design in consultation with the debtor’s legal counsel and with input from the compensation committee of the Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. Board of Directors, none of whom are beneficiaries of either program.

[33] The Monitor has been consulted extensively. The Monitor has inquired into the design and objects of the proposed plans and has verified the levels of the proposed incentives relative to the objectives of the programs and other historical data. The Monitor’s input has resulted in a number of alterations to the proposals as these have evolved. As the programs have emerged from the process, the Monitor’s conclusion is that the KERP is comparable to other KERP plans this court has approved and is reasonable in the circumstances. The Monitor has concluded that the KEIP addresses the concerns raised by the Monitor, protects the interest of Canadian stakeholders and these would not be materially prejudiced by approval of the KEIP. Both recommendations are entitled to very significant weight from this court.

[34] The U.S. Trustee raised a number of concerns with the proposed KEIP which have also resulted in revisions.

[35] Finally, Deerfield has been consulted and has indicated that they take no objection to either program as they have emerged from this process. For the reasons discussed above, Deerfield’s imprimatur carries a particularly significant degree of weight in these circumstances in terms of establishing the arm’s length and market-tested nature of the two programs before me.

[36] The business judgment of Deerfield and the Board of Directors of API are entitled to significant weight. The independent and very significant input of the Monitor, A&M and the U.S. Trustee afford significant comfort that objective viewpoints have played a significant role in designing and vetting the proposals. Finally, the recommendation of the Monitor is entitled to significant weight given the unique role the Monitor plays in the Canadian restructuring process.

[37] In summary, the process followed provides a high degree of comfort that a reasonable level of objective business judgment has been brought to bear. Circumstances will not allow every case the luxury of such a thorough process. However, this process was professionally designed thoroughly run. It has appropriately generated a high level of confidence in the integrity of the outcome.

(b) Necessity

[38] The design of the two programs demonstrates an appropriate regard for the criterion of necessity. They are not over-broad.

[39] Any analysis of whether a program is over-broad must take into account the nature of the business. In some respects, Aralez may be likened to a virtual pharmaceutical company in that it out-sources many functions of a traditional pharmaceutical company such as manufacturing. It thus has relatively few employees compared to its size.

[40] In designing the programs and assessing which employees to be included, an assessment was undertaken of each prospective beneficiary in terms of the ease with which they might be replaced, the degree to which they are critical to daily operations of the debtor companies or completion of the sales process and – for the KERP program at least – the perceived level of retention risk. The Monitor’s input was sought at each level of the design and finalization of the programs.

[41] The KERP program involves three employees in Canada and I am advised that their inclusion in the KERP is a condition of the purchaser under the stalking-horse bid. The loss of these three employees – critical to the Canadian business being sold – would endanger the stalking horse bid process at worst and disrupt the business being sold by requiring the debtor companies to deal with recruiting, transition and similar matters at a juncture where they are least able to deal with them at best. Their departure at this juncture would entail significant additional expenditures in terms of professional time at least if that event did not endanger the stalking horse bid.

[42] The KEIP program involves nine members of senior management. They are employees the nature of whose function defies precise description or measurement. They are employees who act in concert with each other as part of a team for whom neither the clock nor the calendar play more than a subsidiary role in dictating their hours of labour. These employees are essential to ensuring the business remains stable and performs well during the restructuring process. They play a key role in helping ensure the sales process achieves the highest level of return. They are also employees most of whom are laboring under the near certainty that the more efficient and successful they are in their efforts, the sooner they will be out of a job.

[43] At such a high level, personal reputation and professional pride remain as significant motivators to be sure. While a job well done may be its own reward, appropriate financial incentives are not without their place. This is a classic case for a well-designed incentive program.

[44] I am satisfied that the design of these programs satisfies the criterion of necessity.

(c) Reasonableness of design

[45] The KERP program provides for retention bonuses ranging from 25% to 50% of annual salary. The aggregate compensation available is $256,710, a figure that may be contrasted to the stalking horse bid for the Canadian assets of $62.5 million. Payment is made on the earlier of termination without cause by the company, death or permanent disability and the completion of the sales transaction.

[46] The timing of payments and the amount of the payments provided for, relative both to the salary of the individuals and to the value of the company, are both well in-line with precedent.

[47] The KEIP program provides for incentive payments to participants based on the debtors’ performance relative to target established for cash flow targets during the bankruptcy proceedings and relative to the achieved asset sale proceeds. Failure to reach targets results in no bonus, while four levels of bonus are possible (Threshold [2], Target, Stretch and Super Stretch).

[48] The real controversy on the motion was in respect of the KEIP.

[49] It is true that the cash flow performance of the debtors to date plus the projections of cash flow over the coming weeks put the KEIP participants well on track to achieving the highest “super-stretch” level of incentive. It is also true that if no bids are received in the sales process now underway and only the stalking horse bids are completed, the participants will be comfortably within the “target” level of incentive for asset sales. Combined, this means that that total incentives of approximately 81.25% of salary appears to be all but assured to KEIP participants. In the circumstances, the Official Committee objects that these incentives are simply too easily earned.

[50] They also object to the level of incentives relative to salary as being unacceptably high.

[51] The answer to both of these objections lies in the peculiar facts of this case.

[52] The KERP and KEIP programs were both conceived of and designed primarily in the period leading up to the initial filings made in August 2018, although alterations have been made following the input of, among others, the United States trustee. The employees selected for inclusion in both programs have been operating in the expectation that the employer would proceed in good faith to seek court approval as soon as practicable. At the request of the DIP Lender, the process of seeking court approval was deferred to put priority on the process of securing and finalizing the stalking horse bids and getting the sales process underway. At the time these plans were first offered to employees, forecasting cash flow in bankruptcy and sales proceeds was looking through a glass darkly. It is only hindsight – and the past efforts of the employees – that has made the targets appear to be such an easy goal.

[53] Of course, the employer could not promise and the employee could not expect that court approval of these plans would be a rubber stamp. That does not mean that this court should not take into account the circumstances prevailing when the plans were first offered to employees and the good faith of the employees in continuing to apply their shoulders to the wheel without causing disruption to the process when it could least afford it. It would be fundamentally unfair to penalize the affected employees for their good faith and constructive behavior in this case. It would also be counter-productive as such a precedent would not fail to alter behavior in future cases.

[54] I am satisfied that the targets were realistic and appropriate at the time they were set and served to align the interests of employees with stakeholders in an appropriate manner.

[55] The level of incentive is also less than meets the eye when the facts are examined more closely. While the combined cash flow plus asset sale incentives could result in incentives of up to 125% of salary, that figure is premised on base salary. In the case of the employees within the proposed KEIP program, base salary has been but one portion of their total compensation. When historical compensation is taken into account, the incentive payments recede to levels significantly below the 80% level calculated by the Official Committee to something closer to 50%.

[56] I am satisfied that the incentive amounts are reasonable in all of the circumstances.

Disposition

[57] In the result, I confirmed the KERP program at the hearing of the motion on December 16, 2018 and am granting the motion in respect of the KEIP program at this time. My approval extends to the requested priority charges securing the KEIP payments.

[58] Order accordingly.

S.F. Dunphy J. Date: November 21, 2018

[1] See also Pepall J. (as she then was) in Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re) at para. 49-52.

[2] The threshold incentive based on cash flow was removed after discussions with the United States Trustee.