DATE: November 29, 2021
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
S.B.
EMILY KOSTANDOFF, for the APPLICANT
APPLICANT
- and -
J.I.U.
ACTING IN PERSON
RESPONDENT
HEARD: NOVEMBER 26, 2021
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
ENDORSEMENT
Part One – Introduction
[1] The applicant (the mother) has brought a motion asking for orders to protect herself and the parties’ two children, ages 7 and 5 (the children), from the respondent (the father).
[2] The mother seeks orders that the father remove all social media posts, commentary and videos about herself and the children from the internet and that he be prohibited from making any future social media postings about them. She seeks a restraining order against the father and her costs of this motion.
[3] The father asks that the mother’s motion be dismissed.
[4] Both parties filed Form 14A and Form 35.1 affidavits. The court also heard brief oral evidence from the mother at the hearing of the motion.
Part Two – Brief Background Facts
[5] The mother is 29 years old. The father is 36 years old.
[6] The parties cohabited from May 2013 until October 28, 2020.
[7] On November 25, 2020, the father was charged with two counts of assault, two counts of assault using a weapon, and one count of assault, choke, suffocate or strangle related to the mother.
[8] The mother and the children moved into a shelter for women fleeing domestic abuse.
[9] The criminal matter remains outstanding. The father’s criminal release conditions prohibit him from having contact with the mother, except through legal counsel in writing for the purpose of non-criminal court proceedings.
[10] The children continue to live with the mother and have not had parenting time with the father for the past year.
[11] The mother issued her application on April 8, 2021. She seeks orders for sole decision-making responsibility for the children, no parenting time for the father, a restraining order and child support.
[12] The father has not paid any child support to the mother.
[13] The father did not attend the First Appearance Court date on August 9, 2021.
[14] On October 1, 2021, Justice Carolyn Jones granted the father an extension of time to serve and file his Answer/Claim. The father filed it on November 9, 2021. In it, he seeks orders for decision-making responsibility for the children and a restraining order against the mother. He asks for the dismissal of the mother’s application.
[15] At a case conference held on November 22, 2021, Justice Jones ordered the father to produce financial disclosure and organized the hearing of this motion.
Part Three – Social Media Postings
3.1 Legal Considerations
[16] There is authority pursuant to clause 28 (1) (c) of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act) to prevent a party from making negative social media postings and to require them to remove the existing ones. Many courts have made such orders in the best interests of children. See: C.A.V. v. L.C.M., [2002] O.J. No. 4878 (SCJ); Shotton v. Switzer, 2014 ONSC 843; Singh v. Batoolall, [2009] O.J. No. 1046 (SCJ); Chartrand v. De Laat, [2008] O.J. No. 4529 (SCJ); Daher v. Khanafer, [2016] ONSC 5969; E.H. v. O.K., 2018 ONCJ 412.
[17] Clause 28 (1) (c) of the Act reads as follows:
Parenting orders and contact orders
28 (1) The court to which an application is made under section 21,
(c) may make any additional order the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,
(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child,
(ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child,
(iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child’s residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court,
(iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court,
(v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child’s passport, the child’s health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify,
(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, to another party or other person specified by the court, or
(vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.
[18] The seminal case regarding social media postings is Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279, a decision of Justice Freya Kristjanson. The material posted online by Mr. Yenovkian contained photographs and videos of the children, personal identifying information, and comments about the children. His websites included links to YouTube videos of his court-ordered parenting time with children.
[19] Justice Kristjanson observed that Mr. Yenovkian’s social media postings engaged Article 16 of the United Nations Rights of the Child Convention. She wrote, at paragraphs 54-55 and 63 of her decision:
[54] The father has posted significant personal information about the children on the internet, including posted court-ordered access visits with the children on the internet, and has edited and labelled pictures and videos of the children, often with critical commentary, on the internet. Article 16 of the Rights of the Child Convention provides broad protection of the right of a child to privacy:
[1] Article 16
[2] 1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.
[3] 2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
[55] In the family law sphere, the heightened vulnerability of children is a concern when parents use public internet postings in a way that intrudes on the privacy of children, as is the case here.
[63] Children are particularly vulnerable to the online postings of a parent which expose the intimacy of a child’s life which only a parent should have access to. Public posting of recorded in-person and Skype access visits with children, photographs of parental moments, and written and video commentary about the children in a cyberbullying campaign directed to undermining the spouse in family law litigation, viewed objectively, is an offensive intrusion on the privacy of the child. Court-ordered access visits are the right of the child—not a tool for parents to manipulate and then post publicly in a cyberbullying campaign against the other parent. I find that the father’s websites, videos, petitions and postings are an intrusion on the privacy of these children and should reasonably be known to cause these children intimidation, humiliation, distress and harm to their feelings, self-esteem and reputation. Because of the extraordinary campaign of cyberbullying conducted by the father, where the images, access visits and voices of the children are plastered across the internet, it is essential to consider the father’s actions as they affect the children’s privacy in the context of the best interests analysis.
[20] Justice Kristjanson ordered Mr. Yenovkian to remove the internet postings and prohibited him from making future postings. However, she did not stop there. She ordered Mr. Yenovkian to pay Ms. Gulian $50,000 damages for the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering, $100,000 damages for the tort of invasion of privacy (public disclosure of private facts and publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light) and punitive damages of $150,000.
[21] Here, the father has posted court documents on the internet related to 2018 child protection proceedings regarding the children. Subsection 87 (8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the CYFSA) provides that no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family. Pursuant to sub section 142 (3) of the CYFSA, it is an offence to contravene subsection 87 (8).
[22] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.B., [2012] O.J. No. 3241 (C.J.), Justice Ellen Murray made an order directing the father in that case to remove internet posts that violated the predecessor non-publication provision of the Child and Family Services Act. Justice Murray made a temporary order suspending the father’s access until that was done.
[23] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.T.L., 2019 ONCJ 530, Justice Alex Finlayson ordered the parents to remove internet postings made in contravention of subsection 87 (8) of the CYFSA. The court will be adopting several of the terms that he ordered in that decision.
[24] On March 1, 2021, amendments to the Act, contained in the Moving Ontario Family Law Forward Act, 2020, came into force.
[25] There is a new and more comprehensive definition of family violence in the Act. Subsection 18 (1) of the Act defines family violence as follows:
“family violence” means any conduct by a family member towards another family member that is violent or threatening, that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or that causes the other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person, and, in the case of a child, includes direct or indirect exposure to such conduct.
[26] Subsection 24 (4) of the Act sets out specific factors relating to family violence as follows:
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
[27] In McLellan v. Birbilis, 2021 ONSC 7084, Justice Nicole Tellier writes the following about the new definition of family violence at paragraph 27:
The new definition provides a non-exhaustive list of conduct that constitutes family violence. This assists the court in identifying the nature and extent of the family violence. The definition does not preclude the court from finding that other conduct fits withing its meaning, such as cyber-bulling for example.
[28] This court agrees with Justice Tellier.
3.2 Analysis
[29] The father’s social media postings about the mother follow a similar pattern to the social media postings in the cases set out in Part 3.1 above.
[30] The father has posted on the internet court documents and a court order from the child protection case from 2018, case notes from the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (the society), correspondence exchanged with the society and criminal court documents related to a prior criminal charge against the mother – charges that were withdrawn by the Crown.
[31] The father has posted on the internet a photograph of the mother’s birth certificate and portions of her passport, leaving her vulnerable to identity theft.
[32] The father has posted videos and photos of the mother and the children on the internet with malicious commentary about the mother’s character and ability to parent. He accuses her of kidnapping the children, hiding evidence from the court with the help of the society and being involved in a conspiracy with the police, the society and the court.
[33] Many of the father’s postings are on his own website.
[34] The father claimed that he has no control over this website – that others are making these postings – perhaps even the mother, who he claims is sophisticated in internet technology.
[35] This was nonsense. This is the father’s website. At the bottom, it is marked with the father’s name with a donate button. He puts a copyright stamp on it. The site has two buttons that are directed to two other sites – one is the father’s Facebook account, the other is an Instagram account for the father’s business. He has made similar postings about the mother and the children on these sites. These sites are public. The commentary about the mother made on these sites is written in the first person. [^1]
[36] It also appears that the father created a Facebook account in the mother’s name in the spring of 2021 to further denigrate her. He posted a photo of her passport, contents of her purse and a picture of himself.
[37] It appears that the father regularly changes the location of his social media postings about the mother and the children.
[38] It is evident from the father’s social media postings that he is intent on hurting, humiliating and intimidating the mother. This is cyberbullying. It is family violence.
[39] In making his social media postings, the father has violated the privacy of the mother and the children. He has contravened subsection 87 (8) of the CYFSA.
[40] The father feels justified in what he is doing. He feels that he is exposing who the mother really is. He is unlikely to stop unless there are strong prohibitions against his social media postings, followed by significant consequences if he fails to comply with those prohibitions.
[41] The court will make orders requiring the father to remove all social media postings, including commentary, photographs and videos regarding the mother and the children, made directly or indirectly by him on the internet and prohibiting him from making any similar postings in the future, directly or indirectly.
3.3 Consequences of Breaching the Court Order
[42] A clear message needs to be sent to the father that there will be serious consequences if he does not comply with the court’s orders relating to social media postings. The potential consequences to him for breaching the court’s order are set out below.
[43] Subsection 87 (8) of the CYFSA states no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family. Pursuant to section 142 (3) of the CYFSA, it is an offence to contravene section 87 (8). The offence is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than three years, or both.
[44] Subrules 31 (5) and (7) of the Family Law Rules provide the court with the following authority if it finds the father in contempt of the court order:
CONTEMPT ORDERS
(5) If the court finds a person in contempt of the court, it may order that the person,
(a) be imprisoned for any period and on any conditions that are just;
(b) pay a fine in any amount that is appropriate;
(c) pay an amount to a party as a penalty;
(d) do anything else that the court decides is appropriate;
(e) not do what the court forbids;
(f) pay costs in an amount decided by the court; and
(g) obey any other order.
LIMITED IMPRISONMENT OR FINE
(7) In a contempt order under one of the following provisions, the period of imprisonment and the amount of a fine may not be greater than the relevant Act allows:
Section 38 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.
Section 49 of the Family Law Act.
Section 53 of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.
[45] Section 38 of the Act provides the court with the following authority in addition to its powers in respect of contempt:
Contempt of orders of Ontario Court of Justice
38 (1) In addition to its powers in respect of contempt, the Ontario Court of Justice may punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, any wilful contempt of or resistance to its process or orders under this Act, other than orders under section 35, but the fine shall not in any case exceed $5,000 nor shall the imprisonment exceed ninety days.
[46] Subrule 1 (8) of the Family Law Rules provides the court with the following authority if the father breaches the court order:
FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER
(8) If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,
(a) an order for costs;
(b) an order dismissing a claim;
(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;
(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;
(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;
(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and
(g) on motion, a contempt order.
[47] A criminal charge could be laid against the father if this court’s order is breached. Subsection 127 (1) of the Criminal Code reads as follows:
Disobeying order of court
127 (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
[48] The mother also has the option of bringing a civil claim for damages in the Superior Court of Justice against the father. [^2] In Yenovkian, the court awarded $300,000 against Mr. Yenovkian arising from the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering, the tort of invasion of privacy and punitive damages.
[49] The father’s ability to follow court orders will likely be a significant factor in assessing what parenting orders are in the children’s best interests. See: Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201.
[50] Lastly, a breach of the court order can result in substantial costs being ordered against the father pursuant to rule 24 of the Family Law Rules. Acts of unreasonable behaviour and bad faith are factors that can significantly increase a costs award. [^3]
Part Four – The Restraining Order
4.1 Legal Considerations
[51] The mother’s request for a restraining order is made pursuant to section 35 of the Act and section 46 of the Family Law Act (FLA). Section 35 of the Act reads as follows:
Restraining order
- (1) On application, the court may make an interim or final restraining order against any person if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.
Provisions of order
(2) A restraining order made under subsection (1) shall be in the form prescribed by the rules of court and may contain one or more of the following provisions, as the court considers appropriate:
Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant’s lawful custody.
Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.
Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Any other provision that the court considers appropriate.
[52] Section 46 of the FLA reads as follows:
Restraining order
- (1) On application, the court may make an interim or final restraining order against a person described in subsection (2) if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.
Same
(2) A restraining order under subsection (1) may be made against,
(a) a spouse or former spouse of the applicant; or
(b) a person other than a spouse or former spouse of the applicant, if the person is cohabiting with the applicant or has cohabited with the applicant for any period of time.
Provisions of order
(3) A restraining order made under subsection (1) shall be in the form prescribed by the rules of court and may contain one or more of the following provisions, as the court considers appropriate:
Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant’s lawful custody.
Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.
Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Any other provision that the court considers appropriate.
[53] The legal principles for the court to apply are as follows:
a) Restraining orders are serious and should not be ordered unless a clear case has been made out. See: Ciffolillo v. Niewelglowski, 2007 ONCJ 469.
b) A restraining order is serious, with criminal consequences if there is a breach. It will also likely appear if prospective employers conduct a criminal record (CPIC) search. This could adversely affect a person’s ability to work. It may affect a person’s immigration status. See: F.K. v. M.C., 2017 ONCJ 181.
c) It is not sufficient to argue that there would be no harm in granting the order. See: Edwards v. Tronick-Wehring, 2004 ONCJ 195.
d) Before the court can grant a restraining order, it must be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds for the person to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of their child. See: McCall v. Res, 2013 ONCJ 254.
e) The person’s fear may be entirely subjective so long as it is legitimate. See: Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154, 2011 CarswellOnt 146 (Ont. SCJ); McCall v. Res, supra.
f) A person’s subjective fear can extend to both the person’s physical safety and psychological safety. See: Azimi v. Mirzaei, 2010 CarswellOnt 4464 (Ont. S.C.).
g) It is not necessary for a respondent to have actually committed an act, gesture or words of harassment, to justify a restraining order. It is enough if an applicant has a legitimate fear of such acts being committed. An applicant does not have to have an overwhelming fear that could be understood by almost everyone; the standard for granting an order is not that elevated. See: Fuda v. Fuda, supra.
h) A restraining order will be made where a person has demonstrated a lengthy period of harassment or irresponsible, impulsive behaviour with the objective of harassing or distressing a party. There should be some persistence to the conduct complained of and a reasonable expectation that it will continue without court involvement. See: Purewal v. Purewal, 2004 ONCJ 195. However, there was no need for the applicant to sit back and let that behaviour continue for months before issuing an application, just so that she could argue that the bad behaviour continued for a lengthy period of time. Where serious behaviour has continued for “some period of time”, that will be sufficient. See: Proevski v. Roffel, 2020 ONCJ 310.
i) A restraining order cannot be issued to forestall every perceived fear of insult or possible harm, without compelling facts. There can be fears of a personal or subjective nature, but they must be related to a respondent’s actions or words. A court must be able to connect or associate a respondent’s actions or words with an applicant’s fears. See: Fuda v. Fuda, supra.
j) Courts should have regard for the passage of time. Events that once triggered a temporary restraining order may not be so compelling on the issue of a permanent order. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., 2015 ONCJ 242.
k) In borderline cases, the court must consider what other protections may be available if a restraining order is not granted. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., supra.
l) It is appropriate, in borderline cases, to consider the balancing prejudice to the respondent, if the restraining order is granted. See: D.C. v. M.T.C., supra.
m) A no-contact or communication order made pursuant to section 28 of the Act is not as wide-ranging as a restraining order. It can limit contact and communication between the parties, but it cannot restrain a party from harassing the other party to third parties. See: F.K. v. M.C., supra.
n) A court is not precluded from making a final restraining order if a party has complied with a temporary order under section 28 of the Act. On a temporary motion the court does not have the benefit of the fulsome record it has at trial. Cross-examination at trial can provide valuable information in the court’s risk assessment. Further, the court should be alert to the fact that parties may improve their behaviour when the eyes of the court are on them. This might not continue once the case ends. See: F.K. v. M.C., supra.
4.2 Analysis
[54] The mother established both an objective and subjective basis to fear for the safety of herself and the children.
[55] The father has engaged in a campaign of harassment and cyberbullying against the mother. He has breached her privacy rights and the privacy rights of the children in this campaign.
[56] The mother set out a long history of physical, emotional and psychological violence by the father against her and the children in her Form 14A and Form 35.1 affidavits. She said that his frequent abuse of her often happened in front of the children. She deposed that the father isolated her and threatened to kill her and her friends. She described him as obsessed with hurting people and told her that it was fun and that he loved fighting and seeing people get beat up.
[57] The father denied all abuse allegations and claimed that the mother abused him. After reviewing the content of his social media posts, which reveals a profound disrespect for the mother, the court finds it more likely, for the purpose of this motion, that the mother’s version of events is more accurate.
[58] The mother and the children had to flee to a shelter after the parties separated. The father was criminally charged for assaults against the mother and the criminal matter remains outstanding.
[59] The father is prohibited by his criminal release terms from contacting the mother, except through counsel in writing for the purpose of non-criminal court proceedings. On the date of the First Appearance Court on August 9, 2021, the father contacted the mother directly through Facebook messenger when he attempted to video call her. The mother attached to her affidavit a screenshot of this attempt to reach her.
[60] The mother deposed that in August 2021, the father was telling her friends that he knew where she was and had people watching her.
[61] The mother deposed at this hearing that she was contacted by a society worker after the father was served with her notice of motion materials on November 23, 2021. She said that the society worker told her, and she believes, that the father claimed to know where she was and that the worker felt that she was in danger.
[62] The mother deposed that the father has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. She says that it causes him to behave unpredictably.
[63] The mother testified that she is very afraid for herself and the children. She has tried to hide her location from the father for the past year. She fears that he has found her.
[64] The father denied knowing where the mother lives. This may be the case, but he is intimidating her by telling other people that he knows where she lives.
[65] The father’s motion material bore little relevance to the issues on this motion. It did reveal a deep-rooted anger towards the mother. The father submitted that he feels that the society is trying to take the children away from him through the mother because it failed in taking them away before.
[66] The father set out in his affidavit that he was planning to take the children to live in Jamaica prior to the criminal charges being laid against him in November 2020. The mother fears that he might follow through on this plan.
[67] The court finds that making a lesser non-communication order pursuant to section 28 of the Act would be inadequate to protect the mother and the children.
[68] The court considered that there is a criminal release order in place. However, the father advised the court that he believed the criminal matter will be resolved soon. The court wants to ensure that protection is in place for the mother and the children if the criminal release terms end. Further, the scope of the restraining order that this court will make will extend beyond the criminal release terms. It will include non-harassment orders, including orders that the father not make any social media postings regarding the mother and the children.
[69] A restraining order will be granted on the terms sought by the mother. An additional clause will be added permitting the father to have contact with the children, but only pursuant to any parenting time order that is made after today. A separate restraining order endorsement will be issued on the prescribed form.
[70] The father should be aware that the breach of a restraining order can be enforced as an offence under the Provincial Offences Act or can result in criminal prosecution leading to imprisonment for not more than two years pursuant to section 127 of the Criminal Code. See: C.T. v. C.S., 2021 ONSC 7578.
Part Five – Costs
[71] The mother seeks her costs of this motion in the amount of $1,504.60. She filed her bill of costs with her motion materials.
[72] The father should know that this is a very modest, reasonable and proportionate request in these circumstances. It sends a message to the court that the mother’s priority is to protect herself and the children – not to punish the father. The father is very fortunate that the mother did not seek a much higher costs amount.
[73] The costs sought by the mother will be ordered.
Part Six – Conclusion
[74] The court makes the following orders:
a) The father shall, within 10 days, remove from the internet all social media postings made directly or indirectly by him, that are:
i. photographs or videos of the mother or the children or of any of their personal effects,
ii. comments about the mother or the children or about any criminal, family or child protection case regarding any of them,
iii. court documents from any criminal, family, or child protection case regarding any of the mother or the children.
This shall include, but not be limited to, anything the father has posted on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, his Wordpress website, YouTube, or on any other similar website or social media platform.
b) The father is prohibited from posting, either directly or indirectly, on the internet:
i. photographs or videos of the mother or the children or of any of their personal effects,
ii. comments about the mother or the children or about any criminal, family or child protection case regarding any of them,
iii. court documents from any criminal, family, or child protection case regarding any of the mother or the children.
This shall include, but not be limited to, anything being posted on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, his Wordpress website, YouTube, or on any other similar website or social media platform.
It also includes a prohibition against asking or allowing others to post on his behalf.
c) The father shall, within 7 days, identify to the mother’s lawyer all postings described in paragraph a) above.
d) To ensure compliance with this order, if any content described in paragraph a) remains, or if any content described in paragraph b) is added, the mother shall put any internet service providers, websites, website hosts, or social media companies on notice that the court has ordered this material to be removed and they shall ask those organizations to remove the content and close the father’s websites or accounts. If those organizations do not respond within 30 days, then the mother may bring a motion, on notice to the organization, for an order to compel the appropriate organization to remove the content and close the websites or accounts.
e) A separate restraining order endorsement shall be issued against the father.
f) The Toronto Police Service is requested to strictly enforce this order, at the mother’s request.
g) Due to the extensive references to child protection proceedings in this case, this file shall be treated by court staff in a manner similar to a child protection file. No person, other than the parties or their counsel may view the file without prior court order.
h) The father shall pay the mother’s costs of this motion fixed in the amount of $1,504.60, payable forthwith.
[75] The mother’s counsel should immediately prepare this order and the restraining order. She should file them with the trial coordinator’s office and court staff shall immediately bring the orders to my attention for signature. The father’s approval of the orders as to form and content is dispensed with.
[76] The mother should not hesitate to enforce these orders if the father breaches them.
Released: November 29, 2021
Justice S.B. Sherr
[^1]: The mother attached this information and several of the father’s social media postings to her affidavit. [^2]: The Ontario Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to grant this relief. [^3]: See subrules 24 (5) and (8) of the Family Law Rules.