Court Information

Date: March 29, 2017

Ontario Court of Justice Old City Hall – Toronto

Between: Her Majesty the Queen And: Rami Al-Saedi

Counsel:

• E. Winocur, for the Crown
• R. Timol, for the Defendant

Heard: December 7, 2016 and February 14, 2017

Reasons for Sentence

Justice Melvyn Green

A. THE OFFENCE

[1] Rami Al-Saedi had one very bad night on September 6, 2015.

[2] He got into a dispute with a bouncer who was trying to evict him from a bar in Toronto's entertainment district. It was a little after midnight in the middle of the Labour Day weekend – the last long weekend of the summer. The streets were crowded with clubgoers and other revelers. Al-Saedi had too much to drink and too little judgment. He called 911 and identified himself as an undercover officer who was being assaulted in the course of a drug investigation. He asked for "backup".

[3] Unsurprisingly, the 911 dispatcher broadcast a high priority distress call. Equally unsurprisingly, officers from all over 52 Division responded, some making their way through the pedestrian traffic with their lights flashing and sirens blaring. Al-Saedi, when located, was fighting with nightclub security. He maintained that he was "undercover". His deception was quickly discovered – as was approximately a gram of cocaine in his pocket. Al-Saedi's arrest immediately followed.

[4] As detailed in an Offence Impact Report, Al-Saedi's 911 call diverted police from other duties and needlessly taxed their resources on a very busy night. Thanks to police discipline and good fortune, no injuries or accidents resulted.

B. THE OFFENDER

[5] Al-Saedi immigrated to Canada with his parents when he was eight years old. He is now 27. He has a college diploma in civil engineering and was employed as a project manager with a construction company until February 2016 when he fractured his pelvis in a fall from a ladder. He continues to attend a physiotherapist and, at the time of this hearing, was seeking work in the same industry on a "modified duties" basis. He lives with his parents and two of his sisters and maintains his contributions, as best he can, to the family income as his father has suffered a series of debilitating heart attacks.

[6] Al-Saedi has no prior conflicts with the criminal law. While he "partied" with friends when in college, his drinking was generally moderate, as was his consumption of marihuana. According to Al-Saedi, the night of his arrest was the first occasion he had tried cocaine. On his uncontradicted account and that of a lifelong friend interviewed by the author of the offender's Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), Al-Saedi's behaviour on the night at issue was very much out-of-character.

[7] Al-Saedi voluntarily attended an educational program at a Peel-based drug counseling program and professes to have remained "clean" of drugs and alcohol since the offence date. His doctor reports that despite the pain associated with occasional flare-ups resulting from his pelvic injury, Al-Saedi has declined prescribed opioid medication to avoid any risk of dependence. He completed more than 100 hours of volunteer work for "Habitat for Humanity" and intends to continue to participate in the charity's efforts. He has also made a significant donation to the Mississauga Food Bank. The PSR notes Al-Saedi's expression of remorse and his amenability to any intervention strategies proposed by the court on sentencing.

[8] Al-Saedi was held overnight before being released on a recognizance. His bail terms are not particularly onerous but there is no suggestion that he has done anything but fully comply with them in the 18-plus months since his release.

C. THE PROCESS

[9] Al-Saedi pled guilty to personating a police officer (Code, s. 130(1)(a)) and simple possession of cocaine on December 7, 2016. The Crown proceeded summarily and the matter was adjourned for preparation of a PSR in view of the gravity of the events and their apparent inconsistency with the offender's otherwise unblemished character.

[10] It is unusual for the ritual of arraignment, plea and sentencing submissions to generate moments of drama and, in particular, any that bear on the appropriate disposition. This case, however, illustrates one of these more exceptional instances.

[11] Although the word is rarely used, contemporary criminal procedure continues to recognize an historical common law right of "allocution" or "allocutus" – an offender's opportunity to directly address the court prior to sentencing. The right is statutorily preserved in s. 726 of the Code: "Before determining the sentence to be imposed, the court shall ask whether the offender, if present, has anything to say". Inadvertent breaches of this mandatory provision are commonplace and, short of a deliberate denial of the offender's right to speak, have been held to have no impact on the integrity of a court's sentencing disposition: R. v. Senek (1998), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 473 (Man. C.A.). The procedure appears intended to grant the offender a measure of personal agency in the sentencing process and to provide him or her an opportunity to present information in mitigation of sentence, usually an apology, an expression of contrition or remorse, an explanation of the circumstances motivating the crime, or a promise to reform.

[12] In practice, most offenders decline to address the court when invited to do so. Those who do usually tender a brief apology to the victim or the justice system (typically, a rote "I'm sorry for wasting the court's time") or a statement of remorse which, on visceral reaction, sometimes appears sincere.

[13] Al-Saedi's sentencing hearing traced a somewhat unusual trajectory. As its dynamic impacts on the assessment of an appropriate sentence, a micro-narrative follows:

[14] A class of grade 12 law students began to fill the courtroom as Crown counsel read the factual allegations that grounded Al-Saedi's two offences. Al-Saedi, through counsel, accepted the accuracy of the allegations. I entered findings of guilt, following which counsel made their respective submissions. At bottom, the defence sought a non-custodial disposition while the Crown urged a bricks-and-mortar sentence of a straight 30 days. Throughout, Al-Saedi sat at counsel table, his head bowed, his countenance despairing. He declined the opportunity I afforded him to address the court. The matter was to be remanded for preparation of a PSR. As I waited for the clerk to complete the requisite form, it was apparent that Al-Saedi was growing increasingly agitated. After a brief exchange with his client, defence counsel advised that Al-Saedi wished to speak to the visiting high school class. With the consent of Crown and defence counsel, I allowed him to do so.

[15] Al-Saedi rose, positioned the lectern so that he addressed both the bench and the rapt students in the gallery and, without a note, delivered a patently heartfelt allocution that expressed his remorse, his sense of shame, the edifying potency of his experience, his efforts to make amends, and the lessons he wished to share with the students who, by virtue of purposeful coincidence, were fatefully in court "the day I'm gonna take the plea". As Al-Saedi told the class, in part:

So, not that I only damaged myself, I damaged the public, I damaged everything about me, like, as a person. I wish that I could go back to that night and do everything differently, but the matter of the facts is that I can't. And I can regret it, but at the same time I learned a lesson. And, look at me and take me as a lesson if it would help you down the line to not make mistakes.

So, focus on your studies and make sure that you learn from other peoples' mistakes. … And, maybe this happened to me for a reason. Maybe after seeing me you guys — I might have a saved a life in the future. I don't know, but I believe things happen for a reason and that night it taught me a lesson that I could never forget. It taught me how to be a — it showed me how I could be a better me. I've volunteered voluntarily and I'm going to continue that because that's my new hobby. I never thought that I would like volunteering, but going and volunteering and helping people, it's a, it's a joy.

... Just respect, respect the people that serve us. Cause, as you can see, the judge, the Crown, my lawyer, all those people serve us in a way. Police officers, paramedics, fire fighters; they all serve us and we don't say thank you to them as often. But, without them, we wouldn't have the resources that we have. We wouldn't have all the rights. We wouldn't have, we wouldn't have what we have. We wouldn't be guaranteed tomorrow.

In conclusion, he said:

So, try not to get in trouble, make sure you pick out your friends and always think twice before you do anything. Always. And if you're mad just count to ten.

Al-Saedi's address was direct and, as was clear from my later exchange with the class, impactful. He seized an opportunity to share a cautionary tale, his own, in a manner which could not have been lost on the grade 12 students or those with whom many likely shared their exposure to his account. His words were not self-pitying, nor did he rely on excuses or deflect blame to others. He had made a terrible mistake and he owned it. He fully accepted responsibility, shared his regrets, honoured his parents, the police and the justice system, and cautioned the students against the kind of mindless decisions that had led to his misfortune.

[16] Crown and defence counsel were not immune to the emotional power of Al-Saedi's comments. On the return date, defence counsel, emboldened by his client's speech, urged that he be spared a conviction and, instead, be discharged conditionally. Crown counsel strenuously maintained that the gravity of the offence compelled the register of a conviction but, in view of Al-Saedi's brief taste of pre-trial custody and the obvious markers of rehabilitation, not necessarily a sentence of "straight" incarceration.

[17] As the mutation of counsels' positions illustrate, elements of the sentencing process itself may on occasion infiltrate or inform the determination of a fit outcome. For one, if very different, example, lawyers and judges who participate in "sentencing circles" in "Gladue Court" are increasingly conscious of the enhanced insight and understanding that may result from an offender's direct participation in the ceremony of sentencing. The inclusion of an offender's voice may properly be seen as one facet of a restorative justice process.

[18] A transcript of Al-Saedi's complete address, styled "Appendix", is appended to these Reasons.

D. DISCUSSION

(a) Introduction

[19] The facts underlying the plea and those bearing on the offender's character and post-offence conduct give rise to several inquiries. The first concerns the meaning and mitigative value of "remorse". The second and directly related issue is whether, in light of Al-Saedi's demonstrable remorse, a discharge, as opposed to a conviction, is an appropriate sentence. As s. 718.1 of the Code prescribes, a "sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender". This "fundamental principle" of proportionality directs any sentencing judge's attention to both the circumstances of the offence and the "moral blameworthiness", as it is often put, of the offender. The latter half of the proportionality equation, that of moral blameworthiness, speaks to something larger and more holistic than an offender's causal role or degree or participation in the offence at issue. It compels consideration of the whole person – historical, contextual and criminological. The challenge here, as in every case, is finding the fit reconciliation or balancing of these and other relevant sentencing factors.

(b) Remorse

[20] One of the statutory "objectives" of sentencing, as set out in s. 718(f) of the Code, is "to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community". Other than by allusion through this provision, the word "remorse", or any synonymous language, appears nowhere in the complex of "principles", "purposes", "objectives" and "additional factors" that compose the "Sentencing" regime, Part XXIII, of the Criminal Code. Nor has the concept attracted much doctrinal analysis in Canadian jurisprudence. Despite its relatively unexamined nature, "remorse", or its absence, is frequently cited as a relevant sentencing consideration at both trial and on appeal. A valid assertion of remorse, as judicially construed, is often read as a measure of an offender's positive, reformed or salvageable character. Those who appear remorseful are generally seen as accepting responsibility for their crimes, as less likely to recidivate, and as superior candidates for social re-integration. In short, sincere expressions of remorse, by way of words or conduct, are treated as indicia of an offender's positive character and, thus, as a mitigative factor on sentencing. Conversely, those who "show no remorse" or whose offences are characterized as "remorseless" may well be seen lacking the personal empathy and self-awareness that argue for other than punitive sentencing.

[21] One relatively rare appellate discussion of the role of remorse in sentencing appears in R. v. Anderson (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (B.C.C.A.), at 535-36:

The factor of "remorse" is often important. In so far as it might be suggested that the court should regard those who come before it in a submissive or contrite manner as deserving of more lenient treatment than those who accept their predicament with whatever fortitude they are able to summon, there would be little in this factor which could assist the sentencing judge. But to the extent that an accused person is able to demonstrate that he or she has, since the commission of a crime, come to realize the gravity of the conduct, and as a result has achieved a change in attitude or imposed some self-discipline which significantly reduces the likelihood of further offending, the existence of remorse in this sense obviously has much importance.

The capacity of human beings who have erred to recognize the magnitude of their wrongdoing, and to redeem themselves, offers the only possibility that those who have committed crimes may again become contributing members of the community, rather than its burden for the rest of their lives.

After endorsing these passages, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. Valentini (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 178, at para. 82, turned to the judicial treatment of lack of remorse on sentencing:

[A] court must be very careful in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance. A sincere expression of remorse can be an important mitigating factor and can reduce the sentence that might otherwise be imposed. Lack of remorse is not, ordinarily, an aggravating circumstance. It should only be considered aggravating in very unusual circumstances such as where the accused's attitude toward the crime demonstrates a substantial likelihood of future dangerousness. Even then the trial judge must be careful not to increase the sentence beyond what is proportionate having regard to the circumstances of the particular offence.

Indeed, in Valentini the Court held that the trial judge's treatment of lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance was an error in principle. (See also, R. v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220, 105 O.R. (3d) 161, aff'd on other grounds, 2013 SCC 12, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 565, at paras. 84-85; R. v. Ling, 2014 ONCA 808, [2014] O.J. No. 5485 (C.A.), at para. 11; R. v. Rockey, [2016] O.J. No. 6111 (C.A.), at para. 31.)

[22] While Canadian courts have largely avoided any weighty examination of the role of remorse in judicial decision-making, the topic has proven a rich and expanding area of academic inquiry. Remorse, most commentators agree, is an emotion, a subjective feeling. But its distinguishing features and its fit within utilitarian or retributive theories of punishment remain subjects of considerable debate. A helpful overview of the meaning of "remorse", its individuation from other self-abnegating emotions, and an introduction to its socially constructed nature is provided in Professor Christopher Bennett's most recent contribution to the literature ("The Role of Remorse in Criminal Justice", Oxford Handbooks Online, Online Publication date: Oct 2016; http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935383-e-37):

Remorse concerns the person's assessment of their own performance, achievement, or standing in some dimension or other. It constitutively depends on how the person involved understands their action as reflecting on them in some way.

… The characteristic focus of remorse is the painful awareness of the harm one has inflicted on the other, and the way one has let them down (or worse) by causing it.

… Distinguishing guilt and shame from remorse allows us to insist that, in contrast to these [first two] pathologies, the proper focus should be on the victim as the person who has been harmed.

… [It is] implausible that remorse is a basic … emotional reaction to acts labeled socially as wrongs … as may [be] some forms of sympathy, compassion, or fellow-feeling. [F]or the form of this reaction to have become … a complex and elaborated feeling like remorse requires a person to understand her situation in ways that, though she may find them compelling, are not merely instinctive. They have some grounding in her system of belief, her worldview, her wider outlook, and set of attitudes. Hence … remorse is at least in part socially constructed. This is not to say that remorse is not a "real" emotion.

At the risk of oversimplification, remorse, then, is a sophisticated, higher-order emotional response to one's wrongdoing. It is more cognitive than intuitive. And it is more an expression of sympathy for the victims of one's wrongdoing than for oneself. Its social construction does not compromise its emotional authenticity or, if judicially accepted, its mitigative value. It does, however, help to explain why judicial attention to remorse, or its absence, to assess an offender's character may disadvantage intellectually challenged offenders or those from cultural backgrounds who share different social expectations or means of communicating states of self-effacement. Properly understood, these are problems of capacity not defiance.

[23] It must also be borne in mind that there are at least three scenarios where the absence of remorse ought not, under any circumstances, to have any weight on sentencing. First, where the offender maintains his innocence despite an adverse finding at trial; mistaken convictions are hardly unknown to Canadian law nor is one to be punished for adhering to the presumption of innocence: see R. v. Leroux, 2015 SKCA 48, at para. 62. Second, where the offender acts in principled disobedience of the law; for example, a dairy farmer sincerely convinced that pasteurizing his milk jeopardizes his consumers' health: see, for example, R. v. Schmidt, 2014 ONCA 188. And third, where the offence itself channels the imposition of majoritarian morality untethered to an empirical risk of harm; by way of historical illustration, those sentenced for having same-sex relations with other consenting adults, or, of more current vintage, persons found guilty of simple possession of marihuana.

[24] Moving beyond a taxonomy of post-offence emotional responses, the here-critical inquiry focuses on the communicative function of remorse in the negotiation of a fit sentence. The expression of remorse is part of a transactional process that, if effective, has morally transmutative properties. Richard Weisman, Professor Emeritus in the Law and Society Program at Toronto's York University, has recently developed these themes in Showing Remorse: Law and the Social Control of Emotion, Ashgate, Surrey, U.K and Burlington, VT, USA, 2013. His work reflects a close review of hundreds of reported Canadian and American sentencing cases in which "remorse" presents as a matter of discussion or dispute. Weisman's research attends not to the emotional sources of remorse but, rather, to its social manufacture, utility and function in a forensic setting. As he writes at pp. 8-9 (citations omitted; emphasis in original), he approaches remorse,

not as a feeling as it is experienced by an individual but rather as a communication to an audience. … The work of expressing remorse … is to represent the wrongdoer as not aligned with the act for which he or she has been condemned. If the … showing of remorse is successful, then it may be inferred that the self that condemned the act is more real than the self that committed the act. Contrariwise, for those who are viewed as unapologetic or unremorseful, the act becomes their essence. If they do not separate themselves from the act [or are] not believed, then the transgression comes to define who they are – the self that committed the offending act is the true self.

Further, a genuine expression of remorse has a communitarian or civic dimension. As said at p. 13, "the show of remorse that is believed … [is an act] by which the wrongdoer re-establishes their membership in the moral community". Put otherwise, an effective expression of remorse has a redemptive quality; the sinner, once banished, is restored to the fold.

[25] Expanding on his proposition that exhibitions of remorse are socially constructed, Weisman first makes clear that it is the judicial system that sets the performative parameters. Accordingly, expressions of remorse are not so much natural phenomena as they are efforts to meet the judicial system's expectation of both adequate and sincere displays of the prerequisite emotional state. As put at p. 44:

[T]he thrust of … the analysis is not just that juridical discourse constitutes when remorse should be demonstrated but how it should be demonstrated. … Through the prospect of mercy and moral accreditation but also the concealed threat of violence, judicial discourse shapes the content of remorse in a way that reflects the context in which it is produced. If it is appreciated that remorse is not just a psychological trait inherent in the individual but rather an attribute that is situated in a specific social context, the impact of juridical discourse on the shaping of remorse becomes all the more comprehensible. The form in which remorse must be expressed is that of submission to a greater power—the moral performances that are validated all have as their common point of reference a posture of abjection and surrender by the offender before the authority of the law.

[26] Two additional passages gracefully capture the nexus between remorse and character and the legal implications of their association. At p. 27 (emphasis added):

[I]t is through remorse that the world is divided … into those whose misconduct will come to define their character and those whose character will lead us to redefine their misconduct.

And at pp. 44-45:

By attending to the remorsefulness of the offender and taking into account its presence or absence, legal discourse comes to link act to character and doing to being. … Remorse is the attribute by which this linkage between act and character is achieved.

[27] The sometimes-difficult task of validating a claim of remorse is thankfully evaded in the case before me. There is here no dispute as to the sincerity or heartfelt nature of the offender's expression or remorse. The spontaneous character of Al-Saedi's delivery, his chosen audience and the absence of either self-pity or qualification buttress the authenticity of his show of remorse. His statement also eloquently speaks to the offender's insight, abject humiliation and deep appreciation of the harm he risked not only to his personal prospects but to his family and the public as well. The remaining question, to which I now turn, is the influence of the offender's remorse – both verbal and by way of his tangible efforts to make amends – on an assessment of the appropriate disposition.

(c) Discharge v. Conviction

[28] Counsel agree that the sentence levied for Al-Saedi's possession of a gram of cocaine should run concurrently with that imposed for the personation offence. They also, if implicitly, concur that, in all the circumstances, a custodial disposition (other than, as urged by Crown counsel, by way of intermittent or conditional sentence) is not required to meet the ends of justice. The issue that divides the parties is whether Al-Saedi's guilt need be perpetuated through registry of a conviction.

[29] The foundational offence, that of personating a police officer, is one of many potential variants. The personation in the instant case was not used to facilitate a more grievous crime. While serious, it appears more an offence of intoxication-fueled public mischief than one of deliberate exploitation or corruption. Its commission, like that of possession of a controlled substance, attracts no minimum penalty. A discharge, as opposed to a conviction, is not statutorily precluded. Its imposition in lieu of a conviction depends, as set out in s. 730 of the Code, on whether "the court … considers it to be in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest [to] direct that the accused be discharged absolutely or on the conditions prescribed in a probation order". As defence counsel concedes the propriety of probation order, any discharge, if imposed, would be conditional.

[30] It is difficult, if not quite impossible, to conceive of a fact-pattern where the imposition of a discharge on a relatively young offender without criminal antecedents would not "be in the best interests of the accused". The far more challenging question is whether the same result is "not contrary to the public interest". Although an imprecise concept of some elasticity, "the public interest" most certainly includes encouraging rehabilitation and societal reintegration – particularly, as here, in the case of youthful first offenders who, by virtue of their post-arrest conduct, have convincingly demonstrated that deterrence is of substantially diminished value in crafting a fit sentence.

[31] As many jurists have observed, the discharge provision is discretionary. Further, the exercise of that discretion with respect to the second statutory prerequisite is not whether the imposition of a discharge is "in the public interest" but whether it is "not contrary to the public interest". The double-negative phrasing shifts the burden of persuasion to the state once, as here, an offender realistically brings himself within a bubble of discharge contemplation. This second-branch inquiry inevitably comprehends the consequences that may flow from a conviction. As said in the germinal case of R. v. Sanchez-Pino (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 53 (Ont. C.A.), "Normally the [offender] will be a person of good character, or at least of such character that the entry of a conviction against him may have significant repercussions".

[32] Sanchez-Pino was released in the immediate wake of the promulgation of the "discharge" sentencing provisions. Forty years and a technological revolution later, the Court of Appeal's concerns have taken on a broader and potentially more ominous cast. Justice O'Donnell addresses some of these concerns in R. v. Novielli, 2015 ONCJ 192, at para. 19:

[W]hen considering the suitability of discharges in 2015, judges might appropriately tweak their analysis from some of the categories of the past. I say this for two reasons. The first is that information in 2015 is not what it was in 1960 or 1970 or 1980. Computerization and information-sharing now mean that records of a person's criminal history, as well as many lesser contacts with law enforcement, are likely to be immeasurably more widely available than ever before, whether to the public on the internet or to foreign agencies by means of post-"9/11" data-sharing agreements, at the same time that the availability of a "pardon" (now a record suspension) has been constrained. The difference between a conviction and a discharge is now more acute than it has been in the past. The other consideration is that, sometimes for legitimate reasons and sometimes simply because it is possible, it seems to be much more common for employers and voluntary organizations to insist upon records checks. The potential for a criminal conviction to affect a much broader group of defendants is thus very real.

[33] Here, the offender, Al-Saedi, is a young man with professional credentials and prospects who has striven to reclaim his moral identity. The ancillary or collateral consequences, as put in R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, of a conviction for an isolated episode of egregiously bad behaviour appears inequitable or unfair when measured against both the relative gravity of the offence and Al-Saedi's pro-social history and restorative efforts. The cardinal sentencing rule of proportionality is breached when the imposition of a conviction would grant greater weight to, in effect, an offence of public mischief or nuisance than the individualized treatment of an offender who, in the vernacular, has "earned a second chance".

[34] As Crown counsel effectively concedes, Al-Saedi's remorse precludes any need for specific deterrence. Nor do the amorphous aspirations of general deterrence and denunciation command much traction where, in the unique circumstances of this case, the offender's spontaneous address to a random high school class has achieved, but in palpable and poignant measure, the same objectives. Rehabilitative reinforcement and restoration, coupled with the principle of restraint, are here the primary drivers of a fit disposition, one that aims to secure the fundamental sentencing goal of individualized proportionality.

[35] Accordingly, Al-Saedi will be discharged on a conditional basis. He will be subject to concurrent probation orders for a period of 18 months. Apart from the statutory conditions (including keeping the peace and being of good behaviour), he is required to report to his probation officer forthwith and thereafter as required by his probation officer. He is also required to immediately inform his probation officer of his residential address and of any changes in that address within 24 hours of such change. He is not to enter that area of Toronto bounded by Front Street to the south, Queen to the north, University to the east and Spadina to the west unless travelling through the area in motorized transportation. Further, he is to complete 100 hours of community service with Habitat for Humanity, or such other charitable or community-service organization as his probation officer directs, within the first 10 months of his probation, and to sign such releases as may prove necessary for his probation officer to monitor his compliance with this directive.

[36] Only slightly paraphrasing Professor Weisman, the palpable sincerity of Al-Saedi's remorse firmly situates him among "those whose character leads us to redefine their misconduct". Retrofitted to the language of s. 718(f) of the Code, a conditional discharge affirms Al-Saedi's expressions of remorse, through both speech and conduct, in securing the sentencing objectives of promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledging the harm done to the community.

E. CONCLUSION

[37] For the reasons just recited, Rami Al-Saedi is conditionally discharged with respect to both counts on which he was arraigned.

Released on March 29, 2017

Justice Melvyn Green

Appendix: The Offender's "Allocution"

So you guys heard what happened to me. I got charged. I was out. I got drunk. And it doesn't take a lot to realize it's only that one call. People will usually think that you have to through a lot. But, it's that one judgement call that you do, what could end up happening. So, with this, pretty sure I'm going to — my life is ruined if it goes on my record. So you guys always have to think about what you guys want and what do you guys want for your future. Doesn't take much. It's that one phone call. You guys don't know how many times I've played in the back of my head what I could have done differently that night.

What if — my dad could have been getting a heart attack and I could have been took those resources away from him. So, not that I only damaged myself, I damaged the public, I damaged everything about me, like, as a person. I wish that I could go back to that night and do everything differently, but the matter of the facts is that I can't. And I can regret it, but at the same time is, I learned a lesson. And, look at me and take me as a lesson. If it would help you down the line to not make mistakes.

And just make sure who you hang out with. That the — friends do play a big part of your life and I noticed that, like — I'm not going to put the blame on my friends. I'm old enough, I'm going to take, the actions of what have I done and I'm going to accept it.

As you've seen, my night was planned totally different. I went out to have fun, party and to go home. I ended up going out, making a wrong judgement call, going to jail and now I might be getting a criminal record. And, as a young professional, that's already ruined.

So, focus on your studies and make sure that you learn from other peoples' mistakes. Honestly, everything is a coincidence in life and this might not be a coincidence that the day that I'm gonna take the plea there's a class in court.

And, maybe this happened to me for a reason. Maybe after seeing me you guys — I might have a saved a life in the future. I don't know, but I believe things happen for a reason and that night it taught me a lesson that I could never forget. It taught me how to be a — it showed me how I could be a better me. I've volunteered voluntarily and I'm going to continue that because that's my new hobby. I never thought that I would like volunteering, but going and volunteering and helping people, it's a, it's a joy.

So, honestly, you guys have to look at the big picture, always, and make sure you think about whatever you want to do twice. And if you're angry, count to ten. And, if you're mad, walk away. Just respect, respect the people that serve us. Cause, as you can see, the Judge, the Crown, my lawyer, all those people serve us in a way. Police officers, paramedics, fire fighters; they all serve us and we don't say thank you to them as often. But, without them, we wouldn't have the resources that we have. We wouldn't have all the rights. We wouldn't have, we wouldn't have what we have. We wouldn't be guaranteed tomorrow.

So, try not to get in trouble, make sure you pick out your friends and always think twice before you do anything. Always. And if you're mad just count to ten. That's all I guess.