Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice Old City Hall – Toronto

Between: Her Majesty the Queen And: Jack Reis

Counsel:

• S. Curtis, for the Crown
• A. Goldkind, for the Defendant

Heard: February 16 and May 30, 2012

Reasons for Sentence

Justice Melvyn Green

A. INTRODUCTION

[1] Jack Reis was arrested on January 21, 2009. He lived in a central Toronto apartment from which he distributed a broad variety of unlawful drugs. He pled guilty to possession of cocaine, heroin and Oxycodone, each for the purpose of trafficking, more than three years after his arrest. Mr. Reis (hereafter, the offender) is 50 years old. He does not have a prior criminal record. He has no substance dependencies. A fit sentence, says Crown counsel, is one of two years incarceration. Defence counsel does not disagree with the length of the proposed disposition but submits that it can properly be served in the community by way of a conditional sentence. Neither party urges the imposition of any period of probation.

[2] My determination as to the appropriate sentence, and my reasons, follow.

B. BACKGROUND

(a) The Offences

[3] Beginning about April 2008, the police received complaints from the public about drug dealing in the vicinity of the defendant's apartment. Police surveillance on January 20, 2009 noted the attendance of some 25 persons at the door of that apartment within a four-hour period, the average visit lasting no longer than three minutes. The defendant was arrested on a nearby street the next day. He was carrying about two ounces of powder cocaine, some cash and two cell phones. Further drugs and drug paraphernalia were located during the execution of a search warrant at the defendant's apartment soon after his arrest. The apartment was equipped with a video security system that allowed those inside the apartment to determine who was at the door before granting access.

[4] In total, the prohibited drugs seized from the defendant and his apartment include:

• 59 grams (2.1 ounces) of powder cocaine;
• 1.22 grams of heroin;
• 224 pills of Oxycodone;
• 3 grams of marihuana;
• 16.5 grams of MDMA ("ecstasy"); and
• 1 pill of "BZP" (Benzylpiperazine, a "recreational" stimulant).

No evidence was tendered as to the street level value of these drugs.

[5] The search of the apartment also yielded the typical accoutrements of a commercial trafficking operation, including scales, baggies, a press and a "debt list". The offender's girlfriend, a heroin-dependent woman, was found in the bathtub during the execution of the search warrant. Some money – the equivalent, in mixed currencies, of about a thousand dollars in total – was also seized from the offender and his residence. On consent, it has since been ordered forfeited to the Crown.

[6] The defendant spent 22 days in the Don Jail before being interim released. He has fully complied with the conditions of his recognizance during the almost 40 months he has been on bail. He has also made dozens of court appearances during this time. Counsel agree that the offender's plea, while hardly entered at the first opportunity, reflects the culmination of a very early indication to the Crown that the matter would be resolved without need of a preliminary inquiry or trial.

(b) The Offender

[7] The offender was born in Portugal but immigrated to Canada with his parents when he was about six months old. He was 47 at the time of his arrest. He had a "normal" upbringing and remains close with his now retired parents. The offender's marriage ended about a decade ago, but he maintains an amicable relationship with his former wife, provides child support of approximately $1,000 a month and visits his children, now 18 and 15, once a week. The offender has been lawfully employed throughout his adult life. He operated a bakery with a cousin for six years after leaving high school. He then opened and managed a bar and, following its closure in 2007, he worked as a dry-waller until his arrest. Currently, the offender works fulltime as an assistant framer with a carpentry firm where he earns $17 an hour.

[8] Other than some youthful experimentation with cannabis, the offender has never used drugs. He consumes alcohol only occasionally. He appears to have no history of other dependencies, mental illness or trauma. As already noted, he has no criminal record other than that arising from the events that bring him before me, and he has apologized to the court for his criminal conduct. The author of a pre-sentence report (PSR) characterized the offender as:

… suitable for community supervision on the basis that he is a first offender, regrets his involvement in the offences, appears to have "learned his lesson" since arrest on January 21, 2009 and expresses willingness to comply with any conditions of community supervision, if granted such.

Of course, such "suitability" is only one of many factors I must address in determining the appropriate sentence in this case.

[9] The PSR reports that the offender rationalized his involvement in drug trafficking as an effort to help his then drug-dependent girlfriend "so she wouldn't get sick". While his infatuation with his girlfriend (from whom he is now separated) and catering to her addictions may help explain the offender's initial involvement in the illicit drug trade, defence counsel realistically concedes that, in the end, the offender's primary motivation had much more to do with profit than altruism. Put otherwise, this was a decidedly commercial operation.

C. ANALYSIS

(a) Introduction

[10] Persons, such as the offender, found guilty of persistent trafficking in "hard" drugs can expect to attract severe punishment. While every sentence must reflect the individual circumstances of both the offences and the offender, possession for the purpose of trafficking in the amounts of dangerous drugs involved in this case usually results in a substantial period of incarceration and, on more than few occasions, a penitentiary-length sentence of two years or more.

[11] Given the offender's otherwise unblemished background, Crown counsel allows that a maximum reformatory length sentence (that is, one of two years less a day) meets the sentencing goals in this case. A conditional sentence (that is, a sentence of imprisonment of the same or lesser duration but served in the community, usually under "house arrest" conditions, rather than through incarceration) would, she says, fail to honour the here-paramount principles of deterrence and denunciation. In the alternative, were I to sanction a conditional sentence (as urged by the defence), she asks that I craft a "blended" sentence that includes elements of both "true" incarceration and imprisonment under community supervision.

[12] Sentencing involves more craft than science. It is ultimately a fact-driven exercise that is sensitive to the circumstances that define each offender and his or her crimes. While parallels, parity and precedent are important, there are very few cases that can be said to be factually identical.

[13] The variety of considerations that factor into sentence calculation, and the weight that may be variously attributed to them, inevitably generate a spectrum of legally appropriate dispositions. A fit sentence is one that observes the purposes, objectives and principles of sentencing, as set out Part XXIII of the Criminal Code and as complimented by the common law. The goals of denunciation and deterrence are principal considerations in cases, as here, involving the distribution of significant amounts of "hard" drugs. Rehabilitation, although always a consideration, is of reduced immediate concern given the absence of any identified dependencies or treatment needs and the offender's apparent return to pro-social conduct following his release on bail. However, the principles of totality, parity, restoration and restraint must still be observed, as must, especially, the fundamental principle of sentencing, that of proportionality to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender's responsibility.

[14] As to the proportionality principle, I assign a relatively high degree of moral blameworthiness to the offender. He is a mature man. He is not an "addict-trafficker". His harmful conduct was the product of a conscious and continuing choice to traffic in illegal drugs. Those drugs – particularly cocaine and heroin – are further aggravating as appellate courts routinely characterize them as insidious substances that harm those who use them, their families and their communities by compelling those addicted to them to commit ancillary crimes to finance their dependencies.

[15] The personal and community problems associated with hard drug consumption give rise to profound social policy concerns. Cogent arguments have long been advanced in favour of a predominantly public health response model. However, Parliament's historical preference for a strategy of criminalization has survived challenge as a lawful exercise of its criminal law authority under the division of powers doctrine. Whether or not the current social control methodology is a contributing factor, what cannot be gainsaid is the devastating social damage that flows from the unregulated trafficking in addictive drugs. (For judicial acknowledgement of the consequences of such trafficking, see, by way of examples only, R. v. Pearson (1992), 77 C.C.C. 124 (S.C.C.), at para. 60; Pushpanathan v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, esp. at paras. 83-106; R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.), esp. at para. 8; R. v. Hamilton (2004), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 104; R. v. Daya, [2007] O.J. No. 3865, at para. 18; R. v. DaSilva, [2004] O.J. No. 4808 (C.A.), at para. 30; and R. v. Nguyen, [1996] O.J. No. 2593 (C.A.), at para. 9.) Measured by indicia of personal and social harm, there is little to distinguish cocaine from heroin or, for that matter, from medically unsupervised use of pharmaceutical opioids such as Oxycodone. Prohibited hallucinogens such as "Ecstasy", which also formed part of the offender's pharmacopeia, have their own not insignificant potential for harm.

[16] Much of both counsels' submissions pivoted on a single case, R. v. Paper, 2010 ONCJ 88, [2010] O.J. No. 1131 (C.J.), a decision of my colleague Justice Beverly Brown. Paper involves the sentencing of a woman who, as in the instant case, distributed a broad array of prohibited substances from her apartment. Brown J. imposed an effective sentence of two years (that is, a minimum penitentiary length sentence) which thereby rendered Ms. Paper ineligible for a conditional sentence: see s. 742.1 of the Code and R. v. Fice (2005), 2005 SCC 32, 196 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). Brown J. also concluded that a conditional sentence was otherwise inappropriate. Crown counsel says that the commercial motivation and "drugstore"-like features of the case before me render it virtually "on all fours" with the fact pattern in Paper and urges me to follow Justice Brown's thorough review and cogent reasoning. Unsurprisingly, defence counsel is at pains to distinguish the aggravating factors in Paper from those pertaining to his client's predicament.

[17] Given the facts, as found, in R. v. Paper, I have no quarrel with Brown J.'s disposition of that matter – nor could I given the Court of Appeal's conclusion, by way of a brief Endorsement, that it was "not persuaded that [Justice Brown] erred in principle in the sentence she imposed": 2011 ONCA 56, [2011] O.J. 261, at para. 1. I do, however, find Paper materially distinguishable from the case before me. Even were the cases factually identical, I remain, respectfully, of the view that a fit sentence can be achieved without having to exactly duplicate the disposition carefully crafted by Justice Brown.

[18] The offender in R. v. Paper was clearly an intelligent and talented single woman of 33 who ran a "drugstore" commercial trafficking operation out of her apartment home. She was not an "addict trafficker" at the time of her arrest. She pled guilty to some eight counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in illicit substances, including powder and crystal methamphetamine, Oxycodone (and other prescription opioids), and various hallucinogens including ketamine, GHB, LSD and MDMA. In addition, seizures of unauthorized marihuana, hashish and a large amount of diazepam (Valium) were taken into consideration on sentencing. Some of these drugs, such as the methamphetamine and the opioids, have strong addictive properties. Those grounding all eight counts are potentially hazardous. As in the case before me, the amounts involved were not trivial: over two ounces methamphetamine, in total; over an ounce of ketamine; over 300 pills or tablets of the opioids, the LSD and the MDMA; and a very substantial amount, some 2.5 litres, of GHB (a potent sedative that is sometimes used as "date-rape" drug and more frequently as a "party" or club drug).

[19] Like Mr. Reis, a few weeks after her arrest Ms. Paper was released on a recognizance that required her, among other restrictions, to refrain absolutely from using or possessing non-medically prescribed drugs. Unlike Mr. Reis, Ms. Paper did not comply with this critical bail condition. Indeed, she commenced using heroin while on bail, became at least moderately dependent and sought treatment at a clinic. Inconsistencies in the information she provided that clinic and the court through her pre-sentence report led Brown J. to conclude that she did "not find Ms. Paper to be a credible or reliable reporter in relation to her past drug use". Brown J. also found that, other than her guilty plea, Ms. Paper displayed "a total lack of remorse", that she had little if any insight into the significance or potential harm of her criminal conduct, and that her expressed regrets were "self-centered". Even were an effective reformatory length sentence appropriate (which, Brown J. concluded, it was not), a conditional sentence, she reasoned, ought not to be imposed given Ms. Paper's demonstrated non-compliance with court orders and the risk to public safety were Ms. Paper to return to drug dealing while under house arrest.

[20] Unlike the Paper case, Crown counsel here joins the defence in proposing a reformatory length disposition and, thus, one at least theoretically amenable to a conditional sentence regime. Unlike Ms. Paper, Mr. Reis, the offender before me, has no history of drug use or trafficking – either before of after the conduct that brings him to court. He has complied strictly with his bail conditions – including those prohibiting him from involvement with scheduled drugs – for almost three and a half years. While not as grandiose as that advanced by some other offenders, I accept Mr. Reis' apology. Further, any misguided effort to off-load some of his moral responsibility in his meeting with the author of his PSR was corrected through the candid representations of his counsel. Based on the evidence led at this hearing, I have no difficulty concluding that the offender is most unlikely to commit further drug-related offences, that he would comply with the conditions of a court-ordered community-supervised sentence and that, as result, there is little risk of danger to the public through the imposition of a conditional sentence.

[21] That, however, does not end the matter. As set out in s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, five pre-conditions must be met to decide an offender's qualification for a conditional sentence. The first four are clearly satisfied here: the offender's crimes do not involve "serious personal injury", terrorism or criminal organization offences; no minimum penalty attaches to the offences to which the offender has pled; the jointly proposed term of imprisonment is under two years; and, as I have just determined, the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving his sentence under house arrest. It is the final criterion that gives me pause. This last condition requires me to be satisfied that service of the sentence in the community "would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2" of the Code.

[22] There is no doubt that a conditional sentence may prove a fit disposition in many cases of drug trafficking or, as here, constructive trafficking. Depending, of course, on consideration of all the circumstances, cases in which an offender sells or offers a wide variety of potentially dangerous drugs are not excluded from eligibility for such dispositions. R. v. Dormevil, 2011 ONCJ 323, [2011] O.J. No. 2930, for example, is one "drugstore"-like prosecution in which I have imposed a conditional sentence. Significantly, the accused in that case was a youthful first offender who had overcome considerable odds, helped support his family, was involved in voluntary programs, enjoyed the support of his employer, family and community, and had returned to school where he was doing well while continuing to work part-time in a Montreal hospital.

[23] In the seminal case of R. v. Proulx (2000), 2000 SCC 5, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, the Supreme Court, at para. 113, provides a helpful approach to distinguishing between incarcerative and community-supervised alternatives when addressing the fifth condition precedent to conditional sentencing:

[I]n determining whether a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing, sentencing judges should consider which sentencing objectives figure most prominently in the factual circumstances of the particular case before them.

Applying this measure, in my assessment the prominent sentencing objectives in the case before me weigh in favour of an incarcerative disposition. I move now to explaining this conclusion. I then turn to the central remaining issue: the length of offender's imprisonment.

[24] For the reasons already developed, rehabilitation, one of the primary purposes of sentencing, is of reduced significance in this case. Specific or individual deterrence appears of equally diminished importance on the presenting facts: the offender has no prior history with the criminal justice system; he had more than a "taste" of jail before his release on a recognizance; he has been subject to and complied with strict bail conditions for a very lengthy period; and, as said in his PSR, he has "learned his lesson". His pro-social conduct since his release on bail more than three years ago lends credence to the probation office's assessment.

[25] While not the only considerations, the remaining sentencing themes – and those most often invoked in cases of serious drug trafficking – are general deterrence and denunciation. These objectives are often paired in the rhetoric of sentencing but they vindicate different social interests and warrant discrete attention on the facts before me. I first address the sentencing objective of general deterrence.

[26] Whereas specific deterrence is directed to the offender, general deterrence, as set out in s. 718 (b) of the Criminal Code, is intended "to deter … other persons from committing offences". As with the concept of "homo economicus" in the social science of economics, general deterrence is founded on a conception of humans as rational and narrowly self-interested actors who utilize available information about opportunities, liabilities and risk to maximize achievement of their subjectively defined goals. Homo economicus, as a model for human economic decision-making and related behaviour, has been widely discredited as an idealization far removed from the realities of everyday economic behaviour. As a rationale for efficacious sentencing, the theory of general deterrence has suffered a similar fate. (See, for example, the summary of the scholarly literature in Doob, A.N. and Webster, C.M. (2003), "Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis", in Tonry, M. (Ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Volume 30. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, at 143-195.) A unanimous Supreme Court expressed its own reservations in R. v. Proulx, supra, when it noted, at para. 107, that, "[t]he empirical evidence suggests that the deterrent effect of incarceration is uncertain". Nonetheless, the Court went on to say:

[T]here may be circumstances in which the need for deterrence will warrant incarceration. This will depend in part on whether the offence is one in which the effects of incarceration are likely to have a real deterrent effect, as well as on the circumstances of the community in which the offences were committed.

[27] Incarceration may well have "a real deterrent effect" in cases such as the offender's. His crimes were the product of rational risk-appraisal. They were not sudden, impetuous or provoked, nor were they driven by addictions, obsessions or psychological deficits. The offender's calculus of risk is little different from that rationally assumed by many others who engage in purely commercial drug trafficking. I addressed a similar issue (albeit in a very different factual context) in R. v. Pinnock, 2007 ONCJ 276, at para. 39; appeal dismissed, Feb. 15, 2008, Ont. C.A. (unrepd.):

One acknowledged problem with the theory of general deterrence is that many of those most in need of the court's lesson are unlikely to get the message. This critique loses considerable force in the case, as here, of crimes of reason – crimes of calculation and deliberation motivated by little more than the desire for [material] self-gratification. In these cases it is essential that those tempted to deviate from the law appreciate with certainty that their crimes will be appropriately sanctioned if they assume the penal risk of their misconduct. While the sentence imposed in any individual case may escape the attention of those contemplating criminal conduct, the repeated and, most importantly, consistent message of penal consequence will, over time, find its place in the matrix of risk assessment that goes into such criminality.

Put otherwise: the certainty of incarceration may well serve to deter rational, like-minded and mature others from pursuing similar schemes.

[28] On the facts of this case, a carceral sentence also better honours the sentencing objective of denunciation than does one served under house arrest in the community. Again, as said by the Supreme Court in Proulx, at para. 102, denunciation is "the communication of society's condemnation of the offender's conduct". This goal, where germane, can often (perhaps most often) be secured through a stringent conditional sentence. However, where, as here, the crimes are prevalent, protracted and calculated, and where their consequences risk substantial social jeopardy, some effective denunciatory statement is appropriate. Combined with the principle animating general deterrence, the role of denunciation persuades me that a sentence of incarceration is fit in this instance.

[29] The residual question, then, is how long a period of custody is required to serve these objectives while properly respecting the other salient sentencing principles. The short, if hardly quantitative, answer is: no longer than necessary to meet the goals of general deterrence and denunciation. This proposition flows from the principle of restraint or incarcerative minimalism developed at common law and now prescribed in sub-ss. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Code. Arguably, it is the fact of meaningful incarceration, more than its precise duration, which is here most important. This is not a case where an offender needs to be "separate[d] … from society" (s. 718 (c)) to protect public safety. The primary rationales for a carceral sentence are, again, largely symbolic or directed to others.

[30] Regard must be had to the nature and quantity of the drugs involved in determining the appropriate length of sentence. There is indeed appellate precedent, if somewhat dated, for the proposition that "trafficking in heroin, even in small amounts, will attract penitentiary time": for example, R. v. Turner, [2003] O.J. No. 685, at para. 3. However, in my view it would be grossly disproportionate to sentence a first offender who has pled guilty and demonstrated remorse and constructive social re-integration to a sentence of anywhere near that length in a case where, as Crown counsel concedes, the seized heroin would yield only six to twelve individual doses.

[31] The amount of cocaine, approximately two ounces, is much more substantial. However, the drug at issue is powder rather than crack cocaine, the latter being generally considered far more hazardous and addictive. Further, and at least in Toronto, the amount seized typically results in reformatory-length dispositions for first offenders, a reality Crown counsel effectively acknowledges by capping her proposed disposition at "two years less a day".

[32] In R. v. Woolcock, supra, the Court of Appeal, at para. 15, held that the "range of sentence for this type of offence appears to be 6 months to 2 years less a day", the cases at the higher end generally involving "either larger quantities of narcotics or offences committed while the accused was still on probation for a similar offence". On appeal, the Court in Woolcock reduced the sentence of two years less a day imposed at trial for the offence of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking to 15 months. The case involved an investigation into an ongoing commercial operation from a residential address that culminated in the seizure of approximately a quarter-ounce of crack cocaine. At the time, the offender was a non-addict commercial trafficker of 51 years of age with two prior drug convictions.

[33] The Court of Appeal, R. v. Speziale (2011), 2011 ONCA 580, 107 O.R. (3d) 447, has very recently re-affirmed this range of sentence in a case involving more grievous circumstances than the one immediately before me. Of some noteworthiness, the Court's decision in Speziale followed its dismissal of the appeal brought in R. v. Paper. More importantly, while the Court of Appeal's review of the trial decision in Paper is recorded in a three paragraph "Endorsement", that rendered in Speziale is a considered judgment of a very experienced panel of the Court rendered some nine months after the hearing of the appeal.

[34] The facts in Speziale, as with any precedential authority, are of importance in endeavouring to draw comparisons. The 25-year-old offender in that case was found guilty after a trial of possession of more than a half-ounce of cocaine and a relatively small amount of MDMA (ecstasy). His apartment contained drug distribution paraphernalia, debt lists and evidence of crack manufacture. He appears to have had a "drug problem", although its nature or history is otherwise unaddressed and it plays little role in the Court's determination of a fit sentence. The offender had amassed a prior criminal record for weapons offences and crimes of property, theft and violence. The trial judge found that he "was part of a high level drug business" and the Court of Appeal recognized that the offender was convicted of "a very serious offence". While on bail, the offender had been convicted of three additional crimes: two breaches of his recognizance and a further drug offence. He had assisted the police after his arrest and the trial judge took this into consideration in sentencing the offender to what she viewed as the low end of the appropriate range: a penitentiary sentence of five years for constructive trafficking in cocaine. The Court of Appeal did not expressly factor Mr. Speziale's co-operation with the police into its decision to reduce his sentence by more than 75%, decreasing the five years of incarceration imposed at trial to time served: some 14 months and 9 days. The Court recognized, at para. 24, that a fit sentence was "within the range of a reformatory term". Ultimately resting its decision on the principle of proportionality, the Court concluded, at para. 26, that the five-year sentence imposed at trial "for the small amount of cocaine involved in this case is not proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender".

[35] Given the additional aggravating factors in R. v. Speziale, I do not place great weight, for sentencing purposes, on the differential between the amounts of cocaine involved here and in that case. No evidence was led as to Mr. Reis's station or role in a drug distribution hierarchy. The weight of the seized cocaine is materially less than the pounds and even half- and quarter-pounds involved in some other sentencing precedents to which I have turned for guidance. While other drugs besides cocaine and heroin were seized from Mr. Reis, these two substances are generally regarded as the most potentially dangerous and it is clear from counsels' submissions that they, rather than any of the other drug seizures, drive the debate as to the quality and duration of sentence. Further, given that the three offences arise from the same transactions counsel rightly agree that concurrent sentences are here appropriate.

[36] Each sentencing decision is ultimately a product of its own unique facts. That said, the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Woolcock and Speziale provide authoritative direction as to the appropriate quantum of sentence in the case at bar. Even granting mitigative weight to Mr. Speziale's police assistance (a matter of no express moment to the Court of Appeal's determination of a fit sentence), there is no real moral equivalence between his circumstances and those that define the seemingly reformed, first-offender who pled guilty before me. In my view, the appropriate effective global sentence here is one of 12 months. This is the sentence I would have imposed for the offence of constructive trafficking in cocaine but for the offender's 22 days of pre-sentence custody to which I assign one month of credit on the basis of lost remission. (See s. 719 of the Code and R. v. Johnson (2011), 2011 ONCJ 77, 268 C.C.C. (3d) 423 (O.C.J.).) Accordingly, that 12-month sentence is thereby reduced to 11 months going forward from today's date. I note that but for the wide variety of drugs involved and the evidence of frequent and persistent trafficking at the door of his apartment, I may well have been inclined to impose a materially reduced sentence.

[37] The offender is sentenced to eleven months of imprisonment for the two other offences to which he pled. These latter sentences are concurrent to each other and to that respecting the cocaine offence. This term of imprisonment is to be followed by concurrent probation periods of one year, subject to the following terms:

• Keep the peace and be of good behaviour;
• Complete 80 hours of community service at the direction of the probation office;
• Report forthwith following release from custody to the probation office and thereafter as directed until such time as the community service order is satisfactorily completed.

As should be clear, an important function of this probation order is to ensure that Mr. Reis provides some measure of reparation for harm caused to the community. Given the probation office's assessment of the offender's "suitab[ility] for community supervision", I am confident that Mr. Reis will honour this directive.

[38] Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Reis is prohibited from possessing the weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other offensive devices listed in that provision for a period of ten years. Given the circumstances of the offence and Mr. Reis' otherwise unblemished record and apparent reform in the years since his arrest, my balancing of the appropriate personal and societal considerations leads me to decline ordering that he provide a sample of his bodily substance for purposes of DNA testing.

D. CONCLUSION

[39] As set out in my Reasons, Mr. Reis is sentenced to a further 11 months incarceration, concurrent, for each of the three offences to which he pled guilty, to be followed by concurrent one-year terms of probation. A weapons prohibition order completes this disposition.

[40] Given the inevitable adverse impact of the sentence on Mr. Reis' financial situation, I waive the victim fine surcharge in this case.

Released on June 12, 2012

Justice Melvyn Green