Divisional Court

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board refusing to grant an extension of time to request a review of an earlier order.

The earlier order awarded the respondent tenant compensation for lost property and rent abatement following an eviction without notice.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice because he did not receive notice of the hearing, as the documents were served on his paralegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that service on the legal representative was proper under the Board's Rules and the Board's refusal to extend time was reasonable.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a costs order of $30,000 awarded against them following their unsuccessful motion to vary a Mareva injunction.

They argued that the motion judge erred by not providing written reasons for the costs award, particularly after receiving their late submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions requiring written reasons for costs awards under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, as the record disclosed a proper basis for the judge's exercise of discretion.

The applicant, an OPP officer facing workplace misconduct proceedings, brought an application for judicial review seeking to quash or stay the proceedings.

He argued that the disciplinary process under the Police Services Act violated his rights under sections 7 and 11 of the Charter by failing to provide an independent and unbiased tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that section 11 applies only to criminal matters, not employment discipline, and that section 7 is not engaged because there is no constitutional right to practice a profession unfettered by regulatory rules.

The court also declined to order the police association to fund the applicant's legal counsel.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing her application for $200,000 in damages for substantial interference with quiet enjoyment and harassment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was fact-driven and raised no issue of law.

The court also dismissed the landlords' request for a vexatious litigant order, noting that such an application must be brought before a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles under the Boundaries Act regarding the eastern boundary of her property.

The Deputy Director found that the boundary was the western shore of Three Mile Lake, rejecting the appellant's claim that her property included land on the eastern shore.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found that the Deputy Director's reliance on the original plan and patent, rather than other extrinsic evidence, was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal from a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, the appellant sought partial indemnity costs of $12,367.42.

The Board argued that no costs should be awarded against it due to its role as an administrative tribunal.

The Divisional Court held that because the Board took an active, adversarial role on the appeal, an award of costs was appropriate.

Finding the claimed amount excessive, the Court fixed costs at $5,000 all inclusive.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination, harassment, and reprisal against her former employer, a law firm where she articled.

The applicant alleged she was terminated due to her disability after the firm discovered she had failed her first year of law school and requested her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision to be reasonable, upholding findings that the request for the transcript was not discriminatory, disability was not a factor in her dismissal, and there was no harassment or reprisal.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination against a university.

The adjudicator had dismissed the complaint under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had an outstanding civil action against the university regarding the same essential factual content—the inclusion of a failed academic year on her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 34(11) to be reasonable, confirming that the provision requires an applicant to choose between the Tribunal and a concurrent civil action at the time the application is filed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring her to pay $26,232.53 owing on a small business line of credit to the respondent bank.

The appellant argued that the bank had verbally promised not to close the account, that the bank treated her unfairly due to her disability, and that the rules of civil procedure violated her Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank had a contractual right to demand repayment, the requirements for promissory estoppel were not met, and the Charter does not apply to private corporations or provide a defence to a legal debt.

Following the settlement and abandonment of an application for judicial review regarding the Crown's duty to consult, the interveners and the respondent Ontario Power Authority sought costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the requests for costs.

The court held that interveners typically do not receive costs and that imposing costs on First Nations in disputes concerning constitutional rights and reconciliation would inappropriately deter such claims.

The court also denied costs to the Ontario Power Authority, noting it played a secondary role and the Crown itself did not seek costs.

The appellant brought a proposed class action against her former lawyer and his firm, alleging they took unauthorized fees, failed to obtain required court approval, and charged illegal interest rates on disbursements under invalid contingency fee agreements.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding the common issue and preferable procedure criteria were not met.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and certified the class proceeding, finding the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the Solicitors Act and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to address the common issues.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its motion to compel the respondent to seek answers and documents from its non-party insurers regarding their participation in a class action settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the request was overbroad and tantamount to requiring an affidavit of documents from a non-party.

The court held that the proper procedure for seeking such extensive production from non-parties is a motion under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed her motion for financial disclosure prior to a first case conference.

The respondent disputed the existence of a spousal relationship and argued he had no obligation to provide financial disclosure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that there was no urgency and that the disclosure issue should be addressed at the case conference.

The plaintiff sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a summary judgment decision that denied his claim for damages in lieu of bonus payments following his wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff's counsel had inadvertently missed the appeal deadline due to a misunderstanding of the rules.

Applying the test for extending time, the court found that the plaintiff had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay was reasonably explained by solicitor error, there was no prejudice to the defendant, and the proposed appeal had sufficient merit.

The court granted the extension of time and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The applicant, a Chartered Professional Accountant, sought judicial review to quash the respondent's decisions to investigate him and issue allegations of professional misconduct for failing to cooperate.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and breached natural justice by refusing to identify the complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature to intervene before the administrative process concluded and holding that the applicant had a duty to cooperate with the investigation.