Employment and Labour Law - ODC

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim for damages for constructive dismissal and unpaid wages against her former employer.

The trial judge found she was constructively dismissed but that her employment contract governed the notice period, which she had received.

The trial judge also found she had abandoned her claims for unpaid wages during the trial.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had abandoned her claims for specific monetary compensation, as she presented no documentary quantification and explicitly stated she was not expecting compensation for them.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 for breach of contract.

The central issue was the interpretation of a termination provision in their memorandum of understanding, which required one year's notice.

The appellants argued the notice was conditional on an agreement with the Toronto District School Board (TDSB).

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that the one-year notice requirement was not a condition precedent dependent on a TDSB agreement, but rather a commercially reasonable term.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing his wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge had found that the appellant abandoned his employment by failing to return to work, failing to provide medical documentation for short-term disability, and relocating to another province.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant abandoned his position after 8.5 months of absences and warnings.

The court also upheld the finding that the employer had no independent duty to accommodate beyond its short-term disability plan.

The applicant's employment was terminated and his union took the matter to arbitration.

After an inordinate delay, the arbitrator ordered reinstatement but denied compensation for lost wages.

The union, relying on legal advice, declined to seek judicial review of the award.

The applicant sought standing to bring his own application for judicial review, which was denied by a motions judge.

On a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to vary that decision, the court dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the applicant did not fall within any of the exceptions to the rule of union exclusivity.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed her claims for wrongful dismissal and age discrimination, but awarded her 23 weeks' notice under a 1998 employment contract.

The appellant argued that a 2011 contract, though void for lack of consideration, successfully rescinded the 1998 contract, or alternatively, that the 1998 termination clause was ambiguous.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the 1998 contract remained valid and its termination clause was unambiguous.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the motion judge's $15,000 costs award to the respondent, varying it to no costs due to the mixed success of the parties.

The employer appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the employee $25,000 for wrongful dismissal.

The employee was terminated for cause following a workplace altercation over a bagel, for which she had already been suspended.

The Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in failing to consider the enforceability of the employment contract's termination clause, but found the clause void for potentially violating the severance provisions of the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer lacked just cause for termination and that dismissing the employee after she had already served a suspension for the same incident constituted double jeopardy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed decisions of the Financial Services Tribunal ordering a partial windup of its pension plan following a plant closure.

The Tribunal found that a reorganization had occurred prior to the closure and included employees laid off during that period in the windup group.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's determination that a reorganization occurred and its definition of the windup group were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the Tribunal's jurisdictional rulings regarding the Superintendent's authority.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class proceeding for unpaid overtime on behalf of approximately 7,800 employees.

The defendants argued the certification decision conflicted with appellate authority regarding systemic practices and misclassification.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the plaintiff had properly framed the case around a systemic policy rather than individual misclassification.

The moving party employer brought a motion to dismiss the responding party employee's application for judicial review for excessive delay.

The employee sought to review decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario made five years prior.

The court found the employee's explanation for the delay—that he pursued other avenues like the United Nations and Supreme Court of Canada, and did not know about judicial review—unacceptable.

Given the five-year delay, the statutory mandate for expeditious resolution of human rights disputes, and the prejudice to the employer, the court granted the motion and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against three Muslim employees by requiring them to taste pork, failing to accommodate religious holidays, and engaging in reprisals.

The applicants argued the Tribunal made unreasonable findings of fact, erred in its treatment of s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, and improperly ignored unsworn willsay statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's fact-finding was reasonable, the s. 45.1 argument was not raised before the Tribunal, and willsay statements of uncalled witnesses are not evidence.

The applicant union sought judicial review of three Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions that declared it no longer represented the employees of the respondent employer.

The union argued the Board unreasonably dismissed its allegations of employer interference without a hearing, relying on a continuing taint from a prior Board finding of interference three years earlier.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding it was reasonable for the Board to require the union to plead specific, proximate facts of interference rather than relying on the historical taint, especially since the statute does not impose a reverse onus on the employer in these circumstances.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his claim that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The union had refused to seek judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld the applicant's termination for insubordination and time theft.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the union's decision was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision finding that the termination clause in the respondent's employment contract was void.

The clause provided for base salary during the notice period but excluded pension contributions and a car allowance, contrary to the minimum requirements of the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the clause was void and could not displace the common law presumption of reasonable notice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision regarding the interpretation of a collective agreement.

The issue was whether the agreement provided for 100% reimbursement for a psychologist's report diagnosing the grievor's child with autism, or if it was subject to a cap for psychological services.

The Board had relied on a clause in a subsequent Implementation Agreement that neither party had made submissions on.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable because it relied on a paragraph that, in context, only applied to routine eye examinations and had no relevance to the psychological assessment at issue.

The Board's decision was quashed and remitted to a differently-constituted panel.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions finding it discriminated against an employee by failing to accommodate her disability and ordering her reinstatement with damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions on liability and remedy were reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing an unfair labour practice complaint.

The union alleged the employer violated the statutory freeze period under s. 86 of the Labour Relations Act by reducing employee benefits after the applicant displaced the incumbent union.

The Board found that the employer's obligation was only to pay premiums to the incumbent union's trust fund, which became impossible upon displacement.

Applying the 'reasonable expectations' test, the Board concluded the employer's substituted benefit plan was reasonably comparable and did not violate s. 86.

The Divisional Court held the Board's decision was reasonable and dismissed the application.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision denying a retirement gratuity to a teacher who resigned following a criminal conviction for sexual assault.

The arbitrator found that under the collective agreement, the teacher did not retire 'for the reason of age' but rather because of his criminal conviction, and thus was not entitled to the gratuity.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding her interpretation of the collective agreement language to be intelligible, defensible, and within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant in a wrongful dismissal action sought to review a single Divisional Court judge's order dismissing her motion to admit fresh evidence on her pending appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to allow amendments to the statement of claim, finding the limitation period had expired and rejecting the appellant's argument that she was incapable due to mental health issues.

The Divisional Court panel held that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by applying the Palmer test to reject the fresh evidence before the appeal was heard on its merits.

The panel set aside the order, directing that the admissibility of the fresh evidence be determined by the judge hearing the appeal.