Administrative Law - ODC

The applicants sought to challenge Tarion Warranty Corporation's decision requiring security for potential 7-year warranty claims.

The applicants' registration had previously been revoked by a Consent Order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that Tarion's concern about the risk of major claims was justified and its discretion was exercised reasonably.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the agreed amount of $22,319.98.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application for judicial review, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court rejected the applicant's argument that he was a public interest litigant and applied the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs.

Costs were fixed in favour of the respondent on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $15,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant daycare sought judicial review of a Ministry of Education Director's decision refusing to approve its proposed supervisor.

The Director had previously revoked the supervisor's approval following an inspection.

When the daycare reapplied, the Director refused approval based on new, undisclosed concerns regarding absenteeism and past complaints that had not been raised as issues previously.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Director breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide notice of the case the applicant had to meet.

The matter was remitted to a different director for a fresh decision.

The applicant, a forensic pathologist, sought judicial review of a reporting letter issued by the Death Investigation Oversight Council regarding her complaint against the Chief Forensic Pathologist.

The applicant alleged that the Chief Forensic Pathologist abused his authority by interfering with her conclusion that a child's death was due to natural causes rather than abuse.

The Council investigated and issued recommendations to improve the death investigation system but did not recommend the Chief Forensic Pathologist's dismissal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Council is an advisory body, not a disciplinary tribunal, and its decision not to make findings of fact or recommend dismissal was reasonable.

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

The tenants appealed from interlocutory orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing that their notice of appeal automatically stayed the proceedings, including a review of an eviction order.

The Divisional Court held that section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 does not confer a right of appeal from an interlocutory order, and therefore the appeal did not stay the proceedings.

The court also found that the tenants were not denied procedural fairness, as they deliberately chose not to attend the review hearing.

The appeals were dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision interpreting the overtime provisions of a collective agreement.

The arbitrator had ruled that overtime pay was based on hours actually worked rather than scheduled hours.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's interpretation was logical, transparent, and justified by the wording of the collective agreement.

The court also dismissed a motion to admit fresh evidence, finding the evidence was already before the arbitrator and not essential to the decision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of Landlord and Tenant Board decisions ordering their eviction and payment of rent arrears.

The court had previously quashed the applicants' appeal of the same decisions.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and subsequently dismissed the application for judicial review as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding it to be an improper collateral attack on the court's prior final decision.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision reinstating a railway conductor who was terminated following a positive urine test for marijuana.

The employer argued the arbitrator unreasonably excluded an expert report on marijuana impairment tendered eight days before the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator reasonably exercised his discretion to exclude the late report to protect the integrity and fairness of the expedited arbitration process.

The Court also upheld the arbitrator's conclusion that a positive urine test, without corroborating evidence of impairment, did not establish a violation of the employer's drug policy.

The appellant, a licensed land surveyor, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of multiple acts of professional misconduct and revoking his license.

The misconduct included unauthorized billing, performing unnecessary research, and counseling a client to file a malicious complaint against a competitor.

Applying the standard of review from Vavilov, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Committee's findings of fact and mixed fact and law.

The court upheld the penalty of license revocation, noting the appellant's fundamental dishonesty, lack of accountability, and the need to protect the public.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a grievance arbitration award that substituted a thirty-day suspension for the termination of an employee.

The Divisional Court stayed the application as premature, noting that the arbitrator had remitted the matter back to the parties and remained seized of the issue of whether reinstatement was an appropriate remedy.

The court held that judicial review should wait until the final disposition of the remedy to avoid overlapping work and inconsistent decisions.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a psychological assessment, which the insurer denied on the basis that the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) applied.

At arbitration, the Arbitrator found the MIG unconstitutional under s. 15 of the Charter without making any factual findings about the applicant's condition or whether the MIG actually precluded his benefits.

The Director's Delegate overturned this decision, holding that constitutional issues cannot be decided in a factual vacuum.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review, affirming that the Arbitrator erred by deciding the Charter issue without a proper factual foundation.

The applicant police officer faced misconduct allegations under the Police Services Act.

He brought a motion for the hearing officer to recuse himself due to alleged bias and lack of jurisdiction, which the hearing officer dismissed.

The applicant then commenced an application for judicial review.

The Chief of Police moved to quash the application on the basis of prematurity.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and quashed the application, holding that judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions is only available in exceptional cases, which this was not.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her nine applications on the basis of delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant argued the HRTO failed to include all respondents she complained against.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to address why the HRTO's decisions were unreasonable and noting the HRTO correctly identified the named respondents.

The tenants appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board regarding the landlord's responsibility to maintain an elevator under s. 20 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Board was entitled to construe its home statute to consider the landlord's actions in the circumstances.

Finding no error of law, the court dismissed the appeal.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order continuing a Mareva injunction against them.

The injunction was largely based on information obtained by the plaintiff's counsel from the RCMP, which had received it from FINTRAC and US law enforcement.

The defendants argued this disclosure breached privacy laws.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's conclusion that the RCMP's disclosure of personal information to a private lawyer for a civil fraud action was authorized under the Privacy Act and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The court also found the tension between privacy and access to information to be a matter of public importance.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that approved ten minor variances for the responding parties' proposed home construction.

The moving party, a neighbour who had 'participant' status at the OMB hearing, argued the OMB's reasons were insufficient and failed to demonstrate it grappled with the issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the OMB's reasons were sufficient given the brief, uncontested expert evidence presented at the hearing.

In obiter, the court noted that a 'participant' at an OMB hearing likely lacks standing to seek leave to appeal.

The appellant, a city councillor, appealed a declaration that he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by failing to disclose a pecuniary interest in a municipal tax sale.

The appellant had expressed interest in bidding on a property and arranged to view it before formally submitting a bid through his corporation.

He did not declare his interest at council meetings where the property's sale was discussed prior to his bid submission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's pecuniary interest crystallized when he first became interested in purchasing the property, not when he submitted the bid.

The court found the saving provision for inadvertence or error in judgment did not apply and upheld the four-year disqualification from city council.

The applicant sought judicial review of a permit issued by the Minister of Natural Resources under the Endangered Species Act, which allowed for the disturbance of species at risk during the construction of a new bridge and parkway.

The applicant argued the Minister failed to apply the precautionary principle, improperly consulted experts, ignored relevant information, and was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision was a matter of public policy entitled to broad deference, the statutory requirements for consultation and opinion-forming were met, and there was no reasonable apprehension of bias given the Minister's political and legislative functions.

The applicants sought to stay an ongoing coroner's inquest into the deaths of a mother and two children in a fire, pending judicial review of the coroner's refusal to expand the scope of the inquest and call certain witnesses regarding social services in the Jane-Finch community.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test and dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured completing the inquest.