ODC 2018

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating the tenancy and ordering payment of rent arrears.

The tenant had appealed the order, which automatically stayed the eviction, arguing she was coerced into the agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the tenant failed to obtain leave to appeal a consent order, raised no question of law, and brought the appeal solely for the purpose of delay to remain in the premises without paying rent.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) decision granting workers' compensation benefits to an off-duty paramedic.

The paramedic injured his bicep while assisting on-duty paramedics with a medical emergency at a music festival.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that WSIAT reasonably applied the 'place, time and activity' criteria from the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board's policy to conclude the injury occurred in the course of employment.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from an Ontario Securities Commission decision finding them guilty of securities fraud, the Commission and the intervenors sought costs.

The Commission sought $40,000, which the court awarded in full on a partial indemnity basis.

The intervenors, who were the appellants' former counsel and intervened to defend against allegations of ineffective assistance, sought over $53,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that the intervenors were entitled to costs as parties to the appeal, but reduced the scale to partial indemnity and fixed their costs at $20,000.

The appellant appealed an interim order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy and evicting him for rent arrears.

The appellant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because he had commenced a Superior Court action claiming a 50% ownership interest in the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine if the appellant was a tenant and to order eviction, as he was not a registered co-owner and no final court determination of co-ownership existed.

The Court also upheld the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment, finding no denial of procedural fairness where the appellant voluntarily chose not to attend the hearing.

The appellant appealed a final order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy and evicting him so the landlord could demolish the building.

The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by determining he was not a co-owner of the property, an issue he had raised in a concurrent Superior Court action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine if the appellant was a 'tenant' under the Residential Tenancies Act, which required assessing if he occupied the unit as a co-owner.

The Court held the Board's conclusion was reasonable and would not cause a multiplicity of proceedings, as the Board only determined legal ownership for tenancy purposes, leaving the Superior Court to adjudicate the appellant's claim for an equitable interest.

The applicant Employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reclassified the Employment Relations Officer position to a higher level.

The Employer argued it was denied procedural fairness because the arbitrator failed to bifurcate the hearing, depriving it of the opportunity to lead evidence on the proper classification level.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Employer should have known classification was in issue given the evidence and submissions presented at the hearing without objection.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of a private arbitration decision made under a LAWPRO policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application at the outset for prematurity and lack of jurisdiction.

The court noted that the proper route to challenge a private arbitration award is through an appeal or an application to set aside the award under the Arbitration Act, 1991, which must be brought before a single judge of the Superior Court.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion to set aside a legal ruling made by a motion judge who had dismissed its motion for summary judgment.

The underlying appeal had already been heard and dismissed, rendering the current motion moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, noting the lack of an adversarial context, judicial economy concerns, and the fact that the applicant was seeking a broad declaration rather than overturning an order.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a director's delegate's decision dismissing his request to vary or revoke a previous arbitration award that denied him statutory accident benefits.

The applicant argued that new medical reports diagnosing a traumatic brain injury constituted fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the director's delegate reasonably concluded that the evidence could have been obtained with reasonable diligence and, in any event, did not address the functional eligibility criteria required for the benefits sought.

The University of Ottawa brought a motion to set aside a decision finding that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction to hear an application for judicial review brought by the Association of Professors of the University of Ottawa.

The Association sought to challenge the compensation paid to two non-unionized employees, arguing it violated wage restraints under the Broader Public Sector Accountability Act, 2010.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and quashed the application, holding that the compensation decision was essentially a private employment matter lacking the requisite public law dimension for judicial review.

The appellant landlord appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding rent arrears under a commercial lease.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by failing to recognize personal indemnity clauses in the lease, improperly crediting the tenant for rent deposits despite the lease continuing with a new landlord, and mischaracterizing a claim for damages (interest on borrowed funds) as prejudgment interest.

The court increased the judgment to $13,791 and held the personal respondents jointly liable as indemnifiers.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Environmental Review Tribunal's decisions dismissing her application for leave to appeal an Environmental Compliance Approval granted to an adjacent asphalt plant, and refusing to reconsider that dismissal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal had carefully considered the applicant's submissions regarding zoning, noise, and past environmental breaches.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decisions were within the range of reasonable outcomes and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant children's aid society appealed a temporary order placing a newborn child in the care of the respondent parents subject to supervision terms.

The society argued the application judge erred by imposing terms irreconcilable with his findings regarding the mother's mental health and the father's prior criminal conviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the test under section 51(2) of the Child and Family Services Act and made no palpable and overriding error.

The Court also dismissed the society's motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the paternal grandfather's criminal record, applying a relaxed test but finding the evidence would not have affected the result.

The appellant, a minor, appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal denying her income support under the Ontario Works Act.

The Tribunal found that the appellant's grandmother, with whom she lived, met the definition of a 'parent' because she demonstrated a settled intention to treat the appellant as a child of her family.

The Tribunal also found no special circumstances existed to justify assistance.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that their long-term cabin leases were exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under the seasonal or temporary accommodation exemption.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable, as the cabins were permanent structures subject to 20-year leases and were used as secondary homes, not temporary vacation accommodations.

The court declared that the Act applies to the leases and that the appellants reside in a land lease community.

The appellant mother appealed an order directing the pre-trial sale of the jointly-owned matrimonial home.

She argued the sale would prejudice the best interests of her autistic child, who had lived there since birth.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh expert evidence confirming that moving would be a high-level stressor for the child.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard, the court found the motion judge erred in ordering the sale before the resolution of the Family Law Act claims, as it would defeat the mother's claims for exclusive possession and a vesting order.

The appeal was allowed and the sale orders were set aside.

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action against their investment advisors.

The action had been dismissed for delay after plaintiffs' counsel, who was suffering from severe health issues, failed to meet a set-down deadline and was unaware of the dismissal order for nearly two years.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master made palpable and overriding errors of fact by concluding the delay was deliberate and that the plaintiffs had abandoned the action.

Applying a contextual approach, the Court held that the minimal prejudice to the defendants was outweighed by the severe prejudice to the plaintiffs of losing their right of action due to their counsel's inadvertence.

The tenant appellants appealed an eviction order and a subsequent LTB order denying their request for a review.

The tenants had attended the LTB for their hearing but left during a lunch break because the elevators broke down, and they could not climb 18 flights of stairs due to a disability.

The LTB member dismissed their review request without a hearing, finding they should have telephoned the Board.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the LTB denied the tenants natural justice by failing to hold a review hearing to consider their evidence regarding their inability to participate.

The matter was remitted to the LTB for a review hearing.

The plaintiff was acquitted of murder following a 'Mr. Big' sting and sued the police for negligent investigation, as well as the Crown attorneys who provided legal advice to the police.

The police defendants cross-claimed against the Crown attorneys for contribution and indemnity based on negligent legal advice.

The Crown attorneys moved to strike the cross-claim under Rule 21.

The motion judge declined to strike the cross-claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that prosecutorial immunity applied to claims by police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the cross-claim, holding that Crown attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits in negligence arising from the exercise of their official functions, including providing legal advice to police during an investigation.