Konesavarathan v. City of Guelph et al, 2018 ONSC 2146
CITATION: Konesavarathan v. City of Guelph et al, 2018 ONSC 2146
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 579/16
DATE: 20180405
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Kiteley, Tzimas and Matheson JJ.
BETWEEN:
Kovarthanan Konesavarathan
Applicant
– and –
City of Guelph, Guelph-Wellington Local Immigration partnership and the human rights tribunal of ontario,
Respondents
Self-Represented
Jeffrey Aitkens, for the Respondent City of Guelph and Guelph-Wellington Local Immigration Partnership
James Schneider, for the Respondent Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
HEARD at Toronto: October 16, 2017
[1] The Applicant is seeking to judicially review the final decision[^1] dated November 10, 2016 of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) in which the Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dismissed the application pursuant to s. 34 of the Human Rights Code (the “Code”)[^2]. In its decision, made pursuant to a summary hearing procedure under Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal dismissed the application as having had no reasonable prospect of success. For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.
Background
[2] The Respondents are the City of Guelph (the “City”) and the Guelph-Wellington Local Immigrant Partnership[^3] (“LIP”). On January 23, 2015, the City advertised the position of Project Specialist, Immigration Partnerships with the LIP. After describing the duties, the posting listed the qualifications for the position as follows:
Experience related to the duties listed above, normally acquired through a degree or diploma in Social Sciences or related field and experience with community initiatives or in a related area. Candidates with an equivalent education and experience may be considered.
Experience overseeing projects and the project teams ensuring they are on track and completed on time.
Intermediate skills in Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook).
Excellent customer service skills with the ability to develop positive relationships with local partners.
Leadership and interpersonal skills to facilitate meetings and the ability to work collaboratively with community stakeholders and volunteers.
Knowledge of community resources, organizations, and businesses.
Commitment to issues in immigration and inclusion work.
Knowledge of immigration issues and challenges.
Excellent oral and written communication skills with the ability to prepare reports and make presentations.
Excellent organizational skills with the ability to work on multiple assignments and meet deadlines.
Ability to analyze data and prepare reports.
Ability to develop programming and communication strategies for immigrants and newcomers.
Experience with grant writing proposals an asset.
Lived immigration experience will be considered an asset.
[3] The Applicant had been involved with the LIP as a volunteer. Before the February 8 deadline, the Applicant applied for the position by providing his resumé and a covering letter. He was not invited to interview for the position.
[4] In about mid April, 2015, the Applicant contacted the City of Guelph Human Resources (HR) about the position. In response, Alex Goss, Project Manager for the LIP responded by email indicating that he was following up given the Applicant’s connections and contributions with the LIP. He confirmed that interviews had been completed. Goss offered to meet with the Applicant to discuss his application and some of the reasons why he was not offered an interview.
[5] In his email dated April 17, 2015, the Applicant noted that he wanted to separate himself from his LIP involvement when dealing with the issue and asked that he be considered as an outsider of LIP. He indicated he wanted to analyze how fair the City recruitment process is especially when it is related to immigrants’ issues.
[6] In another email dated April 17, Goss provided a link to the City of Guelph website about applying for city jobs. He had included Jeff Beaton in the email and described him as the staffing specialist at the City with whom he had worked throughout the hiring process. He repeated his willingness to answer further questions.
[7] In an email to Goss and Beaton dated April 19 the Applicant asked for a copy of the recruitment posting. He forwarded a link to the Human Rights Commission’s webpage and, on the basis of Section E that dealt with “making non-discriminatory hiring decisions” he asked them for the “non-discriminatory reason for not hiring” [him]. He also asked that in replying, Goss and Beaton “consider the competitiveness of the hiring process and explain the qualities that [he] lacked but all other interviewees had”.
[8] In an email dated April 22, 2015, Beaton provided the recruitment posting and wrote the following:
Your cover letter and resume were reviewed based on the qualifications listed in the posting that covered:
#1 – education and experience with community initiatives as well as experience related to the job duties listed in the posting (such as supporting committees, coordinating meetings, facilitating meetings, planning and evaluation, working with stakeholders, gathering and analyzing data and reporting on trends).
#2 – experience overseeing projects and project teams ensuring they are on track and completed on time.
Based on a paper screen of your resume and cover letter we recognized that you had the education and some of the experience listed in the 1st qualification from your various work assignments listed in your resume. However we did not feel you had the breadth of experience to be considered for an interview at this time. We also felt that you were not able to demonstrate the 2nd qualification about overseeing projects and project teams. While you have had some project experience listed on your resume we didn’t feel they were of similar nature to the requirements on this position.
The candidates that were selected for the first group of interviews we conducted have all met these qualifications in order to be interviewed by the panel.
I would say this was a fairly competitive process with some very strong candidates with specific experience in this area including experience working on other LIP projects.
[9] In an email dated April 23 to Beaton and Goss, the Applicant pointed out that there were 14 qualifications/evaluation criteria listed but in his email, Beaton had mentioned only the first two. The Applicant asked if they had used “any scoring system to evaluate all the qualifications/evaluation criteria listed in the recruitment posting”. He went on to point out that in his resumé he had described some of the projects in which he had been involved and that his listed management or project oversight experience was not Canadian. He asked if they had been looking for Canadian experience. And in reference to the qualification of “lived immigration experience” he asked if they had recruited an immigrant.
[10] In his email dated April 28, Beaton responded to the first question as follows:
Not for screening [i.e. they did not use any scoring system] – we screened resumes based on the comments in the previous email – education, experience and project management experience. Its more about if you have described that experience we then shortlist candidates for interviews which is when the rest of the all of the [sic] qualifications are assessed. We have set questions for all interview candidates and they are based on all the qualifications listed in the posting and candidates are scored on their answers.
[11] With reference to the projects in which the Applicant had been involved, Beaton responded as follows:
We didn’t see this experience as similar/breadth of project management experience we have in the candidates that were selected for an interviews [sic].
[12] And on the point of Canadian experience, Beaton wrote the following;
The manager aspect of what you did is understandable in your resume but the project management part is not clear in how you described your work in these 2 positions listed above – we can’t make assumptions in what you tell us.
Experience is experience – the country a candidate obtains it in does not matter.
[13] In response to the Applicant’s question about whether they had recruited an immigrant, Beaton advised that they had not finished the hiring process.
[14] There were 110 applicants for the position out of whom eight were selected for an interview. Four attended the interviews. The successful candidate was one of those interviewed and was an immigrant.
Application to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
[15] On June 22, 2015, the Applicant filed an application pursuant to s. 34 of the Code alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of race, colour, ethnic origin and/or place of origin. He alleged that he was not granted an interview for the position for discriminatory reasons. He also alleged that the job posting itself was discriminatory because of the reference to “Lived immigration experience will be considered an asset” contrary to s. 23 of the Code. In his application, the Applicant pointed out that the successful candidate was an immigrant which he believed might have been “the result of his pressure on the City which would otherwise have hired someone from the non-immigrant community”. His application consisted of three pages of his description of discriminatory events, emails and two articles from the Guelph Mercury including the one he wrote dated June 8, 2015. Attached to his application, the Applicant provided other emails starting with April 29 and ending with May 30, 2015 to which we need not make reference.
[16] In section 16 the Applicant listed “important documents” he had, that did not include his resumé and covering letter. In section 17, he listed the “important documents” that he sought from the respondents that included the proof that they “documented non-discriminatory reason for selecting or excluding a candidate for interview”, the credential information of the candidates that were selected for interview, the statistical information on the number of immigrants and non-immigrants who applied for the job and were called for the interview, the reasons that were documented for not selecting other interview candidates, the dates of the recruitment events, the composition of the selection and interview panel, the scoring record, the NOC code for the position and the documented reasons for not selecting him for the interview.
[17] The remedies the Applicant requested included monetary compensation in the amount of $30,000, that the City offer him a job that recognized his skills, education, experience and his passion in supporting the community with necessary accommodation, that the City provide him with a letter of reference recognizing his skills and passion in Developing Healthy Community and promoting Diversity and Equity in the Community, and extensive requests with respect to future compliance.
[18] After raising an issue as to whether the application ought not to include the LIP, the City filed a Form 2 Response on September 11, 2015 attached to which was the Applicant’s resumé and covering letter, a copy of the job position, and the City’s Harassment and Discrimination Policy. In section 15, the City listed “important documents” it had and that included the “Competition file” and “all notes and screening forms, as well as applications, in relation to the job”.
[19] On October 2, 2015, the Applicant filed Form 3 Reply to a Response that included a twenty page detailed paragraph by paragraph reply to the City’s Response and several exhibits.
[20] In a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated October 19, 2015 the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held to determine whether the application should be dismissed on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of success under the Code.
[21] In a notice dated November 18, 2015 the HRTO scheduled the hearing for February 9, 2016.
[22] On January 6, 2016 the Applicant filed a summary hearing brief that consisted of a 14 page analysis of the expectations at a summary hearing as outlined in Dabic v. Windsor Police Services.[^4] The Applicant quoted from five paragraphs of the CAD and noted that those points in the CAD made him believe that the Tribunal “did not pay adequate attention to the written submissions” in his Application and in his Reply.
[23] The Respondent did not provide a summary hearing brief.
[24] On February 2, 2016, the Applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings in which he asked to amend the Application to add to his claim “discrimination because of association with immigrants”. In an email dated February 5, 2016 the Tribunal indicated that the request would be considered if the application was not dismissed.
Decision of the Tribunal
[25] In a decision dated November 10, 2016 the Tribunal dismissed the application against the Respondents. In paragraphs 8 to 11, the Tribunal referenced the expectations in a summary hearing including: the Tribunal assumes the applicant’s version of events is true unless there is some clear evidence to the contrary or the evidence is not disputed by the applicant; the question is whether there is likely to be any evidence, or any evidence that may be reasonably available to the applicant, to connect the unfair treatment allegedly experienced by the applicant with the Code’s protections; to proceed to a full hearing, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show a breach of the Code; and the test of no reasonable prospect of success incorporates the concept of whether an applicant may be able to establish a prima facie case.
[26] In paragraph 15 the Tribunal quoted from the email dated April 22 in which the Respondent had answered the Applicant’s question as to why he had not been interviewed and the email dated April 28 in which the Respondent advised that only the first two qualifications were considered in the interview selection process and all 14 were considered in selecting the successful candidate.
[27] In paragraphs 16 to 18 the Tribunal noted the Applicant’s position that he did have the experience necessary for the position and that, if that was not clear from his application, it was because different job titles were used respecting his experience outside Canada. He had also argued that if he did not have the project management experience sought, that it was not a bona fide requirement and had been included to exclude individuals whose work experience was not primarily in Canada.
[28] The Tribunal analyzed the issues by answering three questions.
1. Did the interview selection process discriminate against the Applicant?
[29] The Tribunal considered the Applicant’s argument that the Respondents were only looking at job titles and did not look at the underlying competencies. In paragraphs 23 and 24 the Tribunal concluded as follows:
Furthermore, in order for the applicant to establish that the respondents disregarded the applicant’s relevant non-Canadian experience, the respondents would have to have been aware that he had the experience in question. As the specifics of the relevant experience were not set out in his job application, the respondents could not be aware that he had such experience. There is nothing overtly discriminatory about an employer basing its decisions on whether to grant interviews based solely on the information provided by the job applicant. See Thambipillai v. Toronto District School Board, 2012 HRTO 843 at para. 13.
For the above reasons, I find that the applicant has not been able to point to any evidence that would establish that his non-Canadian experience was disregarded in the hiring process.
2. Is the program management experience requirement bona fide?
[30] The Tribunal again referenced the email dated April 22 that indicated the primary reason given by the Respondent for not granting the interview was that he did not have sufficient project management experience listed in his cover letter or resumé. The Tribunal referred to s. 11(1) and (2) of the Code, on which the Applicant relied, and noted that the Applicant would have to be able to point to evidence that would reasonably support a finding under s. 11(1) before s. 11(2) became an issue. In paragraph 28, the Tribunal observed that the Applicant’s claim was based on the assumption that the Respondents were only considering individuals who had experience under the job title of “Project Manager” and yet he was not able to point to any evidence that would substantiate that assertion. In paragraph 30, the Tribunal held that the Applicant had not been able to point to any evidence that would support his claim that requiring project management experience was discriminatory.
3. Was the Reference to “Lived Immigration Experience” discriminatory?
[31] In paragraph 31 the Tribunal referred to the three reasons relied on by the Applicant. The first was that the criteria of “lived immigration experience” resulted in a misdirection to candidates in that, if the Respondent had said in the posting of the job that it would be considered only at the interview stage, he would have spent more time concentrating on his project management experience and may have been selected for an interview.
[32] In paragraph 33, the Tribunal held that there was no reasonable prospect that the Applicant would be able to persuade the Tribunal that the inclusion of “lived immigration experience” meant he had to include less information about his project management experience.
[33] The second reason was that the inclusion of “lived immigration experience” may have been made to limit the number of immigrants that would be given an interview, and to give an advantage to non-immigrants. However, in paragraph 35 the Tribunal indicated that the Applicant agreed that “lived immigration experience” was a legitimate asset for the position”. And in paragraph 36 the Tribunal pointed out that the successful candidate was a racialized person with lived immigration experience, a fact that the Applicant acknowledged although he took credit for it by having pressured the Respondent when he did not get an interview.
[34] In paragraph 37 the Tribunal held that the Applicant’s suggestion that the Respondent screened individuals out who identified as having “lived immigration experience” was simply speculation. In paragraph 38, he noted that the Applicant had not been able to point to any basis on which the inclusion of “lived immigration experience” as an asset disadvantaged him given that he had that experience.
[35] The third reason was that the reference to “lived immigration experience” constituted a breach of s. 5(1) and 23(2) of the Code. In paragraph 44, the Tribunal noted the reference to “lived immigration experience” indicated that individuals with such experience are more worthy and more desirable for the position. It held that there was no basis to find that the job posting constituted adverse treatment towards the Applicant as he had the characteristic being given preference. In paragraph 45 it held that there was no reasonable prospect of success that the Applicant would be able to establish that the posting discriminated against him under ss.5 and 23(1).
[36] The Applicant did not submit a Request for Reconsideration. Neither of the Respondents raised that as an issue.
Application for Judicial Review
[37] The Application for Judicial Review was issued December 1, 2016. The Applicant asks for the following relief:
(a) This Application for Judicial Review is allowed.
(b) The Tribunal’s Summary Hearing decision is set aside.
(c) The matter is sent back to the Tribunal for hearing before a different Tribunal member.
(d) Applicant receives his costs.
(e) This honourable court, in its supervisory role, observe all the procedural and other deficiencies of the Tribunal and make relevant findings and declarations so as to avoid similar problems in the future, in particular problems such as systemic oppression on the self-represented applicants by the lawyers and the Tribunal, provision of unfair procedures to self-represented applicants, making inconsistent decisions when the applicant is self-represented, lack of judicial impartiality and independence, favouritism to lawyer represented side, power abuse and reprisal attempts.
(f) Such further and other orders as the applicant may advise and/or this honourable court may deem just.
[38] In support of his application, he has filed an affidavit sworn March 9, 2017.
Issues to be addressed
[39] In paragraphs 8 to 23 of his factum, the Applicant identified the “General Issues” beginning with his statement in paragraph 8 that he is using “this opportunity to report about the Tribunal’s oppressive conduct towards [him] as a self-represented applicant”, his reliance on the lack of procedural fairness, his concern about apprehension of bias and oppression, and his concern about the scope of a summary hearing. In paragraphs 24 to 41 he identified the “Specific Issues”.
[40] For purposes of this application, the issues the court must address are these:
What is the standard of review?
Was the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the application reasonable?
Was the Tribunal’s procedure fair?
Preliminary Issue: Admissibility of affidavit sworn March 9, 2017
[41] Counsel for the Respondents took the position that the affidavit sworn March 9, 2017 is not admissible.
[42] In applications for judicial review of the decision of a tribunal, the tribunal is required to prepare a “record of proceedings” pursuant to s. 20 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act[^5] and s. 10 of the Judicial Review Procedures Act[^6]. The HRTO did file a record of proceedings. This court is required to rely on the record as it was before the HRTO. Affidavit evidence is only admissible in judicial review proceedings when necessary to show that a statutory ground of review is applicable or in the exceptional and rare circumstance where there is a complete absence of evidence on an essential point amounting to a jurisdictional error or to show a breach of natural justice that cannot be proved by mere reference to the record.[^7]
[43] The Applicant has not provided a basis for finding that exceptional and rare circumstances exist. For that reason, while we have received and read the affidavit, we do not rely on its contents with respect to the issue of the reasonableness of the decision to dismiss. As indicated below, it is addressed in the context of the procedural fairness issues.
Standard of Review
[44] The Applicant and the Respondents agree that the standard of review is reasonableness except for issues of procedural fairness. In Dunsmuir[^8], the Supreme Court held that certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. In judicial review, reasonableness is primarily concerned with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. In according deference, this court should analyze whether the outcome was within the range of reasonable outcomes in light of the facts and the law.
[45] To the extent that the Applicant raises procedural issues, he relies on the standard of review of correctness.[^9]
Legal Framework
[46] Pursuant to s. 39 of the Code, the HRTO has jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any application.
[47] The HRTO has a broad range of powers to permit it to adjudicate and resolve disputes and, pursuant to s. 40, the HRTO has authority to adopt practices and procedures that offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the application. Pursuant to s. 41, the HRTO has established Rules of Procedure including Rule 19A that provides for summary hearings to address whether an application should be dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success.
[48] As indicated in Shakes v. Rex Pak Ltd.[^10], to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in an employment context the Applicant is expected to prove that (a) the complainant was qualified for the particular employment; (b) the complainant was not hired; and (c) someone no better qualified but lacking the distinguishing feature which is the gravamen of the human rights complaint (i.e., race, colour, etc.) subsequently obtained the position. The Applicant pointed out that the first criterion had to be modified for the interview stage and he also submitted that Shakes may have been overtaken by Canada (Armed Forces) v. Canada (Human Rights Commission)[^11] where, in para. 28, the Court observed that:
It is now recognized that comparative evidence of discrimination comes in many more forms than the particular one identified in Shakes.
[49] For purposes of this decision, we accept the three factors above and agree that the first criterion must be adapted to reflect that the issue is arising from the interview stage not the offer of employment stage.
[50] In Peel Law Association v. Pieters[^12] the Court of Appeal held at paragraph 72 as follows:
. . . The question whether a prohibited ground is a factor in the adverse treatment is a difficult one for the applicant. Respondents are uniquely positioned to know why they refused an application for a job or asked a person for identification. In race cases especially, the outcome depends on the respondents’ state of mind, which cannot be directly observed and must almost always be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The respondents’ evidence is often essential to accurately determining what happened and what the reasons for a decision or action were.
[51] Rule 19A of the HRTO Rules of Procedure came into effect in July 2010. In Dabic and in Pellerin[^13], and dozens of cases since then, the HRTO outlined the initial and developing expectations for its application as summarized by the HRTO in this case. At a summary hearing, the Tribunal is required to assume that the facts as alleged by the Applicant are true; and while the Tribunal is permitted to refer to the submissions by the Respondent, the Tribunal must not rely on those submissions or make findings of fact against the Applicant unless there is some clear evidence to the contrary or the evidence is not disputed by the Applicant. If the Applicant is unable to point to any evidence beyond his own suspicions and beliefs that could reasonably be found to support his position, then the application must be dismissed on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success under the Code.
Analysis: was the decision to dismiss the Application reasonable?
[52] In oral submissions, the Applicant reviewed the decision in detail and commented on many paragraphs including the reference at paragraph 13 that “the facts of what occurred are largely not in dispute”. He insisted that most of the facts were in dispute, that the Tribunal did not assume that the facts he alleged were true; that the Tribunal referred to and relied upon “facts” put forward by the Respondent; that the Tribunal weighed the evidence and made findings of fact in favour of the Respondent; that he was required to put forward the evidence on which he relied without having access to the documents which he requested in his Application or to the documents listed in the Response and, importantly, without having the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the Respondent at a full hearing.
[53] The Tribunal did not make reference to the criteria in Shakes or to any other cases involving racial discrimination in the employment context. However, it is apparent that the Tribunal focused on the first of the criteria, namely whether the Applicant had the qualifications to be offered an interview. In order to meet that criterion, it is only the documents of the Applicant that are relevant: what he described in his letter of application and what he included in his resumé. As the Tribunal found, the specifics of his relevant experience were not set out in his job application and the Respondent could not have been aware that he had such experience. Those conclusions logically arise from the content of his job application and his resumé and the information he provided to the Tribunal during the summary hearing. The conclusion by the Tribunal that the Applicant had not been able to point to any evidence that would establish that his non-Canadian experience was disregarded in the hiring process was a conclusion that was available on the record before the Tribunal. To arrive at that conclusion, it was not necessary to consider the production of any additional documentation nor to consider potential evidence in cross-examination.
[54] The criteria in Shakes must all be met. Having arrived at the conclusion that the Applicant had no reasonable prospect of success is establishing the first one, it was not necessary to consider the second or the third criterion.
[55] The Tribunal did consider the Applicant’s allegation that the reference in the job posting to “lived immigration experience” was discriminatory. The Tribunal’s analysis of the three reasons relied on by the Applicant was sound and indeed, in view of the observation that the Applicant had that characteristic, there was no reasonable prospect of success that he could establish that the posting discriminated against him.
[56] The Tribunal did refer to positions advanced by the Respondent[^14]. However, the Tribunal did not make findings of fact that incorporated those positions. The Tribunal did not weigh the evidence nor adopt the positions taken by the Respondent.
[57] In the end, the conclusion of the Tribunal was that the Applicant pointed to his own suspicions and beliefs, not to evidence that could reasonably be found to support his position that the decision not to give him an interview was discriminatory.
[58] Questions such as those raised by the Applicant come before the HRTO routinely and attract deference on judicial review. We are satisfied that the decision to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19A was justified, transparent and intelligible and was within the range of reasonable outcomes in light of the facts and the law.
Analysis: Procedural Fairness
[59] As the Supreme Court held in Baker[^15] the content or level of the duty of procedural fairness is flexible and variable and requires a contextual analysis in each case to assess its adequacy. Flexibility is necessary when evaluating the requirements of the duty of fairness given the day to day realities of administrative decision makers.
[60] The Applicant asserts a lack of procedural fairness in many respects including: the Tribunal’s oppressive conduct towards him as a self-represented applicant; his apprehension of bias and oppression; his allegation that the Tribunal showed favouritism to lawyers over him as a self-represented litigant; and his submission that he was not given appropriate notice of what to expect at the summary hearing. In his affidavit sworn March 9, 2017 he referred at length to prior decisions made by the HRTO in connection with applications that he has brought. In his three volumes of books of authorities and “other materials for perusal” he has included copies of decisions made by the HRTO[^16]. That affidavit is largely argumentative but it outlines his grievances that he feels he is being unfairly treated by the HRTO.
[61] In what is referred to as the “recusal decision”,[^17] the HRTO noted that, at that point in February 2017 the Applicant had filed 13 applications; ten were moving through the Tribunal; five had been directed to summary hearing in which the Adjudicator had issued the C.A.D.; and three matters were before the Adjudicator including one where there had been five days of hearings. On November 10, 2016, the Tribunal had issued decisions dismissing two of the applications following summary hearing: the one in issue here, namely Konesavarathan v. Guelph (City) and Konesavarathan v. Guelph Mercury.[^18]
[62] The Applicant relies on various sections of the Code to support his position. In the preamble, the Code indicates that it is public policy in Ontario to create a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person so that each person feels a part of the community and able to contribute fully to the development and well-being of the community and the province. Section 34(1) provides that if a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order. The Applicant relies on these and other excerpts for his submission that discrimination is subjective. He asserts his belief that he has suffered discrimination.
[63] For purposes of this decision, we assume that all of the allegations on which the Applicant relies that are referred to in paragraph 60 above could constitute a lack of procedural fairness. Despite all of the material he has presented, the Applicant has not provided any basis on which this court would find that the Tribunal acted in an oppressive manner; that the Tribunal acted in such a manner that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias and oppression; that the Tribunal showed favourites to lawyers over him as a self-represented litigant; or that he was not given appropriate notice of what to expect at the summary hearing. The record does not reveal that he has been denied procedural fairness in relation to the decision challenged in this judicial review.
ORDER TO GO AS FOLLOWS:
[64] The application for judicial review is dismissed without costs.
Kiteley J.
I agree _______________________________
Tzimas J.
I agree _______________________________
Matheson J.
Released: April , 2018
CITATION: Konesavarathan v. City of Guelph et al, 2018 ONSC 2146
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 579/16
DATE: 20180405
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Kiteley, Tzimas and Matheson JJ.
BETWEEN:
Kovarthanan Konesavarathan
Applicant
– and –
City of Guelph, Guelph-Wellington Local Immigration partnership and the human rights tribunal of ontario,
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Released: April 05, 2018
[^1]: 2016 HRTO 1453 [^2]: R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19 [^3]: The City of Guelph took the position that the LIP was not a separate entity and it ought to have been removed as a Respondent. The Applicant did not agree and provided his analysis as to why the LIP was appropriately a Respondent. The Tribunal did not make a decision on that issue. For purposes of these reasons, I will refer to the LIP or the City without deciding whether the LIP is a separate entity. [^4]: 2010 HRTO 1994 [^5]: R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 [^6]: R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 [^7]: Keeprite Workers’ Independent Union v. Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980) 1980 1877 (ON CA), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 Ont. C.A.) [^8]: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick [2008] 1 S.C.R. at paras. 46-47 and 53 [^9]: Watterson v. Canadian EMU 2016 ONSC 6744 [^10]: 1981 4315 (ON HRT), 1981 CarswellOnt 3407 [^11]: 2005 FCA 154, [2005] F.C.J. No. 731 at para 8 [^12]: 2013 ONCA 396 [^13]: Pellerin v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud and Maryse Francella 2011 HRTO 1777 [^14]: paragraphs 15, 16, 20, 25, 35, 36 [^15]: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para 22 [^16]: Konesavarathan v. Guelph (City) 2016 HRTO 1453; Konesavarathan v. CPSO et al C.A.D. dated September 27, 2016 and 2017 HRTO 973; Konesavarathan v. University of Western Ontario et al, 2016 HRTO 908 and 2017 HRTO 1152; Konesavarathan v. The Ontarion Inc. 2017 HRTO 967; Konesavarathan v. Wellington-Dufferin-Guelph Public Health C.A.D. dated July 19, 2016 and 2017 HRTO 199; Konesavarathan v. Ontario Public Interest Research Group C.A.D. October 14, 2016; Konesavarathan v. Lutherwood [^17]: Konesavarathan v. Wellington-Dufferin-Guelph Public Health 2017 HRTO 199 [^18]: 2016 HRTO 1454. Application for judicial review heard by the Divisional Court November 1, 2017.