Court File and Parties

Citation: Renee v. Simonetti, 2017 ONSC 982 Divisional Court File No.: 685/15 Landlord and Tenant Board File No.: TSL-65647-15 Date: 2017-02-09

Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Divisional Court

Re: Dionne Renee v. Romolo Simonetti and Martha Crowley

Before: Nordheimer J.

Counsel: D. Renee, moving party/appellant in person S. Toole, for the respondent, Martha Crowley No one appearing for the respondent, Romolo Simonetti

Heard at Toronto: February 9, 2017

Endorsement

[1] Ms. Renee brings this motion for an order staying the order of Associate Chief Justice Marrocco, dated January 6, 2017, along with other relief including a stay of an earlier order of Sachs J.; a stay of different orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board; for various declarations; and for an extension of time to complete her motion, to set aside the Associate Chief Justice’s order, that would be returnable before a panel of this court pursuant to s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. This motion follows on an earlier ex parte motion that the appellant brought for similar relief, that I dismissed on February 1, 2017. At the end of the hearing, I dismissed this motion for reasons to follow. I now provide those reasons.

[2] The order of the Associate Chief Justice both refused to extend the time for Ms. Renee to perfect her appeal, and quashed the appeal. Ms. Renee had appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, made in September 2015, and confirmed in December 2015, that terminated Ms. Renee’s tenancy in residential premises, originally owned by Romolo Simonetti, but subsequently purchased by Martha Crowley.

[3] A stay order is a discretionary remedy. It is also an extraordinary remedy that should only be granted in clear cases. While this is not a request for a stay pending appeal, in the technical sense, it is analogous to such a request. In order to obtain such a stay, the appellant must satisfy the requirements for such an order that mirror the requirements for an interlocutory injunction, that is, that there is a serious issue; that irreparable harm will result; and that the balance of convenience favours a stay being granted: see, for example, Ontario (Commissioner, Provincial Police) v. MacDonald, [2008] O.J. No. 5053 (Div. Ct.) at para. 4.

[4] In my view, the appellant’s motion fails to satisfy any of those three requirements.

[5] First, the appellant sought an indulgence before the Associate Chief Justice by asking for an extension of time to perfect her appeal. By the time the matter came before the Associate Chief Justice, the appeal had been outstanding for almost a year. The stated reason for the extension of time, as reflected in the affidavit filed by the appellant, was that the appellant could not afford to pay for the transcripts, that she said were necessary for the appeal. The Associate Chief Justice refused to grant that indulgence. In doing so, he noted, in part, that the appellant had not paid any rent for the premises in the last fourteen months and that, if even a portion of those savings had been devoted to paying for the transcripts, the transcripts could have been prepared.

[6] Before me today, the appellant contends that, by the time of the hearing before the Associate Chief Justice, she did not need any extension of time, for that reason, because she could by then afford to pay for the transcripts because of monies that she had received from family members, and that she so informed the Associate Chief Justice. There is no reference in the reasons of the Associate Chief Justice to that fact nor could the appellant point to any evidence in the record she had prepared for this motion (which I note exceeded six hundred pages) that confirmed that fact. I have to deal with the matter on the record that I have, and as it appeared before the Associate Chief Justice, and not as the appellant might now like it to appear.

[7] Given that the Associate Chief Justice was exercising a discretion in deciding the issue that he did, I see little likelihood that a panel of this court would interfere his order. Consequently, I do not see how a serious issue is raised.

[8] However, even if that hurdle could be overcome, the appellant has failed to establish that she would suffer irreparable harm, if the order is not stayed. Assuming that the eviction order is enforced, and there is no evidence before me as to whether that is likely to occur before the appellant’s motion to set aside is heard, any harm that the appellant might suffer, as a consequence, is completely capable of being quantified in money.

[9] Finally, the balance of convenience does not favour the appellant. The appellant has now been living in the premises, without paying any rent, for more than fifteen months – a fact that the appellant confirmed before me. Any issues that she raises about repairs not done, or building orders not complied with, would have led, at most, to a rent rebate, but since the appellant has not been paying any rent, she appears to have obtained that remedy on her own. In any event, the appellant’s position, about issues she had with her prior landlord, ignores the fact that the property has been sold. The Landlord and Tenant Board terminated the tenancy agreement, and ordered the appellant’s eviction, because it was satisfied that the new owner of the premises required the premises for her own personal use. The balance of convenience tilts significantly in favour of the landlord, who requires the premises for her own purposes, and who has been denied that right for more than fifteen months, at the instance of a tenant who is not paying any rent.

[10] Finally, there is no basis, on a motion such as this, for the grant of any declarations of the type sought by the appellant nor is there any basis to stay the earlier order of Sachs J. that simply adjourned the appellant’s motion. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the appellant to complete her motion to set aside the order of the Associate Chief Justice, principally due to the fact that the appellant has not shown any reason why she needs the extension or why one should be granted in light of the history of this matter.

[11] It is for these reasons that I dismissed the appellant’s motion. The appellant will pay to the respondent, Martha Crowley, costs fixed in the requested amount of $1,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST. Approval of the formal order by the appellant is dispensed with.

NORDHEIMER J.

Date: February 9, 2017