CITATION: Jayaraj v. H.M.Q., 2014 ONSC 6367
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOs.: 382/14; 438/14; 439/14; 455/14; 467/14
DATE: 20141103
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: DAVID PRABAKAR JAYARAJ v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
DAVID PRABAKAR JAYARAJ v. THE ONTARIO JUDICIAL COUNCIL
BEFORE: NORDHEIMER J.
HEARD: Written submissions
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] On October 20, 2014, I directed the Registrar, pursuant to r. 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, to give notice to Mr. Jayaraj that the court was considering making an order dismissing five applications brought by Mr. Jayaraj on the basis that the applications could be the subject of an order under r. 2.1.01(1). An order may be made under that subrule if the court is of view that a proceeding is frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mr. Jayaraj was given fifteen days, from receipt of the notice, to file written submissions on these matters, not to exceed ten pages in total. Mr. Jayaraj actually filed his submissions the next day.
[2] Mr. Jayaraj submits that Rule 2.1 is “ultra vires, illegal, vindictive and a gross violation of constitutional rights”. I do not agree. Rule 2.1 simply reflects the well-established principle that a court has the authority to control its own processes and ensure that those processes are not abused. There is nothing unconstitutional about that authority. It is part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
[3] Turning to Mr. Jayarj’s five applications, they may be summarized as follows:
(a) In 382/14, the applicant seeks an order quashing the recent appointments of more than twenty persons as Judges of the Ontario Court of Justice and orders requiring that Ontario Court of Justice judges, Justices of the Peace, Crown Attorneys and Public Prosecutors only be appointed through written exams.
(b) In 438/14, the applicant seeks an order quashing orders issued by the Ontario Court of Justice regarding the release of recordings of court proceedings and other relief related to the protocols developed by that court and the Attorney General’s office regarding this issue.
(c) In 439/14, the applicant seeks an order that the Ontario Judicial Council conduct a formal public hearing into the applicant’s complaints regarding Chief Justice Bonkalo of the Ontario Court of Justice and other relief.
(d) In 455/14, the applicant seeks an order quashing s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43; staying the appointments of all juges to the Ontario Court of Justice; requiring appointments of persons as Justices of the Peace to be lawyers and only after a written exam and other relief.
(e) In 467/14, the applicant seeks an order quashing the appointment of all members of the Toronto Police Services Board; staying the promotion of all officers in the Toronto Police Service, directing the Toronto Police Services Board not to extend the term of the present Chief of Police and staying all proceedings in respect of the selection of a new Chief of Police; staying the appointments of all Chiefs of Police in the Province and staying the promotion of all officers in all police services in the Province and other relief.
[4] Each of these applications appears, on its face, to be frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process. In response to that concern, in his written submissions, Mr. Jayaraj makes various references to proceedings in the Supreme Court of India. It is not clear to me what relevance those references have to the issue that is raised here. Mr. Jayaraj also refers to a number of hypothetical events that might happen to him and that might then demonstrate an institutional bias on behalf of the judges of the Ontario Court of Justice. Mr. Jayaraj submits that, if he was to become involved in court proceedings as a result of one of these hypothetical events occurring, there would be a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of any judge hearing the matter because of what he asserts are their close connection to the “ruling political party”. Putting aside, for the moment, that Mr. Jayaraj does not provide any factual foundation for this asserted close connection, it is sufficient for the purposes of the issue before me to note that courts do not hear and determine hypothetical cases. Courts deal with actual cases based on actual events that have occurred. Mr. Jayaraj does mention a criminal offence that he was charged with but, if any of these issues arose in the context of that case, then they ought to have been raised within that proceeding.
[5] The contents of the applications filed do not demonstrate that the applicant has standing to seek any of the relief that is referred to in these applications. For example, there is no indication that the applicant has a matter currently outstanding in the courts that would draw into question the provision of s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act that prohibits the broadcasting of court proceedings or draw into question the policy regarding access to digital audio recordings of court proceedings.[^1] Nor is there any outstanding matter that would even theoretically give the applicant standing to question the recent appointments of persons as judges of the Ontario Court of Justice. Similarly there is no outstanding proceeding that could conceivably give rise to some basis upon which the applicant could purport to interfere with the promotion process of the Toronto Police Service or of appointments to the Toronto Police Services Board.
[6] Individual citizens do not have any inherent right to bring applications challenging government action on the basis that it is unconstitutional. In order to do so, a person must show that they have either a particular private interest standing or there are good reasons to accord the individual public interest standing. As D. Corbett J. observed in Landau v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 6152, [2013] O.J. No. 4443 (S.C.J.) at para. 16:
Being a citizen, resident, taxpayer, does not give someone private interest standing to challenge government action a person believes is unconstitutional. This is trite law.
Mr. Jayaraj also cannot satisfy any of the necessary requirements to be granted public interest standing: Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524.
[7] In the end result, it is clear that these matters are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process. Each of the applications is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
NORDHEIMER J.
DATE: November 3, 2014
[^1]: Mr. Jayaraj correctly points out that, in my earlier endorsement, I mistakenly referred to s. 140 rather than s. 136 on this point. Mr. Jayaraj had raised the validity of s. 140 in one of his applications.