ODC 2013

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering them to pay $25,000 to the respondents.

The respondents had loaned $35,000 to a deceased family member, and the appellants had signed a written acknowledgment to repay the loan from the proceeds of a house sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the action was not statute-barred due to the written acknowledgment and the date of discovery.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding of a constructive trust over the sale proceeds and concluded that the trial judge's interventions during the self-represented trial did not amount to bias.

The moving party husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed his jurisdictional challenge, struck his materials, and ordered him to pay temporary lump sum spousal support and costs.

He also sought a stay pending appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which properly found jurisdiction to order support under the Family Law Act despite a contested foreign annulment.

The motion for a stay was also dismissed as the RJR-MacDonald criteria were not met.

The defendant brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's appeal to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiff had appealed a Master's note in the procedure book that varied the cap on the defendant's counterclaim from $26,572.54 to $364,447.73.

The court found that the Master's note was an interlocutory step, as the merits of the case remained to be determined and the Master had not issued a confirmed report.

Under section 71 of the Construction Lien Act, an appeal from an interlocutory order is forbidden.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, Versailles Convention Centre, appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its $10,000 claim against the respondent for breach of contract regarding a convention hall booking.

The trial judge found the appellant's witness not credible and accepted the respondent's evidence that the parties mutually agreed to cancel the tentative booking.

The trial judge also found the cancellation clause to be an unenforceable penalty rather than a genuine pre-estimate of damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, concluding there was no reversal of the burden of proof and that the damages claimed were arbitrary and excessive.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding they contravened the Securities Act by trading in securities without registration or a prospectus, and by misrepresenting that the securities would be listed on an exchange.

The appellants argued the transactions were good faith loans exempt from the Act, and raised numerous procedural and fairness arguments including abuse of process, bias, and failure to disclose evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Commission's conclusion that the transactions were disguised sales was reasonable, and rejecting all procedural and fairness challenges.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding property tax arrears.

The respondent City of Toronto brought a cross-motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was brought in the wrong court.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that under the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a final order of a Superior Court judge seeking such relief lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The defendants/appellants moved for a stay of two requirements imposed by the trial judge pending their appeal: to develop a by-law amendment regarding new membership applications and to hold a special meeting to elect directors.

The trial judge had previously declared the admission of 23 new members and a subsequent meeting to appoint directors null and void due to bad faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the loss of the right to vote by the five appealing defendants at the next meeting would not result in irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured holding the election sooner rather than later.

The plaintiffs appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking their claim for harassment, malicious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The claim was based on statements made by the defendant to a Justice of the Peace during judicial proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that communications made during or incidental to judicial proceedings are protected by absolute privilege, which extends to all causes of action pleaded.

An allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias was also dismissed for lack of evidence.

The applicant, a payday lender, brought an application for judicial review challenging the validity of amendments to a regulation under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The amendments redefined the total cost of borrowing to include directly or indirectly connected amounts, required lenders to provide cash for unused balances on devices, and prohibited the sale of third-party services in connection with payday loans.

The applicant argued that the government breached its legitimate expectations by failing to provide a 45-day consultation period and that the amendments were ultra vires.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the exercise of legislative powers and that the amendments were intra vires as they aligned with the consumer protection purpose of the Act.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision allowing the respondent to proceed with her civil action for wrongful dismissal and unpaid wages.

The appellants argued the action was barred under s. 97 of the Employment Standards Act because the respondent had previously filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labour regarding the same matter.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding no complaint was filed.

The court admitted fresh evidence confirming the online complaint and held the civil action was statute-barred, declining to exercise inherent jurisdiction to extend the two-week withdrawal period.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons finding her guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence following the death of a patient who underwent high-volume liposuction.

The Committee found she breached standards of practice regarding extraction volumes, informed consent, and post-operative care, and that her website advertising violated regulations banning testimonials and superlatives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's findings on the standard of practice, its evidentiary rulings, and its conclusion that the advertising ban was a justified limit on freedom of expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

The penalty restricting her practice to acting as a surgical assistant in a hospital was also upheld as reasonable.

The appellant real estate brokerage appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for $17,850 in unpaid commission.

The trial judge had found the evidence of both parties lacked credibility and concluded that a side deal existed between the appellant's agent and the respondent, leading to the dismissal of the claim.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of review for findings of fact and credibility, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order adjourning the defendants' summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had adjourned the summary judgment motion to allow for discoveries to be completed, as the defendants had not provided an evidentiary record to support their limitation period defence.

The plaintiff argued the motion should have been dismissed outright for failure to put their best foot forward.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion to control the process.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal an interlocutory order that fixed costs at $5,000 and set aside stays of the action.

The defendants argued the motion was never argued and costs should not have been awarded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the award of costs is discretionary and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

Furthermore, the court held that the matter was not of sufficient importance to warrant an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action for a share of corporate cash receipts following a successful motion for non-suit by the respondent.

The trial judge found that the appellant had not pleaded the agreement, had released the respondent in a prior Superior Court action, and that any claim belonged to the corporation.

The Divisional Court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The tenant appealed an eviction order of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court found that the Board applied an incorrect or incomplete legal test by only considering the discretionary provision under s. 83(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, and failing to consider the mandatory provision under s. 83(3).

The Board had explicitly found that the landlord substantially interfered with the tenant's reasonable enjoyment, which could constitute a serious breach under s. 83(3).

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the same board member for reconsideration.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that ordered the return of $397,941 in disputed development charges to the respondent developer.

The developer had paid the development charges for two condominium towers based on the municipality's calculations before the building permits were issued, but the municipality later demanded additional charges for the second tower due to a phased rate increase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of the Development Charges Bylaw was reasonable and not open to substantial doubt, and that the case did not raise a point of law of sufficient general importance to warrant the court's attention.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motions judge's order certifying two class proceedings regarding the restitution of allegedly illegal lottery licensing fees.

The motions judge had certified all claims going back to 1990, including those that were prima facie time-barred.

The court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b), finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification order, particularly regarding whether a class proceeding was the preferable procedure and whether a sub-class should have been created for the time-barred claims.

The court also found the issues to be of general importance to the development of class action law.

The appellant commercial tenant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord damages for breach of a lease.

The trial judge found the tenant failed to leave the premises in a good state of repair, including failing to replace a broken HVAC unit and remove a mirror.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, deducting a 15% administrative fee that was not authorized by the lease for non-structural repairs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal and for a stay of an order removing her as executor and requiring her to vacate an estate property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it was not properly before the court because the underlying orders were final.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties.