Property Tax Assessment - OCJ

The appellant, Joseph Scott Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for destroying or harvesting prescribed trees contrary to a Haldimand County by-law.

The appeal challenged the trial Justice of the Peace's interpretation of the "own use" exception and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant also sought a reduced fine and restitution.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the "own use" interpretation and no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for costs, deeming the appeal not to meet the high threshold for a cost award.

The Corporation of the Town of Erin appealed a sentence imposed on Patricia Kentner for an illegal dumping/landfill by-law offence.

The original court imposed a $5,000 fine but declined a discretionary special fine, citing Kentner's diminished moral blameworthiness (her son was the operating mind), the principle of totality (remediation costs for GRCA charges), and crucially, the lack of accurate estimates for the landfill volume.

The appeal focused on whether the Justice of the Peace erred in declining the special fine, particularly regarding the application of the totality principle and the reliance on inaccurate estimates.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the original decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Justice of the Peace's finding that accurate estimates were lacking, which was the paramount reason for not imposing the special fine.

The defendant was charged with driving a motorized personal mobility device (described as a Segway-type device) on a roadway in contravention of City of Hamilton Bylaw 01-215, which prohibits riding on toy vehicles or similar devices on roadways.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that the bylaw does not apply to motorized devices because municipalities lack authority to regulate motor vehicles without express provincial authorization.

The device did not conform to definitions in provincial pilot project regulations for low-speed vehicles or electric kick-scooters, and the bylaw's enumerated devices were all non-motorized, indicating the city's limited jurisdiction over motor vehicles.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of charges against the respondents for unlawfully operating a public storage facility on four properties zoned Highway Commercial C3.

The trial justice found the by-law unclear regarding public storage and dismissed the charges.

On appeal, the court held that the by-law contained an overall prohibition on land uses not specifically permitted, and public storage was not enumerated as a permitted use in the C3 zone.

The court found the use was unlawful both at the time of purchase in 1988 and at present, therefore the defence of legal non-conforming use failed.

The appeal was allowed and convictions were registered.

The appellant, a company convicted of breaching a municipal zoning bylaw by stacking shipping containers to a height exceeding the maximum permitted height of 5 metres, appealed the conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The fresh evidence consisted of internet-sourced information regarding standard shipping container sizes.

The court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the evidence was available and discoverable at trial, the issue of container height was clearly foreseeable, and the appellant's legal counsel had been aware of and addressed this issue during trial.

The appellant's decision not to call evidence at trial was an informed tactical decision by counsel, and the appellant could not now introduce such evidence on appeal.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss charges for alleged violations of Town of Fort Erie By-Law 129-90 regarding the use of a public storage facility and cargo containers on their properties.

The defendants argued that the prosecution constituted an abuse of process because similar charges had been brought against them on multiple prior occasions that were resolved in their favour, and that the Town was therefore estopped from continuing the prosecution.

The court rejected the motion, finding no evidence of bad faith, discrimination, or vexatiousness on the part of the Town.

The court held that a prior dismissal in 2013 did not preclude the municipality from ongoing enforcement of zoning by-law violations, and that the defence of legal non-conforming use remained a matter for adjudication at trial.

The defendant was convicted on 56 counts of unlawfully removing, injuring, or destroying heritage trees without a permit contrary to the Town of Ancaster Bylaw 2000-118.

The defendant removed 56 heritage trees from the property at 558 Golf Links Road in Hamilton over a period of several days in July and August 2014.

The court imposed a sentence of $6,000 per count for a total fine of $336,000 and a two-year probation order with standard statutory terms and conditions.

The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the conviction should be stayed and that the Keinapple rule against multiple convictions should apply to reduce the sentence to a maximum of $10,000.

The defendant corporation was charged with using a property zoned for residential use as a commercial business in violation of the City of Hamilton Zoning By-law.

The court found that the defendant established a legal non-conforming use defense based on continuous commercial use since the property's original construction in the late 1940s.

The court also found ambiguity in the applicable zoning by-law as of the alleged offense date and determined the defendant acted with due diligence in responding to prior enforcement notices.

The charge was dismissed.

A corporate defendant charged with two counts of permitting an entertainer to provide services in an area not clearly visible from the main stage and patron area, contrary to section 5(6) of the City of Mississauga Adult Entertainment Establishment Licensing Bylaw 507-2005, brought a motion to quash the information on the grounds that the bylaw provision was unconstitutionally vague.

The defendant argued that key phrases in the provision, including "any services," "clearly visible," "main stage," and "obstruction," were impermissibly imprecise and failed to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct or to limit enforcement discretion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that section 5(6) was sufficiently precise to allow for intelligible legal debate when read in context with the entire bylaw, its definitions, and the licensing requirements that obligated the defendant to submit floor plans identifying the main stage and patron seating areas.

The defendant, a used car dealer, was charged with failing to comply with a Property Standards Order requiring removal of unlicensed vehicles from his residential property.

The defendant challenged the by-law on multiple grounds, including spelling of the word "license," the distinction between licensing and plating in Ontario, and the requirement to comply absent evidence of actual removal on the compliance date.

The court rejected all defenses, finding the by-law enforceable as written, that common usage supports the interpretation of "license" as referring to vehicle plates, and that the compliance date is merely a temporal marker rather than a single point of inspection.

The defendant's credibility regarding claimed compliance was found suspect given his stated opposition to the by-law and failure to appeal the order.

The court convicted the defendant, finding he failed to establish due diligence.

This is a preliminary motion ruling on appeals of Compliance Audit Committee decisions to order compliance audits of election campaign finances.

The appellants sought to have the appeals conducted as hearings de novo, while the respondents and the Committee argued the appeals should be limited to a review of the record.

The court determined that absent a clear statutory mandate to the contrary, appeals must take the form of a review of the record rather than de novo hearings.

The court rejected arguments that deficiencies in the record, the Committee's failure to provide reasons, or the prematurity of the audit application warranted a de novo hearing format.