Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - OCJ

The defendant, Scott Watson, was found guilty of careless driving causing death and careless driving causing bodily harm under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial, conducted via Zoom, involved a collision where the defendant's motorcycle struck two elderly pedestrians, one fatally, who were jaywalking.

The court found the defendant was speeding, failed to maintain proper situational awareness, and did not react prudently, concluding his actions constituted a lack of reasonable care and attention, despite the unexpected nature of the pedestrians' crossing.

The offender was convicted of five counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm and one count each of impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

On July 22, 2018, while driving at excessive speed (157-159 km/h) on the QEW with a blood alcohol concentration between 100-155 mg/100mL, the offender struck a vehicle containing five occupants, causing serious and lasting injuries to all victims.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence, finding that while the offender had mitigating factors including genuine remorse and rehabilitation prospects, the gravity of the offence, the severity of victims' injuries, and the paramount sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a substantial custodial sentence.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol and dangerous driving following a single-vehicle collision in a rural area on September 17, 2017.

The Crown sought acquittal on the dangerous driving charge due to insufficient evidence regarding how the vehicle entered the ditch.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant was operating the vehicle between 01:30 and 03:00 on September 17, 2017, while having a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The dangerous driving charge was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with selling tobacco to a person under 19 years of age contrary to the Smoke-Free Ontario Act.

Both entered guilty pleas at their first appearance without legal representation.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the validity of their guilty pleas, arguing that the plea inquiry was inadequate, that language barriers compromised their understanding, and that the court failed to inform them of their right to trial or to assist them in obtaining representation.

The court found that the guilty pleas should be quashed because the defendant did not accept the facts underpinning the conviction, and because the plea inquiry was insufficiently detailed given the unsophisticated nature of provincial offences court participants.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to slow down and proceed with caution for an emergency vehicle contrary to section 159(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the appellant testified that he slowed to approximately 40 kilometres per hour upon seeing the emergency vehicle lights, while the officer testified the vehicle did not slow down as it approached the RIDE checkpoint.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty, accepting that slowing to 40 kilometres per hour was insufficient to meet the statutory obligation to slow down and proceed with caution.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding the conviction was reasonable and well-supported by the evidence.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for violations of the Building Code Act and Planning Act.

The appellants operated a garden centre on property zoned within the Oak Ridges Moraine without required permits and in violation of zoning restrictions.

The trial court convicted both appellants on multiple counts and imposed substantial fines.

The appellants appealed on six grounds, including challenges to the rejection of a legal non-conforming use defence, the refusal to adjourn sentencing, and a prior s. 11(b) delay application.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error in the trial court's application of zoning law principles or procedural rulings.

The defendant was charged with three offences: fail to remain at the scene of an accident, impaired driving, and having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving.

The Crown's case on the issue of driver identity was entirely circumstantial.

The defendant denied involvement and claimed his vehicle had been stolen and crashed by an unknown third party.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence—including the location of the passenger's cell phone, the defendant's facial injuries consistent with driver-side airbag deployment, the passenger's lack of injuries, and the defendant's implausible explanations—proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle, operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and assault of a peace officer with intent to resist arrest.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial judge found that the accused operated his vehicle in a parking lot and was in care or control of the vehicle while impaired.

The accused's testimony was found unreliable due to his level of impairment and inconsistencies with police evidence.

The accused was convicted of impaired operation and assault of a peace officer.

The over 80 charge was conditionally stayed.

The Electrical Safety Authority sought an extension of time to file an appeal of a sentencing decision by Justice of the Peace Moses.

The ESA's notice of appeal was filed outside the statutory appeal period.

The central issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil to impose consequences on the company's principal and his new enterprise, given that the company's negligent electrical work resulted in the death of an elderly man.

The court granted the extension, finding that the ESA demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal, acted diligently in pursuing the appeal, and that the proposed appeal had sufficient arguable merit.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The defence challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and whether the evidence established impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the officer possessed reasonable and probable grounds based on the accused's erratic driving behaviour, odour of alcohol, admission of consumption, and physical signs of impairment.

The court convicted the accused of impaired operation and stayed the over 80 charge pursuant to the Keinapple principle.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(2) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Oxford Street and Veterans Memorial Parkway in London, Ontario.

The Crown alleged the accused was racing another vehicle at speeds exceeding 150 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone, resulting in a collision with an innocent third party.

The accused claimed she was fleeing an aggressive pursuer.

The court found the accused was operating the trailing vehicle in a race, rejected her evidence as tailored and illogical, and convicted her based on the credible testimony of three independent witnesses who consistently described dangerous high-speed driving.

Appeal from a conviction under section 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act for permitting a motor vehicle to be operated on a highway without insurance.

The appellant owned a vehicle that was driven by another individual on a test drive basis.

The Crown proved ownership through Ministry of Transportation records and established that no insurance was in place.

The appellant raised grounds of appeal regarding hearsay evidence, denial of a non-suit motion, and application of the strict liability test.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding the trial justice properly applied the law and made no material errors of fact.

The sentence was also upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to drive in a marked lane contrary to section 154(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised two grounds: (1) whether the Justice of the Peace had a duty to inquire if the appellant required interpreter services, and (2) whether the Justice of the Peace should have inquired into the suitability of an adjournment given that disclosure was provided on the trial date.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that no inquiry into interpreter services was required as the appellant had completed the Notice of Intention without requesting an interpreter and conducted the trial in English without apparent difficulty.

While the court acknowledged that providing disclosure on the trial date presents procedural concerns, it found that the Justice of the Peace appropriately addressed the issue by permitting a recess for the appellant to review the disclosure and determine how to proceed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, possession of stolen license plates, and breach of probation arising from an incident on January 31, 2014, in a parking lot behind a bar in Hamilton.

Two plainclothes police officers observed a vehicle with three occupants and initiated a liquor license investigation.

When the officers approached, the vehicle accelerated and fled the scene.

The central issue was identification of the driver.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of stolen plates and breach of probation but acquitted on the dangerous driving charge due to insufficient evidence regarding the officer's precise location at the time of acceleration and uncertainty about whether the officer was directly in front of the vehicle.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the key in the ignition.

The accused conceded impairment but argued he was not in care or control of the vehicle because he had arranged for a friend to pick him up.

The court found that while the accused may have initially intended not to drive, his high level of intoxication, confused state, weak explanations for his conduct, and demonstrated willingness to manipulate the gear shift when police arrived established a realistic risk he would change his mind and operate the vehicle.

The court convicted the accused.

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

On August 18, 2012, the offender accelerated his pickup truck while exiting a parking lot to show off its power to a passenger, lost control, and struck a 16-year-old girl standing on the grass in front of a house, killing her.

The offender fled the scene without stopping to render assistance.

The court imposed an 18-month sentence for dangerous driving causing death and a 9-month consecutive sentence for failing to remain at the scene, with credit for 13 months of stringent bail conditions, resulting in a global sentence of two years less a day.

A five-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of the vehicle were also imposed.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant stopped at a red light holding a black BlackBerry device in his right hand with his thumb moving in a texting motion, while holding a dog in his left hand.

The officer continued to observe the defendant driving southbound while holding and using the device.

The defendant's agent argued that the prosecution failed to prove the device was a wireless device capable of texting.

The court found the defendant guilty, holding that the prosecution proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the device was a hand-held wireless communication device capable of receiving or transmitting communications.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the accused was both impaired and over 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of his parked car at a military base.

The defence established that the accused had arranged for an alternative plan of transportation (a designated driver), had divested himself of the vehicle keys to a third party, and was merely waiting in the vehicle to shelter from the rain until the designated driver returned.

The court found that the accused had met his burden under s. 258 of the Criminal Code to establish that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of section 11(b) rights (trial within a reasonable time) in a speeding charge under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged on April 24, 2011, and filed a Notice of Intention to Appear on April 29, 2011.

The central issue was whether the five-month delay in scheduling a first attendance meeting with the prosecutor should be counted as institutional delay or treated as a neutral intake period.

The court found that the defendant had voluntarily requested the first attendance meeting and was aware that a trial date would not be scheduled until after the meeting.

After deducting various neutral periods and the first attendance meeting delay, the remaining institutional delay was 6 months and 24 days, which fell below the acceptable guideline of 8 to 10 months.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following a single motor vehicle accident on Highway 17 near Sudbury.

The Crown alleged that the accused's manner of driving—characterized by excessive speed, alcohol consumption, fatigue, and night driving—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The defence argued that the accused had taken appropriate evasive action to avoid a collision with an oncoming vehicle, which resulted in the loss of control.

The court found that while the actus reus of dangerous driving was established, the Crown failed to prove the necessary mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.