Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

Maisum Ansari was charged with breaching a release order's curfew condition, obstructing a peace officer, and impersonation.

He pleaded guilty to obstruction and impersonation but not guilty to the breach.

The court found that the defendant violated his curfew by engaging in activities unrelated to work or direct travel to/from work, such as socializing at a parking lot, discussing an electric vehicle charger, and consuming alcohol at a friend's residence.

The court determined that the Crown proved both the actus reus and mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant's asserted "lawful excuse" (lack of control, cost of alternative transport) was objectively unreasonable and disproven.

The defendant was found guilty of breaching his release order.

This case concerns a s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay in a sexual assault prosecution.

The court found the net delay of approximately 20 months exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, after accounting for defence waivers and partially deducting delay caused by a mistrial.

The Crown failed to adequately mitigate the delay following the mistrial.

A stay of proceedings was ordered.

R.R. was charged with sexual assault and voyeurism stemming from events where the complainant, T.L., became heavily intoxicated at R.R.'s dance studio.

T.L. testified that R.R. sexually assaulted her while she feigned sleep and later took a surreptitious photo of her breasts.

R.R. denied the allegations, offering alternative explanations for his actions and the social media messages exchanged.

The court found T.L.'s evidence credible and reliable, despite minor inconsistencies, and rejected R.R.'s testimony as implausible and contradictory.

R.R. was found guilty of both sexual assault and voyeurism, as the court concluded T.L. did not consent and R.R. acted with the requisite intent and in circumstances where T.L. had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of criminal harassment against the accused, E.T. The complainant, after ending a brief relationship with E.T. due to his controlling and aggressive nature, received over 180 unwanted phone calls and 60 text messages from him, including calls to her workplace, causing her significant distress and fear.

The central issue was whether the complainant's subjective fear for her safety was objectively reasonable.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness and concluded that the accused's relentless and unwanted contact constituted harassment.

The court determined that the complainant's fear for her safety, encompassing psychological and emotional security, was objectively reasonable given the accused's past behaviour, controlling nature, and persistent contact despite explicit requests to cease.

The Crown successfully proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application seeking to terminate a preliminary inquiry that had commenced on September 18, 2019, arguing that amendments to Section 535 of the Criminal Code (Bill C-75), which came into effect on September 19, 2019, eliminated the jurisdiction of the court to conduct preliminary inquiries where the maximum punishment is under 14 years of imprisonment.

The Crown had withdrawn a Section 244 charge (punishable by 14 years or more), leaving only offences with maximum sentences under 14 years.

The court denied the Crown's application, finding that the legislation should not apply retrospectively to proceedings already commenced.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant on the grounds that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was heavily redacted and lacked sufficient grounds to justify the warrant.

The Crown applied for a telewarrant to search three locations based primarily on information from two confidential informants regarding drug trafficking.

The applicant challenged the warrant under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, arguing insufficient nexus between the alleged criminality and the locations, and lack of currency in the information.

The court found that the heavily redacted ITO, even with limited peel-backs and clarifications, did not contain sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice to find reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The defendant was found asleep in his vehicle parked in the middle of a residential street with the engine running.

Police arrested him for impaired care or control and "over 80" (excessive blood alcohol concentration).

The Crown charged him with both offences.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of his breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging police violated his right to counsel by failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

The court found the police breached the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in acquittal on the "over 80" charge.

However, the court convicted on the impaired care or control charge based on the defendant's condition at the scene.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving a hand-held communication device contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and calculated the net delay at 16 months and 19 days, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Provincial Court matters.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable and that he had not taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The motion was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to proceed to trial.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution alleged the defendant was texting while stopped at a red light.

The defendant testified he was using his cell phone through a Bluetooth hands-free device while keeping both hands on the steering wheel.

The court found the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was holding or using the device in a manner prohibited by the statute.

The court determined the defendant was using the device in hands-free mode, which is permitted under section 78.1(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug offences following a search warrant execution.

The trial proceeded by agreed statement of facts with no witnesses called.

However, material discrepancies emerged between the agreed statement and the defence's anticipated evidence regarding the location of a firearm, where the accused slept, and how often he remained at the premises.

The defence sought to call evidence to clarify or contradict the agreed statement.

The court found irreconcilable conflicts between the agreed statement and the defence's new position, determined that defence counsel could not continue due to conflicts of interest, and declared a mistrial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over .08 following a motor vehicle accident.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude a roadside statement admitting he was the driver on the basis that the statement was compelled under the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, thereby violating his right against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the accused had a statutory duty to report the accident, his evidence did not establish that he believed he was legally compelled to make the statement.

Rather, the accused was motivated by moral responsibility and a sense of honour.

The statement was admitted into evidence, and the accused was found guilty of driving over .08.

The applicant was charged with Care and Control over 80 mg and Impaired Care and Control following observations of her sitting in the driver's seat of a running vehicle in live traffic on Bayview Avenue.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking to stay proceedings or exclude evidence including breath samples, statements, and observations based on alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest existed, but determined that no valid breath demand was made because the officer making the demand did not receive information regarding the grounds for arrest.

The court excluded the breath samples and readings but declined to stay proceedings.

The applicant's detention at the police division after medical clearance was found to be arbitrary, though the duration was not sufficiently egregious to warrant a stay.

A 40-year-old offender was sentenced for serious sexual offences committed as a young person between ages 13 and 17.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault involving repeated non-consensual sexual intercourse with his step-sister, who was 8 years old at the onset of the abuse and 13 when she stopped it.

The defence sought a 6-month deferred custody sentence, emphasizing the offender's exemplary life since the offences and familial obligations.

The Crown sought 18 months to 2 years incarceration.

The court imposed 12 months total custody (8 months in custody followed by 4 months community supervision), finding that accountability required incarceration despite the significant passage of time and the offender's rehabilitation.

The accused was found guilty of four counts each of sexual interference and sexual assault of four nieces committed over a period of 3-4 years during their early and pre-teen years.

The offences involved multiple occasions of unwanted sexual touching, including digital penetration.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years imprisonment, along with a SOIRA Order for 10 years, a weapons prohibition order for 10 years, and a DNA sample requirement.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence principles, recognizing the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victims, and the profound psychological harm caused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mLs of blood.

He brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charge was laid on February 8, 2014, and the trial was scheduled for October 9, 2014, but could not proceed due to court overbooking.

A new trial date was set for March 26, 2015, resulting in a total delay of approximately 13 months and 16 days.

The court found that the institutional delay of 11 months and one week exceeded the Morin guidelines, that the accused suffered actual financial and emotional prejudice, and that the delay was unacceptable for a straightforward impaired driving case.

The charge was stayed.

The defendant was charged with common assault and failing to comply with a probation order after allegedly pushing an elderly woman down stairs at a shopping mall.

The Crown presented testimony from the complainant and two independent witnesses who claimed the defendant pushed the complainant down the stairs.

The defendant testified that he made only incidental contact with the complainant's arm while gesturing to allow her to pass.

The court reviewed CCTV footage of the incident and found that the video evidence supported the defendant's account of accidental contact rather than an intentional assault.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The accused, a United States citizen, sought leave to plead guilty and be sentenced through designated counsel pursuant to section 650.01(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, without physically returning to Canada.

The accused was charged with multiple offences related to a loaded firearm found in his vehicle at the Ambassador Bridge.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while section 650.01 provides discretion to allow designated counsel to appear for guilty pleas and sentencing, the serious nature of the offences, the possibility of a penitentiary sentence, and the necessity of an in-person plea inquiry to prevent miscarriage of justice outweighed the accused's claimed hardships of health issues, financial difficulty, and travel distance.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision that resulted in the death of a pedestrian.

The Crown alleged the defendant was driving at an inappropriate speed for wet road conditions.

The defendant claimed his vehicle's brakes suddenly failed, causing the loss of control.

The trial judge found the road was wet at the time of the collision, rejected the mechanical failure defence as speculative, and found the defendant's testimony regarding road conditions and vehicle speed to be unreliable due to inconsistencies with his earlier statement to police.

The defendant was convicted of careless driving.

The defendant was charged with assault on a police officer causing bodily harm and threatening after an altercation at a bar in Richmond Hill.

Police officers and liquor inspectors attended the premises to conduct compliance inspections.

The defendant was approached on the dance floor and led to a quieter area where he was asked for identification.

The defendant became agitated and allegedly head-butted the officer, causing injury to the officer's mouth and teeth.

The defendant was arrested and subsequently made threatening statements.

The court found the defendant not guilty of both charges, determining that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was dealing with a police officer, and that the defendant's actions constituted lawful self-defence against an unlawful assault by the officer.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and care or control over 80 mgs of alcohol.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the accused was in care or control of a motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the keys in the ignition and the gearshift in drive position.

The accused claimed he never drove the vehicle and was merely comforting his intoxicated friend in the passenger seat.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and found that the conduct created a significant risk of the accused putting the vehicle in motion.

The court convicted on both charges, with a conditional stay on the over 80 mgs charge.