Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

Darren Pennock pleaded guilty to fraud, breach of trust, and uttering forged documents involving the misappropriation of $327,045 from the John Howard Society of Peel over seven years while serving as CEO.

The court considered aggravating factors including the breach of trust, repeated and calculated deceit, and significant impact on a vulnerable community served by the charity.

Mitigating factors included Pennock’s guilty plea and restitution made by a second mortgage on his home.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence, and sentenced Pennock to 12 months’ jail plus three years’ probation with specific conditions.

The defendant, Patrick Thiruchelvam, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 660 days (21 months and 22 days).

The court attributed 161 days of this as defence delay due to unavailability for earlier trial dates that provided sufficient preparation time.

This resulted in a net delay of 499 days (16.41 months), which falls below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's argument for an exceptional circumstance deduction due to a judge's family loss was rejected because significant disclosure remained outstanding, meaning the pre-trial could not have proceeded regardless.

The court found that the defence did not demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than reasonable for its complexity.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned an assault charge against Tobias Bishop, accused of punching his brother, Shai Bishop.

The Crown presented direct evidence from the complainant and corroborating police testimony, detailing the incident, the complainant's injuries, and the disarray of the shared residence.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility and reliability, suggesting he was motivated to remove the accused from the home and that the accused was asleep during the alleged incident.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, supported by independent police observations, and rejected the accused's general denial as inconsistent with the overall evidence.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

This case concerns an application by the accused, Taiga Building Products Ltd., for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial, related to an Occupational Health and Safety Act charge following a workplace fatality, spanned 11 days over nearly two years.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating a total delay of 23 months and 29 days.

After deducting 80 days for defence delay and 39 days for a discrete COVID-19 related event, the net delay was 610 days (20.05 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and that the delay was unreasonable, partly due to the Crown's unsuccessful expert qualification application and late disclosure.

A stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Over a three-year period, the accused developed a serious cocaine addiction that led him to sell cocaine to an undercover officer on four separate occasions, totalling approximately 30 grams, with additional cocaine found in his residence.

The accused successfully completed a residential addictions treatment program prior to sentencing and demonstrated genuine rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days incarceration to be served intermittently, along with one year of probation, finding that while incarceration was necessary, the accused's exceptional rehabilitative efforts and demonstrated sobriety warranted a departure from the standard sentencing range for cocaine trafficking.

The accused was placed on probation with a condition to attend and complete the P.A.R.S. (Perpetrators of Abuse Rehabilitation Services) program.

He was rejected from the program because he refused to acknowledge his guilt for the underlying domestic violence offence.

The Crown charged him with breach of probation.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that it is inappropriate for the state to force an individual to admit guilt, as this would violate Charter protections of freedom of thought and expression.

The court reasoned that programs designed to assist abusers must be able to accept those who deny the abuse, as these individuals may be those most in need of assistance.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography between February 1, 2017 and June 1, 2017, contrary to Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering mandatory minimum penalties.

Police discovered 863 unique images and 5 unique videos of child pornography depicting extremely young children in explicit sexual acts.

The accused had organized and catalogued the materials.

The court imposed a sentence of 19 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years probation, with ancillary orders including DNA registration, a 20-year Sexual Offence Identification Registration Act order, and a 10-year Section 161 order prohibiting attendance at public swimming areas where children are present and restricting computer and internet use.

During a preliminary hearing, the court determined the voluntariness of two statements made by the defendant to police.

The first statement involved providing name and address during a search warrant execution.

The second statement was a videotaped interview at the police station following arrest and exercise of rights to counsel.

The defendant alleged she was distraught, lacked an operating mind, and was induced by promises that she could go home and rejoin her children if she provided information about drugs and a gun.

The court found both statements were made voluntarily and with an operating mind, rejecting the defendant's credibility and accepting the officer's evidence that no inducements were offered.

The accused was charged with assault for allegedly spanking his five-year-old daughter excessively on March 7, 2017, contrary to Section 43 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including medical evidence of severe bruising to the child's buttocks consistent with multiple forceful impacts by an adult hand, and the accused's proximity to the child during a stressful morning.

The defence challenged the Crown's burden of proof and the reliability of the accused's post-arrest statement.

The court found that while the accused was the most likely suspect, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused's exculpatory statement, corroborated in part by the mother's testimony, created reasonable doubt that could not be dispelled by the circumstantial evidence alone.

The Crown sought to introduce viva voce evidence from a police officer to identify an individual in a bank surveillance video as part of a fraud prosecution.

The defendant opposed the evidence, arguing it did not meet the test established in R. v. Leaney and that the officer's evidence was tainted by prior dealings with the defendant.

The court conducted an admissibility ruling on a voir dire, examining whether the officer had sufficient acquaintance with the defendant and whether the officer was in a better position than the court to identify the person in the video.

The court found the Leaney test was satisfied and admitted the evidence.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment by the arresting officer and breath analysis results.

The court found that the police failed to conduct the breath tests as soon as practicable, contrary to statutory requirements, thereby eliminating the presumption of identity for the blood alcohol readings.

Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the totality of circumstances, including video evidence contradicting the officer's testimony regarding the defendant's physical coordination.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with assaulting his common-law partner and assaulting her daughter with a wine bottle.

The court first addressed a Charter application seeking to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b), which was dismissed for non-compliance with Criminal Rules.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty of assaulting the common-law partner but acquitted him of assaulting the daughter with a weapon.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable due to intoxication and inconsistencies, while accepting the complainant's evidence as credible and coherent.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence, arguing that the required breath tests were not administered "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

The accused identified three periods of alleged delay: from initial stop to departure for headquarters, during booking-in procedures, and during preparation and administration of breath tests.

The court examined the reasonableness of police conduct throughout the entire chain of events and found that the police acted reasonably under the circumstances.

The application to exclude the breath test evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with obstructing police and eight driving-related offences arising from a traffic stop on February 2, 2014.

The accused raised numerous pseudo-legal arguments based on a denial of state authority, claiming he was subject only to divine law.

The court dismissed these arguments by adopting the reasoning from Meads v. Meads regarding organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments (O.P.C.A.).

The court found the accused guilty of all charges, including obstructing police by driving away from the scene in an uninsured, unregistered vehicle despite lawful police direction to remain at the scene.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault against four sisters (his nieces) between January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2010.

The complainants testified that the accused engaged in multiple sexual violations including digital penetration while they slept over at his apartment during their early and pre-teen years.

The accused denied all allegations and testified that his bedroom was locked and he had limited contact with the complainants.

The court found the complainants' evidence credible and reliable, applying the appropriate standard for assessing child evidence.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as contrived and self-serving.

The accused was found guilty on all eight counts.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the defendant to Constable Foreman in the Intoxilyzer room for purposes of cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs. per cent blood alcohol.

The court conducted a voluntariness voir dire and found that the Crown failed to call all persons in authority who had dealings with the defendant, specifically the Staff Sergeant and booking officer who were observed in conversation with the defendant on video.

The court excluded the statement, finding that the Crown's failure to call these witnesses prevented it from satisfying the burden of proving the statement was voluntarily made.

A bail hearing concerning a 21-year-old accused facing multiple serious charges including robbery with an imitation firearm, unlawful confinement, break and enters, and various breaches of bail conditions.

The Crown sought detention on secondary grounds (substantial likelihood of further offences), while the defence argued the accused could be released with appropriate sureties.

The court found the proposed plan of release inadequate due to inconsistencies in surety testimony, lack of clear communication and coordination among sureties, and evidence suggesting planning and deception rather than impetuous conduct.

The court detained the accused on secondary grounds, finding that community supervision was insufficient to address the serious concerns.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority appealed the sentencing decision imposed on the respondents for contravening the Conservation Authorities Act by undertaking unauthorized development in a designated erosion hazard zone.

The respondents had applied for permission to construct a lakeside addition to their property in Burlington, which was denied.

Despite the denial and subsequent stop work orders, they proceeded with construction and completed the addition.

The trial judge imposed fines of $5,000 each and a probation order requiring seawall reconstruction, but did not order removal of the unauthorized structure.

The appellate court found the sentence demonstrably unfit and allowed the appeal, setting aside the fines and imposing an order for removal of the lakeside addition at the respondents' expense.

The accused sought leave to cross-examine the informant who swore the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant for his residence.

The court dismissed the application.

While confirming that a preliminary inquiry justice has jurisdiction to grant leave to cross-examine an informant under the Garofoli test, the court held that the contextual factors at a preliminary inquiry—particularly the protection of confidential informers and concerns about prolixity—warrant a more restrictive approach than at trial.

The court found that the accused failed to meet the threshold for leave in all proposed areas of cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit and breaching a probation order by driving without a valid license.

The charges arose from a RIDE spot check.

The court examined four key issues: whether police failed to wait 15 minutes for residual mouth alcohol to dissipate before using the approved screening device; whether the Intoxilyzer 8000C was an approved instrument; whether the defendant's blood alcohol level was over 80 at the time of the stop; and whether the Crown proved the probation breach beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the defendant guilty on both charges.