WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.5(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code. These subsections and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.5(1) or (2), read as follows:
486.5 ORDER RESTRICTING PUBLICATION — VICTIMS AND WITNESSES — (1) Unless an order is made under section 486.4, on application of the prosecutor in respect of a victim or a witness, or on application of a victim or a witness, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.
(2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the justice system participant shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.
(2.1) OFFENCES – The offences for the purposes of subsection (2) are
(a) an offence under section 423.1, 467.11, 467.111, 467.12, or 467.13, or a serious offence committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization;
(b) a terrorism offence;
(c) an offence under subsection 16(1) or (2), 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) or 22(1) of the Security of Information Act; or
(d) an offence under subsection 21(1) or section 23 of the Security of Information Act that is committed in relation to an offence referred to in paragraph (c).
(3) LIMITATION – An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice if it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
A.W.
Before Justice R. Tomovski
Heard on May 27, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on June 29, 2026
Calvin Findlay..................................................................................... counsel for the Crown
Alexa Banister-Thompson …………….………………...counsel for the defendant A.W.
Tomovski J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
1The Applicant’s case is a relatively straightforward matter involving allegations of intimate partner violence against his spouse. There are no Charter applications. Credibility and reliability are central issues. The trial is scheduled for three days, from July 6 to 8, 2026, and up for the first time. The total delay is 606 days (approximately 20 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27.
2The Applicant seeks a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay arising from late disclosure of the complainant’s statement to police. The Crown opposes the application, submitting that the summary of the statement provided ought to have enabled the Applicant to proceed earlier in obtaining a trial date. The Crown further submits that the change in counsel contributed to the delay in setting the trial date.
3I find that the Applicant’s s. 11(b) Charter rights were breached and that a stay of proceedings is warranted. The complainant’s statement constituted core disclosure and ought to have been provided before the Applicant was required to proceed with setting a trial date. I am also not satisfied that the change of counsel materially contributed to the overall delay. My reasons follow.
II. BACKGROUND
4A.W. was arrested and charged on November 8, 2024, with sexual assault (subsequently stayed by the Crown), three counts of assault, and uttering a threat against the alleged victim, whose primary language is not English. The Information was sworn on November 9, 2024. The trial is scheduled to conclude on July 8, 2026, the third day of a three-day trial.
5The total delay is 606 days (approximately 20 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for unreasonable delay established in Jordan for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice where the Crown has elected to proceed summarily, as it has in this case.
III. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
6A.W. was released on bail the day following his arrest and retained counsel at the outset.
7Counsel for A.W. requested initial disclosure prior to the first post-bail court appearance on December 11. After receiving initial disclosure on January 23, 2025, counsel made the first of several follow-up requests for further disclosure on January 27 to the assigned Crown. The requested items included the complainant’s video-recorded statement to police at the scene (primarily in a language other than English) and a subsequent video-recorded statement at the station (approximately three hours in length and entirely in a language other than English). As of March 19, only the scene statement had been disclosed, and non-English portions remained untranslated.
8In addition to raising disclosure concerns at court appearances, counsel made further written requests on March 19, April 7, April 28, June 19, August 5, and December 8, 2025, as well as on January 4, April 14, and May 6, 2026. Disclosure issues were also raised at Crown pretrials on April 7, September 12, and December 16, 2025, and January 9, 2026, and at judicial pretrials on May 27, August 26, November 17, 2025, and January 22 and May 5, 2026.
9At the August 26, 2025 judicial pretrial, the Court directed that the complainant’s statement at the station be translated and disclosed by September 12, failing which a follow-up pretrial was to be scheduled. That direction was not complied with; instead, only a translated summary was provided. As a result, a further judicial pretrial was held on November 17. At that time, in addition to addressing the status of disclosure, a trial estimate, inclusive of pretrial motions, was set.
10Around this time, A.W. changed counsel. Prior counsel had scheduled a meeting with the trial coordinator for November 27, 2025, to obtain trial dates despite the outstanding disclosure. A.W. discharged counsel before trial dates were secured. (The parties’ submissions did not address the reason for the discharge, focusing instead on its impact on the proceedings.) At the next court date, December 5, new counsel went on record. New counsel sought an adjournment to obtain disclosure and conduct Crown and judicial pretrials and quickly became apprised of the case. By December 8, 2025, new counsel had requested disclosure, scheduled a judicial pretrial for January 22, 2026, and, on January 4, wrote to the Crown itemizing outstanding disclosure, including the complainant’s statement at the station.
11On January 9, in the continued absence of the station statement, a Crown pretrial was conducted to address its status. The Crown advised that the statement had been translated but required redaction prior to being disclosed. It was also noted that portions of the complainant’s statement at the scene required translation.
12A further judicial pretrial was held on January 22, 2026. At that time, an untranslated copy of the complainant’s station statement – approximately three hours in length – was disclosed. The Court directed that a certified translation of that statement, as well as the untranslated portions of the scene statement, be provided at least 60 days before any pretrial motion.
13At a scheduling meeting on February 9, the parties secured trial dates. A four-day trial was set for March 30 to April 2, 2027, together with interim dates for anticipated pretrial motions. Earlier dates in June and August 2026 were available to the Crown but were not fully available to the defence.
14On February 10, concerned about delay, counsel wrote to the trial coordinator seeking earlier dates. A further meeting was held on February 23, at which earlier trial dates of December 1 to 4, 2026 – approximately 25 months after the Information was sworn – were secured. No earlier dates were available. Pretrial motions were scheduled for May 7 and August 25.
15In light of the history of the proceedings, including the continued absence of a certified translation of the complainant’s station statement, A.W. advised that he would be bringing an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay. The application was initially scheduled for July 15.
16On April 14, approximately 17 months after the Information was sworn, the Crown requested that counsel arrange a further scheduling meeting in an effort to secure a Jordan-compliant trial date. Counsel responded the same day, and a meeting was scheduled for April 28. Earlier trial dates of August 25 to 28, 2026, were secured, with pretrial motions scheduled for June 5 and July 3, and the s. 11(b) application scheduled for May 27.
17Counsel requested a further judicial pretrial to address the outstanding certified translations. At the pretrial held on May 5, the Court reiterated its direction that the certified translations be provided at least 60 days in advance of the pretrial motion. With the motion less than 30 days away, the Crown indicated that it might not proceed on the sexual assault charge, which would likely eliminate the need for pretrial motions. The matter was adjourned to permit the Crown to make that determination.
18On May 6 – 17 months and 27 days after the Information was sworn – the Crown confirmed that the sexual assault charge would be stayed. The following day, the parties appeared before the judicial pretrial judge, who approved a revised trial estimate of three days based on that decision.
19At the May 13 court appearance, the sexual assault charge was formally stayed.
20A scheduling meeting was held on May 14. The Court offered trial dates of June 10 to 12 and June 17 to 19, 2026. Although those dates were available to the Crown, they were not fully available to counsel. Trial dates of July 6 to 8, 2026, were therefore set, notwithstanding certified translations of the complainant’s statements had not yet been disclosed. Those translations were ultimately provided on May 20, approximately 18 months after the Information was sworn. In submissions, the Crown fairly did not attempt to justify the delay in disclosing the statements or their translations.
21A.W. renewed his intention to proceed with his s. 11(b) Charter application, which was rescheduled for May 27. The application proceeded on that date before me, and I reserved my decision to June 29.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Jordan Framework
22The Supreme Court in Jordan outlined the framework by which delay is to be assessed under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The framework as it applies to the Ontario Court of Justice is summarized as follows.
23There is a presumptive ceiling of 18 months. Delay above that mark is presumptively unreasonable, whereas delay below it is presumptively reasonable. Delay is considered and calculated in different ways at various stages of the framework. At the outset, the total delay must be calculated. This period is calculated from the date of the charge to the end of the trial: Jordan at paras. 5, 46-49, 60, 68, 82 and 105. The former equates with the date the Information is sworn: see R. v. Allison, 2022 ONCA 329 at paras. 35-43; R. v. Kalanj, 1989 CanLII 63 (SCC).
24Defence delay is then subtracted from the total delay. Defence delay can result from an explicit or implicit waiver or delay caused solely or directly by the defence’s conduct. An example of the latter is when the Crown and court are ready to proceed but the defence is not. However, legitimate defence conduct is not defence delay: Jordan at paras. 49-66.
25When the delay is above the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to establish the presence of exceptional circumstances that justify the delay. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the ensuing delay emanating from those circumstances cannot reasonably be remedied by the Crown. The Crown must show that it took reasonable steps to avoid the delay before the presumptive ceiling was surpassed. Those steps need not be successful in preventing the delay: Jordan at paras. 47, 68-70, 81, and 105.
26Generally, exceptional circumstances fall into two groups: discrete events or particularly complex cases. The former includes medical emergencies or unexpected illnesses, whereas the latter includes cases with novel or complicated legal issues, voluminous disclosure or many witnesses requiring a lengthy trial. Like defence delay, delay caused by exceptional circumstances is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at paras. 71-78.
27When the delay is below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Applicant to show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable by establishing that it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the case, and the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. Meaningful and sustained steps include seeking and setting the earliest available trial dates and giving notice when delay is becoming a problem. Whether a case took markedly longer considers multiple factors including the case’s complexity, local considerations, and whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings: Jordan at paras. 48, 82-87 and 105.
28Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling will be granted only in clear cases: Jordan at para. 83.
B. Jordan Applied
29The total delay runs from November 9, 2024, when the Information was sworn, to the anticipated end of trial on July 8, 2026 – a period of 606 days (approximately 20 months).
1. Defence Delay
30Two discrete periods of delay attributable solely to the defence must be deducted from the total delay.
31The first period, from January 15 to 22, 2026, totals seven days. On December 17, 2025, counsel scheduled a judicial pretrial for January 22, as she was unavailable on the earlier date of January 15.
32The second period, from November 27 to December 5, 2025, totals eight days and corresponds to the transition between counsel. Although the precise date prior counsel was discharged is unknown, it was no later than November 27, when a scheduled meeting with the trial coordinator did not proceed. New counsel formally went on record on December 5 and assumed carriage of the case.
33The Crown submits that the entire period from November 27, 2025, to February 9, 2026, should be treated as defence delay. February 9 is when new counsel held a meeting with the trial coordinator and secured trial dates. I do not accept this submission.
34Prior counsel acted diligently, including pursuing outstanding disclosure and conducting multiple Crown and judicial pretrials. After assuming carriage, new counsel moved the matter forward in short order. Between December 5 to February 9, counsel reviewed disclosure, renewed the request for outstanding disclosure – including for the complainant’s station statement – conducted further pretrials, and secured trial dates, notwithstanding that the Crown had yet to disclose the station statement.
35It was only at the January 22, 2026 judicial pretrial that an untranslated copy of the complainant’s three-hour station statement was disclosed, together with a judicial direction that a certified translation be provided. At that point, the defence was in receipt of core disclosure (see R. v. Abu Laban, 2025 ONCJ 629 at para. 11) and required to proceed to set trial dates, failing which it risked being seen as acquiescing in further delay. The defence did so, scheduling a meeting for February 9 and securing trial dates. By contrast, I do not accept that receipt of a translated summary on October 24, 2025 obligated the defence to set a trial date, particularly in the absence of evidence as to the content or utility of that summary: see R. v. R.M., 2024 ONCJ 491; R. v. Racanelli, 2022 ONCJ 390.
36In the circumstances, the change of counsel did not materially contribute to the overall delay.
37Deducting 15 days from the total delay leaves a net delay of 591 days (approximately 19.4 months), which exceeds the presumptive ceiling: see R. v. Shaikh, 2019 ONCA 895 at footnote 2.
2. Other Contested Periods
38The Crown advances two additional periods as defence delay.
39First, the Crown submits that August 7 to 26, 2025 should be deducted because the defence did not secure an earlier judicial pretrial on August 7 than the one secured on August 26. I do not agree. The June 18 transcript does not clearly establish that August 7 was an available date for the pretrial itself, as opposed to merely a date to schedule a judicial pretrial. No further evidence was provided to clarify this ambiguity (e.g., an affidavit from the trial coordinator confirming whether August 7 was an available judicial pretrial date).
40In any event, I would not attribute this period to the defence. By that stage, the Applicant had already undertaken significant efforts to obtain disclosure, including multiple written requests and pretrials. The August 26 judicial pretrial did not prompt disclosure from the Crown, nor did the November 17 pretrial. The untranslated station statement was only disclosed on January 22. There is no basis to conclude that an earlier pretrial would have produced a different result.
41Second, the Crown submits that a portion of the period between March 21 and April 2, 2025 (six days) should be deducted because the defence was not in a position to schedule a judicial pretrial within four months of the Information being sworn, contrary to the applicable practice direction. I do not agree.
42The Crown relies on the decision of Robichaud J. in R. v. Singh, 2026 ONCJ 195. While I accept the reasoning regarding the importance of judicial pretrials in addressing disclosure issues, the facts here are distinguishable. In Singh, no meaningful steps were taken within the initial four-month period, and the parties delayed significantly (124 days) in seeking judicial intervention after that period, which contributed materially to the overall delay.
43Here, A.W. exceeded the four-month mark by only 12 days. During that time, he made written disclosure requests, raised the issue in court, and received responses indicating that the requests were being processed. In these circumstances, and given the defence’s sustained efforts throughout, the slight delay did not materially contribute to the overall delay.
44Although not expressly contested by the Crown, I do not treat the defence’s unavailability for the June 2026 trial dates as defence delay. Those dates were offered on short notice at the May 12 scheduling meeting, It is not reasonable to expect defence counsel to be available and prepared within that timeframe, particularly in the absence of certified translations of the complainant’s statements: see Jordan at para 65; R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12 at para. 9; R. v. Godin, 2009 SCC 26 at para. 23; R. v. A.H., 2025 ONCJ 243 at para. 16; R v. A.B., 2023 ONCJ 459 at paras. 21, 23; R. v. S.C., 2022 ONCJ 486 at para. 27.
3. Net Delay – Above the Presumptive Ceiling
45Because the net delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the burden shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness. While the Crown did not advance a case for exceptional circumstances, I will briefly address the issue.
46There are no exceptional circumstances in this case.
47The Applicant’s case is not complex. It is a relatively straightforward prosecution involving a single complainant. There are no Charter applications, and credibility and reliability are the central issues.
48There was no discrete event accounting for the delay.
49The unexplained failure to provide timely core disclosure precludes a finding that the delay arose from reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances.
50The Crown also failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the delay prior to the ceiling being exceeded, including waiting until shortly before the ceiling was reached to stay the sexual assault charge and thereby eliminate the need for pretrial motions.
4. Net Delay – Below the Presumptive Ceiling
51In the alternative, even if all periods identified by the Crown were deducted, I would still conclude that a stay is warranted.
52On that approach, 99 days would be deducted from the total delay of 606 days, resulting in a net delay of 507 days (approximately 16.6 months).
53In such circumstances, the Applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that the delay is nevertheless unreasonable. I am satisfied that he has met that burden.
54The Applicant took sustained and meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, including:
(1) Requesting initial disclosure before the first court appearance
(2) Making repeated written requests for further disclosure
(3) Actively pursuing disclosure through multiple Crown and judicial pretrials
(4) Seeking early dates for many procedural steps
(5) Writing to the trial coordinator the day after the first trial dates were obtained seeking earlier trial dates, and accepting the earliest date offered
(6) Selecting the current trial dates on short notice (less than two months)
(7) Providing timely notice that delay was an issue, including pursuing this application
55The case also took markedly longer than it reasonably should have:
(1) It is not complex
(2) The trial is relatively short
(3) The Crown’s late decision to stay the sexual assault charge was not a reasonable step to expedite the proceedings as any rescheduled trial dates would have inevitably exceeded the presumptive ceiling: see R. v. Qureshi, 2026 ONCA 20 at paras. 34-35
(4) Regarding local considerations, a case like the Applicant’s should not take 16.6 months to complete. The presumptive ceiling is not an aspirational target: Jordan at paras. 56-57. In Peel region, recent cases with a net delay in the range of 16-17 months stayed, in part, due to the case taking markedly longer than required: R. v. Ayoubi, 2025 ONCJ 585 (17 months); R. v. R.M., 2024 ONCJ 491 (16.5 months); R. v. Fonseca, 2022 ONCJ 119 (16.7 months)
56In all the circumstances, even if the delay were below the presumptive ceiling, a stay would nevertheless be warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
57The net delay of 591 days (approximately 19.4 months) exceeds the Jordan presumptive ceiling. The Crown has failed to rebut the resulting presumption of unreasonableness. Accordingly, a stay of proceedings is warranted.
58It is regrettable that the charges cannot be determined on their merits due to unreasonable delay.
59The application is granted. The charges are stayed.
Released: June 29, 2026
Signed: Justice Tomovski