ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE No.: Central West, Peel Region 3111-998-24-31111853-00
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JAGDEEP SINGH
Before Justice S. Robichaud
Heard on March 30, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on April 1, 2026
A. Grittani counsel for the Crown
G. Singh counsel for the accused Jagdeep Singh
ROBICHAUD J.:
I. Overview:
1On behalf of the accused, the defence brings an application seeking a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter has been breached.
2The defence submits that the total delay from the swearing of the Information on October 9, 2024, to the anticipated completion of trial on April 16, 2026, is 18 months and 7 days, thereby exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R v Jordan.1
3The defence argues that a significant portion of this delay is attributable to Crown delay in providing essential disclosure, which prevented the defence from moving the matter forward and ultimately from proceeding to trial in a timely manner. The Crown, in contrast, submits that discrete periods of delay are attributable to defence conduct, including a failure to pursue available remedial measures, some of which were expressly identified and encouraged by the Court.
4The Crown further notes that no “below‑the‑ceiling” application has been advanced. As framed, the application therefore turns entirely on whether the delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling after proper attribution of defence delay. The Crown submits that even the attribution of a minimal period of delay to the defence, including less than one week, would result in a net delay below the 18‑month ceiling applicable in the Ontario Court of Justice, rendering the delay presumptively reasonable. The defence submits that if no delay is attributable to the defence, the ceiling would be exceeded by a matter of days and that a stay must follow.
5For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the defence has not established a breach of section 11(b) of the Charter.
6I am satisfied that a significant period of delay is properly attributable to the defence. This defence‑attributable delay arises from two related sources: first, the failure to schedule a judicial pre‑trial promptly after April 2025 despite clear direction from the Court to do so; and second, the defence’s partial responsibility for non‑compliance with the Ontario Court of Justice’s Jordan‑Compliant Trial Scheduling Practice Direction, which would have served as an effective and timely case‑management mechanism to address the outstanding disclosure relied upon by the defence.
7Taken together, this defence conduct materially contributed to the overall delay. Once that delay is properly deducted, the remaining net delay falls well below the presumptive ceiling.
II. Chronology
| Date | Event | Total Delay Since Information Sworn | Time Since Previous Event |
|---|---|---|---|
| September 27, 2024 | Accused arrested. | N/A | N/A |
| October 09, 2024 | Information sworn. | 0 days (0.0 months) | 12 days |
| October 28, 2024 | First appearance; Crown not in a position to elect; matter adjourned for disclosure and case-management steps. | 19 days (0.6 months) | 19 days |
| January 06, 2025 | Initial disclosure shared with defence electronically (materials did not include complainant video statements). | 89 days (2.9 months) | 70 days |
| January 15, 2025 | Defence email to Virtual Crown requesting all video-taped statements provided by the complainant. | 98 days (3.2 months) | 9 days |
| January 20, 2025 | Second appearance; defence advises complainant statement outstanding; Crown advises statement exists but requires review. Court grants longer adjournment so counsel to “do all the case management steps up to setting of the trial date…for you to be able to have the CPT (resolution meeting), potentially book a JPT, and have it and let us know whether there’s trial dates on the record on the next day.” | 103 days (3.4 months) | 5 days |
| February 9, 2025 | 4 month threshold reached to schedule a judicial pre-trial in accordance with the Ontario Court of Justice’s Jordan‑Compliant Trial Scheduling Practice Direction | 123 days (4.0 months) | 20 days |
| March 06, 2025 | Crown pre-trial held (R3) with Alex Rowell. | 148 days (4.9 months) | 45 days |
| March 07, 2025 | Further disclosure shared (including scribe notes of a complainant statement and a witness statement) via electronic platform. | 149 days (4.9 months) | 1 days |
| March 09, 2025 | Defence follow-up email confirming receipt of a video-taped statement of a witness but notes that the video-taped statement of the complainant remains outstanding. | 151 days (5.0 months) | 2 days |
| March 18, 2025 | Further disclosure of OIC memo re: no text messages, photographs. | 160 days (5.3 months) | 9 days |
| March 24, 2025 | Third appearance; defence advises complainant disclosure remains outstanding and another witness identified. | 166 days (5.5 months) | 15 days |
| April 22, 2025 | Defence emailed the Crown identifying that complainant video‑taped statement(s) and an anticipated additional witness statement had not been disclosed, noting that only one witness statement had been received, describing the outstanding materials as essential to case review and full answer and defence, and requesting prompt disclosure or notice of anticipated delay. | 195 days (6.4 months) | 29 days |
| April 28, 2025 | Fourth appearance; defence states a judicial pre-trial (JPT) is required; court identifies need to book a JPT. The Court advises that June 13 and June 14 are available judicial pre-trial dates and the matter should return past that but to book the JPT dates as soon as they can to preserve them. The matter is adjourned to June 30th for that purpose. | 201 days (6.6 months) | 6 days |
| June 13, 2025 | June 13, 2025 — Available judicial pre‑trial dates (Identified by the Court on April 28, 2025) | 247 days (8.1 months) | 46 days |
| June 30, 2025 | Fifth appearance; defence states s. 11(b) is a live issue; judicial pre‑trial scheduled for September 16, 2025. The Court questions the length of time to the judicial pre‑trial. Defence advises that August dates were offered but unavailable and that efforts to schedule occurred in late June. | 264 days (8.7 months) | 17 days |
| July 4, 2025 | R2 Meeting was held with Crown counsel Reya Dhandari | 268 days (8.8 months) | 4 days |
| July 14, 2025 | Further disclosure provided, including vetted complainant audio disclosure and additional witness material. | 278 days (9.1 months) | 14 days |
| September 16, 2025 | Judicial pre-trial conducted. | 342 days (11.2 months) | 64 days |
| September 29, 2025 | Sixth appearance; trial dates of July 27-30, 2026 placed on record. s. 11(b) confirmation date of January 26th, 2026 , and 11(b) motion hearing dates of March 30, 2026 scheduled. | 355 days (11.7 months) | 13 days |
| January 26, 2026 | s. 11(b) confirmation hearing. | 474 days (15.6 months) | 119 days |
| February 26, 2026 | Earlier trial dates offered (March 23–26, 2026 and March 30–April 2, 2026) and not accepted due to unavailability. | 505 days (16.6 months) | 31 days |
| March 09, 2026 | Trial rescheduled to April 8 and April 14–16, 2026 through administrative scheduling correspondence; previously scheduled July 2026 dates vacated/adjusted. | 516 days (17.0 months) | 11 days |
| March 30, 2026 | s. 11(b) application hearing. | 537 days (17.7 months) | 21 days |
| April 08, 2026 | Trial date (Day 1 of rescheduled trial). | 546 days (18.0 months) | 9 days |
| April 16, 2026 | Final day of trial (rescheduled Day 4 / anticipated completion). | 555 days (18.2 months) |
III. Applicable Legal Framework: Jordan Delay Calculations
8The framework for determining whether a proceeding violates section 11(b) of the Charter is set out in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. The analysis proceeds in a structured sequence designed to bring predictability and discipline to delay assessment. The court must first calculate the total delay from the date the charge or Information was sworn to the actual or anticipated end of trial. Delay attributable to the defence is then deducted. The remaining delay is the delay attributable to the Crown and the justice system.
9Jordan established presumptive ceilings for institutional delay. For matters proceeding entirely in the provincial court, the ceiling is 18 months. If the net delay exceeds the ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable, and the burden shifts to the Crown to justify the delay by demonstrating exceptional circumstances. If the net delay falls below the ceiling, the burden rests with the defence to demonstrate that the delay was nevertheless unreasonable by showing (1) sustained and meaningful efforts to expedite the proceedings, and (2) that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. Findings of unreasonableness below the ceiling are intended to be rare.2
10The deduction of defence delay is governed and clarified by R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31. Defence delay takes two principal forms: (1) waiver, which must be clear and unequivocal, and (2) defence‑caused delay, meaning delay that is solely or directly caused by defence conduct. The focus is not on whether defence conduct was blameworthy, but whether it caused delay or prevented the matter from moving forward. The purpose of deducting defence delay is to ensure that an accused does not benefit from their own delay‑causing conduct or inaction.3
11While Cody does not prescribe a closed category of deductible defence delay, it confirms that trial judges may consider whether defence conduct, including inaction, solely or directly caused delay.4 Where available case‑management mechanisms capable of advancing the proceeding are not pursued in circumstances where they reasonably could have done so, the resulting delay may, contextually and having regard to all relevant circumstances, be attributed to the defence or allocated proportionately depending on the degree of responsibility borne by each party. The inquiry focuses on whether the defence conduct solely or directly caused delay, including through missed opportunities to move the case forward.
12Where the net delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling and no exceptional circumstances are established, a stay of proceedings is the sole remedy. Conversely, where the net delay falls below the ceiling and the defence has not satisfied the Jordan below‑ceiling test, no remedy is available, regardless of identified shortcomings in Crown conduct.5
13Although Jordan introduced presumptive ceilings and a structured method of calculation, the attribution of delay remains a contextual, fact‑specific exercise. In R v Boulanger, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts must consider “All relevant circumstances should be considered to determine how delay should be apportioned among the participants” when determining how delay should be characterized and apportioned between the parties, rather than applying categorical or mechanical rules.6
14The Supreme Court rejected “bright‑line” approaches to attribution and emphasized the need for a fair and realistic assessment grounded in the actual conduct of the parties.7 Where delay arises from circumstances involving both parties, courts are not required to attribute the entire period to one side. In Boulanger, the Supreme Court confirmed that partial or shared attribution may be appropriate where responsibility is mixed, provided the allocation reflects the realities of the case and the roles played by each participant.8
15Delay attribution must be grounded in all relevant circumstances, not mechanical rules.9
IV. Analysis
a. The simple finding that disposes the matter
16Although this application raises several important issues that warrant careful consideration, there is a discrete and straightforward finding that is dispositive of the application.
17On April 28, 2025, the defence properly raised ongoing disclosure concerns relating to a complainant’s video‑taped statement. The Crown indicated that it would follow up. In that context, and having characterized the disclosure as important, the defence raised the need for a judicial pre‑trial.
18The Court agreed. The Crown agreed. The exchange was as follows:
19The discussion on April 28 proceeded on the shared understanding that the judicial pre‑trial would be scheduled promptly so as to not lose these dates. The Court identified June 13 and June 14, 2025, as available and adjourned the matter to June 30, 2025, with the expectation that the judicial pre‑trial would occur in the interim and that the parties would return to report on its outcome, including addressing the outstanding disclosure issue.
20The need to act urgently on scheduling these dates was clear:
21Despite that direction, the defence did not schedule a judicial pre‑trial at that time. The record reflects that no attempt was made to secure a judicial pre‑trial date until late June, nearly two months later. By then, the June availability had passed, and the next dates offered were in August 2025. Defence counsel advised that they were unavailable on those dates, and the judicial pre‑trial was ultimately scheduled for September 16, 2025.
22June 13, 2025, represented the earliest date by which a judicial pre‑trial could reasonably have occurred following the Court’s April 28 direction, with no expression of unavailability by either party. The context of that exchange reflected a clear expectation that one of the June judicial pre‑trial dates would be scheduled. The resulting delay of approximately three months is therefore properly attributable to the defence.
23I therefore find that the period between June 13, 2025, and September 16, 2025 is properly attributable to the defence, amounting to approximately three months and three days. Once that period is deducted, the remaining net delay is approximately 15 months, well below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.
24I attribute the entirety of this period to the defence because the context of the April 28 exchange reflected an expectation that prompt steps would be taken to secure one of the June judicial pre‑trial dates, followed by a return appearance on June 30 to address the outstanding disclosure issue and determine next procedural steps. That sequence did not occur. The resulting delay arose not from Crown inaction or systemic unavailability, but from the defence’s failure to act with the level of promptness contemplated by the Court.
25I accept that the defence is not required to be perpetually available and that reasonable scheduling constraints must be accommodated; however, that is not the issue here. The defence’s unavailability in August arose only because the June judicial pre‑trial dates were not secured when they were available and expressly identified by the Court. This is therefore not a case of unavoidable scheduling difficulty, but of delay flowing from the failure to act on clear judicial direction and expectation. The importance attributed to the outstanding disclosure underscores, rather than mitigates, the consequences of that inaction.
b. Delayed disclosure of key evidence
26The delayed disclosure of the complainants’ statements was a recurring issue throughout the proceedings.
27Initial disclosure was provided to the defence on January 6, 2025 through the Crown’s electronic disclosure platform. That disclosure did not include vetted complainant video or audio statements. Shortly thereafter, defence counsel made written requests seeking all video‑taped statements provided by the complainant, including correspondence sent on January 15, March 9, and April 22, 2025. Those requests specifically identified the absence of complainant statement material and, by April 22, 2025, also referenced an anticipated statement from an additional witness.
28There is no dispute that important disclosure remained outstanding for a significant period. The evidentiary record establishes that complainant statement disclosure, in some form, was delayed, and that complete vetted disclosure, including audio material, was not provided until July 14, 2025.
29This represents a serious and unacceptable failure on the part of the Crown. A complainant’s statement is foundational evidence. Timely disclosure is essential to permit the defence to properly advise the accused, assess the case, and prepare for trial. The Crown was on notice of the outstanding disclosure through repeated defence requests over several months, yet the record discloses no satisfactory explanation for the length of the delay.
30I therefore have no hesitation in finding that the delayed disclosure of the complainants’ statements was entirely inexcusable. However, that conclusion does not, on its own, resolve the section 11(b) inquiry. The Jordan framework does not provide a remedy for every instance of unacceptable Crown conduct. The governing analysis is now binding and structured, and it requires the Court to assess whether the overall delay, once properly attributed, is constitutionally unreasonable.
31The issue is therefore not whether the delay was troubling or inexcusable, but whether it caused the proceedings to become unreasonable in the constitutional sense under section 11(b) once periods of defence delay are properly deducted.
i. Impact on defence preparation
32What the evidentiary record does not establish is the extent to which the delayed disclosure prevented the defence from continuing to move the matter forward in a procedurally efficient way. While the importance of a complainant’s statement can readily be inferred, the record does not explain why the absence of the statement, in the form in which it was outstanding at various points, rendered other case‑management steps impracticable or impossible. Several procedural options remained available to the defence to ensure that the matter continued to progress toward an expeditious trial date while the disclosure issue was being addressed.
33The submissions characterize the disclosure as critical, but do not identify what could not be done without it, beyond the generalized assertion that a complainant’s statement is inherently significant.
34That distinction matters. Importance alone does not demonstrate impossibility. Where disclosure is said to be the lynchpin preventing progress, the Court requires some explanation of how the absence of specific material impeded specific procedural steps. That explanation is not found in this record.
35As a result, while the delayed disclosure is troubling and unacceptable, it does not, on its own, establish that the defence was unable to pursue available case‑management remedies during the relevant period.
c. Defence response to the disclosure delay
36While the importance of a complainant’s statement is obvious, the evidentiary record does not demonstrate that the defence sought timely judicial guidance when the disclosure issue first arose, including through the convening of a judicial pre‑trial at an earlier stage.
37In the face of the outstanding disclosure, a number of procedural options remained available to the defence to ensure that the matter continued to progress toward an expeditious trial date while the disclosure issue was being addressed. Chief among those options was seeking a focused judicial pre‑trial directed specifically to the outstanding disclosure. The scheduling of a judicial pre‑trial serves a practical and meaningful function. It places pressure on the Crown to either provide the outstanding disclosure in advance of the appearance or to be prepared to explain, on the record, why the disclosure remains delayed and what steps are being taken to address it.
38Although a provincial court judge presiding at a judicial pre‑trial does not have jurisdiction at that stage to grant Charter remedies, the Court nonetheless retains a range of case‑management tools capable of meaningfully advancing the proceeding. Those tools include, but are not limited to:
providing clear and persuasive guidance on the record regarding disclosure obligations and reasonable timelines;
commenting on apparent sources of delay and clarifying expectations for moving the matter forward;
directing further case‑management steps to ensure continued progress of the proceeding;
making decisions about whether, when, and on what basis trial dates should be scheduled or deferred;
providing direction on how unresolved disclosure issues should be framed and preserved for determination by a trial judge with full remedial jurisdiction;
offering practical guidance to counsel on how outstanding disclosure concerns should be positioned so they can be addressed effectively in the proper forum;
where jurisdiction exists, considering variations of forms of release in appropriate circumstances; and
requiring the attendance of an officer in charge to explain the status of disclosure, the steps taken to provide it, and the anticipated timeline for completion, thereby introducing individual accountability into the disclosure process.
39These tools operate in a practical context. Judicial pre‑trials introduce structure, accountability, personal prosecutorial assignment to files, and fixed expectations into the process. Experience demonstrates that where concrete timelines are identified and judicial scrutiny is anticipated, outstanding disclosure issues are often resolved in advance of the appearance. As a matter of effective case‑management, deadlines transform stated intentions into obligations.
40While judicial pre‑trials often proceed most efficiently when the parties are in a position to provide time estimates, discuss resolution, and schedule trial dates, those ideal conditions are not a prerequisite to their effective use. A judicial pre‑trial remains a valuable case‑management tool even where the proceeding is not yet trial‑ready. In this case, a focused judicial pre‑trial could have been convened for the limited purpose of addressing the outstanding disclosure that the defence said was preventing further progress, including resolution discussions or the scheduling of trial dates.
41Such use is even more important with the onset of recent Ontario Court of Justice Practice Direction: Jordan-Compliant Trial Scheduling:
To ensure an accused person’s constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time is respected, the Ontario Court of Justice has established a Jordan-Compliant Trial Scheduling procedure. Under this practice direction, parties will be expected to have completed all intake (case management) steps and be ready to resolve the case or schedule a trial or preliminary inquiry within six months of the Information sworn date.
More importantly, the Directive states:
If the parties anticipate that a judicial pre-trial is going to be required in a case, the parties should schedule the judicial pre-trial within four months of the Information sworn date. A judicial pre-trial must be scheduled if substantial disclosure has not been received within four months of the Information sworn date. If necessary, the parties can schedule the judicial pre-trial before the Crown pre-trial has been conducted, if they undertake to conduct the Crown pre-trial before the date of the judicial pre-trial.10 [Emphasis added]
42While compliance with the Ontario Court of Justice’s Jordan‑Compliant Trial Scheduling Practice Direction rests with both the Crown and the defence, the defence is uniquely positioned to assess whether disclosure is “substantial” for the purposes of advancing the case. That assessment is made with the benefit of the accused’s instructions and informs decisions about whether the matter can proceed toward resolution, the setting of trial dates, or requires further judicial intervention. The Directive is intended to benefit all parties, but it is designed primarily to safeguard the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time by ensuring early judicial oversight where disclosure delays risk impeding case progression.
43Non‑compliance with the Directive in this case contributed materially to the overall delay. While it is neither possible nor appropriate to quantify with precision what effect an earlier judicial pre‑trial would have had on securing the outstanding disclosure, it is not speculative to conclude that timely judicial involvement would have advanced the proceeding through appropriate case‑management mechanisms. A judicial pre‑trial convened in accordance with the Directive would have introduced structure, accountability, and focused oversight at a materially earlier stage, either accelerating disclosure or resulting in the setting of trial dates much sooner.
44The Practice Direction contemplates that where substantial disclosure has not been received, a judicial pre‑trial should be scheduled within four months of the Information sworn date. That four‑month threshold was reached on February 9, 2025. Despite continuing disclosure deficiencies, neither party took steps to invoke judicial oversight within that timeframe, and no judicial pre‑trial was scheduled in compliance with the Directive. From February 9, 2025 to June 13, 2025, a period of 124 days, both the Crown and the defence were aware that substantial disclosure remained outstanding and both were subject to the obligation to ensure compliance with mandatory case‑management requirements. Responsibility for the failure to invoke timely judicial oversight during that period is therefore properly regarded as shared.
45I accordingly attribute that interval of delay on a 50–50 basis between the Crown and the defence, resulting in 62 days of defence‑attributable delay arising from non‑compliance with the Practice Direction.
d. Combined defence delay
46I have already found that the period between June 13, 2025 and September 16, 2025 is properly attributable entirely to the defence. That interval amounts to approximately 95 days, or three months and three days, and must be deducted from the overall delay.
47I have also found that, from February 9, 2025 to June 13, 2025, a period of 124 days, responsibility for non‑compliance with the Jordan‑Compliant Trial Scheduling Practice Direction was shared equally between the Crown and the defence. Applying a 50–50 allocation to that interval results in a further 62 days of defence‑attributable delay.
V. Final delay calculation and disposition
48The combined defence‑attributable delay is therefore approximately 157 days, or just over five months. When that total is deducted from the overall delay of approximately 18 months and 7 days, the remaining net delay is approximately 13 months. That delay falls well below the presumptive 18‑month ceiling applicable in the Ontario Court of Justice under Jordan, and the section 11(b) application cannot succeed.
Released: April 1, 2026
Justice S. Robichaud
Footnotes
- R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631
- R v Jordan, supra, at paras 48–49, 105
- R v Cody, supra, at paras 26–31
- R v Cody, supra, at paras 28–30).
- R v Jordan at paras 47–48).
- R. v Boulanger, 2022 SCC 2 at para 9
- R. v Hanan, 2023 SCC 12, at para 9
- R v Boulanger, supra, at paras 10–12
- R. v. Hanan supra, at paras 9.
- https://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/notices/jordan-compliant-trial-scheduling/