Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal from a May 21, 2024 trial judgment in family law proceedings.

The trial judge had found the appellant engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour, psychological abuse of the child, failure to honour support obligations, and efforts to alienate the child from the respondent.

The appellant failed to comply with a stay order requiring payment of support arrears within 30 days and continued to breach court orders regarding parenting time and support payments.

The Court of Appeal found this to be one of the clearest cases justifying quashing an appeal, citing the appellant's deliberate and unwavering breach of crystal-clear orders, substantial arrears, and pattern of vexatious and frivolous litigation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Kurt Ashley Ritchie from an order upholding, with modification, a separation agreement between himself and Jessica Bortoleti De Oliveira.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s adjustment of child support or in the costs award, which reflected divided success and the parties’ conduct.

The court emphasized the ongoing obligation for both parties to exchange financial information annually and confirmed that no costs would be awarded for the appeal.

The appellant sought to set aside an administrative dismissal of her spousal support application, which was initially refused by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by treating the factors for setting aside a dismissal as rigid hurdles, misanalyzing prejudice, and failing to properly consider the policy favoring determination on merits.

The Court emphasized that lawyer inadvertence and the ability to restart the claim without limitation period expiry weighed against upholding the dismissal.

The dissenting opinion argued for deference to the motion judge's discretion and emphasized the importance of enforcing Family Law Rules timelines to combat delay.

In a highly contentious family law matter involving child custody and support, the trial judge appointed two amicus curiae—one for the self-represented mother and one for the father after his counsel withdrew due to non-payment of fees.

The Crown appealed the amicus appointments.

Although the appeal became moot when the trial concluded with both amicus participating, the Court of Appeal issued a comprehensive judgment establishing principles governing amicus appointments in private family law cases.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by appointing the mother's former counsel as amicus (injecting adversarial elements inconsistent with amicus's impartial role) and by appointing a second amicus (contrary to principle in family law contexts).

The court emphasized that amicus appointments should be rare, essential to adequate discharge of judicial functions, and subject to clear, detailed orders specifying the scope of duties.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his application against his daughters regarding the transfer of a mortgage from a family company to a family trust.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order arose from an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act, for which the proper appellate route is to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that section 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act or Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permitted the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal, and declined to reconstitute itself as the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action against his daughters and their company.

The appellant sought to challenge the validity of a family trust established in connection with an estate freeze in 2007.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis of res judicata, collateral attack, and abuse of process, finding that the appellant could have raised the validity issue in the daughters' prior oppression application but failed to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the doctrine of abuse of process alone warranted striking the claim, as allowing the action to proceed would constitute an attempt to relitigate a matter already decided.

An appeal from a costs order against Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) as a non-party funder in a family law dispute.

The application judge found that LAO engaged in an abuse of process by failing to adequately monitor and assess the merits of the defence it was funding in a case involving a vulnerable individual.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs award, holding that LAO's role as a statutory funder does not expose it to non-party costs awards absent evidence of bad faith or improper purpose, and that requiring LAO to monitor litigation would impermissibly invade solicitor-client privilege and frustrate the statutory legal aid scheme.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order that the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) had custody or control of the Children's Lawyer's litigation records relating to child clients, and therefore such records were subject to freedom of information access requests under FIPPA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Children's Lawyer operates independently from MAG with respect to her core functions of representing children, and therefore MAG does not have custody or control of child client records.

The court emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the Children's Lawyer-child relationship to the proper functioning of the legal system and the best interests of children.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario in a child protection matter.

The appellant, a foster-to-adopt mother, sought costs against the respondent child protection agency (Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell) for both the appeal before the Court of Appeal and the prior appeal before the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that exceptional circumstances existed because the agency had acted unfairly in appealing the motion judge's decision granting her status in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs, finding that the agency's decision to appeal did not warrant a costs award, particularly as the court's decision provided guidance on relevant factors for adding parties in child protection proceedings.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's decision to set aside a separation agreement on the grounds of material misrepresentation regarding the value of his company, Renegade Capital Corporation, at the date of marriage.

The husband had valued Renegade at $7.6 million using book value, when the trial judge found it was worth nil based on market value analysis.

The trial judge also recalculated the equalization payment and awarded retroactive child support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the husband had breached his disclosure obligations and materially misrepresented his assets.

The court affirmed that the duty to disclose includes the duty to fairly value assets, and that the onus is on the party disclosing to establish the recipient's actual knowledge of any falsehood.

In a 32-year marriage, the trial judge ordered equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The appellant challenged both awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the equalization determination, finding the trial judge's use of similar multiples for two companies in the same business was reasonable and well-reasoned.

However, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle in determining spousal support by failing to consider the significant effect of the equalization payment on the respondent's compensatory and non-compensatory entitlement and by failing to impute investment income to the respondent based on the equalization payment.

The spousal support was varied from $28,978 per month to $21,000 per month based on an imputed income of $675,000 rather than the full $1,000,000.

This is a costs decision supplementary to the Court of Appeal's February 3, 2017 judgment allowing in part an appeal from an application judge's order regarding spousal support and insurance benefits.

The appellant sought to set aside the application judge's costs award to the respondent and obtain costs for both the application and appeal.

The respondent sought to maintain the costs award and obtain additional costs for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that unusual circumstances existed because the appropriate reduction to the respondent's obligations remained open for determination by another application judge, warranting a departure from the general principle that the successful party on appeal receives costs below.

The Court reserved costs of the application and any further application to the application judge and awarded the appellant costs of the appeal in the amount of $13,000.

Following an appeal where the appellant succeeded in reducing the amount payable but failed to obtain a new trial or overturn the setting aside of a domestic contract, the court determined costs.

The respondent was deemed largely successful and awarded $25,000 in appeal costs.

The issue of trial costs, originally awarded on a substantial indemnity scale, was remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration in light of the appeal outcome.

The appellant sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order in question was interlocutory.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with no order as to costs.

The appellant challenged a family law order setting aside a marriage contract, arguing the trial was unfair because of his hearing impairment.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge accommodated the self-represented appellant and that the record did not support any unfairness affecting the outcome.

The court further held it was open to the trial judge to conclude there had been inadequate financial disclosure and that the responding party did not understand the nature or consequences of the contract.

Fresh evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of understanding the hearing-impairment argument, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the interpretation of a divorce judgment and the applicable interest rate.

The divorce judgment entitled the respondent to a share of the appellant's pension benefits when he received them.

The appellant argued he did not receive the benefits until he began receiving monthly annuity payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant received his benefits when he retired early and transferred the funds into a locked-in RRSP, as he had control over them at that time.

The Court also upheld the 10% interest rate specified in the divorce judgment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, the paternal grandmother of a six-year-old child, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her application for access in Ontario.

The child and her mother had moved to Nova Scotia, where the mother was granted joint custody.

The Court of Appeal held that while Ontario had concurrent jurisdiction because the child was habitually resident there when the application commenced, Nova Scotia was the more appropriate jurisdiction under section 25 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment ordering joint custody and parallel parenting of the parties' four-year-old child.

She sought sole custody, arguing the trial judge erred in prioritizing the father's interests, presuming co-parenting was appropriate, and ordering joint custody despite parental conflict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the custody appeal, finding the trial judge made no reviewable errors and that the child was thriving under the joint custody arrangement.

The Court varied the parenting schedule to align with a post-trial expert assessment and allowed the appeal regarding child support, ordering the respondent to pay support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's costs order in a family law proceeding regarding custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in upholding a previous judge's costs order that had been implicitly set aside, and in awarding an amount substantially in excess of party and party costs.

However, the Court noted that the respondent had made a reasonable settlement proposal regarding custody which the appellant rejected, justifying some costs to the respondent.

The Court granted leave to appeal costs, varied the trial judge's costs order to $4,000, and otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The moving party father sought to stay a joint custody order and parenting schedule pending his appeal.

The trial judge had awarded joint custody despite the parents' conflict, relying on parallel parenting principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the father failed to show irreparable harm to the child or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court noted the mother's historical role as primary caregiver and the minimal differences between the trial judge's parenting schedule and the previous interim order.