Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a former wife's application for spousal support and equalization of net family properties under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the application, finding that a Lebanese annulment of the marriage deprived the Ontario court of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in law, clarifying that a "former spouse" under s. 7 of the Family Law Act is not restricted to those divorced in Canada, and foreign corollary relief proceedings do not remove the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction over equalization claims.

The appellant withdrew her claim for spousal support.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for consideration of the equalization claim.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding spousal support, child support, and net family property, the respondent sought costs of $13,585 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant suggested $10,000, citing modest success and unproven economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive, noting the appeal was heard in writing, and ordered the costs enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

The husband appealed the trial judge's determination regarding the wife's entitlement to compensatory spousal support, the attribution of income for child and spousal support purposes, the set-off of equalization against retroactive support, and the determination not to award limited term support.

The wife had cross-appealed on the basis of fresh evidence but withdrew the cross-appeal during submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on all issues.

The appellant appealed from an order striking out his entire Answer pursuant to a consent order requiring disclosure of financial documentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the settlement judge's jurisdiction to strike pleadings for failure to comply with disclosure obligations, finding that such orders may be made at settlement conferences to promote the overarching objectives of the Family Law Rules.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the portion of the Answer relating to custody and access should not have been struck, as custody decisions must be based on the best interests of the children and require full participation of both parents.

The matter was ordered to proceed to trial on an expedited basis.

Two consolidated appeals from Superior Court orders in a family law matter.

The first appeal (C63096) concerning the striking of the appellant's pleadings was found to be moot as the order had been stayed and the trial proceeded.

The second appeal (C64255) challenged the trial judge's final order following trial, including findings of non-disclosure by the appellant, an unequal division of family property (75% to the respondent), and the denial of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning equalization amounts, spousal support, and child support.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of a psychiatric report regarding a child's dependent status.

The Court of Appeal declined to consider the fresh evidence on appeal, noting that the appropriate remedy was to seek variation under section 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal applied the stringent standard of review for family law decisions and found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge's decision was plainly wrong.

The trial judge's findings regarding income imputation and business valuation were entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

On appeal from a trial decision in a family law matter involving equalization, spousal support, and costs following a 27-year marriage.

The trial judge had ordered an equalization payment, spousal support at the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and full indemnity costs against the wife.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the equalization payment but found errors in the spousal support calculation and costs award, returning both issues to the trial judge for reconsideration.

On the second appeal, the Court of Appeal corrected the wife's income calculation to account for tax implications and eliminated double-counting, resulting in a higher spousal support award.

The costs award was upheld as reasonable given the wife's conduct.

Appeal from a motion judge's order determining child support obligations.

The appellant sought to reduce child support based on reported lower income, but the motion judge found the appellant had engaged in deliberate non-disclosure and evasion of financial disclosure obligations, hiding income through a corporation.

The motion judge attributed significantly higher income to the appellant and ordered child support payments over twelve months rather than the ten months specified in a prior consent order.

On appeal, the court found one palpable and overriding error regarding double-counting of repaid corporate loans but otherwise upheld the motion judge's decision.

The court reduced the attributed income and corresponding child support amounts but maintained the twelve-month payment structure.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for a beneficial interest in the family home or equitable damages for services rendered to his mother, as well as the dismissal of his application to revoke his sister's power of attorney.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in allocating the burden of proof for unjust enrichment by requiring the appellant to prove a 'net benefit'.

Applying the correct framework from Kerr v. Baranow, the Court awarded the appellant $438,113 in equitable damages for domestic services.

The Court also admitted the trial judge's findings of undue influence as fresh evidence and revoked the sister's power of attorney.

The appellant father brought a second appeal regarding a trial judgment that awarded custody of a three-year-old child to the respondent mother and allowed her to relocate to England.

The first appeal judge upheld the trial judge's decisions on custody and relocation but remitted the final order back to the trial judge to correct errors and inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in remitting the matter, as the trial judge had properly settled the order and was functus officio.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the remitted order and restore the original trial order.

The mother applied to relocate with the parties' child from Toronto to Kingston.

The trial judge granted the application, focusing heavily on the mother's reasons for moving and her relationship with the paternal family.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the maximum contact principle and inappropriately treated the mother's reasons for moving as the primary factor, despite this not being an exceptional case where such reasons were relevant to her ability to meet the child's needs.

The order allowing the relocation was set aside.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship without access of his child to the Children's Aid Society.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial given the father's failure to address risks and lack of insight into his parenting deficiencies.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, and the father appealed to the Court of Appeal, tendering fresh evidence of his progress as a parent with a new child.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, holding that the child's best interests required finality and a permanent adoptive home.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement regarding property and support claims arising from divorce proceedings.

She argued that the respondent's acceptance constituted a counter-offer because it included minor modifications regarding tools and spousal support arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the modifications did not alter the main substance of the agreement and that the offer was accepted in time.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings for allegedly failing to answer undertakings, and the subsequent trial judgment made in his absence.

The Court of Appeal found that the order striking pleadings was made without sworn evidence and without full disclosure by the respondent's counsel regarding the appellant's efforts to answer the undertakings.

The Court set aside the order striking the pleadings and the trial judgment, noting that striking pleadings is an order of last resort.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's dismissal of his motion to vary spousal support, terminate daycare expenses, and reapportion section 7 child support expenses.

The appellant argued that the respondent mother's transition from a student to full-time employment constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the mother's employment was foreseeable and necessary given the father's continuous failure to meet his support obligations.

The court also upheld the motion judge's temporary apportionment of section 7 expenses based on the parties' 2006 tax returns, noting the father's failure to make full and frank financial disclosure.

The mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a summary judgment that granted Crown wardship without access.

The child had been placed with an adoptive family after the mother struggled with addiction and instability.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's decision.

Although the mother submitted fresh evidence showing she had rehabilitated herself, the court held it was not in the child's best interests to be removed from her adoptive family after significant time had passed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent a 50% interest in a farm property based on resulting trust principles and ordering a lump sum child support payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the property division, finding no error in the trial judge's application of resulting trust principles or rejection of the appellant's 'unclean hands' argument.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding child support, finding the trial judge erred by ordering a lump sum payment without sufficient evidence to calculate the amount under the Child Support Guidelines, including assumptions about post-secondary education.

The Court substituted an order for ongoing periodic child support of $345 per month and ordered $40,000 from the appellant's share of the farm sale proceeds to be paid into court or the Family Responsibility Office as security.

The moving party, the first wife of the respondent husband, sought leave to intervene in an appeal regarding a vesting order made in favour of the husband's second wife.

The trial judge had ordered the husband's beneficial interest in certain corporate properties vested in the second wife to satisfy substantial support arrears.

The moving party, who also held foreign judgments for support arrears against the husband, sought to intervene to protect her interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the intervention was instigated by the husband to frustrate the second wife's recovery, and that allowing it at this late stage would unduly delay and prejudice the second wife's rights.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the respondent was the deceased's 'spouse' under the Family Law Act, as they had not 'moved in' together three years prior to the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'living together in a conjugal relationship' is a flexible, unitary concept and maintaining separate residences does not preclude a finding of cohabitation.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to reduce damages for contingencies, as no evidence was led on that issue.

The appellant appealed an order setting ongoing spousal support at $600 per month and applying that amount against arrears.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons were so conclusory that appellate review was impossible.

The order was set aside and the matter remitted to be heard by a different judge.