Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her alleged financial motive to fabricate and by failing to properly consider the implausibility of the assaults given the proximity of sleeping children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the implausibility argument.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to believe the complainant's testimony.

Marc Gauthier appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of Tammy Avery.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of a voicemail left for his doctor (Dr. Morrison) and the voluntariness of confessions made to police and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the voicemail, as it constituted criminal harassment, and thus it was admissible.

While the court found the trial judge erred in admitting the confessions due to an inadequate evidentiary record regarding voluntariness, it applied the curative proviso, concluding that this error did not impact the verdict as the confessions only confirmed the undisputed fact of the killing, not the mens rea for first-degree murder.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.S., appealed convictions for sexual offences against three step-grandchildren and the imposed global sentence of 30 months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to intervene.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed, reducing a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order to 20 years with the Crown's consent, and imposing conditional stays of proceedings on three sexual assault counts, without altering the overall 30-month sentence.

The appellant, Pedro Hechavarria-Tapia, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for serious intimate partner violence.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's findings of fact regarding the appellant's treatability and willingness to engage in rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample support in the record for the sentencing judge's conclusions that the appellant was intractable and unwilling to be treated for the relevant conditions, despite some superficial engagement with probation officers and past program enrollment.

The appellant, Robert Lavergne, appealed his 17-month global sentence for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the sentence was unfit and that post-sentence changes to conditional sentencing law (Bill C-5) required reconsideration, including the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the changes in law did not compel a reconsideration of the sentence or the constitutional challenge, as the trial judge's imposed sentence was fit and exceeded the minimum, and a conditional sentence would not have been imposed even under the new law.

The sentences were not demonstrably unfit, considering the profound psychological harm to the victims and the appellant's abuse of trust as a teacher.

The appellant, Michael Davani, appealed his conviction for murder, raising three grounds: improper cross-examination on prior discreditable conduct by co-accused's counsel, unfairness due to the trial judge's criticism and interjections, and an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Pollock principles regarding bad character evidence, no inappropriate or excessive judicial interventions, and that the jury charge was fair and balanced when read as a whole.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order granting certiorari.

The decision itself is subject to a statutory non-publication order under section 539 of the Criminal Code, pending the outcome of the trial.

The full text of the reasons is not publicly available.

A police services board and a detective appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for false arrest, negligent investigation, and malicious prosecution, with significant damages awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on lack of reasonable and probable grounds and malice, and the cross-appeal, affirming the costs award.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, sought to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the trial judge erred by not inquiring into the impact of his Indigenous experiences on the voluntariness of his plea, even though he had not raised this issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while judges have a duty to inquire into the validity of a plea if there are apparent indications of an issue, there is no general affirmative obligation to inquire into an Indigenous person's experiences affecting plea voluntariness unless specific circumstances trigger such a duty.

The court found no such circumstances in this case, and the evidence suggested the plea was voluntary.

The applicant, Jamal Daye, sought re-release pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new firearms and breach charges.

He had previously been convicted of narcotics trafficking and sentenced to 5.5 years.

The Crown opposed his re-release on tertiary grounds, arguing that his detention was necessary to preserve public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous, its strength did not outweigh the public interest concerns, particularly given the seriousness of the new alleged offences and the breach of bail conditions.

The application for re-release was denied.

The appellant, convicted of firearms offences and breach of recognizance following a shooting incident, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the admission or assessment of witness evidence, that the verdict was reasonable given the strong circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge properly rejected the self-defence argument.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but ultimately dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the eight-year custodial sentence was fit, balancing mitigating factors with the appellant's prior firearms offence and the dangerous nature of discharging a weapon in a populated area.

Angelina Codina applied for bail pending her application for leave to appeal three decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the bail application, finding that Ms. Codina had not met her burden of persuading the court that her release was in the public interest.

The court considered the strength of her proposed grounds of appeal, which were deemed not to "clearly surpass the minimal standard" of "not frivolous," and noted a residual public safety concern given her history of preying on vulnerable individuals and being "ungovernable." The court emphasized the paramountcy of enforcing trial judgments at this stage of proceedings, especially given no further right of appeal.

The applicant sought bail pending the Minister's surrender decision in an extradition matter.

The applicant had been convicted in absentia in Illinois in 2004 for drug trafficking and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

He fled to Jamaica and subsequently immigrated to Canada in 2006, becoming a Canadian citizen in 2009.

Upon attempting to renew his passport to attend his mother's funeral in 2016, he was arrested under the Extradition Act.

The court granted bail, finding that the applicant met the three-part test under section 679 of the Criminal Code as applied to extradition proceedings: the application was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender when ordered, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to undue delay.

The delay included a period following a mistrial caused by a misstep by the trial judge.

The application judge characterized this period as institutional delay, noting the unusual circumstances and the failure of the Crown or the court to canvas earlier trial dates.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusions regarding the characterization of the delay or the finding of prejudice, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence that the complainant had previously made and recanted two other allegations of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not engage s. 276 of the Criminal Code as it did not involve sexual activity.

The court found the evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and was not barred by the collateral fact rule, as the recantations were allegedly made in the same conversation where the complainant reported the assault by the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of tax evasion after failing to disclose income or pay taxes from 1993 to 1997, based on his belief that federal income tax was unconstitutional.

He appealed his conviction and his sentence of one year in jail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding he had the requisite mens rea and the trial judge properly handled a juror issue.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by treating the absence of a conditional sentence in tax evasion cases as an absolute rule and by mischaracterizing aggravating factors.

The jail sentence was varied to a one-year conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence when rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's conclusions regarding the appellant's credibility—specifically his characterization of his criminal record and his reasons for calling his mother—were supported by the transcript.

The trial judge's factual findings concerning knowledge and control of scales, cocaine residue, and guns were open to him on the record.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding a prior altercation and by permitting cross-examination on his prior criminal record under a Corbett ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no realistic danger of propensity reasoning regarding the prior altercation, which the defence had relied upon.

The Court also deferred to the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting that clear limiting instructions were given to the jury regarding the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from severe scalding injuries suffered by a young child left unattended near an extremely hot bathtub.

The court rejected arguments that the jury charge was misleading, that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to apply an objective mens rea standard, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

Relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority, the court held that criminal negligence is assessed objectively absent personal characteristics establishing incapacity to appreciate risk, which were not present on the record.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned because the custodial sentence had already been served.