Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault involving a child relative and an eight‑year custodial sentence.

The offences occurred over several years when the complainant was between seven and eleven years old.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly assess his evidence, relied on implausible allegations, reversed the burden of proof, and gave inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, reasonably rejected stereotypical assumptions about victim behaviour, and gave reasons that were sufficient when read contextually with the record.

The court also found no error in principle in the sentencing analysis and held the eight‑year sentence fell within the appropriate range for serious sexual offences against a child.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession and making available child pornography, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The proceedings spanned approximately 50 months and involved disclosure disputes concerning forensic images of hard drives, bifurcation of the trial to accommodate an expert witness, and numerous defence applications.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the net delay exceeded the 18‑month Jordan ceiling and that the trial judge erred in characterizing the case as particularly complex.

However, because the charges were laid before the release of Jordan, the court applied the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis and concluded that the Crown had justified the delay in light of the parties’ reliance on the pre‑Jordan Morin framework, the modest excess over the Morin guidelines, the defence’s limited diligence in advancing the case, and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.

The applicant, convicted of historical sexual offences against a child in his family's foster care and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The court found that while the applicant was not a flight risk or a danger to the public, the grounds of appeal were weak and did not clearly surpass the 'not frivolous' standard.

Balancing the public interest in the enforceability of the judgment against the reviewability interest, the court concluded that a reasonable member of the public would find the applicant's detention necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a former army reservist, shot and killed a prowler who was breaking into his truck.

At trial, the accused claimed self-defence, arguing his military training led him to proactively confront the threat and that he believed the prowler was reaching for a gun.

The jury acquitted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding self-defence under s. 34 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider the accused's conduct leading up to the shooting when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a home invasion robbery where an occupant was shot.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a 'mixed witness' Vetrovec instruction and a W.(D.) instruction regarding a co-perpetrator's testimony, which was exculpatory at trial but inculpatory during a prior guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge adequate when read as a whole.

The sentence appeal was granted only to credit the appellant with 90 days of pre-sentence custody on consent of the Crown.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his appeal to the Superior Court from his conviction in the Ontario Court of Justice for uttering threats to cause death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the test on both branches: there was no question of law with arguable merit and significance to the administration of justice, and there was no clear error in the decision below.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding solicitor-client privilege, finding that such privilege did not apply to the communications in question and that the summary conviction appeal judge was not required to address the issue in his reasons.

The appellant operated a garden supply business and sold legal products to customers who used them in marijuana grow operations.

He was convicted of conspiracy to produce and traffic marijuana, as well as the substantive offences of production and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed the conspiracy convictions, holding that selling legal goods with knowledge of their intended illegal use does not make one a party to a conspiracy without a shared mutual objective.

However, the court upheld the substantive convictions on the basis that the appellant actually aided and abetted specific grow operations.

The Crown's appeal against the appellant's acquittal for money laundering was dismissed.

The respondent, a mortgage broker, was convicted of 25 counts of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a large-scale Ponzi scheme.

The sentencing judge imposed a 23-month conditional sentence, characterizing the respondent as a victim of the scheme's mastermind.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle as the jury's verdict implicitly rejected the respondent's claim that he thought the investments were legitimate.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds involving breach of trust, the Court varied the sentence to four years' imprisonment.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to one year imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed because he expected a 45-day sentence based on his counsel's advice.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing insufficient weight was given to his traumatic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the plea was valid as the appellant knew he faced a custodial sentence, and the sentencing judge had properly considered his medical condition as a mitigating factor.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The applicant, convicted of assault, sexual assault, and uttering a death threat, applied for an order under s. 683(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant (his ex-wife) in aid of a potential fresh evidence application on appeal.

The applicant sought to question her about documents obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada post-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding this was not an exceptional case justifying the renewed questioning of a sexual assault complainant.

The court noted the complainant had already admitted at trial to contacting immigration to have the applicant deported, and the fresh evidence argument could be made without further cross-examination.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by invoking the collateral facts rule to curtail cross-examination of the complainant regarding internet postings.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are exceptional and the proposed ground of appeal did not raise a question of law of general significance or demonstrate a clear legal error.

The applicant sought an extension of time to seek a panel review of a 2008 order by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had denied his application for an extension of time to appeal his 2002 second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking the review and failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences after a handgun was found in the driver's footwell of a vehicle in which he was the sole passenger.

The driver was acquitted.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to assess his case independently from the driver's and by rendering an unreasonable verdict based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's opportunity, proximity to the firearm, and after-the-fact conduct.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a home invasion where the victim was shot in the chest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of a Vetrovec witness, in admitting a gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He also argued the sentence violated the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the witness or the s. 24(2) analysis, and rejected the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the shooting was a cold-blooded assault resulting in near-fatal injuries.

The appellant was convicted of procuring a 14-year-old to become a prostitute and aiding her in engaging in prostitution for gain.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the closing address by his co-accused's counsel relied on matters not in evidence and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that circumstantial evidence supported the co-accused's counsel's inferences and that the trial judge provided an adequate corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal the sentence was also denied.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual abuse of a child, arguing the trial judge erred in accepting the complainant's evidence due to inconsistencies, relying on a prior child pornography conviction, and inferring a prior denial was an attempt to protect the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately evaluated the evidence, properly used the prior conviction to show sexual interest and opportunity, and reasonably inferred the complainant's prior denial was to protect the appellant given their close relationship.

The appellant appealed his convictions for mischief and break and enter.

The Crown conceded that fresh evidence should be admitted and that, in light of this evidence, the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial on both charges.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's interjection during argument resulted in unfairness and challenged the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the unfairness argument and held that the factual challenges revealed no error in law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed a disposition totaling three and one-half years.

The court held the disposition was illegal because it exceeded the two-year maximum under s. 20(3) of the Young Offenders Act and found the trial judge erred in principle by relying on adult offender factors to the virtual exclusion of youth sentencing principles.

While the offence was very serious and had a serious impact on the complainant and her family, the court concluded that further treatment in custody remained appropriate for public protection.

The appeal was allowed and the disposition was reduced to nine months secure custody and fifteen months probation on the same terms imposed below.