Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences committed against a foster child.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for credibility assessments, applied uneven scrutiny to evidence, permitted a discovery right violation, and erred in admitting apology emails and analyzing third-party records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility findings, evidentiary rulings, or handling of the late disclosure of a witness.

The appellant was convicted of forgery-related offences and tax fraud arising from his operation of a fake identification business and failure to report income.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by preventing him from reopening his case, improperly finding him vicariously liable as a 'directing mind', misapplying the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule, relying on inadmissible affidavits, unevenly scrutinizing evidence, reversing the burden of proof for tax fraud, and dismissing a stay application for pre-charge delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no legal errors, properly assessed the evidence, and correctly concluded that the appellant directly controlled the illegal business and deliberately evaded taxes.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, arguing she was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant alleged her trial counsel failed to seek a severance or mistrial despite knowing the appellant was being actively abused by her co-accused, and failed to properly advise her on whether to testify.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, including trial counsel's notes, and found that counsel's failure to explore severance and properly advise the appellant on testifying fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance and caused prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the strangulation death of his intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in leaving planned and deliberate murder with the jury, as there was no air of reality to the element of deliberation.

While there was an air of reality to constructive first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement, the Court found that the appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Trial counsel's decision to call a forensic psychiatrist, whose evidence introduced highly prejudicial statements by the appellant about his intent to kill, fell below the standard of reasonableness and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for sexual assault and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge committed a 'Boutilier error' by failing to consider his treatment prospects and intractability at the designation stage, and misapprehended psychiatric evidence regarding his antisocial personality disorder diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the judge erred by not considering intractability at the designation stage, there was no reasonable possibility of a different outcome given the judge's findings at the penalty stage that the appellant posed a grave, intractable threat with no reasonable treatment prospects.

The court also found no misapprehension of the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing a police officer to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of trafficking and in instructing the jury not to speculate about a missing witness.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in permitting the expert opinion on the ultimate issue, as it was not necessary and risked the jury accepting it without critical consideration of the evidence, particularly the absence of evidence on dosages and consumption rates.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the error was not harmless.

The conviction was set aside, and the court requested submissions on substituting a conviction for simple possession and an appropriate sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred by using the doctrine of abandonment to dismiss his s. 24(2) Charter application following a s. 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in using abandonment as an absolute bar to s. 24(2) relief, but conducted its own analysis and found the evidence should not be excluded.

The court held that while there was a serious s. 10(b) breach due to a delay in facilitating the right to counsel, the impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests was minimal and society's interest in adjudicating the serious firearms charges on the merits favoured admission.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges relating to the sale of sexual services.

The application judge had struck down sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3 (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted by the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, finding they infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate section 7.

The Court found that cooperative arrangements among sex workers do not constitute a 'commercial enterprise' under the material benefit provision, and that the procuring and advertising provisions are neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate to their objectives.

The Court also rejected arguments that the provisions unjustifiably infringed sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was arrested during a drug investigation and searched, revealing a concealed firearm.

At trial, the judge found the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, but admitted the firearm under section 24(2).

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the balancing of the Grant factors, and concluded the total sentence of 3.5 years was fit.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after nearly 2.5 kilograms of cocaine were found in a hidden compartment in his vehicle.

He appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because there was little evidence he knew about the drugs and his brother had access to the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's expressed sympathy and disagreement with the verdict, a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude guilt based on the appellant's ownership and exclusive use of the vehicle, the visibility of the compartment, and the high value of the drugs.

The appellant, Davide Duncan, appealed his conviction for aiding or abetting the importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of wiretap evidence, challenged on the basis of alleged misleading or fraudulent affidavits used to obtain the authorization, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge did not err in allowing amplification or excision of the affidavit errors, as they were not deliberate and the affiant acted in good faith.

The court also upheld the finding that the wiretap authorization fell within the criminal organization exception under s. 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code, negating the need to prove investigative necessity.

Finally, the court found no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his credibility assessment by impermissibly using the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate as proof of no motive, and by making blanket credibility findings without sufficient analysis of individual counts or conflicting evidence.

The court applied the curative proviso to one count (Count 6) but not others.

The appeal was allowed for four counts, with a new trial ordered for three and an acquittal entered for one.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence relating to possession of a restricted firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the unreasonable verdict ground, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of possession.

However, the court allowed the appeal on count four (possession of a firearm obtained by crime), finding the trial judge incorrectly answered a jury question by stating that acquiring a firearm without a licence constitutes obtaining it by crime.

An acquittal was entered on count four.

The court declined to reduce the global sentence based on the acquittal but increased the pre-sentence custody credit by two months, finding the trial judge misunderstood the concept of earned remission in the federal system.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from her 2010 convictions, citing unforeseen immigration consequences that recently culminated in an admissibility hearing.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed regarding collateral consequences and raised potential ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the applicant acted promptly upon receiving notice of the admissibility hearing and that there were arguable grounds of appeal, making the extension in the interests of justice.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after a sniffer-dog alerted on her at an international airport and a subsequent search revealed four kilograms of cocaine in her luggage.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that the dog sniff and a subsequent strip search violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge made evidentiary and jury charge errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a dog sniff during a routine border crossing does not violate section 8 of the Charter, the appellant was not detained at the time of the alert, and the sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that his arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds once evidence obtained from an illegal police entry into a condominium was excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the totality of the remaining circumstances provided sufficient grounds for the arrest.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the two-year probation order, as the Crown conceded it was illegal under s. 731(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board failed to address a treatment impasse and erred in admitting an email into evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of a treatment impasse on the record and noting the Board's wide latitude to accept hearsay evidence.

The appellant's continued detention at a maximum secure forensic facility was deemed appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating his common-law spouse to death.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W. (D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements to police and by refusing to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury.

He also appealed his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and intent, and that there was no air of reality to the provocation defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was reasonable given the aggravating factors.

The appellant owned two handguns registered in the 1980s.

Under the new Firearms Act, he had until December 31, 2002, to re-register them as grandfathered s. 12(6) handguns.

He failed to do so, and his registrations expired.

In 2007, he applied to re-register the handguns, but the Registrar refused in 2009 because he no longer held a valid licence with s. 12(6) privileges.

The provincial court and superior court upheld the refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant lost his grandfathered status by failing to continuously hold a registration certificate, and was therefore ineligible for a licence and registration under the Act.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition granting the respondent an absolute discharge.

The respondent had previously been found not criminally responsible for offences related to harassing a former girlfriend.

The Crown argued the Board failed to obtain evidence from a staff psychiatrist and misapplied the test for determining if the respondent posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had sufficient evidence to conclude the respondent did not pose a significant threat and that its decision was reasonable.